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bond of itself was of no value to Dunfee or chise does not arise in this case. Did it arise, anybody else. It was the guaranty in the the question is fully met and answered by those bond and what the guaranty imported that provisions of the state Constitution which auwas of value and was obtained. The com- alone, to alter or revoke any corporate law
thorize the General Assembly, and that body plaint sets forth, in addition to what has passed or special privilege conferred by the lawbeen quoted, all the facts pertaining to the making power. issuance of the bond and the payment
of the 518, 4 L. Ed. 629) was decided in 1819, Mr. Jus
When the Dartmouth College Case (4 Wheat. loss, and it should be regarded as sufficient. tice Story suggested in his opinion that the legis
The defendant relies on the case of Glea- lation of the various states conferring corporate son v. Thaw, 236 U, S. 558, 561, 35 Sup. Ct. rights and privileges, in order to avoid any inbi287, 289 (59 L. Ed. 717), which holds that se Constitution, might contain a provision reserv
bition of the contract-impairment clause of the curing the services of an attorney at lawing to the Legislature the right to amend or by false representations is not obtaining repeal the rights so conferred. In accordance "property" within section 17 of the Bank-Ohio, prior to 1851, in the legislation granting
with this suggestion various states, including rupt Law. The court there says that the corporate rights and privileges in perpetuity, exword property in section 17 is used in its pressly reserved the right to amend or repeal popular sense, and means "something sub-adopted the Constitution of 1851" they, for their
such statutes. But when the people of Ohio ject to ownership, tran er, or exclusive pos- own protection, carried these provisions for the session and enjoyment.” The difference be- right of amendment, revocation, or repeal into tween Gleason v. Thaw and the case under instrument provides that: “No special privileges
the Constitution itself. Article 1, § 2, of that consideration is obvious. The services of or immunities shall ever be granted, that may an attorney are, of course, not property of not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the Gen
eral Assembly," and article 13, § 2, provides a tangible nature, but here, if I am right, that: “Corporations may be formed under genthe bankrupt obtained money by his fraudu- eral laws; but all such laws may, from time to lent representations. Congress did not in time, be altered or repealed." These provisions tend by the Bankrupt Law
to relieve a debt of the Constitution become an integral part of
every law passed by the Legislature, and enter or from liabilities of that character.
into all legislation subsequently enacted and inI, therefore, recommend that the order ap- to every contract made or franchise thereafter pealed from be reversed, with costs, and that granted, with the same force and effect as if inthe question certified to this court by the corporated bodily into such contract or legisla
These two sections of the Constitution Appellate Division be answered in the nega- bave usually been construed together by both tive.
the state and federal courts.
The franchise granted was by its terms indefiWILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., and HIS- nite in time, and the county commissioners, be
cause of that fact, claim the authority to termiCOCK, CHASE, CARDOZO, and POUND, nate at any time, and at their will, the operaJJ., concur. HOGAN, J., not sitting.
tion of the road and oust it from its franchise
upon the public highways of the state. Order reversed, etc.
The right of occupancy of the public highways is a franchise, and as such is derived from the
state itself. It is true that municipalities and (93 Ohio St. 466)
boards of county commissioners may consent or
withhold consent for the occupation of the pubSTATE ex rel. PONTIUS, Pros. Atty.,
lic highways, and may impose terms and condiNORTHERN OHIO TRACTION & tions under which such occupancy may be had, LIGHT CO. (No. 14114.)
but the franchise itself emanates from the state, (Supreme Court of Ohio. Oct. 19, 1915.)
which has power at all times to limit the control
and supervision of its subsidiary agencies. Application by the state, on relation of one State ex rel. v. Cincinnati Gaslight & Coke Co., Pontius, prosecuting attorney,
for writ of quo 18 Ohio St. 262; State ex rel. v. Toledo Home warranto to the Northern Ohio Traction & Light Telephone Co., 72 Ohio St. 60, 74 N. E. 162; Company. Judgment for relator.
Farmer v. Columbiana County Telephone Co., A. Talmadge Synder, Pros. Atty., Henry w.) 72 Ohio St. 526, 74 N. E. 1078; Grand Trunk Harter, Jr., Asst. Pros. Atty., and Hubert 0:1 Western Ry. Co. v. South Bend, 227 U. S. 544, Pontius, all of Canton, for relator. John c: 555, 33 Sup. Ct. 303, 57 L. Ed. 633, 44 L. R. Welty, of Canton, and Kline, Clevenger, Buss 4. (N. S.) 405; Louisville v. Cumberland Tele& Holliday, of Cleveland, for respondent. R. phone Co., 224 U. S. 649, 32 Sup. Ct. 572, 56 T. Sawyer and G. M. Cummins, both of Cleve
L. Ed. 934. land, for Cleveland Trust Co.
There are many special privileges enjoyed by
corporations which do not accrue to individuals, PER CURIAM. Judgment for relator on au- occupying streets of the municipalities and the
and among others is the privilege or franchise of thority of East Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Akron, 81 Ohio St. 33, 90 N. E. 40, 26 L. R. A. (N. bighways of the state; the right of consolidation S.) 92, 18 Ann. Cas. 332.
of corporate bodies; the power to make, alter, Judgment for relator.
and regulate rates of fare, etc. Shields v. State,
26 Ohio St. 86, affirmed in Shields v. Ohio, 95 NICHOLS, C. J., and JOHNSON, WANA-U. S. 319, 24 L. Ed. 357; Railway Co. v. TeleMAKER, and MATTHIAS, JJ.,
graph Ass'n, 48 Ohio St. 390, 432, 27 N. E.
890; Greenwood_v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13, JONES, J. (dissenting). The sole question in 26 L. Ed. 961. But it has been held that while this case as presented is whether the board of these privileges and franchises, though percounty commissioners can revoke and annul a petual in form, may be revoked, this does not franchise granted by the state without having divest the vested rights of the shareholders in the power so to do delegated to it by the sov- the corporate property nor their rights of conereign authority.
tract or choses in action. Greenwood v. Freight The question of the perpetuity of the fran- Co., supra.
This brings us to the main question involved Water Co. v. Boise City, 230 U. S. 84, 33 Sup. in this case. Because the grant to the predeces- Ct. 997, 57 L. Ed. 1400; Hudson Telephone Co. sor of the defendant was indefinite in time, could v. Jersey City, 49 N. J. Law, 303, 8 Atl. 123, the board of county commissioners at any time 60 Am. Rep. 619. revoke the franchise granted the former by the In the first case Mr. Justice Lamar said state and oust it and its property from the pub- (227 U. S. on page 555, 33 Sup. Ct. 306, 57 L. lic highways? And in this connection it must Ed. 633, 44 L. R. A. [N. S.) 405): "In determinbe conceded that there is no statutory authority ing whether they would grant or refuse that conwhatever for the county commissioners to make sent the municipal authorities were obliged to such a revocation. Nor by the terms of the balance the present and prospective inconvenigrant or resolution of the county commission- ences of having trains operated through its ers to the predecessor of this defendant was streets against the advantage of having the railthere reserved such power. The question under road accessible to its citizens. It could have reconsideration is highly important, and I know fused its consent, except on terms; it could have of no adjudicated authority, under the facts forced the road to the outskirts of the town, or stated, which sanctions that view. No case bas could have permitted the company to lay tracks been cited in which this principle was sustain in the more thickly settled parts of the city. ed. The courts have held with practical una- When such consent was once given the condition nimity that wherever one of the agencies of the precedent had been performed and the street sovereign power has endeavored to revoke a franchise was thereafter held, not from the city, franchise which could only come from the state, but from the state which, however, did not it can be done only by virtue of the power di- confer upon the municipality any authority to rectly delegated by the state or reserved in the withdraw that consent, nor was there any atgrant itself under such delegation.
tempt by the council to reserve such power in There is a wide distinction between the regula- | the ordinance itself.” tive powers incidental to municipal grants based Mr. Justice Lurton delivered the opinion in upon the exercise of the police powers and the both of the cases reported in 230 U. S., and on attempt, as in this case, to evict and destroy the page 72, of 230 U. S. (33 Sup. Ct. 993, 57 L. Ed. public use. This distinction is plainly made in 1389), in the former case, said: "When that grant the case of Grand Trunk Western Ry. Co. v. was accepted and acted upon by the grantee it South Bend, supra.
became a contract between the city and the An examination of the revoking resolution of telephone company, which could not be revoked February 19, 1913, shows no complaint of the or repealed, unless the power to repeal was clearcharacter of the use made as affecting the pub- ly and unmistakably reserved." In that case lic welfare, but the resolution was based solely Mr. Justice Day delivered the dissenting opinon the claim to terminate the franchise at will ion, which was concurred in by three of his asbecause it savored of perpetuity.
sociate justices. However, it will be observed, In this particular case the county commission upon examination of this dissenting opinion, ers of Stark county, Ohio, on February 22, 1892, that there was no contention as to the principle passed a resolution granting to the predecessor that the power of revocation must be delegated of this defendant the right to construct and op- to the municipal authority, but was based solely erate an electric road on the state highway be upon the view that such delegation of authority tween Canton and Massillon. This grant was had been made by the statutes of Kentucky, for not for a definite time, neither did the resolu- Mr. Justice Day closes his opinion in the followtion of the commissioners reserve the right to ing language, page 83 of 230 U. S. (33 Sup. Ct. revoke this grant. In the meantime large in- 997, 57 L. Ed. 1389) in the Owensboro Case: vestments were made, bonds issued and the oper- "In my view the case in its present attitude ation of the road continued. Later a controversy comes to this: The permission to place poles and arose between the commissioners and the com- string wires in the city of Owensboro was grantpany as to the reduction of fares between the ed under a charter which expressly reserved the two cities, and upon disagreement relating right to repeal by subsequent act of the muthereto, the county commissioners, on the 19th nicipal Legislature." day of February, 1913, passed a new resolution, And in the New Jersey case of Hudson Telereciting that the term of grant was indefinite phone Co. v. Jersey City, supra, approvingly and continued only so long as the parties might cited by Judge Lurton in the former case, the agree. They therefore terminated the grant learned judge there stated, on page 305 of 49 and ordered the prosecuting attorney to bring N. J. Law, on page 124 of 8 Atl. (60 Am. Rep. suit ousting the company from the operation of 619): “No provision is contained in the act units franchise and directing the removal of all der which the prosecutors were incorporated its property, equipment, and belongings from the which confers upon a municipality the power to state highway. The result was this suit in quo revoke a permission once granted. The grant of warranto.
the franchise to this company was subject only As already stated, the Constitution of Ohio to a repeal or alteration by the Legislature, and has lodged the power of revocation, alteration, when that corporation had acquired vested or amendment of corporate grants and privileges, rights in the mode designated by their charter, whether perpetual or otherwise, in the legisla- it certainly was not in the power of a common tive body of the state, and it alone has the pow- council to strip them of any right so acquired." er to revoke these privileges, which it may do
A judgment of ouster has been rendered by the either on its own initiative or by expressly dele majority in this case on the authority of the gating this power to its municipal agencies. East Ohio Gas Co. v. City of Akron, 81 Ohio And in this connection it may be stated, while a St. 33, 90 N. E. 40, 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 92, 18 grant may be in terms perpetual, since the Con- Apn. Cas. 332; but that case is readily 'disstitution has reserved to the state the right to tinguished from the case at bar. In the Akron repeal, it cannot be held to be perpetual when Case the legislation of the state with reference the state acts under its constitutional preroga- to gas companies became a part of the municipal tive.
grant, and that legislation provided that the muThe following cases hold that where no power nicipalities were "empowered to regulate from to alter or repeal has been reserved, either in time to time" the price of gas, and provided the law or the municipal ordinance, any subse- further that in case the price was fixed by the quent action repealing the franchise was an im- council for a period of not exceeding ten years, pairment of the contract and unconstitutional upon written acceptance by the company, it under the contract clause of the Constitution: should not be lawful for the council to require Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. South Bend, supra; gas to be furnished at a less price during the Owensboro v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 230 U. period agreed on, not exceeding ten years. PurS. 58, 33 Sup. Ct. 988, 57 L. Ed. 1389; Boise suant to this legislation council passed an ordi
nance on the 26th day of September, 1898, grant- to be utilized in this case. This power is lodged ing the company the use of its streets and at- in the Legislature of the state. taching a condition that for the first five years Upon the facts stated, plaintiff is not entitled it should charge not exceeding 25 cents per 1,000 to a judgment of ouster. feet of gas and for the next five years not exceeding 30 cents per 1,000 feet of gas. After the expiration of ten years from September 26, the dissenting opinion.
DONAHUE and NEWMAN, JJ., concur in 1898, council passed another ordinance, fixing the price of gas to be furnished by that company at 20 cents per 1,000 feet, and providing
(94 Ohio St. 154) that the company for the ensuing ten years should not charge more than this lower rate STATE ex rel. DAVIS v. HILDEBRANT,
Secprovided by the ordinance. The company de retary of State, et al. (No. 15160.) clined to accept the terms and signified its intention of discontinuing its business in the city,
(Supreme Court of Ohio. April 18, 1916.) whereupon the city endeavored to restrain it from withdrawing, claiming that its franchise
(Syllabus by the Court.) was a perpetual one and that it was obliged to 1. UNITED STATES O11-CONGRESS-REGULAaccept the changed rates provided by the city. The plain distinction between that case and this
TION OF ELECTIONS—“LEGISLATURE." is that in the Akron Case, both by statute and of the United States Constitution, comprehends
The term “Legislature," in section 4, article 1, under the ordinance itself, a definite time could be fixed between the parties for the furnishing the entire legislative power of the state, and, of gas, with a proviso, however, in both the as so used, includes, not only the two branches statute and ordinance, that the rates for gas as expressed in the referendum provided for in
of the General Assembly, but the popular will should not be changed for a period of ten years. When this contract terminated between the par- sections 1 and 1c of article 2 of the Ohio Constities, in case there was no renewal thereof, the tution. franchise was at an end, and of course either [Ed. Note. For other cases, see United States, party could withdraw from further continuance Cent. Dig. $ 7; Dec. Dig. Om 11. under the grant. The state of Ohio had specific. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, ally authorized council to make a grant "fron First and Second Series, Legislature.) time to time," and when such a grant was made
CONGRESS CONand accepted under the provisions of that law, 2. UNITED STATES O10 the time did become definite. To hold other
GRESSIONAL DISTRICTS STATUTORY PROVIwise than it did in the Akron Case would re
SIONS. quire the parties to be held to a contract that
If a congressional redistricting act, passed by necessarily lacked mutuality, and it is so stated the General Assembly and lawfully submitted to by the judge delivering the opinion.
a referendum for popular vote under the foregoIn this case the state of Ohio did not author- ing provisions, fails of approval by a majority of ize the county commissioners to grant a fran- those voting upon the same, such act is invalid chise from time to time or to provide for any and inoperative. contract for time stipulation between the par [Ed. Note. For other cases, see United States, ties. The grant of the use of the public high- Cent. Dig. $ 6; Dec. Dig. Om 10.) way was indefinite as to time, and the principle 3. UNITED STATES Om10 CONGRESS CONinvolved here is covered by the following propositions of the syllabus in the case of Boise Wa
GRESSIONAL DISTRICTS STATUTORY PROVI
SIONS. ter Co. v. Boise City, supra: “Where there is
Under the latter clause of section 4, article no limitation in the general law of the state, nor in the charter of the city, as to duration of 1, of the United States Constitution, complete franchises for public utilities in the streets, the thereunder rests in the federal Congress, and its
and plenary power over state legislation enacted grant of an easement for that purpose, not specifying a period of duration, is in perpetuity." laws supersede all state regulations upon the "Where there is a limitation in the law of the same subject. Under its grant of power to state of duration for which easements in streets "make or alter such regulations,” Congress did, can be granted by municipalities, an easement by its apportionment act of August 8, 1911 [37 granted for an indefinite period continues for the Stat, 13, c. 5 (U. S. Comp. St. 1913, §§ 15-19)], statutory period. There is a distinction between legislate upon the subject, by recognizing as lawa definite grant for a period longer than the ful such congressional districts as may be created law of the state permits and an indefinite grant; in the manner provided by the laws of those while the former may be altogether void as an
states employing the constitutional referendum. effort to obtain that which is illegal, the latter (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see United States, is simply limited in duration to the period es. Cent. Dig. $ 6; Dec. Dig. Om10.] tablished by law, and during that time it is pro- 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Om68(1)-DISTRIBUtected from impairment by the contract clause
TION OF GOVERNMENTAL POWERS-JUDICIAL of the Constitution of the United States.” This
DEPARTMENT. distinction is also noted in Old Colony Trust Co. v. Omaha, 230 U. S. 100, 33 Sup. Ct. 967, under a law or constitutional provision which is
Where a ministerial officer assumes to act 57 L, Ed. 1410. Another distinction is that in the Akron Case although the election of an officer is indirectly in
claimed to be invalid or of doubtful construction, there was a delegated power to the municipal volved, the subject-matter becomes one for judithey could agree upon from time to time, but in cial cognizance and is not political. the present case the Legislature has granted to
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional the board of county commissioners the naked Law, Cent. Dig. $ 125; Dec. Dig. Om68(1).] authority of permitting the .county commissioners, outside of municipalities, to grant an Application by the State, on the relation easement in the public highways, and to fix of David Davis, for mandamus to C. Q. Hildeterms and conditions of construction. Sections brant, Secretary of State. Writ refused. 3438-3443, Revised Statutes.
Regulatory powers are lodged in the county This action was brought by the relator, boards to make reasonable terms and conditions David Davis, as a citizen of the United under which these highways shall be occupied, but they do not permit them to employ at their States and an elector of this state, and who mere pleasure the destructive power endeavored is a resident and elector in Hamilton county,
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
Ohio, seeking to invoke the original jurisdic- could not affect or apply to an act of the tion of this court in mandamus.
Legislature of Ohio, districting or making an The salient and pertinent facts set forth apportionment of the state of Ohio into conin the petition are as follows: On May 27, gressional districts, and that the sole power 1915, the General Assembly of the state therefor is lodged strictly in the state Legispassed an act, which was approved by the lature, irrespective of the referendum so Governor and filed in the office of the secre- authorized and employed. tary of state on June 4, 1915, redistricting A writ of mandamus is prayed for, ask. and apportioning the state into 22 congres- ing that the act of May 27, 1915, entitled sional districts, of which portions of Hamil- "An act to amend section 4828-1, General ton county constituted the first and second Code,” etc., be held valid, that the referendistricts. Prior to that time, by virtue of an dum proceedings be declared invalid, and act of the General Assembly, the state had that defendants be directed to hold, conduct, theretofore been redistricted and divided in- and supervise the several district elections to 22 congressional districts under an act ensuing in the Hamilton county districts as passed April 28, 1913 (103 Ohio Laws, 568), territorially divided in the legislative act of in which the districts, including the first and May 27, 1915. The defendants challenge second, were geographically different from
the sufficiency of the petition by a general
demurrer. the later act of May 27, 1915 (105–106 Ohio
Order affirmed 241 U. S. 565, 36 Sup. Ct. Laws, 474).
Assuming to act under article 2, § 1c, of the 708, 60 L. Ed. 1172. Constitution of Ohio, adopted in 1912, for
Keifer & Keifer, of Springfield, and Sherthe purpose of causing the later act, that of man T. McPherson, of Cincinnati, for re1915, to be submitted to the people of the lators. Edward C. Turner, Atty. Gen., T. state for their approval or rejection, a peti- S. Hogan, E. H. Moore, and J. E. Campbell, tion, containing the required number of sig. all of Columbus, and A. G. Turnipseed, of natures, was filed with the secretary of state West Union, for defendants. J. V. Campbell, conformably to law, and at the general elec- Pros. Atty., and Smith Hickenlooper, Asst. tion following, on November 3, 1915, the act Pros. Atty., both of Cincinnati, for answerof May 27, 1915, was submitted to the elec- ing defendants Board of deputy state supertors of the state for their approval or rejec-visors and inspectors of elections for Hamil. tion. At such election, however, the same did ton county. not receive, and was not approved by, a majority of the electors voting on the same. JONES, J. The question to be decided is
By reason of these facts it is alleged that succinctly stated in the brief of relator's the defendant, Hildebrant, secretary of state counsel as follows: and state supervisor and inspector of elec
"Whether or not the apportioning and redistions, and his associated defendants, who tition and referendum vote held under the Con
tricting act of May 27, 1915, was annulled by peare deputy state supervisors and inspectors stitution of Ohio." of elections for Hamilton county, now refuse, and will continue to refuse, to hold elections tion it is necessary to refer, for the purpose
For the proper determination of this quesin the year 1916 in the first and second con- of construction, to the following provisions of gressional districts composing Hamilton coun- the state and federal Constitutions, and to ty, as divided and described in the act of the laws passed pursuant thereto, so far as 1915, which was submitted to referendum and they may be germane to the proposition infailed of approval by popular vote; that
volved. delegates and alternates to political party
Section 4, art. 1, of the Constitution of the conventions and political party committeemen United States provides as follows: are required by law to be elected at the elec
"The times, places and manner of holding elections ensuing in 1916, and, furthermore, that tions for senators and representatives, shall be candidates for Congress are required to be prescribed in each state by the Legislature there elected in the several lawful congressional of; but the Congress may at any time by law districts at such ensuing election,
make or alter such regulations, except as to the
places of choosing senators." It is alleged that the state and deputy state supervisors and inspectors of elections,
Section 1, art. 2, of the Constitution of whose duty it is to provide for the machinery Ohio, as amended September 3, 1912, is as and control the elections, unless directed
follows: otherwise by the court, will proceed in the vested in a General Assembly consisting of a
"The legislative power of the state shall be conduct of elections in the several districts Senate and House of Representatives but the under the act of 1913, although it is their people reserve to themselves the power to produty to conduct the same in the districts pose to the General Assembly laws and amendas described in the act of 1915, which was the same at the polls on a referendum vote as
ments to the Constitution, and to adopt or reject subjected to referendum as aforesaid.
hereinafter provided. They also reserve the It is further alleged in the petition that power to adopt or reject any law, section of any the submission by referendum to the people passed by the General Assembly, except as here;
law or any item in any law appropriating money of the act of 1915 was void for the reason inafter provided, and independent of the general that the referendum provisions comprised in Assembly to propose amendments to the Consti
polls. The limitations expressed in the Consti- | nay vote of two-thirds of all members elected tution, on the power of the General Assembly to to each branch of the General Assembly, shall enact 'laws, shall be deemed limitations on the go into immediate effect and shall not be subpower of the people to enact laws."
ject to the referendum imposed by the preThe sections immediately following provide for the initiative and referendum powers by the General Assembly, the people have re
ceding section. As to all other laws passed reserved to the people of the state and for
served to themselves the power of adoption the method in which such powers shall be ex
or rejection. These various sections disclose ercised. Section 1c, art. 2, of the Constitution of that, while the legislative power has been
delegated to the bicameral body composed of Ohio provides that:
the Senate and House of Representatives, the "No law passed by the General Assembly shall go into effect until ninety days after it shall have people of Ohio have, by the aforesaid provibeen filed by the Governor in the office of the sec- sions of their Constitution, determined the retary of state, except as herein provided. manner by which such legislative power may When a petition, signed by six per centum of the be exercised, under what circumstances the electors of the state and verified as herein provided, shall have been filed with the secretary of laws passed by it may become operative withstate within ninety days after any law shall have out an appeal to the people, and have furbeen filed by the governor in the office of the sec- ther imposed the conditions under which retary of state, ordering that such law, section of such law or any item in such law appropriat- such laws may become operative or inoperaing money be submitted to the electors of the tive as they may have been adopted or restate for their approval or rejection, the secre-jected by the popular vote designated as the tary of state shall submit to the electors of the "referendum." state, for their approval or rejection such law, section or item, in the manner herein provided,
[1, 2] While article 1, § 4, of the United at the next succeeding regular or general elec- States Constitution is controlling upon the tion in any year occurring subsequent to six- states in so far as it grants the Legislature ty days after the filing of such petition, and no of the state authority to prescribe the times, such law, section or item shall go into effect until and unless approved by a majority of those vot- places, and manner of holding elections, this ing upon the same."
is the quantum of the federal grant. The Act Cong. August 8, 1911, c. 5, $ 4, pro- character of the Legislature, its composition vides:
and its potency as a legislative body are “That in case of an increase in the number of among the powers which are, by article 10 Representatives in any state under this appor- of said Constitution “expressly reserved to tionment such additional Representative or Rep- the states respectively, or to the people.” resentatives shall be elected by the state at large Webster's New International Dictionary deand the other Representatives by the districts now prescribed by law until such state shall be fines “Legislature” as follows: redistricted in the manner provided by the laws “The body of persons in a state, or politically thereof and in accordance with the rules enumer-organized body of people, invested with power to ated in section three of this act; and if there be make, alter and repeal laws.", no change in the number of Representatives from a state, the Representatives thereof shall be The Century Dictionary defines the same elected from the districts now prescribed by term as follows: law until such state shall be redistricted as herein prescribed.” 37 U. S. Stats, at Large, 14. "Any body of persons authorized to make laws.
or rules for the community represented by Section 5 of the same act provides:
them." "That candidates for Representative or Representatives to be elected at large in any state
Under the reserved power committed to the shall be nominated in the same manner as candi- people of the states by the federal Constitudates for Governor, unless otherwise provided by tion, the people, by their state organic law, the laws of such state."
unhindered by federal check or requirement, Does the term “Legislature," as used in may create any agency as its lawmaking article 1, § 4, of the federal Constitution, body, or impose on such agency any checks comprehend simply the representative agen- or conditions under which a law may be encies of the state, composed of the members acted and become operative. Acting under of the bicameral body, or does it comprehend this recognized authority, the Ohio Constithe various agencies in which is lodged the tution, prior to the adoption of the amendlegislative power to make, amend, and repeal ment of 1912, provided that the "legislative the laws of the state, including the power re- power” of the state should be vested in the served to the people empowering them to General Assembly, consisting of a Senate "adopt or reject any law” passed by the Gen- and House of Representatives. The same eral Assembly under the provisions of sec- provision now exists, but by the adoption of tion 1, art. 2, of the Constitution of Ohio? the amendment of 1912 the people expressly By the adoption of the Constitution of 1912, limited this legislative power by reserving as affecting the passage and finality of laws to themselves the power to reject any law passed by the General Assembly, the people by means of a popular referendum. The lawprovided for certain checks upon both the making body, the Legislature, as defined by Legislature and the people. Section id of lexicographers, comprehends every agency article 2 of the Constitution of Ohio provides required for the creation of effective laws. that laws providing for tax levies and certain It cannot be claimed that the term "Legislaemergency laws, when passed by a yea and ture" necessarily implies a bicameral body.