Page images

person; but the authorities seem clear to ever claiming any title or interest by virtue the point that a grant of an executory de- of the devise over to them but this deed vise operates in equity by way of estoppel did not change the estate of complainant to prevent the executory devisee and his created by the will from a base fee to a fee heirs from subsequently claiming the benefit simple absolute. It might be otherwise if it of the devise. Pitzer v. Morrison, 272 Ill. had become impossible for the condition to 291, 111 N. E. 1017; 2 Washburn on Real Prop- happen upon which the estate was to be enerty, 681. It would seem to necessarily fol- larged to a fee simple, bu the possibility low that the deed from the complainant's of the condition happening will exist until brothers and sisters must be held to estop extinguished by the death of the complainthem and their heirs from hereafter claim-ant. Gannon V. Peterson, 193 Ill. 372, 62 ing the benefit of the devise. But does it fol. N. E. 210, 55 L. R. A, 701. Until that event low because all right of the executory devi. happens the estate devised complainant will sees to assert any title or interest under the continue, as the will created it, a base or devise has been terminated by the deed, determinable fee. If that event never hap. that this operates to enlarge the estate of pens and complainant dies without issue, then complainant into a fee simple absolute? The the land will go to the testator's heirs as in condition imposed by the will, the happen- case of intestacy. ing of which would raise the estate from a The decree of the circuit court is reversed, base or determinable fee to a fee simple ab- and the cause remanded, with directions to solute, was that complainant should die enter a decree in conformity with the views leaving issue surviving him. If that event herein expressed. happened there was then nothing left of the Reversed and remanded, with directions. estate for the executory devisees. It cannot now be known whether complainant will

(276 Ill. 430) leave issue surviving him or 'not, but it is PEOPLE ex rel. O'CONNELL, County Collecclear that the will does not give him an un

tor, V. NOONAN. conditional fee in the land. To make the PEOPLE ex rel. STUCKART, County Collec fee absolute so as to defeat the devise over,

tor, v. HICKS et al. the will requires that issue of his must sur

(Nos. 10560, 10382.) vive him. So long as there is a possibility of the condition happening upon which the

(Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 21, 1916. estate devised to complainant will become a

Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1917.) fee simple absolute, the title of complainant 1. JUDGMENT m294-AMENDMENT AND COBis a base or determinable fee. The condition


A motion to correct certain errors of fact imposed by the will upon which the title in a judgment against real estate for delinquent was to become an unconditional fee could taxes and special assessments by striking out not be abrogated by the executory devisees, Practice Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1915–16, c. 110)

portions of the judgment order therein, under who were to take only in the event the es- $ 89, providing for correction of errors in the tate was not enlarged into a fee simple by judgment in the court where rendered, is in the the death of complainant leaving issue sur- nature of a new suit, the motion taking the viving him. . Until that event happened the form and sufficiency of such motion amounting

place of a declaration and the objections to the estate was subject to the executory devise to a demurrer. to the brothers and sisters of complainant. [Ed. Note. For other cases, sce Judgment, They might, before the condition happened Cent. Dig. $8 579, 614; Dec. Dig. 294.] upon which the executory devise over would 2. JUDGMENT m303_AMENDMENT AND CORtake effect, by grant of their expectancy


Under Practice Act, $ 89, abolishing the estop themselves and their heirs from claim- writ of error coram nobis, and providing that ing any benefit under the devise; but they all errors in fact committed in the proceedings could not, by their grant or any other act, of any court of record, and which by the comdefeat the provision of the will, and the mon law could have been corrected by that writ,

may be corrected by the court in which the clearly expressed intention of the testator, error was committed, upon written motion, etc., that the estate devised to complainant was alleged errors, consisting of finding of 'facts not an unconditional fee and could never be contained in the judgment order itself, may not

be corrected by such motion, and affidavits in come so unless he left issue surviving.

support of motion to correct such alleged er [2] We cannot agree with the contention rors cannot be heard to contradict the record. that the death of appellee without issue (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, means his death during the life of the wid-Cent. Dig. 88 594, 595; Doc. Dig. Om 303.) ow, the life tenant. We think, under the 3. JUDGMENT 303_AMENDMENT AND COBauthority of Fifer v. Allen, 228 Ill. 507, 81


-RECITALS. N. E. 1105, and cases there cited, a proper It is only concerning matters of which the construction of the will means the death judgment itself is silent that the court may enof appellee without issue at any time. tertain a motion under such statute to correct Our conclusion therefore is that the broth-cured by the writ of error coram nobis.

errors in fact, since only such errors could be ers and sisters of complainant by their deed

(Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judgment, haye barred themselves and their heirs from Cent. Dig. 88 594, 595; Dec. Dig. 303.]

4. JUDGMENT Om 470_IMPORTING VERITY. judgment order was not a bar to the later ren

The judgment of the court imports absolute dition of judgment in the tax proceeding against verity.

the lots. [Ed. Note.-For_other cases, see Judgment, [Ed. _Note.- For other cases, see Judgment, Cent. Dig. 8 907; Dec. Dig. 470.]

Cent. Dig. 1016; Dec. Dig. 564(2).] 8. JUDGMENT O 319_AMENDMENT AND COR

Appeal from Cook County Court; John H. RECTION--MOTION UNDER PRACTICE ACT.

Under Practice Act, $ 89, providing that all Williams, Judge. errors in fact committed in the proceedings of Appeal from Cook County Court; David any court of record, and which by the common T. Smiley, Judge. law could have been corrected by writ of error coram nobis, may be corrected by the court in

Proceedings by the People, on the relation which the error was committed, upon written of the county collector of Cook County, for motion, etc., a motion to set aside a judgment judgment against certain real estate for de for errors of fact must set up and rely on such

linquent taxes and special fact or facts as are unknown to the court and

assessments, do not appear upon the face of the record, and Judgment was attacked by motions by Edwhich, if known, would have precluded the ward T. Noonan and by George I. Hicks, trusrendition of such judgment.

tee, and others. From judgments for the Peo[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, ple, objectors appeal, and their appeals are Cent. Dig. 8 617; Dec. Dig. Om319.]


William J. Donlin and Edward T. Noonan, FRAUD.

both of Chicago, for appellants. Harry F. Relief cannot be secured under such statute Atwood, Harry F. Hamlin, and Henry R. where certain recitals of fact in the judgment Baldwin, all of Chicago (Samuel A. Ettelson, order itself were procured to be inserted there in by fraud practiced on the court, as where Corp. Counsel, of Chicago), for appellees. the party procuring the judgment drew up and handed to the trial judge for signature a judgment order incorrectly reciting that an oppos

COOKE, J. At the June term, 1913, of the ing party was present in person and by attorney, county court of Cook county the county collecthat he consented to the error and released all tor of Cook county made application for judg. errors, etc., and secured his signature.

ment and order of sale against certain real [Ed. Note. For other cases, see_Judgment, estate for delinquent taxes and special asCent. Dig. SS 594, 595; Dec. Dig. 303.]

sessments. Among the tracts against which 7. TAXATION 647 - ACTION TO COLLECT judgment was sought were certain lots in TAXES--AUTHORITY TO ENTER JUDGMENT AT LATER TERM.

Edward T. Noonan's subdivision of the city Under Revenue Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1915– of Chicago, against which there had been ex16. c. 120) $ 185, providing that all applica- tended amounts aggregating about $4,200 on tions for judgment and order of sale for taxes and special assessments shall be made at the account of a special assessment.

Appellant June term of the county court, and if judgment Edward T. Noonan filed objections to the apat said term is prevented it shall be legal to ob- plication for judgment against these lots. tain judgment at any subsequent term, where A hearing was had upon these objections, objections to application for judgment against certain lots were, after hearing, taken under and the cause was taken under advisement. advisement and judgment rendered against all On July 31, 1913, judgment was rendered other lots, the rendition at a subsequent term of against all lots and tracts as to which no judgment' against the lots as to which objection, objections had been filed, but no judgment was made was valid, although no new application was filed; the court not having lost juris- was then rendered against the lots involved diction by the rendition of the first judgment. in this appeal. Thereafter, in June, 1914,

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, the collector advertised appellants' lots for Cent. Dig. 88 1312-1315; Dec. Dig. 647.]

sale under the judgment of July 31, 1913. 8. CONTINUANCE 3 BY OPERATION OF Noonan thereupon filed his motion to quash LAW.

the process and notice of sale, alleging that When a case on the docket of the court is there had been no judgment and order of undisposed of at the end of a term, it stands continued to the next term by operation of law, sale against said lots. The court sustained in the absence of a statute to the contrary.

this motion, and on October 20, 1914, entered (Ed. Note. For other cases, see Continuance, an order finding, in substance, that no judgCent. Dig. 8 3; Dec. Dig. Om3.]

ment had been rendered against said lots on 9. JUDGMENT Om 17(8)—PROCESS TO SUSTAIN- July 31, 1913, and directing that said proSUBSEQUENT PROCESS.

cess and notice of sale be quashed. AfterAfter a cause has been heard, argued, and wards, on December 1914, the county court taken under advisement, no further application for judgment or notice to the parties is neces- rendered judgment and entered an order of sary before the court renders its judgment.

sale against said lots on the application of [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judgment, the county collector made at the June term, Cent. Dig. § 25; Dec. Dig. Om17(8).]

1913. The judgment order recites, among 10. JUDGMENT O 564(2)-RES JUDICATA.

other things, that E. T. Noonan was present Where motion to quash process and notice of in person and by W. J. Donlin, his attorney, sale of lots for taxes was sustained and order and that the order was entered with the conentered finding that no judgment for the taxes sent of the said E. T. Noonan. It also recites had been rendered against the lots in the proceeding against them therefor, but that the that said E. T. Noonan did there in open cause was then pending under advisement, such court waive and release all errors in the

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
114 N.E. -59


judgment and order or in the prior proceed Section 89 of the Practice Act abolishes ings, and agreed that no appeal should be the writ of error coram nobis, and provides prosecuted from said judgment, that no writ that all errors in fact committed in the proof error should be sued out thereon, and that ceedings of any court of record, and which by no steps of any kind should ever be taken, the common law could have been corrected by a bill in chancery or otherwise, to prevent by that writ, may be corrected by the court or interfere with the collection thereafter in which the error was committed, upon of the said special assessment, by the sale of motion in writing made at any time within the property assessed or otherwise. This five years after the rendition of final judgjudgment was thereafter attacked in the coun- ment in the case, upon reasonable notice. It ty court of Cook county by two separate will thus be seen that while the writ of error proceedings, one by appellant Edward T. coram nobis has been abolished, the same Noonan, who on September 22, 1915, filed errors which at the common law could have what he designated a motion under section been corrected by that writ may now be cor89 of the Practice Act to correct certain er- rected, under section 89 of the Practice Act, rors of fact by striking out of the judgment upon motion in writing by the court in which order those portions which stated that he the error was committed. was present in person and by attorney and [2, 3] “The office of the writ of coram nobis consented to the entry of the order and waiv- is to bring the attention of the court to and ed and released all errors, etc. The other obtain relief from errors of fact, such as proceeding a motion by appellants the death of either party pending the suit George I. Hicks, trustee, Joseph Hedrick, and before judgment therein; or infancy, trustee, and John A. McCormick, to quash where the party was not properly representthe process and notice of sale under said judg-ed by guardian; or coverture, where the ment upon two grounds: (1) That the judg- common-law disability still exists; or insanment of December 5, 1914, was not a valid | ity, it seems, at the time of the trial; or a judgment; and (2) that said judgment was valid defense existing in the facts of the invalid because of the prior order and judg- case, but which, without negligence on the ment of October 20, 1914, wherein, it was part of the defendant, was not made, either alleged, the same matters were adjudicated through duress or fraud or excusable misand settled adversely to appellees. Both mo- take, these facts not appearing on the face tions were decided against appellants and of the record, and being such as, if known in judgments were entered accordingly. Sepa- season, would have prevented the rendition rate appeals followed, which have been con- and entry of the judgment questioned.” 5 solidated in this court.

Ency. of Pl. & Pr. 27. This text is amply [1] In support of the motion of appellant supported by authority. It will thus be seen Noonan to correct certain errors of fact un- that it is only such errors of fact as do not der section 89 of the Practice Act by striking appear upon the face of the record which out portions of the judgment order of De could be cured by the writ of error coram cember 5, 1914, he offered the affidavits of nobis or may now be corrected under section 89 John E. Owens, who was the judge of the of our Practice Act. The alleged errors here county court at the time the judgment of sought to be corrected are findings of fact December 5, 1914, was rendered, and of contained in the judgment order itself. It is William J. Donlin, Noonan's attorney, and only concerning matters of which the judgalso his own affidavit, which in substance set ment itself is silent that the court may enterforth that said judgment of December 5, 1914, tain a motion, under section 89 of the Pracwas rendered upon the last day of the term tice Act, to correct errors in fact, and affidaof office of said Owens; that the order was

vits in support of such motion cannot be handed to said Owens by counsel for the city heard to contradict the record. of Chicago, who stated to him that the matter

[4-6] It is elementary that the judgment was pending under advisement and requested

of a court imports absolute verity. In Mains him to sign the same; that neither said v. Cosner, 67 111. 536, a motion was made unNoonan nor said Donlin, his attorney, was

der this provision of the Practice Act to corpresent in court when the judgment order was rect an error in fact and to set aside the signed; and that said order is incorrect in its of the issuing and service of the summons

judgment for the reason that at the time recitals to the effect that Noonan was present and pleading and entry of judgment the dein person and by attorney, that he consented fendant was a minor under the age of 21 to the order and that he released ali errors, etc. The judgment order of October 20, 1914 years and appeared by attorney instead of was also offered in connection with the at: by guardian. It was there held that nothing

can be assigned for error which contradicts fidavits. The collector appeared and filed

the record, and whether a minor appeared by objections to the form and sufficiency of the motion. As a motion of this kind is in the attorney can be determined only by an innature of a new suit (Domitski v. American spection of the record itself. In passing upon Linseed Co., 221 Ill. 161, 77 N. E. 428), the

this question we said: motion took the place of a declaration and appeared only by an attorney is one which

“The question whether or not plaintiff in error

and can be determined by us only by inspection, the collector is prevented from advertising and of the record itself. That record was before obtaining judgment at said term it shall be held the court below, forming an essential and indis to be legal to obtain judgment at any subsepensable part of the grounds of decision. If quent term of said court." Hurd's Stat. 1916, indispensable there, it must be here, in deter- p. 2193. mining the correctness of that decision. It is

There is nothing in the statute which no answer to say that plaintiff in error swore that he appeared only by attorney, and no affi- prevents separate judgments from being rendavit was filed contradicting that statement; dered at different times or which forbids the because, if a score of witnesses had sworn to the continuance of the cause from term to term, same statement, and the records showed to the contrary, the latter would prevail. The burden as to any or all of the properties involved, was upon plaintiff in error to affirmatively show until such day as the court is able to pass error in fact in the court below, and here to upon all the matters taken under adviseshow error in law in the decision which the ment. This statute does not fix any particulower court made. Inasmuch as the fact as to how he appeared in the cause, whether by at lar term of the county court for the final distorney or guardian, could be properly ascertain position of causes arising under it. When ed only by the record in that cause, and as he a case on the docket of the court is undisposhas seen fit not to have it brought up, he must ed of at the end of a term, it stands continfail in his assignment of error.

ued to the next term by operation of law, in In that case the record was not before the the absence of a statute to the contrary. court. Here we have the record before us, Matson v. Swanson, 131 III. 255, 23 N. E. 595. and it appears affirmatively that Noonan When a cause is taken under advisement it seeks to contradict the record itself. This goes over until a subsequent term by operahe cannot do. Under said section 89 a motion tion of law, and the court at a subsequent to set aside a judgment for errors of fact term may render judgment without additionmust set up and rely on such fact or facts al service on the party. Updike v. Armas are unknown to the court and do not ap- strong, 3 Scam. 564. In Illinois Central Rail. pear upon the face of the record, and wbich road Co. v. People, 189 Ill. 119, 59 N. E. 609, if known, would have precluded the rendition an application for judgment and order of of the judgment. If the facts alleged in the sale for a special assessment was made at affidavits filed by Noonan in support of his the June term, 1899, of the county court, and motion are true, then it is apparent that the owner's name was incorrectly given. The fraud was practiced upon the court in pro-owner did not appear. Leave was granted curing the judgment of December 5, 1914. by the court to substitute the correct name Under such a state of facts Noonan can se- No further proceedings were bad until thr cure no relief under the provisions of section October term, 1899, to which term proper 89 of the Practice Act.

notice was given and application for judg[7-9] In the appeal of Hicks and others it ment was made. The cause was continued is contended that after the rendition of the from time to time until the April term, 1900, judgment of July 31, 1913, against the other when judgment for sale was rendered. It property mentioned in the collector's applica- was objected that the court had no juris tion, the court lost jurisdiction of the sub- diction to render judgment at that term, ject-matter; that no further judgment could but we held that the judgment was valid. be rendered without the filing of a new ap After a cause has been heard, argued, and plication; and that therefore the judgment taken under advisement, no further applica: of December 5, 1914, is void. The contention tion for judgment or notice to the parties of these appellants, as we understand it, is necessary before the court renders its judg. is, that when the case was taken under ad- ment. visement judgment should have been render [10] It is further urged that the judgment ed against all of the property at the same order of October 20, 1914, is res judicata, and time, and that different judgments at differ- therefore a bar to the judgment of Decement times cannot be rendered. The county ber 5, 1914. The judgment of October 20th court has jurisdiction to render judgment merely finds and recites that on July 31, for delinquent assessments at any term sub-1913, the objections of appellants were pendsequent to the term at which application is ing under advisement for briefs of counsel made, Section 185 of the Revenue Act pro- to be submitted therein, and that no judgvides:

ment was rendered or order of sale entered "All applications for judgment and order of as to these lots. It was then ordered that sale for taxes and special assessments on de- the process and notice of sale be quashed. linquent lands and lots shall be made at the The simple finding by the court that no judga June term of the county court. If from any cause the court shall not be holden at the term ment had been rendered as to these lots on at which judgment is prayed, the cause shall July 31, 1913, but that the cause was then stand continued, and it shall not be necessary pending under advisement, certainly consti. to re-advertise the list or notice required by law

nt thereto be advertised before judgment and sale, but tutes no bar to rendering judgi at the next regular term thereafter the court after. shall hear and determine the matter; and if The county court properly denied each of judgment is rendered the sale shall be made on the motions, and the judgment in each case is the Monday specified in the notice as provided in section 182, such Monday to be fixed by the affirmed. county collector in the notice. If for any cause Judgment affirmed.


(276 Ill. 363)

under the Municipal Code, were public records, PEOPLE V. HALPIN. (No. 10626.) admissible on proper authentication, without

evidence as to the truth of their contents; their (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 21, 1916.

weight as evidence being for the jury. Rehearing Denied Feb. 7, 1917.)

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal 1. BRIBERY Ow11-RECEIVING BRIBE-SUFFI- Law, Cent. Dig. § 1028; Dec. Dig. 444.) CIENCY OF EVIDENCE.

8. _WITNESSES 349—CROSS-EXAMINATIONIn prosecution of chief of detectives for re DISCRETION OF COURT. ceiving a bribe, evidence held sufficient to show

Cross-examination of a witness as to his guilt.

occupation, associations, and conduct, and also [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bribery, as to other things immaterial to the issues, to Cent. Dig. $ 10; Dec. Dig. 11.)

determine his credibility, is largely in the dis2. CRIMINAL LAW Ow424(1)—EVIDENCE-ACTS cretion of the court, and does not constitute er. OF CONSPIRATORS.

ror, unless the discretion is abused. In prosecution of a chief of detectives for

(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Witnesses, receiving a bribe pursuant to a conspiracy to Cent. Dig. 88 1133–1139; Dec. 'Dig. 349.1 permit confidence men to operate unmolested in 9. WITNESSES em 337(6), 345(2)-CREDIBILITY the city, evidence showing the existence of the -GUILT OF PARTICULAR CRIMES. conspiracy, the crimes committed, and the acts

A witness on cross-examination cannot be and declarations of the conspirators in car- asked as to his guilt of particular crimes to afrying out the conspiracy, was competent, though | fect his credibility, and it is not proper to show the crimes, acts, and declarations were sub- his conviction, even if he has been convicted of sequent to the reception of the bribe.

such crimes. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Witnesses, Law, Cent. Dig. SS 1002, 1006, 1008, 1010; Dec. Cent. Dig. $S 1126, 1132, 1140–1142, 1146–1148; Dig. Om 424(1).]

Dec. Dig. 337(6), 345(2).] 3. CRIMINAL LAW Ow424(1)—DECLARATIONS 10. CRIMINAL LAWO 423(3) — EVIDENCE


In prosecution of chief of detectives for reEvidence of a conversation between two of ceiving a bribe, pursuant to a conspiracy to defendant's co-conspirators and a police of- permit confidence men to operate unmolested, ficer, which took place after termination of the correspondence with the police of another city, conspiracy, when the conspirators had separated the purpose of which was to aid in carrying and ceased to engage in the commission of crimes out the object of the conspiracy, and which was in the city, was inadmissible.

conducted by one of defendant's co-conspira[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal tors, was competent evidence against him, as if Law, Cent. Dig. $$ 1002, 1006, 1008, 1010; the letters had been written and received by him. Dec. Dig. Cu 424(1).]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal 4. CRIMINAL LAW E407(2)—EVIDENCE-AD. Law, Çent. Dig. $8 991, 992; Dec. Dig. MISSIONS SILENCE NATURE OF STATE


11. WITNESSES 367(1)--CREDIBILITY-EviTestimony of witness that, during trial of DENCE. one of defendant's co-conspirators before the If the jury believed that any of the witnesspolice trial board, witness said to defendant, "I es in a criminal prosecution bad testified in the see old Doc Russell is standing up for Walter," hope or expectation that they might thereby esand that he also spoke about the "little nig- cape imprisonment, the fact could be taken inger" going against Walter, was inadmissible, to account in determining the weight and credsince the statement called for no remark from it to which their testimony was entitled. plaintiff.

[Ed. Note.- For other cases, see Witnesses, (Ed. Note.- For other cases, see Criminal Cent. Dig. $ 1184; Dec. Dig. Om 367(1).) Law, Cent. Dig. 88 949, 968; Dec. Dig.

12. CRIMINAL LAW i829(16)-INSTRUCTIONS 407(2).]


Where the court cautioned the jury as to Testimony of a witness' conversation with the credibility of witnesses testifying under hope defendant, not relating to the case, was inadmis- of favor from the state's attorney, conviction sible.

should not be reversed, the evidence of guilt be. (Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal | ing clear, for refusal of a special requested inLaw. Cent. Dig. 88 752, 801; Dec. Dig. Om struction as to the credibility of witnesses who 338(1).]

might have testified in the hope or expectation 6. CRIMINAL LAW m423(6) EVIDENCE

that they would escape a term of imprisonment. ACT OF CONSPIRATORS.

[Ed. Note. -For other cases, see Criminal In prosecution of chief of detectives for Law, Cent. Dig. $ 2011; Dec. Dig. 829 receiving a bribe, pursuant to a conspiracy to (16).) permit confidence men to operate unmolested, evidence of an assault by defendant's co-conspir

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; ators upon a clairvoyant, which did not tend in Jesse A. Baldwin, Judge. any manner to accomplish the purpose of the John J. Halpin was convicted of bribery, conspiracy, was incompetent, since the acts and and he brings error. Judgment afirmed. declarations of other conspirators are admissible against one only when done or made in John E. Northup, of Chicago, for plaintit furtherance of the purpose of the conspiracy, in error. P. J. Lucey, Atty. Gen., Maclay and in carrying out the common design.

[Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Criminal Hoyne, State's Atty., Frank Johnston, Jr., Law, Cent. Dig. § 996; Dec. Dig. Om423(6).)

and W. W. De Armond, all of Chicago, for 7. CRIMINAL LAW ww444-EVIDENCE-PUB- the People. LIC_RECORD-PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE. “Patrol sheets," purporting to show the at

DUNN, J. The plaintiff in error was contendance and absence of all officers and employés at the detective bureau, kept pursuant victed of bribery in the criminal court of to the regulations of the detective department Cook county, and has sued out a writ of er

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