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show a disrespect for the court or to influ-, rupt means to return indictments. So far
ence or to interfere with the due administra- as this language is concerned it is fairly sus-
tion of justice. Fishback v. State, 131 Ind. ceptible of the meaning attributed by appel-
304, 30 N. E. 1088; Percival v. State, 45 Neb. lant, and, as so understood, its publication
741, 64 N. W. 221, 50 Am. St. Rep. 568; In does not constitute a contempt of court.
re Walker, 82 N. C. 95; 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) By the language, “A good pointer has
note, 1120, and cases cited.

reached us to the effect that Judge Collins [2, 3] If the language used is clear and ex- tried to confine the grand jury until indict. plicit and is susceptible of but one meaning ments were agreed upon, but failed," appelwhich is per se libelous, and which is a direct lant says that he meant only to say that the charge against the court or jury, it would be judge had attempted to confine the grand trifling with justice to say that a publisher jury unil it had reached some determination could admit the publication and purge him as to the indictments. Appellant states that, self of the contempt by denying that he in- at the time of such publication he believed tended the meaning which the language plain that the court had the same right to order ly and unmistakably conveys; but, if the lan- the grand jury to be confined until matters guage admitted is not libelous per se, if it pending before it were disposed of that it does not show on its face that it was intend had to confine a petit jury, and that such ed to apply to the court and innuendoes are language was not intended as a criticism of required to show such application, or if it is the attempted action of the court, and was fairly susceptible of an innocent meaning so not intended to impugn the motive of the far as the court is concerned, the defendant court in attempting to confine the grand jury. may, by a sworn answer, explain the lan- The explanation thus given does not cover guage by showing that he used it in a sense the language to which it refers. Appellant not libelous, and declare that he did not in- did not state what he meant by saying. “A tend to impugn the motives or integrity of good pointer has reached us,” in connection the court or to interfere with or embarrass its with the statement that Judge Collins had atproceedings, and such an answer must be tempted to confine the grand jury until intaken as conclusive. If he swore falsely he dictments were agreed upon, but failed. If may be punished for perjury.

the fact, as stated, that the judge attempted In view of the principles of law thus stated to confine the grand jury until indictments we proceed to a consideration of the sworn were agreed to was to be regarded as a answer of appellant. In this answer appel- “pointer" as clearly stated, the writer must lant states the conditions and circumstances have intended to say, and to be understood which existed at the time the publication was as saying, that such conduct pointed out or made, and attempts to explain the language indicated something. When the language we used in such a way as to show that the pub- have been discussing is considered with the lication was made in good faith and without language immediately following it in the pub any purpose or intent on his part of casting lication, its meaning becomes obvious. The discredit on the prosecuting attorney, the language referred to is as follows: grand jury, or the court, and without any

"Our information is that two members of the purpose of influencing or embarrassing the grand jury are holding out and refusing to in

dict and will not sign the indictments. It reproceedings of the court in the administra- quires five out of six members to find an indicttion of justice.

ment. Every known method of coercion has been Appellant says that prior to the publica- used, we are told, to secure indictments, but so tion of the article, the Republican organiza- sion and many rumors are current that the jury

far it has failed. The grand jury is yet in sestion had held a meeting and appointed a com- wants to adjourn, but the powers that be refuse mittee charged with the duty of procuring to permit adjournment." evidence as to frauds perpetrated at the No [4] The sworn answer wholly fails to exvember election, 1914, and that such commit- plain the language just quoted so as to show tee had been engaged in an attempt to secure that it was susceptible of any meaning conand present such evidence to the grand jury sistent with an honest, fair, and impartial as would result in the return of indictments discharge of duty by the court and grand jury against a large number of Democrats in the in respect to the proceedings then pending. city of Indianapolis. He stated that the lan- The statement to the effect that every known guage to the effect that the Republicans were method of coercion had been used to secure having a hard time getting the Marion coun- indictments, and the other statement, that ty grand jury to "come through" with batches two members of the grand jury are holding of indictments against 150 Democrats, for the out and refusing to indict, when coupled with alleged violation of election laws was used in the statement in regard to the “pointer" afsaid publication wit reference to efforts of forded by the action of the judge in attemptthe committee to obtain and present to the ing to confine the grand jury until indictgrand jury sufficient evidence to obtain in- ments were agreed upon makes the meaning dictments, and that it was not intended to perfectly clear and plain to any reasonable charge or say that the court, prosecuting at- mind. The language under consideration torney, or any one else was endeavoring to does not require the use of any innuendoes

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clearly means that there was an effort being inherent in every court. It is necessary to made to coerce the grand jury and its mem- the preservation of order, to the enforcement bers ir to returning indictments against which of judgments, writs, and orders, and theretwo of the members were holding out, and fore is essential to the due administration of that the conduct of Judge Collins, in attempt.justice. Fortunately the occasion for the ing to confine the jury until it agreed on in- exercise of this power does not often arise, dictments, was a "good pointer" to indicate and it is seldom exercised by the courts exhis connection with his effort, and that he cept in extreme cases. So long as critics had been willing to use his official power to confine their criticism to the facts and base assist in accomplishing the end sought. Such them upon the decisions of the court, they language is an attack on the official conduct commit no contempt no matter how severe of the court, and its publication constitutes a the criticism may be; but when they pass contempt of court. In a contempt proceeding beyond that line and charge that judicial confor the publication of an alleged defamatory duct was influenced by improper, corrupt, or article relating to a court it was said by the selfish motives, or that such conduct was Supreme Court of Illinois that it could not affected by political prejudice or interest, the accept

tendency is to poison the fountain of justice "as a reason for discharging the rule, the dis- and create distrust, and destroy the coniclaimer in the answers of any intentional disre- dence of the people in their courts. A feelspect of any design to embarrass the administration of justice. The meaning and intent of the ing thus engendered would create dissatisrespondents must be determined by a fair inter- faction with all judicial determination; it pretation of the language they bave used. They would affect the standing and usefulness of cannot now escape responsibility by claiming the courts—would seriously and dangerously that their words did not mean what any, reader affect the administration of justice. It is must have understood them as meaning." People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, 16 Am. Rep. 528. therefore sometimes necessary for courts to

The Supreme Court of Michigan, in passing exercise their power to punish for contempt, on the effect of a sworn answer filed by a de- not for the sake of the judges nor to vindifendant in which he sought to purge himself cate them, but in order to maintain the standof contempt, said:

ing, the respect, the dignity, and the useful“When language is susceptible of two interpreness of the courts through and by which tations or constructions, and the party charged justice is administered to the people. asserts under oath that he did not intend the ar It may be proper to say that this court in ticle to be construed as alleged in the innuen. does, he is purged of the contempt; but if the the consideration of the case has wholly dispublication is fairly susceptible of but one con regarded what is designated as the finding struction, and its purport is to defame and de- of facts filed with the clerk of the trial court. grade the court in the eyes of litigants and the The judgment is treated as resting solely uppublic, his denial of any intended wrong does not operate to purge him of the contempt." In on the facts disclosed by the information and re Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588, 67 N. W. 1071. the sworn answer of appellant thereto. While there is some conflict in the au

The record shows no reversible error. thorities, the overwhelming weight of ju

Judgment affirmed. dicial opinion is in accord with the law as thus announced. Fishback v. State, 131 Ind.

(186 Ind. 377) 304, 30 N. E. 1088; Territory v. Nugent (La.) GOSHEN MILLING CO. v. BAILEY.* 1 Mart. (O. S.) 103, 5 Am. Dec. 702; People

(No. 22704.) v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195, 16 Am. Rep. 528; Sturoc Case, 48 N. H. 428, 97 Am. Dec. 626; (Supreme Court of Indiana. Jan. 24, 1917.) In re Woolley, 11 Bush (Ky.) 111; In re 1. MASTER AND SERVANT Om 11-EMPLOYERS' Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588, 67 N. W. 1071 ;


TEENTH AMENDMENT. In re Chartz, 29 Nev. 110, 85 Pac. 352, 5

The Employers' Liability Act (Acts 1911, c. L. R. A. (N. S.) 916, 124 Am. St. Rep. 915; 88; sections 8020a-8020k, Burns' Ann. St. Hughes v. People, 5 Colo. 436; 9 L. R. A. 1914) is constitutional. (N. S.) 1119, note.

(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and [5] The application of the law as above Servant, Dec. Dig. Om11.) stated necessarily leads to the conclusion | 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Om55—MASTER AND

SERVANT 25042 POWERS OF COURT reached in this opinion. It is not necessary

TRIAL BY JURY. that the language employed should have ac Employers' Liability Act (section 80208, tually brought the court into disfavor and Burns' Ann. St. 1914) § 7, providing for the engendered a want of proper respect and reactions by employés for injuries, is not void as

submission of certain questions to the jury in gard for the court, or that it should have an unwarranted infringement upon the power actually embarrassed or impeded the prog- of the judiciary. ress of the court or the administration of [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutionjustice therein. If the language used is of a al Law, Cent. Dig. § 60; Dec. Dig. Ow55; character calculated to produce such effect, Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. Om 25048.] it is sufficient. People v. Wilson, 64 111. 195, 3. MASTER AND SERVANT Om 258(10) DAN

GEROUS OCCUPATION ACT-PLEADING. 16 Am. Rep. 528, and cases there cited.

A complaint drawn under Dangerous Occu[6] The right to punish for contempt is pation Act (Acts 1911, c. 236; Burns’ Ann. St. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

*Rehearing denied,

1914, 8 3862d) 4, need not aver that defend-, ment of errors and motion for new trial waives ant employed more than five persons.

such questions. (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and (Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Servant, Cent. Dig. § 824; Dec. Dig. 258 Error, Cent. Dig. $ 4258; Dec. Dig. ew1078(3).) (10).] 4. APPEAL AND ERROR 1078(3)—BRIEF8—

Appeal from Circuit Court, Kosciusko FAILURE TO DISCUSS OBJECTIONS.

County; Francis E. Bowser, Judge. Alleged reasons why appellee's complaint Action by Amanda Bailey, administratrix, states no cause of action, not discussed in appellant's brief under points and authorities, as re against the Goshen Milling Company. From quired by Supreme Court rule 22 (55 N. E. judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. v), are waived.

Affirmed. (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. 8 4258; Dec. Dig. Omw 1078(3).]

L. L. Burris, and Deahl & Deahl, all of 5. PLEADING Cm 214(4)—DEMURRER-EFFECT. Goshen, Frazer & Frazer, of Warsaw, and

A demurrer admits as true not only the Van Fleet, Hubbell & Dinnen, of South Bend,
facts well pleaded, but also all other facts rea- for appellant. Perry L. Turner, of Elkhart.
sonably inferable therefrom.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see, Pleading, Fitzgerald, of Kalamazoo, Mich., for appellee.

L. W. Royse, of Warsaw, and Jackson &
Cent. Dig. § 52612; Dec. Dig. Om 214(4).]

ERWIN, J. Amanda Bailey, administratrix
A complaint for death of employé from de- of the estate of Chester Bailey, her deceased
fectively insulated electric wires while employed husband, brought this action against the
painting a cupola on a roof held sufficient, as
against a demurrer or motion to make more

Goshen Milling Company, a corporation, to specific, being sufficient to apprise a person of recover damages, for the benefit of herself ordinary understanding of what he would be re as widow and her infant daughter Evelyn quired to meet.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and Marie Bailey, resulting from the death of Servant, Cent. Dig. 88 825, 826; Dec. Dig. Om

Chester Bailey by reason of the alleged neg. 258(11).]

ligence of appellant. A trial by jury result7. APPEAL AND ERROR O 757(3) BRIEFS

ed in a verdict and judgment for appellee in RECITAL OF EVIDENCE.

the sum of $5,000. All questions based on the evidence are

[1] Jurisdiction of this cause is in this waived by failure of appellant's brief to contain a condensed recital of the evidence in nar court for the reason that appellant contends rative form as required by Supreme Court that the Employers' Liability Act of 1911 rule 22.

(Acts 1911, p. 145; sections 8020a-8020k, [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Appeal and Burns 1914) is unconstitutional as being in Error, Cent. Dig. 8 3092; Dec. Dig. 757(3).] violation of the provisions of section 1 of the 8. MASTER AND SERVANT 228(2)-EMPLOY- Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution ERS' LIABILITY ACT-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI

of the United States, and of section 23, art. Under Burns' Ann. St. 1914, $ 8020c, pro- 1, of our state Constitution. This question viding that an employé shall not be held to have has already been decided by this court assumed the risks of employment where his employer's violation of statute contributed to his against the contention of appellant in Vandadeath, an employé killed by his employer's vio- lia R. Co. v. Stillwell, 181 Ind. 267, 104 N. E. lation of the statute requiring insulation of elec- 289, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 258, Terre Haute, etc., tric wires was not chargeable with contributory negligence because of any risk inherent in R. Co. v. Weddle, 183 Ind. 305, 108 N. E. 225, his employment.

and Kingan & Co. v. Clements, 184 Ind. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and 110 N. E. 66. Servant, Cent. Dig. 8 671; Dec. Dig. Om

[2] Appellant also contends that section 7 228(2).]

of the Employers' Liability Act (section 9. MASTER AND SERVANT Ow204(2)-EMPLOY- 8020g, Burns 1914) constitutes an unwarrantERS' LIABILITY ACT-ASSUMPTION OF RISK. Nor was such servant chargeable with as

ed infringement upon the power of the ju. sumption of the risk.

diciary, and is void. This court has held oth[Ed. Note:--For other cases, see Master and erwise. Kingan & Co. v. Clements, supra. Servant, Cent. Dig. § 545; Dec. Dig.

Error is alleged here upon the overruling of 204(2).)

appellant's motions to make more specific, and 10. APPEAL AND ERROR Om757(3)—BRIEFS in overruling its demurrers to the three paraPRESUMPTIONS-INSTRUCTIONS.

Where evidence is not set out in appellant's graphs of the amended complaint. brief in narrative form as required by Supreme The first paragraph of the complaint in Court rule 22, it is presumed that the instruc- question alleges, in substance, that on July tions given correctly stated the law as perti- 25, 1911, appellant was a duly organized cornent to the evidence, and that those refused, if they stated the law, were not applicable to poration, and was the owner of and engaged the evidence.

in the care, operation, and management of [Ed. Not. For other cases, see Appeal and its factory and building in Goshen, Ind., used Error, Cent. Dig. 8 3092; Dec. Dig. Om757(3).) for the manufacture of flour, and also in the 11. APPEAL AND ERROR 1078(3)-WAIVER transmission of electricity; that the factory OF OBJECTIONS. Failure of appellant to state any proposition

had a cupola which extended six feet above or cite any authorities to sustain his position the slanting roof of a part of the building: as respects questions presented by his assign that certain electric wires were attached to


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wires coming from the cupola, and ran across, first paragraph is drawn under section 3862d, the roof at a distance of about three feet Burns 1914, or section 4 of the “Dangerous above the roof; that defendant engaged in Occupation Act” of 1911. Acts 1911, p. 597. transmitting or permitted to be transmitted The contention that the paragraph should over such' wires electricity of high and dan- aver that appellant employed more than five gerous voltage; that decedent was employed persons is not well made, as the statute does by appellant and was engaged in painting not make that requirement. the above cupola under and about such elec [4-6) The second paragraph is based upon tric wires, and was liable to come in contact the act of 1911, commonly known as the Emtherewith, which appellant knew or should ployers' Liability Act (Acts 1911, p. 145) suhave known; that appellant negligently and pra. Appellant alleges that neither of the carelessly failed to provide full and complete paragraphs of complaint state facts sufficient insulation around and about such wires such to constitute a cause of action, and sets out as would protect persons coming in contact several reasons therefor, part of which have therewith from injury by the electric current; been discussed and part have been waived that the wires were covered with some sub- for failure to discuss under their points and stance for the purpose of insulation, but it authorities as required by rule 22 of this had become old, rotten, decayed, worn, and court. A demurrer admits as true not only out of repair, so as to be worthless as in the facts well pleaded, but also all other sulation; that at all times herein mentioned facts reasonably inferable therefrom. We appellant carelessly and negligently main- are of the opinion that it cannot be fairly tained such wires in the above condition; said that any material fact, requisite to re that on said date decedent, while engaged in covery, is omitted from either paragraph of painting the roof and cupola beneath and the complaint. Either paragraph was sufiabout such wire, under direction of appellant, cient to apprise a person of ordinary undercame in contact therewith solely by reason standing of what he would be required to of appellant's negligence; that the 4,500 volts meet. This is sufficient, and the court did of electricity passing over the wire entered not commit any reversible error either on its the body of decedent causing his death; that rulings upon the demurrers or motions to decedent was 23 years of age, strong, healthy, make more specific. Domestic Block Coal and robust-concluding with other averments Co. v. De Armey, 179 Ind. 592, 100 N. E. 675, as to appellee and decedent's child.

102 N. E. 99. The second paragraph alleges, in addition (7] Appellant's brief does not contain a to the averments of the first, that appellant condensed recital of the evidence in narrative employed in its business more than five perform as required by rule 22 (55 N. E. v) of

this court; therefore appellant has waived The third paragraph alleges facts similar all questions based upon the evidence in this to the above except that it is based upon the case. McClellan v. Thomas, 183 Ind. 310, common law, and alleges in substance that it 109 N. E. 44. was the duty of appellant in maintaining the [8, 9] Objection is made to the court's wire and permitting the same to be used eighth instruction given to the Jury. That upon 'its premises for the purposes aforesaid, part objected to is as follows: and particularly in maintaining or permitting "If you should find for the plaintiff on the it to be maintained where appellant's em- second paragraph and that the said Chester ployés would be likely to come in contact fendant's violation of said statute as alleged,

Bailey was killed as alleged by reason of de with the same, to completely and properly then the defendant would not be permitted to insulate it and inspect it from time to time, avail itself of the defense that said Chester and to cause and require the same to be prop- negligence by reason of the assumption of the

Bailey was guilty of negligence or contributory erly, thoroughly, and completely insulated risk thereof, nor that the dangers or bazards and inspected from time to time, to the end | inherent or apparent in the employment in that any defect in the insulation thereof tributed to such injury, nor could said decedent,

which said Che er Bailey was engaged, conmight be discovered and remedied, and to Chester Bailey, be held to have assumed the maintain and keep such insulation in good risks of the employment." repair, so as not to endanger the life and Under section 8020c, Burns 1914, the de limb of its employés in the due performance cedent was not chargeable with contributory of their duty; and it was appellant's duty negligence because of any risk inherent in to warn its employés of any unusual or ex- the employment, nor could he be charged traordinary danger which they might en- with the assumption of the risk. We are of counter in their employment by reason of the the opinion that the court's instruction was defective condition of such wires. It is then not erroneous. Deer v. Suckow Co., 60 Ind. properly averred that appellant negligently App. 277, 110 N. E. 700; Doan v. E. C. Atkins and carelessly failed to perform any such Co., 111 N. E. 312. duties, and that by reason thereof decedent (10) Other objections are made to the givwas killed by reason of the defective condi- ing and refusing to give tendered instruction of the insulation without negligence on tions, but where the evidence is not set out bis part contributing thereto.

in the brief of appellant in narrative form as [3] Appellant rightfully suggests that the required by rule 22 of this court, it is pre


sumed that the instructions given correctly Appeal from an Award of the Industrial stated the law as pertinent to the evidence, Board. and those refused, if they stated the law, Proceedings for compensation under the were not applicable to the evidence. De Hart Workmen's Compensation Act by Frank L v. Board of Commissioners, 143 Ind. 363, 367, Davis against the Union Sanitary Manufac41 N. E. 825; Lyons v. Souder, 56 Ind. App. turing Company. From an award of the In413, 105 N. E. 511; Gary, etc., R. Co. v. Hack- dustrial Board, the manufacturing company, er, 58 Ind. App. 618, 108 N. D. 756; Muncie, the employer, appeals and Davis, the em. etc., R. Co. v. Hall, 173 Ind. 292, 295, 90 N. ployé, moves to dismiss. Motion to dismiss E. 312.

appeal overruled. [11] Other questions presented by appel Kane & Kane, of Noblerville, for appellant. lants assigument of errors and motion for Gentry & Campbell, of Noblesville, for apnew trial are waived by failure of appellant pellee. to state any proposition or to cite any authorities to sustain its position.

FELT, O. J. This is an appeal from an There being no reversible error shown in award of the Industrial Board of Indiana. the record, the judgment is affirmed.

Appellee has moved to dismiss the appeal,

and the first reason assigned therefor is that (63 Ind. App. 548)

appellant filed no motion for a new trial aftUNION SANITARY MFG. CO. v, DAVIS. er the final award was made by the board. (No. 9661.)

The record shows a finding and an award by (Appellate Court of Indiana. Jan 23, 1917.) the board, and an application by appellant 1. MASTER AND SERVANT 417(3) WORK

for a review by the full board of the award, MEN'S COMPENSATION ACT APPEAL FROM which was granted, and the case was heard AWARD-MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.

by all the members of the Industrial Board, Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 1915, and the award made and entered, from c. 106) $ 59, provides that the Industrial Board, or any of its members, shall hear the parties and which this appeal was taken. determine the dispute in any summary manner,

Appellant has assigned as error: (1) The and that the award, with the findings of fact, award is not sustained by sufficient evidence, rulings of law, and any other pertinent matters, (2) The award is contrary to the evidence. shall be filed with the record of the proceedings, and a copy sent immediately to the parties in (3) The award is not sustained by the finding dispute. Section 60 provides that if an applica- of facts stated by the board. (4) The award tion for review is made to the board within sev- is contrary to the finding of facts stated by en days from the date of the award, the full the board. (5) The award is contrary to law. board, if the first hearing was not held before it, shall

review the evidence or hear the parties, (6) The board erred in its rulings of law upon and shall make a new award and file the same in the facts found. (7) The board erred in its like manner. Section 61 provides that an award award of compensation upon the facts found. of the board, if not reviewed in due time, or an award on such review as provided in section 60 (Acts 1915, p. 392) provides:

[1] The Workmen's Compensation Act shall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact, but that either party may appeal

“Sec. 59. The board or any of its members to the Appellate Court for errors of law under shall hear the parties at issue and their reprethe same terms and conditions as govern appeals sentatives and witnesses and shall determine the in ordinary civil actions. Held, that the Legis- dispute in any summary manner. The award, lature did not contemplate ingrafting on the pro- together with a statement of the findings of fact, cedure provided by the act all the requirements rulings of law and any other matters pertinent relating to appeals from judgments in ordinary to the question at issue shall be filed with the civil suits, and, where there was a finding of record of proceedings, and a copy of the award compensation by the board, and an application shall immediately be sent to the parties in disby the employer for a review by the full board, pute. which was granted, and the case heard by all the “Sec. 60. If an application for review is made members of the Industrial Board, and an award to the board within seven days from the date of made and entered, the employer's appeal there the award, the full board, if the first hearing from to the Appellate Court would lie, although was not held before the full board, shall review there was no motion for new trial.

the evidence or if deemed advisable, as soon as [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and practicable hear the parties at issue, their repreServant, Dec. Dig. 417(3).)

sentatives and witnesses, and shall make an

award and file same in like manner as specified 2. MASTER AND SERVANT Om 417(4) WORK- in the foregoing section. MEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-APPEAL.

"Sec. 61. An award of the board, as provided Where the employer's exceptions, shown on in section 59, if not reviewed in due time, or appeal to the Appellate Court from final award an award of the board upon such review as proof the Industrial Board, are sufficient under the vided in section 60, shall be conclusive and bindprovisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act, ing as to all questions of fact, but either party and would have been sufficient without showing to the dispute may within thirty days from the an exception to the first award of the board, the date of the award appeal to the Appellate Court record setting forth the proceedings on review by for errors of law under the same terms and conthe full board, and the employer's exception to ditions as govern appeals in ordinary civil acthe final award from which appeal to the Appel- tions. The board, of its own motion, may certilate Court was taken, the employé's contention fy questions of law to said Appellate Court for that the record does not show that the exception its decision and determination.' was taken "at the time" is not available. [Ed. Note.For other cases, see Master and

An examination of the whole act shows Servant, Dec. Dig. 417(4).]

clearly that the intention of the Legislature

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