less manner before and at the time he reached the place of the accident; that he was driving at a high rate of speed and did not have proper control of his team. Under this state of the record the instructions objected to were given. Those instructions are as follows: of the boy, it would have been its duty to body, according to the testimony of the vaso find, and that would have been a proper rious witnesses, before the team could be finding to make. It is not within the prov- brought to a stop. It was the theory of apince of the coroner's jury to fix the civil lia-pellant upon the trial that the driver of bility of any one growing out of an accident the wagon was driving in a careless and reckresulting in the death of an injured person, except in so far as the finding required by the statute to be made may have such effect. It was not proper for the jury impaneled at this inquest to inquire whether the street railway company or any one else was legally liable to respond in damages because of the death of Samuel Novitsky. The finding in the verdict that, from the evidence introduced, had the street railway company not blockaded the tracks with cars on both sides of the street crossing the accident would not have occurred and deceased would not have lost his life, and the censure of the street railway company, are mere surplusage, and it was not proper to admit the verdict in evidence with those portions included. As the verdict was offered as a whole, and undoubtedly with a desire to present these very portions of it for the consideration of the jury, the objection of appellant to its admission should have been sustained. [5] The verdict is inaccurate, as it described the accident as having occurred at or near the corner of Eighteenth street, whereas it was near the corner of Nineteenth street, on Archer avenue. We do not regard this variance as of such materiality as to make the proper portions of the verdict in admissible, as there is no contention that this is not the verdict of the jury impaneled to make the inquisition regarding the death of appellant's intestate. [6] It is further contended that the court erred in giving defendant's instructions numbered 2, 12, and 13. The testimony offered on the part of appellant tended to prove that Martin, the driver of the ice wagon, and his helper, were coming south on State street at a rapid rate of speed; that when Nine teenth street was reached the driver turned his horses as though he intended going west on that street; that he then turned in a circle to the south, made another circle to the west and entered the north side of Archer avenue, some of the witnesses describing the course he pursued in making these turns as forming the letter S; that the driver and his helper were both sitting on a seat at the front end of the wagon with a high partition at the back of the seat; that the driver was driving with a loose line, so that he could not quickly or properly control his team; that the driver was intoxicated and his helper was whipping the horses with the loose ends of the lines; that, as the wagon passed the street cars standing on the tracks in Archer avenue near the crosswalk, appellant's deceased came past the west end of the cars standing in Archer avenue; that he collided with one of the horses and was knocked down and run over by the wagon, "(2) The court further instructs you that if you believe, from the evidence, that the plaintiff's intestate suddenly started street ahead of defendant's wagon in question, across the and that the driver of said wagon did not see or have a reasonable opportunity to see that time to avoid a collision with the said deceased, the plaintiff's intestate intended so doing in then your verdict must be not guilty." "(12) The court instructs you that if you believe, from the evidence, that at and just before the time of the accident in question there was one or more street cars standing in Archer avenue a little west of the west line of State street, and if you further believe that the plaintiff's intestate, Samuel Novitsky, ran across Archer avenue in a northerly or northeasterly direction west of said street car or cars and near to the same, and if you further believe that the said Samuel Novitsky came within the range of the vision of the driver of the defendant's wagon when said wagon and team were so close to the said Samuel Novitsky that the said driver by the exercise of ordinary care in driving said team and in trying to stop said team was unable to avoid colliding with and fatally injuring said Samuel Novitsky, then your verdict in this case must be not guilty. And if you believe the facts as above stated, you cannot find the defendant guilty, although you should believe that the defendant's driver was under the influence of liquor. "(13) The court instructs you that if you believe, from the evidence, that the plaintiff's intestate collided with defendant's team at or about the westerly end of one or more street cars standing in Archer avenue entirely west of State street, and if you further believe that the westerly end of said car or cars and came the said Samuel Novitsky ran northerly from within the range of vision of the driver of defendant's wagon when said team and wagon were so close to said Samuel Novitsky that the care in driving and in attempting to stop, could driver of said wagon, by exercising ordinary not avoid running into and fatally injuring said Samuel Novitsky, then your verdict must be not guilty. And if you believe the facts as above stated, you cannot find the defendant guilty even though you should believe the defendant's driver was under the influence of liquor." Each of these instructions directs a verdict, and each of them ignores entirely the testimony on the question of the negligence of the driver and the lack of the exercise of ordinary care on his part, offered by appellant. It was not sufficient that the driver of the wagon should begin to exercise ordinary care from the moment the boy came within the range of his vision. He could see the cars standing in the street at or near the crosswalk. He admitted that he knew that this was a crowded thoroughfare at all times of the day and that many people were liable to be crossing Archer avenue on the west side of State street. It was incumbent may possibly happen. Cent. Dig. §§ 5, 6; Dec. Dig. 4(2).] 2. PERPETUITIES 4(7) WILL CON proaching this crosswalk and in passing these that a violation of the rule against perpetuities cars, as well as to exercise ordinary care after anyone came in view around the west end of the cars. By these instructions the jury were told, in effect, that the only duty devolving upon the driver was to begin to exercise ordinary care after he saw the boy, without regard to the rate of speed he was traveling, the manner in which he was handling his team, his condition as to sobriety, and as to whether, up to that point, he had been in the exercise of ordinary care. The court erred in giving these instructions. [7] The seventeenth instruction told the jury that if they believed, from the evidence, that the parents of the deceased, or either of them, were negligent in allowing him to go upon the street at the time and place of the accident, they should find appellee not guilty. It is complained that there is no evidence upon which to base this instruction. Appellant is in no position to complain of the giving of this instruction on behalf of appellee, as he asked and had given an instruction submitting this same question to the jury. [8] Appellee contends that the admission of the coroner's verdict in evidence is no longer open to question, for the reason that on the first appeal to the Appellate Court the case was reversed for the refusal of the court to admit the verdict in evidence, and that that holding has become the law of the case and is binding upon this court. This question has been conclusively settled contrary to the contention of appellee. Bailey v. Robison, 244 Ill. 16, 91 N. E. 98, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 305. * * A will, after making particular bequests, disposed of the residue of the testator's estate by dividing it into four equal parts. It gave the first part to the testator's brother for life, and, subject to such life estate, gave for life onefifth of such first part to the brother's son, onetenth to his grandson, one-tenth to his granddaughter, one-fifth to each of his sons, and onefifth to his daughter, and then, subject to such life estates, gave such first part "to the children of said children and grandchildren, * * the child or children of any deceased child to and in the take the parent's part, event any of said children or grandchildren above named shall ultimately die without descendants or descendant him or her surviving, his or her portion shall go to his or her brother or brothers, sister or sisters, or in case both of the said grandchildren shall so die without descendants or descendant then to his or her uncles and aunt and their descendants, * for life and in remainrespectively, Held, that the manner in which the estate mender to their respective children, as aforesaid." tioned in the final devise went to the uncles and aunt and their descendants was to the uncles and aunt for life and any remainder to estates created thereby must vest within the their respective children, and that therefore the time limited by the rule against perpetuities. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Perpetuities, Cent. Dig. § 12; Dec. Dig. 4(7).] 3. WILLS 443-CONSTRUCTION. * A will will not be given a construction inconsistent with the decedent's general scheme for the disposition of his property unless the language used imperatively requires it and can be given no other reasonable construction. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. § 960; Dec. Dig. 443.] 4. PERPETUITIES [9] Appellee also contends that the three instructions, numbered 2, 12, and 13, complained of, were given on the second trial, and as appellant on the first appeal to the Appellate Court failed to assign cross-errors questioning the action of the court in giving them he is now estopped to question those instructions. There is no force to this contention. Appellant was not injured by the giving of these instructions upon the second trial, as the verdict and judgment were in his favor. He has the right now, judgment having been rendered against him, to ty; Norman L. Jones, Judge. complain of the action of the court in giving these instructions. 4(7)-DEVISES-VALIDITY. Where the devises to surviving brothers and sisters were to take effect on the death of a life tenant living at testator's death, they were not violative of the rule against perpetuities on the ground that other brothers and sisters might be born after decedent's death, and that a proand sisters should be joint tenants violated such Ivision that husbands and wives of the brothers rule because the brothers and sisters might marry spouses born after testator's death. For the errors indicated, the judgments of the Appellate and superior courts are reversed, and the cause is remanded to the superior court for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. (276 Ill. 164) [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Perpetuities, Cent. Dig. § 12; Dec. Dig. 4(7).] Appeal from Circuit Court, Morgan Coun Bill by George Wood against Iven Wood and others. From decree for defendants, complainant appeals. Affirmed. M. T. Layman, of Jacksonville, for appellant. Worthington, Reeve & Green, of Jacksonville, for appellees. DUNN, J. James Wood died on March 26, 1915, leaving a will. His heirs were his brothers, Richard S., Iven, and George, his sister, Julia A. Beekman, the descendants of his deceased brothers, Milton and David, and the descendants of two half-brothers named A devise is void where the interests devised Smith. He left a widow, who renounced the are dependent on testamentary provisions such will. His estate, worth about $225,000, con WOOD v. WOOD et al. (No. 10968.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 21, 1916.) 1. PERPETUITIES 4(2) DEVISE OF INTEREST-VALIDITY. 1 For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes not be entirely clear, I will and direct that it shall in all cases be taken to mean that the several portions are devised to the succeeding generations per stirpes and not per capita, where, as in two instances, two generations are named, so that the members of each generation shall share and share alike in the portion that is or would have been devised to their parent.' sisted mostly of real estate. His brother "Twelfth. Lest the language of my will may George, and the descendants of his brother Milton and of the deceased half-brothers, took nothing under the will. George filed a bill in the circuit court of Morgan county praying that the will be set aside on the ground that it violated the rule against perpetuities. A demurrer was sustained to the bill, it was dismissed for want of equity, and the complainant appealed. Other provisions of the will are not deemed necessary to notice. Five codicils were subsequently added to the will, one of which refers to the fact that the testator did not mention his brother George or the descend The will makes a number of devises and bequests which are not involved in this proceeding. The part of the will which is ques-ants of his deceased brother Milton as devtioned is that which disposes of the residue of the estate, which the testator divided specifically into four equal parts, making provision for the equalization of the parts in accordance with his estimate of the value of the property included in each part. Paragraph 8 then disposes of the first part as follows: isees under his will for reasons which seem sufficient to him and that he mentions them simply for the purpose of emphasizing that he has purposely selected the persons named as devisees as the sole and only persons and corporations among whom his estate is to be distributed. Another codicil modifies the will so as to direct that the wives of Iven Wood and Richard Wood shall be joint tenants with their respective husbands, and the husband of Julia A. Beekman shall be a joint tenant with her, with the right of survivorship for life. "Eighth. Said first part, subject to said conditional charge, I give, devise and bequeath to my brother David Wood for and during his natural life. Subject to the life estate of my said brother I give, devise and bequeath one-fifth of said first part to his son Ballard Wood, onetenth to his grandson, Albert Stice, one-tenth to [1] The circuit court held that the final dehis granddaughter, Bertha Stice, one-fifth each to his sons Samuel Wood and Richard Wood, vise in the eighth paragraph of the will, in and one-fifth to his daughter, Martha Wood, for case of the death of both of the grandchiland during their respective natural lives. Sub- dren of David Wood without descendants, to ject to the life estate of my said brother David their uncles and aunt and their descendants, Wood, and to the respective life estates in his children and grandchildren above named, I give, was a violation of the rule against perpetuidevise and bequeath said first part to the chil- ties and therefore void, but that the remaindren of said children and grandchildren, re- der of paragraph 8 was valid; that the valid spectively, above named, lawfully begotten, the child or children of any deceased child to take provisions of said paragraph and the said the parent's part in equal shares, share and void limitation over are separable; that the share alike, and in the event any of said corpus of the estate was disposed of by the children or grandchildren above named shall valid provisions of paragraph 8; and that ultimately die without descendants or descendant him or her surviving, his or her portion shall go, irrespective of the date of such death, to his or her brother or brothers, sister or sisters, or in case both of said grandchildren shall so die without descendants or descendant, then to his or her uncles and aunt and their descendants, respectively, in equal shares, share and share alike, for life and in remainder to their respective children, as aforesaid." Paragraph 9 disposes of the second part to his brother Iven, Iven's three sons and daughter, and one grandson and one granddaughter, in the same language as paragraph 8, except that in the final clause the words "and their descendants," after the words "his or her uncles and aunt," are omitted. Paragraph 10 disposes of the third part of the residue to testator's brother Richard and his three daughters in substantially the same language, except that, there being no grandchildren involved, the devise in case of the death of both grandchildren without descendants contained in paragraph 8, was omitted. The fourth part was disposed of by the eleventh paragraph of the will to the testator's sister, Julia A. Beekman, and her three children, in substantially the same language as the third part was disposed of by paragraph 10. The following is the twelfth paragraph of the no other provision of the will violates the rule against perpetuities. "The rule against perpetuities is thus stated: 'No interest subject to a condition precedent is good unless the condition must be fulfilled, if at all, within twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.' 'No interest is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest.' Gray on Perpetuities, § 201; Owsley v. Harrison, 190 Ill. 235 [60 N. E. 89]; Lawrence v. Smith, 163 Ill. 149 [45 N. E. 259]; Howe v. Hodge, 152 Ill. 252 [38 N. E. 1083]. If provisions of a testamentary character are such that under them a violation of the rule against perpetuities may possibly happen, then the devise of interests dependent upon such provisions is void. Eldred v. Meek, 183 Ill. 26 [55 N. E. 536, 75 Am. St. Rep. 861, and cases cited supra." Quinlan v. Wickman, 233 Ill. 39, 84 N. E. 38, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 216. [2] Counsel for the appellant insists that the last clause of paragraph 8 of the will is obnoxious to the above rule because he says, it devises an estate upon the death of the survivor of the two grandchildren without descendants, to the descendants of the uncles and aunt of such survivor for life with the remainder to the children of such descendants, and the tenants of the life estate so created may be the descendants of the death, while their children who are to take | mentioned in the preceding part of the the remainder may not be born until more clause. Referring back, we find that the dethan 21 years after the death of the grand- vise to the uncles and aunt and their de children of David Wood, thus postponing the scendants is to Ballard Wood, Samuel Wood, vesting of the remainder in them beyond the Richard Wood, and Martha Wood for life period fixed by the rule. If this view of with remainder to their respective children, the estate intended to be created is correct, the child or children of any deceased child the conclusion that it violates the rule fol- to take the parent's part, and, in the event lows, and this view was taken by the circuit any child shall die without a surviving decourt; but in our judgment it is incorrect. scendant, his part to go to his or her brother The general scheme of the testator for the or brothers, sister or sisters. It is to this disposition of his property is manifest. devise that the testator refers when making After providing for certain specific legacies the devise over upon the death of both the and expenditures, he intended to divide the grandchildren without issue, and to save the residue of the estate equally among his repetition of the prolix terms necessary to brothers David, Iven, and Richard and his provide for the various contingencies consister, Julia, giving to each a one-fourth part templated he directed that the estate should of his estate for life, with remainder after go "to his or her uncles and aunt and their the death of each to their respective chil- descendants, respectively, for life dren named in the will, in equal parts, for and in remainder to their respective children, life, with final remainder in fee, after as aforesaid." The manner in which the esthe death of each of such children to their tate went to the uncles and aunt and their respective children constituting the third descendants, as aforesaid, was to the uncles generation, treating the grandchildren of his and aunt for life and in remainder to their brothers George and Iven the same as chil-respective children, and this was the mandren, except that each took only half of a ner in which the estate mentioned in the child's share. David died in the testator's final devise was intended to go. lifetime, so that his life estate never took effect; but the construction of the will is not affected by that fact. Upon the testator's death the life estate in the part of the property included in paragraph 8 of the will vested in the four children and two grandchildren of David Wood, and paragraph 8 disposed of the remainder in the life estate of each child and grandchild to his or her children, provided that, if any such children Ishould have died before the termination of the life estate, the child or children of such deceased child should take the parent's part. It was then provided that, if any of the children or grandchildren of David Wood should die without descendants surviving, his or her portion should go to his or her brother or brothers, sister or sisters. The further pro-devise is apparent, and a construction which vision was made "in case both of said grandchildren shall so die without descendants or descendant." The word "so" here refers back to the expression in the preceding clause, “in the event any of said children or grandchildren above named shall ultimately die without descendants or descendant him or her surviving," and indicates that the death without descendants referred to was death without descendant or descendants surviving. The devise in case both of said grandchildren should so die without descendant or descendants was "then to his or her uncles and aunt and their descendants, respectively, • for life and in remainder to their respective children, as aforesaid." The expression "as aforesaid" refers back to the previous devise to the uncles and aunt of the grandchildren and their descendants, and indicates that the gift over after the death without descendants of both the grandchildren is of the same character as the devise to the uncles and aunt and their descendants [3] This construction is consistent with the clearly manifest general intent of the testator that his sister and each of his named brothers should take an estate for life; that the next generation, being their children who are named, including the four grandchildren named, should next take a life estate; and that the children of this generation, being the third generation, should take the fee. A construction which would give to the children of one of David Wood's children who had died the fee in the portion of the property in which his parent had had a life estate, but only a life estate in the portion in which the grandchildren had had a life estate, would be unreasonable. No purpose of the testator in making such an irrational arrives at a result so inconsistent with the general scheme of the testator for the disposition of his property will not be adopted unless the language used imperatively requires it and can be given no other reasonable construction. If the last devise in paragraph 8 takes effect, the estate thereby created, upon the death of the last surviving grandchild of David Wood, will vest at once for life in Ballard Wood, Samuel Wood, Richard Wood, and Martha Wood, with remainder in fee to their children. If any of them are without children, this remainder will be contingent; but it must vest, if at all, during the lives of the persons named. If any of them are dead, the fee will vest at once, on the death of the survivor of the grandchildren, in their children. The estates created by this paragraph must therefore vest within the time limited by the rule. Nothing further need be said about the remaining paragraphs, for if the estates limit ed by paragraph 8 are valid there is no rea- [of the railroad company for delinquent taxes son for holding those limited by the other levied for park purposes in the city of Taylorparagraphs invalid. ville, the relator appeals. Affirmed. pellee. [4] It is suggested that the devise, in cer- Edward E. Adams, of Taylorville, for appeltain contingencies, to surviving brothers and lant. John E. Hogan, of Taylorville, for apsisters, violates the rule because other brothers and sisters may be born after the death of the testator, and that the provision that husbands and wives shall be joint tenants also violates the rule because the brothers and sister might marry spouses born after the death of the testator. The will speaks from the testator's death, and therefore refers to wives and husbands who were such wives and husbands at that time. All the devisees to surviving brothers and sisters were to take effect upon the death of a life tenant living at the testator's death and were therefore within the rule. The circuit court was wrong in its conclusion as to the eighth paragraph of the will but right in sustaining the demurrer. The will did not violate the rule against perpetuities, and the decree will be affirmed. Decree affirmed. (276 IlI. 92) CARTER, J. The Wabash Railroad Company, appellee, filed in the county court of Christian county in April, 1916, objections to the rendition of judgment against certain of its property for delinquent taxes levied for park purposes in the city of Taylorville, in said county. The objections were sustained and judgment refused as to said tax for park purposes, amounting to $89.43. This is an appeal from that decision. The city of Taylorville passed its tax levy ordinance for the annual tax, including $5,500 levied upon the taxable property of the city for park purposes. The sole question involved in this appeal is whether the amount of taxes for park purposes in cities under 50,000 population in this state should be controlled by the act with reference to tax for park purposes, approved and in force June 29, PEOPLE ex rel. DAVIS, County Collector, v. 1915 (Laws of 1915, p. 291), which provides, WABASH R. CO. (No. 10944.) (Supreme Court of Illinois. Dec. 21, 1916.) 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 958-TAXES -STATUTORY PROVISION. That Act June 29, 1915 (Laws 1915, p. 291), authorizing a park tax by cities of less than 50,000 population, provided the inhabitants of any city or village having a population of 1,500 or more shall by vote so determine, was passed as an emergency act, does not limit its application to cities of less than 50,000 population where such emergency existed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations. Cent. Dig. §§ 2023-2037; Dec. Dig. 958.] 2. STATUTES 159-REPEAL BY IMPLICATION. TIME OF among other things, that cities of less than 50,000 population may levy a park tax, not to exceed three mills on the dollar, on the property in said city or village, and providing, further, "that if the inhabitants of any city or village having a population of 1,500 or more shall by vote so determine, said annual tax may be levied in addition to or in excess of taxes levied as limited by section 1 of article 8 of 'An act for the incorporation of cities and villages,' approved April 10, 1872, and the amendatory acts thereto," or whether they should be controlled by the provisions of the act of 1901, as amended in 1905, 1909, 1913, and 1915. Laws of 1915, p. 572. This latter act provides, among other things, that in reducing the rate per cent. of the tax levied for county purposes "the rate per cent. of the tax levy for city or village purposes (exclusive of library, school and park purposes and exclusive of the taxes levied for the payment of the principal of and the interest on bonded indebtedness and * * in cities and villages judgment), having a population of less than 150,000 shall not be reduced below a rate of $1.20 on each $100 assessed value," etc. It is conceded that the population of the city of Taylorville is 5,442; that the tax levy for park purposes is in excess of $1.20 on the $100; that no vote authorizing the tax was taken in the city of Taylorville before the levy; Appeal from Christian County Court; C. that if the tax levy for park purposes in said A. Prater, Judge. city of Taylorville must be controlled by said Proceeding by the People, on the relation Park Tax Law approved June 29, 1915, then of J. J. Davis, County Collector, against the the objection of appellee was rightly sustainWabash Railroad Company. From the refused in the county court. 1. STATUTES 2254 VALIDITY OF TAX [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 304; Dec. Dig. 2254.] al to render judgment against the property The act authorizing a two mill tax for |