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costs against both defendants, and in which , security for said loan, a certain promissory appellee Matchett obtained judgment on his note, particularly described, and being the cross-complaint against appellant, ordering identical note set out as Exhibit A with the the property of the latter levied upon and first paragraph of complaint. That said sold to satisfy the judgment before levying principal note for $2,000, due in 60 days, upon the property of the cross-complainant. was renewed from time to time by the

The complaint is in three paragraphs and Winona Technical Institute, until December there were numerous other pleadings in the 17, 1909, a final renewal note for $2,000, due

Appellant has assigned as error the in 60 days, was executed by it. That before overruling of his separate deņurrer to each the maturity thereof, and before the maparagraph of the complaint; the sustaining turity of said collateral note, said Matchett of the separate demurrer of appellee the for value received sold and assigned both of First State Bank of Bourbon, Ind., to the said notes to appellee First State Bank, and sixth, seventh, and ninth paragraphs of ap- duly assigned said collateral note to it by pellant's answer to the first paragraph of indorsement on the back thereof as follows: complaint; the sustaining of appellee's de "For value received, I hereby assign this note murrer to the sixteenth paragraph of answer

to the First State Bank.

“[Signed] James H. Matchett." to the third paragraph of complaint; error in each of the conclusions of law stated on That thereafter the Winona Technical Inthe special finding of facts.

stitute became insolvent and a receiver was Omitting forwal averments, the first para- appointed who took charge of its property. graph of complaint alleges, in substance, that That said First State Bank filed with the on the 1st day of March, 1909, the Winona receiver its claim on the principal promissory Technical Institute and appellant Hubbard, note aforesaid, but no part of the same has by their promissory note promised to pay to been paid, and said company is insolvent and James H. Matchett, three years from that does not have assets sufficient to pay said date, the sum of $2,000 with interest and at- debt, or any part thereof. That by reason torney's fees, a copy of which note is made thereof, said collateral note so indorsed by a part of the complaint as Exhibit A ; that appellant is due and unpaid. before its maturity Matchett by indorsement The third paragraph of complaint is subor the note transferred and assigned the stantially the same as the second, except it same to the First State Bank of Bourbon, is a verred therein that the note sued on was Indiana, as follows, to wit:

executed by appellant for the accommoda“For value received I hereby assign this note tion of the Winona Technical Institute to tn First State Bank. (Signed] James H. enable it to borrow money upon its own inMatchett."

dividual note by using said note of appelThat appellant executed said note as sure lant as collateral security, and thereafter ty by indorsing his name on the back thereof; on February 20, 1909, it borrowed from that by reason of the mutual mistake of the James H. Matchett, on its individual note, parties and the scrivener who wrote the note, $2,000, and gave the note in suit as collateral the date and name of the payee were left

security therefor. blank; that said note was delivered to said The memoranda accompanying the sepaMatchett, who was intended to be and in fact rate demurrer to each paragraph of the was the payee.

complaint alleged that neither paragraph "Exhibit A

states facts sufficient to constitute a cause "$2,000.00, Indianapolis, Ind., ...... 190/

of action against appellant, because: (1) The Three years after date, we promise to pay to note sued on fails to show the date of its the order of

two thousand dollars, with execution; (2) it fails to show when it is interest at

per cent per annum from until paid, and ten per cent. attorney's payable; (3) it fails to show to whom it is fees. Negotiable and payable at the Union Na- payable; (4) the averments fail to show ap. tional Bank, Indianapolis, Indiana. Value re- pellant liable on the note either as principal, ceived without any relief whatever from valua- surety, or indorser; (5) the allegations fail tion or appraisement laws. The drawers and to show that due diligence was used by apindorsers severally waive presentment, protest, and notice of protest and nonpayment of this pellee bank to collect said note of the Winona note. The Winona Technical Institute, Technical Institute the principal thereof. "By S. C. Dickey, President.

To the first paragraph of complaint appel“Due .....

lant filed answer in ten paragraphs, the first “Indorsements: Wm. H. Hubbard."

of which was a general denial. The gist of the second paragraph of com The others, except 6, 7, and 9, in subplaint is:

stance, allege that appellee First State Bank That on February 20, 1909, the Winona is not the real party in interest; that appelTechnical Institute borrowed from James H. lee James H. Matchett is the party in inMatchett, $2,000, and executed to him therefor terest; want of consideration; payment; its promissory note, due in 60 days. That con- that when appellee Matchett took the retemporaneously therewith, and to induce the newal or second principal note from Winona loan of said inoney, the Winona Technical Technical Institute, he accepted the same Institute and appellant Hubbard, executed without the indorsement of S. C. Dickey, who and delivered to said Matchett, as collateral had indorsed the first principal note.

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The substance of the sixth paragraph of hausted before such judgment be enforced answer is that in 1908, Winona Technical against him. Institute requested appellant to sign the note Issues were duly joined on all the pleadsued upon as an accommodation indorser to ings, and on due request the court made a enable it to use such note as collateral se- special finding of facts and stated its conclucurity in borrowing money; that thereupon, sions of law thereon. without any consideration therefor, he sign

The court found the facts to be substaned said note as such accommodation indors- tially as alleged in the complaint, and we er and delivered the same to Winona Tech- therefore set out only such portions of the nical Institute.

finding as deal with questions that were in The answer then alleges the borrowing of any way controverted at the trial. the money, the execution of the note on Feb The finding shows the execution of the note ruary 20, 1909, by Winona Technical Insti- in the form above set out on January 20, 1909; tute to Matchett for $2,000, due in 60 days, that appellant, on request of Winona Techni. and that the note was indorsed by Solomon cal Institute, indorsed his name on the back C. Dickey; that the note now sued on was thereof, and authorized Solomon C. Dickey, used as collateral security for said note of president of said institute, to deliver and February 20, 1909. Appellee Matchett ac- pledge said note as collateral security to any cepted in payment of said note of February person, firm, or corporation who might there. 20, 1909, a note of like amount due in 60 after loan money to it, and authorized said days, signed by Winona Technical Institute, Dickey to fill all blanks left in said note by but not indorsed or signed by said Dick- inserting therein the date and the name of ey; that Matchett fraudulently assigned the the payee or person from whom such loan note sued on to appellee First State Bank

should be procured; that no consideration after its maturity, to enable said bank to and he executed the note only for the accom

moved to appellant for such indorsement, collect same as a bona fide holder for val- modation of Winona Technical Institute; ue, and to avoid defenses thereto against apo that at the time the note was so executed it pellee Matchett. The seventh paragraph of answer is sub- borrowed, nor that the same would be pro

was not known how much money would be stantially like the sixth, except instead of alleging the second principal note was ac, $2,000 was borrowed from Matchett on Feb

cured from said Matchett; that the sum of cepted as payment of the first, it is charged that the time of payment was extended with ruary 20, 1909, and the note of the institute out the knowledge or consent of appellant. in 60 days, which note was indorsed by S.

given therefor by S. C. Dickey, president, due The ninth paragraph is the same as the o. Dickey, and the note executed by appelsixth, except the additional averment that the second principal note was accepted in

lant was delivered to appellee. Matchett as payment of the first, and likewise the third collateral security for such loan; that at the in payment of the second; that Matchett time of the delivery of said collateral note wrote upon the face of the second note: to Matchett said Dickey neglected to fill the Paid, June 16, 1909. J. H. Matchett"

blanks therein, and nothing was said on and surrendered same to Winona Technical that subject by the parties to the transaction. Institute.

The finding also shows the execution of the The answers to the second and third para

renewal note on April 21, 1909, without the graphs of complaint were, in the main, simi-indorsement of Dickey, and the several relar to those addressed to the first paragraph. newal notes as alleged ; that the note in suit

The sixteenth paragraph, addressed to the was left as collateral security for said loan third paragraph of complaint, in substance from February 20, 1909, with each of said recharges that appellant executed the note newal notes, and on each of such renewal sued on without any consideration and as an notes there was written, “Hubbard note as accommodation indorser only, and then sets collateral," and the same was a separate unout in detail the facts as above shown in dertaking for the payment of the loan aforeregard to the several renewal notes for the said; that appellant had no knowledge, unmoney borrowed from Matchett.

til more than two years after the execution Issues were joined on the affirmative para of the sixth renewal note of December 17, graphs of answer and appellant also filed a 1909, of the execution of the former notes cross-complaint, in which he sought to have for said loan, or that the note of February the note sued on adjudged paid or satisfied, 20, 1909, had been indorsed by S. C. Dickey, and he also asked an order, directing the or that the note so indorsed had been surholder thereof to deliver the same to him, and rendered by appellee Matchett to the Instithat appellee Matchett, be enjoined from tute; that prior to June 14, 1912, appellee transferring the same. Appellee Matchett al. Matchett sent the note in suit to the Conti. so filed a cross-complaint against appellant, nental National Bank of Indianapolis for colin which he sought to have any judgment ren- lection, and the same was returned unpaid; ered upon the note in suit direct that the that on June 14, 1912, Matchett sold, assignproperty of Winona Technical Institute and ed, transferred and delivered the sixth renew

received, and at the same time delivered to 9071, 9072, Burns 1914; McWhorter V. Norsaid bank the note in suit duly assigned as ris, 9 Ind. App. 490-493, 34 N. E. 854, 37 N. E. alleged.

21; Krieg v. Palmer Nat. Bank, 51 Ind. App. The finding then sets out efforts to collect 34-39, 95 N. E. 613; Melton v. Gibson, 97 the note and some correspondence between Ind. 158; Mitchell v. St. Mary, supra. Matchett and appellant in 1910 and 1912, in It is not seriously contended that the exregard to the collection of the note and ap- ecution and delivery of the note in its inpellant's liability thereon and appellant's re- complete form authorized a bona fide holder fusal to pay the same; that when the note thereof to insert the date and fill in the name of February 20, 1909, became due S. C. Dick of the payee in the appropriate blank left ey was solvent and able to pay the debt; that therefor in the note, but that, inasmuch as this suit was brought November 14, 1912; neither the date nor the name of the payee that the debt for which the note in suit was were actually so inserted, appellee bank ac held as collateral security is due and unpaid, quired no right of action by reason of the and likewise the note sued on in this action; alleged assignment and transfer of the note that it was the intention of appellant and of to it by appellee Matchett. said Dickey that the name of the person, In the absence of averments to show that from whom the loan should be procured, as the holder of such note acquired the same for contemplated when the note in suit was ex value and was the owner thereof and the ecuted, should be inserted in the blank left real party in interest in the suit, there is for the name of the payee of the note, and authority supporting the contention that a that the date should be inserted to corre- suit on such instrument, payable otherwise spond with the date on which such loan was than to bearer, cannot be maintained by the obtained, and that the failure to do so was holder thereof, and that in the absence of due to the oversight and omission of said such special averments proof of the instruSolomon C. Dickey; that it was intended ment in such form will not support an acthat the name of James H. Matchett should tion by the holder thereof to recover thereon. be inserted as payee of the note, and that Greenhow V. Boyle, 7 Blackf. 56; Rich v. the date thereof should be February 20, 1909. Starbuck, 51 Ind. 87–89, and cases cited ;

The court stated its conclusions of law in 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments (6th substance as follows: (1) The law is with Ed.) 88 142–145. the plaintiff (appellee bank), and it is entitled [3] But a bona fide holder for value of an to recover from James H. Matchett and Wil- instrument purporting to be a bill of exliam H. Hubbard the sum of $2,200; (2) change, which does not on its face show to Matchett is entitled to the relief prayed in whom it is payable, may maintain an action his cross-complaint; that the property of said thereon against the persons who executed or Hubbard be first exhausted before the prop-indorsed such instrument in its incomplete erty of said Matchett be levied upon to pay form, and under appropriate averments may and satisfy the judgment. The judgment show by parol proof from whom the considerfollows the conclusions of law.

ation moved, to whom the instrument was The principal question arising upon the delivered by the maker or indorser, and who rulings of the court on the demurrers to the is, in fact, the owner and bona fide holder pleadings are identical with those presented thereof, and all the facts and circumstances by the exceptions to the conclusions of law attending the execution and transfer of the and the assignment based thereon, and for instrument. In such cases the intention of that reason they will be considered together. the parties who put the instrument in cir

[1] The first question suggested is based on culation is the underlying and controlling the incompleteness of the note sued on by rea- principle, and when such intention is asson of the absence therefrom of the date of certained, either from the face of the instruits execution and the name of the payee. ment or by proof of extraneous facts, or The note in its incomplete form is not negoti- from all of such sources, it should be folable under the law merchant in this stater lowed, unless it contravenes some rule of Gilpin v. People's Bank, 45 Ind. App. 52, 90 law, for by so doing effect will be given to N. E. 91, and cases cited; Nicely v. Bank, the letter and spirit of our Code, which re 15 Ind. App. 563, 44 N. E. 572, 57 Am. St. quires actions to be brought in the name of Rep. 245; South Whitley Hoop Co. v. U. the real party in interest. Rich v. StarN. Bank, 53 Ind. App. 446, 101 N. E. 824; buck, 51 Ind. 87–90; Moore v. Pendleton, Mitchell v. St. Mary, 148 Ind. 111-113, 47 16 Ind. 481-483; Ferry V. Jones, 10 Ind. N. E 224; Glidden v. Henry, 104 Ind. 278, 226; Clark v. Walker, 6 Blackf. 82; Gothrupt 1 N. E. 369, 54 Am. Rep. 316; 1 Daniel on v. Williamson, 61 Ind. 599; Wells v. JackCommercial Paper (6th Ed.) 88 83, 84, 99, 102, son, 6 Blackf. 40. 103.

[4] The absence of a date on the note in [2] The note sued on is an “Instrument in question prima facie renders the time of paywriting" given for the payment of money, ment uncertain, and affects the negotiability and is negotiable under the statute so as to of the instrument, but it may nevertheless vest the property thereof in an assignee or purport a valid obligation, and under the bona fide holder thereof for value, Sections pleadings in this case the date could be prop

erly inquired into and ascertained from Jackson, supra, and pointed out certain inthe evidence. Bank of Houston y. Day, 145 consistencies in the decisions, and finally Mo. App. 410, 122 S. W. 756–758; 1 Daniel, adopted the rule declared in Wells v. JackNegotiable Instruments, 88 83, 84, 143, 144, son, supra, to the effect that the blank in. 145; 11 Am. & En. Ency. p. 255.

dorsement of nonnegotiable paper, made at Appellant contends that, if liable at all, or prior to its delivery, and unexplained by he is only liable as an indorser, and entitled extrinsic testimony, confers upon the payee to all the rights and protection the law ac- the authority to hold the indorser primarily cords an indorser; that neither the facts liable on the original contract, as a surety pleaded nor found show such diligence on the or joint promisor, but that a similar unex. part of appellee bank as will establish liabil- plained indorsement of paper, negotiable unity against him. Therefore we must deter- der the law merchant, renders such indorser mine the character of appellant's liability, liable only as an indorser, with the usual if any, on the note under the peculiar facts of and ordinary rights and privileges incident this case. While the facts are somewhat thereto. “But that in either case, the liaunusual, we believe the question is settled in bility designed to be assumed, and the auIndiana under facts so analogous as to render thority intended to be given by the indorsethe decision conclusive as to the nature and ment, may be explained by the attendant character of appellant's liability, and to circumstances, and the prima facie responsishow that he is liable primarily as a maker bility be changed into one of another kind." or surety, and not as an indorser.

Pool y.

Continuing, the opinion of Judge Mitchell Anderson, 116 Ind. 88, 18 N. E. 445, 1 L. R. states: A. 712; Oyler v. McMurray, 7 Ind. App. 645– "The proposition

resolves itself in649, 34 N. E. 1004; De Pauw v. Bank of to the following inquiry: Can a stranger who Salem, 126 Ind. 553-555, 25 N. E 705, 26 signs an ordinary promissory note not negotiable N. D. 151, 10 L. R. A. 46; Kealing v. Van by the law merchant, under the circumstances

disclosed in the present case, stand in the relaSickle, 74 Ind. 529,532, 39 Am. Rep. 101; tion of an indorser to the payee to whom it is Wells V. Jackson, 6 Blackf. 40–43.

afterwards delivered, without a special contract In Pool V. Anderson, supra, Pool sued to that effect? Upon principle there can be no

other than a negative answer to this question. Spradling, Neff, and Anderson on a nonnegoti. This conclusion follows from the fact that the able promissory note. Spradling and Neff liability of one whose name appears upon a promsigned the note on its face, and Anderson issory note, no matter when or where it is writ

ten, or what the character of the note is, must. wrote his name across the back before it depend upon the contract which is either expresswas delivered to Pool, the payee, who brought ed in words or implied by law. Seymour v. the suit. Anderson demurred to the com- Mickey, 15 Ohio St. 515. When a person other plaint, and the court sustained the demurrer, the back of a note governed by the law merchant,

than the payee or indorsee signs his name upon on the theory that he was liable as an in- before it bas its inception, it may, without great dorser only and the complaint did not show impropriety, be held that commercial law sup

plies the undertaking into which he enters with facts suficient to fix liability against him. the payee, which is in effect that if the maker Judge Mitchell wrote the opinion of the fails to pay at maturity and the indorser is duly court, reversing the judgment, and, among notified of the dishonor of the note, he will pay other things, said:

it. This, according to the rulings of this court, “The present case involves the liability of a law imports into the transaction, in the absence

is the implied or commercial contract which the stranger who signed his name upon the back of of an express agreement of a different character, a paper not negotiable by the law merchant; and a contract implied by law is as binding as if before it was delivered to the payee, who held it were written in words. Stack v. Beach, 74 the same when the suit was commenced. The Ind. 571 [39 Am. Rep. 113]. To these rulings inquiry is, what is the liability or obligation of we adhere. This constitutes the person so signone who thus signs to the payee? The decisions ing, as between himself and the payee, prima of different courts present an irreconcilable con- facie a first indorser. * Kcaling v. Vandict of views upon the general subject under sickle, supra; 1 Daniel, Neg. Inst. 88 714-666. consideration. It will be noted, however, that

"One cannot, however, become an indorser, the cases in other jurisdictions relate almost ex: in a commercial sense, of paper that is not neclusively to notes negotiable as inland bills of gotiable according to the law merchant. Vore exchange. Whatever diversity exists in the de- 0. Hurst (13 Ind. 551, 74 Am. Dec. 268); 1 cided cases, it cannot be doubted that a stranger Daniel, Neg. Inst. § 709. Hence the signature who writes his name on the back of a promis- of a third person, placed on the back of a note sory note before it is delivered, whether it be not so negotiable, before its delivery to the payee, negotiable or nonnegotiable according to the law creates no implied or commercial contract what, merchant, does so in order to give the maker ever. Chaddock v. Vanness, 35 N. J. Law, 517 credit, or the note currency, and with the inten- (10 Am. Rep. 256). tion to pledge himself in some shape for its payment. Eilbert v. Finkbeiner, 68 Pa. 243 [8 Am. one who signs his name upon the back of a note,

"As has been remarke), it will be assumed that Rep. 176]. All the authorities concur in bolding whatever its description may be, does so for some that the act constitutes a contract which is to be purpose, and that he intends to become responconstrued in such a way as to render it avail- sible for its payment in pursuance of some conable to carry into effe the intention of the tractural obligation. If, therefore, the law imparties, consistent with settled rules of law. ports into the transaction no contract whatever, Good v. Martin, 95 U. S. 90 (24 L. Ed. 341]; and there is no possibility of raising the ordinary Rey v. Simpson, 22 How. 341 [16 L. Ed. 260); obligation of an indorser, it must be assumed, un15 Cent. L. J. 82."

til it appears whether any contract different The learned judge then reviewed the deci- to, and what the character of that contract was,

from that written on the paper was entered insions on the subject, beginning with Wells v.) that all those, other than the payee, who signed

before the execution of the paper, whether upon from the contract which may possibly vary the back or face, intended to become bound ac

or enlarge his liability without his consent. cording to the terms of the note as joint prom. The debt was not paid by the renewals, but isors,

“Our conclusion, therefore is that when a per- remained the same throughout. The signing son not the payee of a note, such as that involv- of the first note by Dickey and his failure to ed in the present case, places his signature on indorse subsequent renewal notes were purethe back of the paper at or prior to the time of its inception, without making an express con- ly incidental matters, wholly unknown to aptract defining the nature and extent of his un- pellant at the time of their occurrence and dertaking, he will be held liable according to the entirely foreign to the contract by which he rule in Wells v. Jackson, supra, upon the original contract, as a surety or joint promisor. obligated himself when he signed and deThis conclusion renders the stipulation in the livered the note under the circumstances note waiving notice of nonpayment wholly im- shown in the case. 2 Brandt on Suretyship material, as such a stipulation is relevant only to notes governed by the law merchant, and (20 Ed.) 88 388–397; Jones on Collateral se which are capable of strict indorsement.

curity, $ 541, and cases cited; 1 Daniel on "A surety or joint promisor is bound to take Negotiable Instruments, $ 748; King v. Doane, notice of the default of his principal. As to ei- 139 U. S. 167, 11 Sup. Ct. 465, 35 L. Ed. 84, ther, notice of nonpayment is not necessary. Fitch v. Citizens' Nat. Bank (97 Ind. 211); 87; Hawkins v. Fourth Nat. Bank, 150 Ind. Scott v. Shirk, 60 Ind. 160."

117–123, 49 N. E. 957; Dayton Nat. Bank, (5-7) The essential facts in the case of 37 Ohio St. 208; Malbon v. Southard, 36 Me. Pool v. Anderson are found in the case at 147; Delaware, etc., Co. v. Haser, 199 Pa. bar, and the fact that the name of the payee 17, 48 Atl. 694, 85 Am. St. Rep. 763; Bangs was not actually inserted is not a material v. Strong, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 250, 42 Am. Dec. 64. difference. The complaint warranted the From the foregoing we have reached the proof of the circumstances under which the conclusion that the court did not err in any note was signed, the intention of the parties, of the rulings on the demurrers to pleadings and the object to be attained.

complained of, nor in its conclusions of law Appellee Matchett, having furnished the stated on the finding of facts. money intended to be raised 'by use of the Judgment afirmed. note in suit, obtained a definite interest in such note which, under our statute, he could, MORAN, P. J., and MENUTT, HOTTEL, and the findings show did, assign to appel- CALDWELL, and IBACH, JJ., concur. lee bank for a valuable consideration, whereby it became the real party in interest and entitled to collect whatever is due upon the

(63 Ind. App. 224) obligation held as collateral security for the

PHILLIPS v. BALL et al. (No. 9703.) unpaid debt. Sections 9071, 9072, Burns 1914; 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2. (6th Ed.) § 748; Hawkins v. Fourth Nat.

Dec. 13, 1916.) Bank, 150 Ind. 117-122, 49 N. E. 957; Mitch- 1. APPEAL AND ERROR On 323(5), 801(3) ell v. St. Mary, supra.

"PARTY" "COPARTIES" DISMISSAL In executing the note sued on, appellant

DETERMINATION. authorized its use as collateral security for Burns Ann. St. 1914, 8 674, which permits one

On a vacation appeal as provided for in any loan of any amount for any period of of several coparties to appeal, but requires all time obtainable within the three years the parties to the judgment to be served with nonote was to run before its maturity.

tice of the appeal, where foreclosure suit named

four defendants, two of whom disclaimed, and (8-10] By renewing the notes for which the judgment decreed that one defendant bad the note in suit was pledged as collateral no interest and ran for foreclosure and against security, the contract entered into by appel- the other defendant, defendant whose interest lant was not changed, his liability was not appeal; coparties, as used in the section mean

was cut off was a necessary "party" to the increased, nor the time of payment extended. ing coparties to the judgment, and though the The acceptance of the renewal note without 180 days elapsed between the time of overruling the indorsement of Solomon C. Dickey, under the motion and filing of motion to dismiss the

appeal, and such party could not have appealed, the circumstances shown, did not, in any yet in passing on the motion to dismiss, the way, affect or violate the contract into which court could consider only whether all parties appellant had entered, for the continued use were properly before the court on the day of of the note in suit as collateral security with submission, and as such defendant was not then

a "party," the appeal would therefore be disout such indorsement was fully within the missed. intention of the parties and the plan orig

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and inally adopted for raising the money to Error, Cent. Dig. 88 1798, 3162; Dec. Dig. which appellant lent his name for the ac-323(5), 801(3). commodation of the Winona Technical Insti

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases,

First and Second Series, Coparty; Party.] tute. The underlying principle by which a surety may be relieved from his contract by 2. APPEAL AND ERROR @m336(1)–PARTIES, dealings or arrangements between his princi

SUFFICIENCY-WAIVER. pal and the creditor, to which he is not a ant joined in an agreement for immediate sub

In such case, where the principal defendparty, is that there has been a departure mission of the cause, the defect of parties was

Par For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key. Numbered Digests and Indexes

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