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So far as appears in the case at bar, the give rise to abuses which it was intended the defendant is a stranger to any contemplated establishment of the rule would prevent. litigation between the plaintiff and those from It follows from what has been said that the whom it is stated in the defendant's letter demurrer was properly sustained and that the alleged claim is due; and even if the the entry must be defendant as to such litigation would be a Decree affirmed. witness, it is plain that a bill for discovery will not lie for the reasons before stated.
(225 Mass. 512) The plaintiff relies upon the case of Orr
OZZOLA V. MUSOLINO et al. v. Diaper, 4 Ch. D. 92, where it was held by a vice chancellor that a bill would lie against
MUSOLINO et al. v. OZZOLA. ship owners who had shipped goods bearing
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. counterfeits of the plaintiff's trademarks,
Suffolk. Jan. 5, 1917.) for discovery of the names of the consignors 1. CONTRACTS 26-ACTION-DEFENSES. from whom the goods were received. The
The binding force of a clear and unambigu
ous contract made by correspondence was not defendants in that case, by shipping the affected by a letter of one of the parties stating goods with the counterfeit trademarks upon he could not "make out" whether the contract them, could well have been held to have par- bad been concluded or not. ticipated in the fraud which was practiced
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Contracts,
Cent. Dig. 8$ 119, 120; Dec. Dig. Om 26.] upon the plaintiff, who might have been entitled to injunctive or other relief against the 2. SALES Ow418(2) — DAMAGES — FAILURE TO
DELIVER. defendants. In that case it was said:
Damages recoverable for failure to deliver "It has been submitted that the defendants goods sold are the difference between the conare mere witnesses; but their position, they be- tract price and what the goods would have been ing the actual shippers, is different from that worth at the time and place specified in the conof mere witnesses."
tract for delivery. We do not think that Orr v. Diaper, supra,
(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Sales, Cent. is to be regarded as an authority in favor of Dig. 88 1175–1179; Dec. Dig. Cw418(2).] the plaintiff in the case. at bar, but is to Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk be distinguished therefrom.
County; John A. Aiken, Judge. (4) We do not agree with the contention of Action by Giovanni Ozzola against Antonio the plaintiff that R. L. C. 203, § 13, implies Musolino and others and an action by Anthat bills for discovery may be maintained tonio Musolino and others against Giovanni against persons who have no interest in a Ozzola, tried together without a jury. Depending or anticipated suit. We construe fendants in the first action except to refusal the statute as authorizing the allowance of of requested ruling, and, as plaintiffs in the costs to such defendants, although the plain- second case, except to refusal of requested titt does not seek a decree against them; rulings. In first case exceptions overruled, but it is not to be inferred that the allowance and in the second case exceptions sustained. of costs under such circumstances was in.
In the second action the second and sixth tended to change the rule in equity that a requests of plaintiff were as follows: bill for discovery will not lie against stran
“(2) On all the evidence the court must find gers to the contemplated litigation. Wright that there was a binding contract between the v. Dame, 1 Metc. 237.
plaintiffs and the defendants whereby the deIt is to be observed that the letter sent by fendants were bound to ship cheese to the plain
tiffs, and that the defendants failed to carry out the defendant to the plaintiff does not de- their contract and committed a breach thereof, scribe any specific property, either real or and for such breach the plaintiffs are entitled personal, to which the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages." It merely recites that there
is a claim against The plaintiffs are entitled to recover from a third person which the defendant thinks he specified in the contract, viz. 210 lire per quiocan collect. The nature of the alleged claim, tal, and the price which would have to be paid whether liquidated or unliquidated, or wheth- for cheese at the time and place specified in the er it grows out of a tort or contract, does contract for delivery." not appear. Apparently the reason why dis Currier, Young & Pillsbury and Henry C. covery is sought is because the parties can- Tuttle, all of Boston, for Giovanni Ozzola. not agree upon the compensation which the John T. Hughes, of Boston, for Antonio Musdefendant is to receive for making the collec-olino and others. tion. It is obvious that the defendant will not be a party to any proceedings which may CROSBY, J. The plaintiff in the first case be brought to enforce the collection. Under seeks to recover for two shipments of cheese these circumstances, we are of opinion that alleged to have been sold and delivered to a bill for discovery cannot be maintained. the defendants.
To relax the salutary rule so firmly es The defendants admit the receipt of the tablished and thereby permit bills of discov- goods and that they have not paid for them, ery to be maintained against persons not but claim that the cheese was of inferior parties to any proposed litigation, in a con-quality and unmarketable. They agree that test between others, would, in our opinion, I they realized from the sale of it an amount
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
substantially equal to the price charged by
(225 Mass. 467) the plaintiff. They also contend that they | UNITED STATES DRAINAGE & IRRIGA. sold the cheese for the plaintiff's account, TION CO, v. CITY OF MEDFORD. and that they are entitled to deduct from
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. the amount received, a commission on the
Middlesex. Jan. 5, 1917.) sale. The plaintiff is located in Italy and the de- 1. HEALTH Cm 16(1)—BOARD OF HEALTA
CONTRACTS-SEAL. fendants reside in Boston. The negotiations Where the members of the board of bealth between the parties were conducted wholly of a city executed contracts for drainage work by correspondence which appears in the bill which recited that the parties had set their
hands and seals thereto, but there was no inof exceptions. Whether the goods were sold dividual seal of wax or other adhesive substance directly to the defendants or were shipped impressed on them or affixed to them, the conto them on consignment to be sold on the tention of the city that the contracts did not plaintiff's account, was a question to be de-ecuted in its name and as its contracts, but in
bind it because they were under seal, but not extermined by the presiding judge upon the the names and as the contracts of the individ. evidence as disclosed by the correspondence. uals who signed and sealed them, was without
force. Upon this evidence the defendants were liable as matter of law as purchasers of the Dig. 8 13; Dec. Dig. Om10(1).]
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Health, Cent. goods for the contract price. Accordingly
2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Om 889 - IMO their request for ruling could not have been
PROVEMENTS-ABATING NUISANCE-STATUTE. given.
Rev. Laws, c.75, $ 75, provides that land  The second action is brought for breach which is wet, rotten, or spongy, or covered with of an alleged contract for failure to deliver stagnant water, so that it is offensive or inju
rious to health, shall be deemed a nuisance, to the plaintiffs five hundred loaves of which the board of health of a city or town cheese. The question whether a binding con- where it lies may abate as provided in following tract was entered into between the parties sections, but that if the expense of abatement
will exceed $2,000, such abatement shall not be is, in the first case, to be determined solely made without a previous appropriation. Held, by their correspondence. A careful examina- that the use of the plural noun "lands” in the tion of the letters which passed between the original statute of 1868 (St. 1868, c. 160, $ 1) parties, all of wbich we do not consider it text, to be construed to mean that all lands of
does not require the word "land,” with the connecessary to refer to, shows that no binding the character described within the territorial contract was made before August 5, 1910. On boundaries of a municipality, regardless of that date by letter to Ozzola, Musolino and similar character, are to be treated as a single
their contiguity or otherwise to other lands of Berger accepted the offer that Ozzola had nuisance in determining whether the expenses made in previous letters. Its binding force of abating the nuisance or several nuisances cannot be affected by Ozzola's letter of Au will exceed $2,000. gust 16th, in which he writes that he cannot Corporations, Cent. Dig. $8 1871-1875; Dec.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal "make out" whether the contract has been Dig. Om 889.) concluded or not. The letter of August 5th
CIPAL CORPORATIONS m889 - IN is definite and free from ambiguity; it con
PROVEMENTS-ABATING NUISANCE-STATUTE. tains a clear and unconditional acceptance In determining the expenses of an abatement of the defendant's offer and there is nothing under such statute, the board of health cannot to show that the contract was afterwards mined to be a nuisance, or the work to be per
arbitrarily split or divide the land it has deterwaived by the plaintiffs.
formed to abate it, so as to evade the statute  As the defendant in this action is liable directly or indirectly. for breach of contract in failing to deliver [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal the goods, the plaintiffs are entitled to re Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 1871-1875; Dec.
Dig. Om 889.) cover as damages the difference between the
CORPORATIONS 889 – IN. contract price and what the goods would 4. MUNICIPAL
PROVEMENTS-ABATING NUISANCE-RECORD have been worth at the time and place spe
-STATUTE. cified in the contract for delivery. The In a proceeding to abate nuisances, held that plaintiffs were entitled to have the court the board of health did not split or divide the make the rulings embodied in their second land or contract for abatement to enable it to
determine that the expenses of the abatement of and sixth requests. If it is necessary to any one nuisance would not exceed $2,000. protect the rights of the plaintiffs in this case (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal that further proceedings in the first case Corporations, Cent. Dig. $$ 1871-1875; Dec. should be continued until the final disposi- Dig. Om 889.) tion of this case, application for that pur. 5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Om 889 – IM. pose can be made in the superior court. R. PROVEMENTS-ABATING NUISANCE-APPROL. c. 170, $ 4. The amount of the plaintiffs'
Where the amount to be expended in the damages are to be determined in the superior abatement of such a nuisance did not exceed court.
the sum of $2,000 under any contract, the obIt follows that in the first case the excep- ligation to the contractor, if incurred, required tions are overruled, and in the second case
no appropriation by the city. the exceptions are sustained.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal
Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 1871-1875; Dec. So ordered.
6. HEALTH 16(1)—BOARD OF HEALTH-CON The record of the board shows that the TRACT-APPROVAL BY MAYOR-STATUTE.
notices were duly served upon all parties enThe provision of the charter of the city of Medford (St. 1903, c. 345, $ 39, as amended by titled thereto; that the board duly heard all St. 1906, C. 252, 5'5) that all contracts made by parties appearing at the time and place apany department of the city, where the amount pointed in the notice; that the board viewed involved is $100 or more, shall be approved by the premises described in the several petithe mayor is applicable to the board of health acting for the city under Rev. Laws, c. 75, 88 tions and thereupon it "adjudged and de 75-82, in contracting for the abatement of the termined” as to each petition that: nuisance of spongy or water-covered land.
“Said petition is hereby granted; that the (Ed. Note. For other cases, see Health, Cent. land described in said petition is rotten, spongy, Dig. § 13; Dec. Dig. Om 16(1).]
and covered with stagnant water, and is offensive 7. HEALTH 16(1)-BOARD HEALTH
to the residents in the vicinity thereof, and inCONTRACTS-NOTICE OF LIMITATIONS.
jurious to the public health and to the health A drainage and irrigation company, con
of the petitioners, and constitutes & puisance to tracting with the board of health of a city, the petitioners and to the public; and that the acting under Rev. Laws, c. 75, $ 75, to abate expense of abating said nuisance and remedythe nuisance of spongy or water-covered land, ing said injury will amount to a sum not exwas chargeable with knowledge of the limita' ceeding two thousand (2,000) dollars, to wit: tions on the contractual powers of the board, $2,000 that said nuisance and injury shall be in that the city charter required that all con: abated and remedied by said board by entertracts involving $100 be approved by the mayor, ing from time to time, upon a certain parcel of and was barred from any recovery for work land together to the adjacent land drained done where the contracts, involving more than thereby and bounded and described as folsuch amount, were not so approved.
lows. [Ed. Note.-For otber cases, see Health, Cent.
After the adjudication of the nuisance the Dig. $ 13; Dec, Dig. eww 16(1).)
board of health and the plaintiff corporation Report from Superior Court, Middlesex which are set out in the nine counts of the
enterd into nine distinct contracts, copies of County ; Henry A. King, Judge. Action by the United States Drainage & the plaintiff agreed to lay out and excavate
declaration. By the terms of each contract, Irrigation Company against the City of Med- all drainage ditches that may be required at ford. On report of a judge of the superior this time for the purpose of mosquito excourt, who heard the case without a jury termination in all the salt marsh area deand found the facts as stated in an auditor's scribed in each of the contracts, and the report. Judgment ordered to be entered for board of health agreed to pay as compensadefendant.
tion therefor a sum of money per acre measS. R. Cutler and H. W. James, both of ured and determined by the acreage drained. Boston, for plaintiff. C. S. Baxter and G. C. Under these contracts the largest sum to be Scott, both of Boston, for defendant.
paid upon the performance of any one con
tract is $1,662.90, and the smallest $108.30. PIERCE, J. In the spring of 1913, ten The testimonium clause of each contract separate petitions were duly presented to reads: the board of health of the city of Medford, “In witness whereof the said parties have alleging that the land described therein is hereto set their hands and seals this 19 day
of July, A, D. 1913.". wet, rotten, spongy and covered with stagpant water, so that it is offensive to resi
Each of the instruments is signed by the dents in its vicinity and is injurious to the three individuals constituting the board of public health, and to the health of the peti- health and by the plaintiff corporation by its tioners; that said land constitutes a nuisance, president, and bears the corporate seal. Upsource of filth and cause of sickness to the on some of the contracts there are brackets petitioners and to the public, and praying enclosing the letters "La S.” opposite the that the same be deemed a nuisance and names of the signers; but no seal of wax or abated as is provided by chapter 75 of the other adhesive substance is impressed or afRevised Laws, SS 75 and 85 inclusive,
fixed to or upon any contract. June 11, 1913, the board of health issued
The plaintiff, subsequent to July 19, 1913, an order of notice on each of nine of the proceeded and performed the work in acoriginal ten petitions in terms following:
cordance with the terms of the contract, and “To the petitioners upon the foregoing peti- no payments have been made therefor. Subtion; all persons whose land it may be neces- sequent to the completion of the work by the sary to enter upon to abate the nuisance de plaintiff, the board of health proceeded to scribed in said petition; or any other person assess the benefits on account of the abatewho may be damaged or benefited by the proceedings prayed for in said petition, and the ment of the nuisance, or nuisances, upon the mayor of the city of Medford. Notice is here several tracts of land adjudged benefited by given that the board of health of Medford has thereby. No specific appropriation was made appointed the twentieth day of June, A. D. by the city of Medford to carry out said 1913, at 8 p. m., and their office in the city hall of Medford as the time and place for å work and of the general appropriation made hearing upon said petition, at which time and for the board of health for the fiscal year place you may be heard upon the necessity and 1913, less than $600 remained unexpended on mode of abating said nuisance, the question of the damages and of the assessment, and appor- July 19, 1913. April 2, 1914, an action was tiorment of the expenses of said abatement." brought against the city of Medford to re
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexos
cover damages resulting to the plaintiff by | Indirectly the statute. It is quite conceive reason of the refusal of the defendant to able that a single tract of land of the char. pay to the plaintiff the compensation agreed acter described in R. L. c. 75, 75, should be to be paid to it by the board of health upon a nuisance of such virulent nature as to de. its performance of the contracts. The case mand a more radical and speedy abatement is before us upon a report of a judge of the than a contiguous or remote parcel of like superior court who heard it without a jury land of less noxious qualities. It must be and found the facts to be as stated in an stated that on this record the board did not auditor's report, which is made a part of split or divide land or contract to enable this report and is the only evidence.
it to determine that the expenses of the (1) The contention of the defendant that abatement of any nuisance would not ex. the written contracts declared on do not bind ceed $2,000. the city because they are contracts under The auditor found, and the fact is not seal not executed in the name of the city and questioned, that “the three individuals who as its contracts, but in the names and as the signed the nine several written contracts contracts of the individuals who signed and were at the date thereof the duly constitutsealed them, is without force for the all-suffi- ed board of health of the defendant city of cient reason that there is no individual seal Medford;" nor is his finding denied "that of wax or oth
adhesive substance im- said board in 1913 was a department of the pressed on them or affixed to them. Tasker city of Medford under St. 1903, c. 345, $$ 33, v. Bartlett, 5 Cush. 359. The copies of the 38." The charter of the city of Medford, St. contracts set out in the several counts re- 1903, c. 345, $ 39, as amended by St. 1906, C. cite a sealing, but beyond that there is noth- 252, § 5, provides that: ing to indicate that the seal of the individu "All contracts made by any department of al members of the board of health was ever the city, when the amount involved is one hun. impressed on or affixed to them. Duncan v. dred dollars or more, shall be in writing, and
no such contract shall be deemed to have been Duncan, 1 Watts (Pa.) 322, 325. The pres- made or executed until the approval of the ence of such recital does not change the mayor is affixed thereto
except as character of the instrument to which no seal otherwise provided herein or required by law, is affixed from a simple contract to a spe- curred for any purpose beyond the appropria
no expenditure shall be made or liability incialty. Bates v. Boston & N. Y. C. R. R., 10 tions previously made therefor. The payment Allen, 255; Dean v. Am. Legion of Honor, for expenditures made, or liability incurred by 156 Mass. 436, 31 N. E. 1; Simpson v. Ritor in behalf of the city not in accordance with
general laws, or with the provisions of said chie, 110 Me. 299, 86 Atl. 124; Taylor v. chapter three hundred and forty-five, or of acts Glaser, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 502, 504.
in amendment thereof or in addition thereto, or The records of the board of health war
with the ordinances made as therein provided,
shall be void." rant the report of the auditor that: "The board of health proceeding under the
 The contracts in the case at bar were provisions of Revised Laws, c. 75, $S75 to 82, made by the officers of the board of health, inclusive, issued an order of notice on each of a department of the city of Medford, on besaid nine petitions, riewed the premises in ques- half of the city. Spring v. Inhabs. of Hyde tion, and after a hearing, severally adjudicated each of the nine several parcels of land de- Park, 137 Mass. 555, 50 Am. Rep. 334; Worscribed in said petitions a nuisance, and ordered cester Board of Health v. Tupper, 210 Mass. the nuisance abated."
378, 383, 96 N. E. 1096, and cases cited. The The further estimate and finding of the obligation, if incurred, required no appropri. board that the expense of abating the nui-ation by the city because the amount to be sance would not exceed $2,000 in each case expended in the abatement of the nuisance was accurate, as proved by the cost of the did not exceed the sum of $2,000 (R. L C. 75, performance of the work.
$ 75), under any single contract. [2-4) We cannot assent to the argument of (6, 7] The remaining question presented is the defendant that the use of the plural whether the contract was void as an obliganoun “lands" in the original statute 1868, tion of the city of Medford because it was 160, § 1, requires the word "land" with the not approved by the mayor. We are of opincontext in R. L. c. 75, $ 75, to be construed ion that the provision of the charter that to mean that all lands of the character de- all contracts made by any department of the scribed in R. L. C. 75, $ 75, within the terri- city where the amount involved is one huntorial boundaries of a municipality, regard- dred dollars or more shall be approved by less of their contiguity or otherwise to other the mayor, is applicable to the board of lands of similar character, are to be treated health acting for the city, under R. L. C. 75, as a single nuisance, in determining whether $ę 75 to 82 inclusive. The requirements that the expenses of abating the nuisance or sev- the contract shall be in writing and shall eral nuisances will exceed $2,000. Neverthe-receive the approval of the mayor do not less, it is quite rue that in the determina- limit or destroy the powers conferred on the tion of the expenses of an abatement the board of health by R. L. C. 75, $ 75, but reg. board rightly cannot arbitrarily split or di-ulate the form and execution of agreements vide the land it has determined to be a nui- and instruments entered into by the departsance, or the work to be performed to abate ment on behalf of the city. As checks upon
as requirements that agreements shall speak Appeal from Supreme Judicial Court, PlyIn understandable and indisputable language mouth County. the requirements of the charter take nothing Suit by Edith M. Farrington, as adminis. from but add to the efficiency of the general tratrix, against John W. Miller and others, laws. Clarke v. Fall River, 219 Mass. 580, as executors. Decree for the plaintiff, and 584, 107 N. E. 419. It follows that the con- defendants appeal. Affirmed. tracts were ineffectual as obligations of the city, because they were not approved by
Tyler, Corneau & ames and Wm. C. Rice, the mayor. McLean v. City of Holyoke, 216 all of Boston, for appellants. A. F. Barker, Mass. 62, 102 N. E. 929; Fiske v. Worcester, of Brockton, for appellee. 219 Mass. 428, 430, 106 N. E. 1025, and cases cited. The plaintiff was chargeable with DE COURCY, J. The plaintiff's intestate, knowledge of the limitations of the contrac-Jane Miller, had a valid claim against the tual powers of the board of health, and is defendants as executors of the will of her barred from any recovery. Douglas v. Lowo brother Thomas W. Pope, for her services ell, 194 Mass. 268, 80 N. E. 510; Bartlett v. as his housekeeper, caretaker, domestic and Lowell, 201 Mass. 151, 87 N. E. 195; Com- nurse. Mrs. Miller did not bring suit within mercial Wharf Corp. v. Boston, 208 Mass. the prescribed statutory period of two years ; 482, 94 N. E. 805.
and the plaintiff, who succeeds to her rights, In accordance with the terms of the re- brought this bill in equity under R. L. C. 141, port judgment is to be entered for the de- $ 10, which reads as follows: fendant.
"If the Supreme Judicial Court, upon a bill So ordered.
in equity filed by a creditor whose claim has not been prosecuted within the time limited by
the preceding section, is of opinion that justice (225 Mass. 535)
and equity require it and that such creditor is FARRINGTON V. MILLER et al. not chargeable with culpable neglect in not
prosecuting his claim within the time so lim(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
ited, it may give him judgment for the amount Plymouth. Jan. 6, 1917.)
of his claim against the estate of the deceased 1 EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS Cw437(3) person; but such judgment shall not affect any -CLAIMS-LIMITATIONS-EXECUTION.
payment or distribution made before the filing
of such bill." Wbere plaintiff's intestate bad a just claim against her brother's estate for services as
 Among the conclusions of fact found housekeeper and caretaker which she had presented to his executors, who did not dispute it, by the master are the following: That the but promised to attend to its allowance by the plaintiff's intestate, Jane Miller, was a sick probate court, and she, plaintiff's intestate, was person during the whole period of two years sick during the two years in wbich she might after the defendants gave their bonds as exprosecute her claim, the most of the time being unable to attend to any business, plaintiff was ecutors, and was entirely unable to transact entitled to sue on the claim under Rev. Laws, c. business of any sort during the last fifteen 141, § 10, providing that, where a creditor's claim has not been prosecuted within the time months of this period; that failure to bring limited and the court is of the opinion that jus- suit on her claim within two years was not tice and equity require it, and that the creditor "culpable neglect" within the meaning of said is not chargeable with culpable neglect in not section 10; that justice and equity require prosecuting his claim, the court may give him that the plaintiff should have judgment for judgment.
(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors $3,960; and that sufficient funds remain in and Administrators, Cent. Dig. $$ 1744-1747, the hands of the executors so that such judg. 1764; Dec. Dig. Om 437(3).]
ment would not affect any payment or distrib. 2. APPEAL AND ERROR 907(2)—QUESTIONS ution made before the filing of this bill. PRESENTED-FINDINGS-ABSENCE Evi.
 These conclusions are warranted by the The subsidiary facts found by the master subsidiary facts found by the master, which are final on appeal, in the absence of the evi- are final in the absence of the evidence. It dence.
would serve no useful purpose to recite these [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and facts in detail. She had collapsed under her Error, Cent. Dig. $S 2011-2013, 2915, 2016; Dec. Dig. Om907(2).]
care of her brother; and from the time of 3. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS 437
his death in December, 1903, until her own (3)-CLAIMS-LIMITATIONS-STATUTES. decease in November, 1906, her bistory is one
To entitle a claimant to relief under Rev. of progressive sickness, with nervous breakLaws, c. 141, § 10, providing that, where a creditor has failed to prosecute his claim against
down. Mrs. Miller presented her bill to the a decedent's estate within the time limited and defendants (one of whom was her son) withthe court is of the opinion that equity requires in six months after their appointment, and it, and that the creditor is not chargeable with soon afterwards they paid her $500 on acculpable neglect, the court may give him judg. ment, it is not necessary that the failure to sue count. They told her they would allow the seasonably was due to such fraud, accident, or whole bill, but that it was for the court to mistake as would be a ground for equitable re decide. They took no action to determine lief if there were no statute.
whether it would be allowed until after the (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators. Cont. Dig. 88 1744-1747, expiration of the special statute of limita1764; Dec. Dig. ww137(3).)
tions, when they included it in their account
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes