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The questions sought to be raised have been, | versal. In this action the court did not comhowever, determined as indicated above.

The complaint of the overruling of a motion of the McClearys is stated to be the fourth error relied on for reversal. This motion seems to be an application to be admitted as parties. They were subsequently admitted as parties, and the other questions raised under this assignment have been considered.

[4, 5] The fifth error asserted is that the court erred in overruling another motion made by the McClearys to strike out of the report everything in it relating to the establishing of that part of the arm of the drain which extended into Allen county. Manifestly the motion asked for the impossible. The drain and the arm were reported as a whole, and the assessments apportioned for it as one system. The impossibility of separating the assessments is obvious. Nor did the motion follow the proper proceeding in any event. Had the report of that part of the arm in Allen county not have been within the lawful authority of the commissioners, objection should have been taken to it under the first cause of remonstrance provided by the statute, namely, "that the report of the commissioners is not according to law."

[6] Certain of the appellants urge that the court erred in overruling their motions, based on not very material alleged defects, to strike out the proof and return of service of notice on themselves and others who were brought in by the report of the commissioners. There was no error in the court's action. The notice was sufficient to bring the parties into court, and appellants' motion was not made until long after they had appeared and filed remonstrances.

[7] The seventh error asserted is based on the action of the trial court in striking out remonstrances of certain appellants. All of these remonstrances were filed more than ten days after notice had been served on those filing them. Hence, under the settled rule declared by this court, they came too late, and were properly rejected. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Hodges (1911) 175 Ind. 669, 94 N. E. 324, and cases cited.

[8] It is argued that the court erred in its conclusions of law-that the proposed drain should be established-for the reason that the court's findings showed that the costs, damages and expenses of the drain would exceed the benefits. The court expressly found and stated the contrary fact, and the exceptions to the conclusions of law admit the fact to be well found. If appellants desired to present to this court the question of whether the evidence sustained the findings on this question, they should have done so by the medium of a motion for a new trial on that ground. This they have not done.

mit error. It has been held uniformly by this court that such motions are not recognized by our practice. When any or all of the facts are not sustained by the evidence, or are contrary to law, or where facts should have been found, but were not, the proper remedy is by motion for a new trial. Delaney v. Gubbins (1914) 181 Ind. 188, 195, 104 N. E. 13, and cases cited; Richards v. Wilson (1916) 184 Ind., 112 N. E. 780.

The tenth error asserted involves the overruling of motions for a new trial made by appellants. Aside from questions hereinbefore determined, the questions presented by the motions for a new trial so far as they are properly presented are given consideration in the order in which they are urged.

Excluding the testimony of Bash, whose remonstrance was stricken out, was assigned as error. Bash testified as a witness, and the only testimony specifically complained of having been excluded the record shows he gave. It is true that after he answered an objection was sustained to the question, but the answer was not stricken out. But in any event the purpose of the testimony was to show that Bash's land was not benefited, and he had no remonstrance raising the issue of his benefits.

[10] The report of the commissioners was admitted in evidence as a part of the case of the petitioners in chief over objections by appellants, and complaint is made of this. The report was competent evidence, and the court did not err in admitting it. Seybold v. Rehwald, (1911) 177 Ind. 301, 310, 95 N. E. 235; Shields v. Pyles (1912) 180 Ind. 71, 81, 99 N. E. 742.

[11] It is asserted that the court erred in admitting in evidence two exhibits marked G and H. These exhibits are agreements made between the petitioners and two groups of landowners who were brought in by the report, and who were contesting their individual assessments. By them it was agreed that these assessments should be reduced to sums fixed which it was agreed represented the full benefits accruing to these lands. It does not appear that appellants offered any evidence to refute these agreements, and it is not claimed by them that the assessments so agreed upon were not the full benefit to the lands involved. If the assessments agreed upon did represent the full benefits to the lands, we cannot see why this summary method of reaching the result could have been more harmful to the appellants than the more prolonged one of hearing evidence from the persons and from the remonstrators immediately concerned.

[12] Under the remaining causes of a new trial it is made to appear that appellants' lands had many years before been heavily as[9] The action of the court in overruling sessed for drains in the upper part of the basthe separate motions of appellants to modify in for which the drain involved in this proand correct the court's special findings of ceeding was intended to give an adequate outfacts is asserted to be an error requiring re-let for the entire basin, and that those drains

adequately drained their lands. As we understand appellants' points, they contend that the court should arbitrarily have given them credit for these assessments as against the assessment made against their lands in this proceeding. To do so would have wiped out any assessments against them for this drain. It would absolve them from bearing any part of the cost of making a sufficient outlet for the waters their drains cast upon the lower part of the basin. The question before the court was: What benefits would flow to the lands of appellants from the construction

of this drain? It is not contended that there was not evidence to support the assessments against appellants' lands which the court made. To support their contention that the court should arbitrarily allow them for their previous assessments counsel for ap pellants cite section 4 of a drainage act of 1881. Acts 1881, p. 410; section 5657, Burns 1901. It needs but a glance to show that this section would have no application to the question involved here, even if such a provision were found in the present law, which it is not.

Appellants have presented no error sufficient to compel a reversal, and the judgment is affirmed.

ERWIN, J., not participating.

Appeal from Superior Court, Porter County; Harry B. Tuthill, Judge.

Suit by Isabella Carson against the Tolleston Club of Chicago, Amos W. Walker, and others. Judgment in part for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed, with instructions to grant venire de novo.

Randall W. Burns, of Chicago, Ill., John H. Gillett and Fred Barnett, both of Hammond, and Simeon P. Shope, of Chicago, Ill., for appellants. Peter Crumpacker and F. C. Crumpacker, both of Hammond, for appellee.

ERWIN, J. Appellee, Isabella Carson, brought an action against appellants, the Tolleston Club of Chicago, Amos W. Walker, and many others, to quiet her title to certain real estate in section 17, township 36 north, range 8 west, in Lake county, Ind., and described as follows: Beginning at a point in the middle of the north line of lot 2, in said section; thence south on a line parallel with the north and south middle line of said section, to the south line thereof; thence west to said north and south center line of said section; thence north along said center line to the northwest corner of said lot 2; thence east to the place of beginning. Also, commencing at a point 591.1 feet east of the southwest corner of the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter of said section; running thence east to the northeast corner of lot 3 as surveyed and designated by the Unit

TOLLESTON CLUB OF CHICAGO et al. v. ed States government in said section; thence

CARSON. (No. 22692.) *

(Supreme Court of Indiana.

Dec. 20, 1916.) 1. PUBLIC LANDS 114(3)—Patents-CoNSTRUCTION.

Where the patent from the United States to the state conveyed land according to official plats of the survey, which plats described the land by section numbers and acreage without reference to the meander line or thread of the stream, and the total acreage called for was less than the acreage would have been had it included a so-called impassable morass within the meander lines, such morass remained the property of the United States, and the patentee of the state took no title thereto.

south along the east line of said lot 3 to the south line of said section 17; thence west along said south line to a point due south of the place of beginning; thence north to the place of beginning.

Appellant Walker answered in three paragraphs: (1) In general denial; (2) claiming title to the lands described in the complaint by virtue of a quitclaim deed from appellee and her husband to an undivided interest amounting to five acres in certain described lands in which they held an undivided interest, and alleging that by previous partition [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Public Lands, proceedings lands described in the complaint Cent. Dig. §§ 317, 318; Dec. Dig. 114(3).] were set apart to appellee and husband; and 2. COURTS 97(1) — RULES OF DECISION (3) that he also acquired title by virtue of a JUDGMENT OF FEDERAL COURTS EFFECT IN tax title, purchased by him from one Dillon STATE COURTS. The judgment of a federal court on the fed-upon all the lands described in the second eral question as to what passed to the state paragraph of answer. Appellant Walker under a grant by the United States must be then filed his cross-complaint asking that his followed by state courts. title be quieted to the same lands described

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[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Courts, Cent. in appellee's complaint. Dig. § 329; Dec. Dig. 97(1).]

3. TRIAL 363(2) IMPROPER VERDICT
RIGHT TO VENIRE DE Novo.
Where there are two verdicts returned by
the jury, and the court does not send the jury
back to their room under proper instructions to
return a single verdict before their discharge,
and where the verdict of the jury is imperfect,
uncertain, or incomplete, a motion for a venire
de novo must be sustained.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. $$ 863, 869, 875; Dec. Dig.

363(2).]

Appellant Tolleston Club answered the complaint and cross-complaint in general denial.

Appellee filed her answer of general denial to Walker's cross-complaint, and also four paragraphs of affirmative answer. Her second paragraph was to the effect that the quit

claim deed from herself and husband was
fraudulently procured and never actually
delivered. Her third paragraph alleges that

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
Superseded on rehearing, see 123 N. E. 169. Rehearing denied.

the deed was made for an undivided five acres in all the lands described, and that the grantee's name was blank; that Walker was to sell the same for $1,500, and fill in the purchaser's name; and that he never sold such interest, but inserted his own name and now claims title thereunder. For her fourth paragraph of answer, she alleges that there never was any delinquent taxes on the lands of her husband and herself, but that the taxes were upon the other lands described in Walker's second paragraph of answer. Her fifth paragraph of answer alleges that no part of the lands described in the cross-complaint, except an undivided five acres thereof, belong to Walker by either of his deeds.

Appellant Tolleston Club bases its claim herein upon its title to lots 5, 6, and 7 in section 17, township 36 north, range 8 west, derived from grantors, who obtained patents therefor from the United States, under the provisions of the act of Congress entitled "An act in relation to certain unsold lands in the counties of Porter and Lake in the state of Indiana," and enacted in 1870. These lots cover all that portion of section 17 south of the meander line of the original survey. The Tolleston Club also seeks to show that it has been in possession of the same as owner and as lessee of their grantors for more than 20 years.

The cause was tried by jury, resulting in two verdicts at the November, 1912, term of the court, which were amended during the February, 1913, term. Upon the amended verdicts the court rendered judgment, which is in substance as follows: Appellee is the owner in fee simple of all the land described in her complaint, excepting therefrom an undivided interest amounting to five acres belonging to appellant Walker, and subject to the rights, if any, of appellant Tolleston Club, in and to said undivided five-acre tract south of the meander line across the described lands; and that appellee's lands are subject to a tax lien in favor of appellant Walker for the sum of $487.23, which is hereby foreclosed, and appellee is given six months in which to discharge the same, or Walker may sell under the foreclosure.

Appellant Tolleston Club assigns as errors herein the ruling of the court in granting appellee's motion to amend the verdict, in amending the verdict returned in favor of Walker; in granting appellee's motion to amend the verdict which was returned by the jury after retiring; in overruling its motions for a venire de novo, for new trial, for new trial with supplement filed therewith, in arrest of judgment, and to modify the judgment.

Appellant Walker assigns as errors the court's action in overruling his demurrers to appellee's second, third, fourth, and fifth paragraphs of answer to his cross-complaint; in setting aside the default of the Tolleston Club; in sustaining the club's motion to dis

regard his cross-complaint; in refusing to grant his motion to amend the verdict in his favor; in granting appellee's motion to amend the verdict; in amending the verdict; in overruling his motions for a venire de novo, new trial, and to modify the judgment; and in granting the motion of appellant club to modify the judgment by adding the words "nothing in this judgment shall be construed to be an adjudication as between the crosscomplainant and defendant Walker and the defendant the Tolleston Club of Chicago," and in so modifying the judgment.

Appellant Tolleston Club contends that the court erred in giving its instruction numbered 4, which is, in part, as follows:

"This action is brought by the plaintiff against the defendant Tolleston Club to quiet her title to the following described real estate in Lake county, Ind. * ** Plaintiff claims that the patent from the United States government to the state of Indiana and the patents from the state of Indiana to her remote grantor, ed States government and of the state of InAaron N. Hart, conveyed the title of the Unitdiana in and to all of the lots claimed by her. including said low, wet, and submerged lands, of said meander line, as well as the land north sometimes styled the impassable morass, south thereof. And I instruct you as a matter of law that these patents to said Aaron N. Hart conveyed all the lands both north and south of the meander line and extending southwardly to the south line of the section 17. * agreement of parties the government meander line is the border line between the lands on the north, admittedly by the Tolleston Club owned by the plaintiff Carson and the lands south of said meander line title to which plaintiff Carson and defendant Club each claim. So the issue of the lands mentioned in the complaint which presented to the jury has to do with that part lie between the government meander line on the north and the south line of section 17 on the south."

By

Appellant Tolleston Club contends that the patent of the United States to the state of Indiana did not convey to the state that portion of lots 2 and 3 claimed by appellee to extend south of the meander line of the impassable morass designated in the official plats of survey of the lands returned to the General Land Office by the Surveyor General. It is also contended that appellant Tolleston Club is the owner of the lands in dispute under patents issued to its remote grantors under the provisions of the act of Congress of 1870.

In the case of Tolleston Club v. State, 141 Ind. 197, at page 213, 38 N. E. 214, 219 (40 N. E. 690), this court was considering much the same question as here involved. It was there shown in the list of swamp lands selected in the Winamac land district, of Indiana, that "part of sections 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, and 20 amounting to 2,443.67 acres were chosen, together with all of sections 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 21, and 22, and the northwest quarter of section 23, amounting to 5,727 acres, all in township 36, range 8 west. As further shown in that case, the patent from the United States to the state of Indiana was to "the whole of sections 2, 3, 6, 7, 8,

9, 10, and 11, the whole of fractional sections 12, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22, the northwest quarter of fractional section 23." The court in passing upon the question of ownership of the land said:

Justice White, dissenting in the Kean Case, supra, concludes his very able discussion of the cases of this and other jurisdictions as follows:

The majority opinion in discussing the question said that:

"Concluding that the patents of the United "It may be observed that the riparian doctrine, States to the state of Indiana for the fractionstrictly speaking, does not apply here. In none al lots abutting upon Wolf Lake and Lake of the conveyances was the land bounded by the George did not convey title to land under the river, by the lake, or by the morass, if there is water, and that the patents subsequently issuch a thing as a meander of a marsh or morass. sued by the United States, based upon the WalNo survey was made to or abutting on the riv-cott survey of 1875, purporting to pass the tier or its meander. The sections were surveyed tle to land once a part of the beds of the lakes, in full, each one mile square and containing were valid, I dissent." 640 acres. The sections or parts of sections sold, therefore, extend, not to the morass or to the river, but to the opposite section lines. Were the survey, or any of the land bounded on the river, the lake, or the morass, then undoubtedly the riparian doctrine would apply, and the land described would extend to the thread of the Little Calumet, or Calumic, river. As it is, all the land is bounded by section lines. We are therefore of opinion that the state received good title to all the land in controversy by virtue of the act of Congress of 1850, and that the state, in selling this tract, conveyed to its grantees all the land so received, in the respective sections, both within and without the meander lines."

The court, in interpreting the term "fractional" as applied to the sections named in the patent, said that:

It "refers simply to the circumstance that they do not contain 640 acres each of dry land. As we have seen, however, the sections were fully surveyed; the corners and boundary lines were determined and recorded in each instance."

This same question arose again in Tolleston Club of Chicago v. Clough, 146 Ind. 93, 96, 43 N. E. 647, 648, and this court said: "The lands here in dispute are a part of the lands in controversy in the case of Tolleston Club v. State, supra. There it was held that the lands between the meanders of the Calumet river, including the bed of the river, were fully surveyed in 1834, and the lands so surveyed all conveyed by patent to the state before 1870; and therefore that, the government not having any such lands unsold or unsurveyed in 1870, the act of Congress for that year and all proceedings thereunder were wholly void. It follows that the appellant in the case at bar, as also in the case against the state, could have no title under the act of 1870, and the survey

thereunder, as here claimed."

The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Kean v. Calumet Canal Co. (1903) 190 U. S. 452, at page 459, 23 Sup. Ct. 651, at page 652 (47 L. Ed. 1134), said:

"On general principles of conveyancing, the state would have acquired the land in controversy here by a conveyance from the United States describing the upland according to the survey, because the local law of Indiana and the common law as understood by this court are the same, so far as this case is concerned. Stoner v. Rice, 121 Ind. 51 [22 N. E. 968, 6 L. R. A. 387]; Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U. S. 371 [11 Sup. Ct. 808, 838, 35 L. Ed. 428]. The case is stronger if the land passed under the swamp land act, as has been held by the state court with regard to this and similar patents. Mason v. Calumet Canal & Improvement Co., 150 Ind. 699 [50 N. E. 85]; Kean v. Roby, 145 Ind. 221 [42 N. E. 1011]; Tolleston Club of Chicago v. Clough, 146 Ind. 93 [43 N. E. 647]; Tolleston Club of Chicago v. State, 141 Ind. 197 [38 N. E. 214, 40 N. E. 690]. See Mitchell v. Smale, 140 U. S. 406, 414 [11 Sup. Ct. 819, 840, 35 L. Ed. 442]."

"It is not necessary to consider how we should decide the case with our present light if the question were a new one.'

States decided the case of Whitaker v. McIn 1905, the Supreme Court of the United Bride, 197 U. S. 510, 25 Sup. Ct. 530, 49 L. Ed. 857, wherein it was held that by the laws of Nebraska riparian proprietors are the owners of the bed of a stream to the center of the channel, that the government, as original proprietor, has the right to survey and sell any lands, including islands in a river or other body of water, that if it omits to survey an island in a stream and refuses, when its attention is called to the matter, to make any survey thereof, no citizen can overrule the action of the department, assume that the island ought to have been surveyed, and proceed to occupy it for the purposes of homestead or pre-emption entry, and that in such case the rights of riparian proprietors are to be preferred to the claims of the settler, said that:

Nothing therein "stated conflicts with Horne 40 L. Ed. 68], Niles v. Cedar Point Club, 175 v. Smith, 159 U. S. 40 [15 Sup. Ct. 988, U. S. 300 [20 Sup. Ct. 124, 44 L. Ed. 171], French-Glenn Live Stock Co. v. Springer, 185 U. S. 47 [22 Sup. Ct. 563, 46 L. Ed. 800], or Kirwan v. Murphy, 189 U. S. 35 [23 Sup. Ct. 599, 47 L. Ed. 698]. In the first of those cases it appeared that the survey stopped at a bayou, and did not extend to the main channel of the Indian river a mile distant; and we held that boundary of the grant, that it could not be exthe line of that bayou must be considered as the tended over the unsurveyed land between the bayou and the main channel of the Indian river, that it was a case of an omission from the survey of land that ought to have been surveyed, and that such omission did not operate to transfer unsurveyed land to the patentee of the surveyed land bordering on the bayou. In the second we held that, as the survey showed a meander line bordering on a tract of swamp or marsh lands, the grant by patent terminated at the meander line, and did not carry the swamp lands lying between it and the shores of Lake Erie. In the third, it appeared that there was no body of water in front of the meandered line, and we held that that line must therefore be the limit of the grant, and the fact that outside the side lines extended there was a body of water did not operate to extend the grant into any portion of that body of water. In the last of these cases the complainants, the owners of 859.38 acres as shown by the descriptions in their patents of fractional lots, claimed by reason thereof to be the owners of 1,202 acres lying between the meandered lines and a lake, and sought by injunction to restrain the Land Department from making a survey of these latter lands. We held that injunction would not

lie, and that the officers of the government could not be restrained from making a survey; that the rights of the complainants could be settled after a survey and transfer of the legal title from the government, by an action at law."

In Chapman & Dewey Land Co. v. Bigelow, 206 U. S. 41, 27 Sup. Ct. 679, 51 L. Ed. 953, the court held that it could not maintain jurisdiction to revise the conclusions of the Supreme Court of Arkansas which held: "That swampy lands, checked by bayous, subject to inundation, but reclaimable to some extent for agricultural purposes, lying between the government meander line and the main channel of the river, were not lands the title to which would pass to the grantee by virtue of riparian rights.'

In Chapman & Dewey v. St. Francis, 232 U. S. 186, 196, 34 Sup. Ct. 297, 299 (58 L. Ed. 564), the court said:

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"If the patent conveyed these lands to the state, we are not concerned with their subsequent disposal, for that is a question of local law. But did the patent include them? This, of course, is a federal question. * Of course, the words in the patent, "The whole of the township (except section sixteen)' are comprehensive, but they are only one element in the description and must be read in the light of the others. The explanatory words, according to the official plats of survey of said lands returned to the General Land Office of the Surveyor General,' constitute another element, and a very important one; for it is a familiar rule that, where lands are patented according to such a plat, the notes, lines, landmarks, and other particulars appearing thereon become as much a part of the patent and are as much to be considered in determining what it is intended to include as if they were set forth in the patent. * The specification of the acreage is still another element, and, while of less influence than either of the others, it is yet an aid in ascertaining what was intended, for a purpose to convey upwards of 22,000 acres is hardly consistent with a specification of 13,815.67 acres. * * * Giving to each of these elements its appropriate influence, and bearing in mind that the terms of description are all such as are usually employed in designating surveyed lands, we are of opinion that the purpose was to patent the whole of the lands surveyed, except fractional section 16, and not the areas meandered and returned, as shown upon the plat, as bodies of water. * *

"But it is said on behalf of the levee district that, even though the lands were not included in the patent, they passed to the state under the swamp land act independently of any patent, and passed thence to the district under the state act of 1893. The contention is not tenable. The lands were never listed as swamp lands, and their listing does not appear to have been even requested, doubtless because they were not surveyed. Assuming that in fact they were swamp lands, the state's title under the swamp land act was at most inchoate and never was perfected."

The court held that as the lands were not patented and, under the findings below, did not pass to the state or to the defendants by riparian right with the adjoining fractional sections and subdivisions, it follows that they remain the property of the United States.

In Producers' Oil Co. v. Hanzen (1915) 238 U. S. 325, 339, 35 Sup. Ct. 755, 760 (59 L. Ed. 1330), Justice McReynolds, after citing a long list of cases beginning with Railroad

and continuing down to Chapman v. St. Francis, supra, said:

be tedious and unprofitable; thorough acquaint"A review and analysis of these cases would ance with the varying and controlling facts is essential to a fair understanding of them. They unquestionably support the familiar rule relied on by counsel for the oil company that, in general, meanders are not to be treated as boundaries, and, when the United States conveys a tract of land by patent referring to an official plat which shows the same bordering on a navigable river, the purchaser takes title up to the water line. But they no less certainly establish the principle that facts and circumstances may be examined, and, if they affirmatively disclose an intention to limit the grant to actual traverse lines, these must be treated follow from the presence of meanders that a as definite boundaries. It does not necessarily fractional section borders a body of water and that a patent thereto confers riparian rights."

This case is cited with approval in the later case of Moss v. Ramey (1916) 239 U. S. 538, 36 Sup. Ct. 183, 60 L. Ed. 425.

The patent of the United States to the state of Indiana, in so far as it applies to the lands in question in the cause now under consideration, is as follows:

"Whereas, by the act of Congress approved September 28, 1850, entitled 'An act to enable the state of Arkansas and other states to reclaim the swamp lands within their limits,' it is provided that all the swamp and overflowed lands, made unfit thereby for cultivation within the state of Indiana, which remained unsold at the passage of said act, shall be granted to said state; and, whereas, in pursuance of instructions from the General Land Office of the United States, the several tracts or parcels of land hereinafter described have been selected as swamp and overflowed lands, inuring to the shid state, under the act aforesaid, being situated in the district of lands subject to sale at Winamac, Indiana, to wit: Whole of sections two, three, six, seven, eight, nine, ten and eleven. whole of fractional sections twelve, fifteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty, twenty-one, and twenty-two," (Here follows the description of many additional tracts of lands not included in this controversy) "all in township thirty-six north of range eight west, containing in all eleven thousand, three hundred and three acres, and thirty-nine hundredths of an acre, according to the official plats of survey of the lands returned to the General Land Office, by the Surveyor General, and for which the Governor of the said state of Indiana, did on the eighteenth day of December, one thousand, eight hundred and fifty-two request a patent to be issued to the said state, as required in the aforesaid act.

The

"Now therefore, know ye, that the United States of America, in consideration of the premises, and in conformity with the act of Congress, have given and granted, and by these presents do give and grant, unto the said state of Indiana, in fee simple subject to the disposal of the Legislature thereof, the tracts of land above described, to have and to hold the same, together with all the rights, privileges, immunities and appurtenances thereto belonging, unto the said state of Indiana, in fee simple and to its assigns forever."

We herewith include a copy of the official plat of survey of 1843 returned to the General Land Office by the Surveyor General, above mentioned, marked "Exhibit A," and a copy of official plat of survey under the act of Congress of 1870 (Act July 1, 1870, c. 199, 16

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