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in their respective statements remained un-in proper form and within the time prescribpaid. But to obtain the benefit of the bonded were delivered to the mayor and the chairgiven to the city by the bonding company as man then in office by a deputy sheriff acting security for payment by the contractor of for the company, who is to be treated as its their several demands, each appellant was re- agent for this purpose, and not as an officer quired to file with the officers who contract in engaged in the service of civil process. The behalf of the city, "a sworn statement of his trustees urge that what was done did not conclaim within sixty days after the completion stitute a filing within the statute. But useof the work." St. 1904, c. 349, re-enacted in less and vain formalities are not essential. St. 1909, c. 514, § 23. The remedy being cre- The word "file" as there used is equivalent ated by statute a compliance with its provi- to the words "give notice to the officers" or sions is requisite to the establishment of an "serve notice upon the officers" in the manner equitable lien on the security. Tower v. Mil. prescribed. It unnecessary for the ler, 211 Mass. 113, 114, 97 N. E. 748. The claimant's agent handing the papers to the reason why the claim should be filed as the officers to see what endorsement if any was statute requires is for the protection of the made thereon, or to ascertain where the pacity as pointed out in Tower v. Miller. It is pers were deposited. The claim was file plain that if the office is vacated by resigna- within the statutory requirement when delivtion or failure of re-election the former in-ered to, and received by them. Wood v. Sicumbent owes no further duty of supervision mons, 110 Mass. 116, 117; Reed v. Acton, 120 and of administration to the municipality in Mass. 130. The claim of Jenkins Brothers whose behalf the contract was made. While should not have been allowed. The stateunder section 23, the security taken whether ment sent by registered letter to each of the "by bond or otherwise" can be marshalled officers who signed the contract, and to the for the benefit of those who perform or fur- mayor then in office and to the clerk of the nish labor or materials used, section 22 con- committee on city property, although duly fers upon workmen a right of action against received was not filed with the proper officers the city for unpaid labor, and if the plaintiff in conformity with the statute. It therefore recovers the city can obtain indemnity under becomes unnecessary to consider the further the bond where the instrument so provides. question whether this claim was seasonably St. 1904, c. 349, R. L. C. 25, § 57. But if the presented. The master having found that signatory officers are not continued in office the contractor and bankrupt failed in peruntil the contract is fully performed and for formance, the city upon default was authorsixty days thereafter, their successors cloth- ized under article five of the contract to comed with the same powers become the officers, plete the work and to deduct the cost from with each of whom the claim is to be filed. the contract price, and even in the absence of The officers during the entire period shown this provision it would bave had the right to by the record who were empowered under recoupment. Hunter V. Boston, 218 Mass. the ordinances to execute contracts author- 535, 106 N. E. 145; Norcross Bros. v. Vose, ized by the city council for the erection of a 199 Mass. 81, 94, 95, 85 N. E. 468. The bondnew high school building were the mayor, and ing company at the request of the city having the chairman of the committee on city prop- performed the work which the master finds erty. If the mayor and chairman who signed "was necessary to complete the contract and for the city had continued in office a filing of that the price paid therefor was reasonable" the claim with each of them would have sat- the city could rightly deduct the payment isfied the statute. But upon their retirement made to the company. Pelatowski v. Black, the claims should have been filed with their 213 Mass. 428, 429, 100 N. E. 831, and cases successors. The filing of a claim with the cited; Bernz v. Marcus Sayre Co., 52 N. J. city clerk, or the city treasurer, or the clerk Eq. 275, 30 Atl. 21. And the sum remaining of the committee not having been authorized, would constitute the fund which the claimand the claims of the appellants never having ants seek to charge in liquidation of their been filed with the mayor and with the chair- respective debts. Burr V. Mass, School for man of the committee on city property in Feeble-Minded, 197 Mass. 357, 83 N. E. 883; office when the alleged right of participation E. I. Dupont De Nemours Powder Co. v. Culaccrued, these debts were rightly disallowed. gin-Pace Contracting Co., 206 Mass. 585, 589, We express no opinion on the question wheth- 590, 92 N. E. 1023. The decree is to be moder the filing would have been sufficient if it ified by the disallowance of the claim of Jenappeared that the chairman actually received kins Brothers, and by correspondingly inthe papers from the clerk of the committee creasing the amount payable to the trustees, before the limitation bad expired. The and as thus modified it is affirmed. New maining questions are presented by the ap- York Bank Note Co. v. Kidder Press Mfg. Co., peal of the trustees. The statements of the 192 Mass. 391, 409, 78 N. E. 463. debt due to the New England Iron Company Ordered accordingly.
(225 Mass. 255)
fied with the provision requiring her to proREARDON et al. v. REARDON et al. cure Philip's consent in mortgaging the prop(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. erty. The wife requested her husband to Essex. Nov. 29, 1916.)
convey the property to her, impressing upon 1. EQUITY Cm 409–REFERENCE TO MASTER— him “that she had worked hard in her youngFINDINGS EFFECT – “USE THE CHILDREN er days and did not care how hard she workALIKE.'
In a suit to establish a trust in favor of ed; that she had really slaved in her youngall the children in lands conveyed by the mother er days to keep a roof over her head.” The to one child, where the master found that the husband was persuaded and conveyed the property was conveyed by the father to the mother under an agreement that the mother property to his wife June 14, 1905. would use the children alike, an inference of  Out of conflicting oral testimony the fact by the judge that the words “use the chil- master finds that the wife "made, in subdren alike" did not mean an agreement to dis- stance, an agreement that, if he would deed pose of the property equally among the children or to the children at all is justified as a the property to her, she would use the chillogical inference from the facts found and from dren alike; and that he transferred said propthe natural claim of the wife that she shoulderty to her because of said agreement and rehave the property which resulted as the fruit of the joint labor and sacrifice of herself and lying upon it.” As a supplementary inferhusband, and that she should be left to deal fair-ence of fact, made necessary by the absence ly with those of her own flesh and blood.
of a finding of fact by the master, the judge [Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Equity, Cent. found that the words “use the children Dig. 88 904, 920–923; Dec. Big. Om409.]
alike,” or equivalent words, "did not mean, 2. APPEAL AND ERROR Om 1022(2)-REVIEW
and were not understood to mean, any agree FINDINGS OF FACT.
The finding of fact by the judge and the ment to dispose of the property equally master, supported by reported testimony and among the children or even to the children at by subsidiary facts, cannot be said to be clear- all." While it might well have been inferred ly wrong.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and from all the circumstances, including the Error, Cent. Dig. § 1416; Dec. Dig. Om 1022(2).] terms of the will of the husband, that the
agreement "to use the children alike" had Appeal from Superior Court, Essex Coun
reference to and was intended to provide for ty; Robert F. Raymond, Judge.
Bill in equity by Philip J. Reardon and an equal division of such property as remainothers against Ann C. Reardon and others to ed unexpended at the death of the wife, nevhave a trust declared in certain property. ertheless, when consideration is given to the Decree for defendants, and plaintiff's appeal. natural, just and legitimate claim of the Affirmed.
wife that she should have the property which
the husband possessed as the fruit of his and Guy Newball and John M. Harney, both of her joint labor and sacrifices, and that she Lynn, for appellants. Edwd. S. Underwood "should be left to deal fairly and justly with and Henry R. Mayo, both of Lynn, for appel. those of her own flesh and blood, and when lees.
regard is had to the fact that the agreement
in dispute is meager, is bare of words of cerPIERCE, J. No exception was taken to tainty, and is capable of diverse interpretathe master's report, and it establishes, with tions, the inference of fact found by the the inferential facts found by the judge in judge, as a logical conclusion from the facts résponse to the request of the plaintiffs to found by the master, was justified. Amerreport the material facts, under R. L. C. 159, ican Circular Loom Co. v. Wilson, 198 Mass.
23, the following facts: On July 18, 1904, 182, 200, 84 N. E. 133, 126 Am. St. Rep. 409; Jeremiah Reardon, being then seised of cer- Smith v. Kenney, 213 Mass. 6, 99 N. E. 468; tain real estate, made a will leaving said Fairbanks v. McDonald, 219 Mass. 291, 106 real estate to his wife for life and after her N. E. 1000. death to his children, share and share alike.
With the finding that there was no agreeThe wife, Ann C. Reardon, was nominated ment to dispose of the property equally executrix and was empowered to mortgage among the children, the remaining facts warthe real estate and to make necessary re- ranted the finding of the judge and of the pairs or desired improvements with the writ- master "that both Jeremiah Reardon and his ten consent of the plaintiff Philip J. Rear- wife at the time of this conveyance underdon.
stood that the property was to be absolutely Prior to the time of their deaths, Jeremiah Ann C. Reardon's and that she was to have and Ann lived upon the estate with their full power of disposing of the property as unmarried daughter, Anastatia. All the oth- she saw fit." er children were married and living away  The finding of the judge and of the from their father's house. Neither Mrs. master "that the deed conveying said real Reardon nor any of the children, except Phil- estate to Anastatia was made by her (Ann] ip, knew of Mr. Reardon's purpose to make a voluntarily without being unduly or impropwill until after its execution. Before Mr.erly influenced thereto by Anastatia and that Reardon's death, his wife learned of the con- she so made it because she desired to prefer tents of the will and was very much dissatis- Anastatia on account of the care she had
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
been given by her daughter for many years Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk and because she thought she might do this County; Robert F. Raymond, Judge. without injustice to the other children, and Action by Philip W. Jacobs, trustee in that at the time of making said deed she was bankruptcy of the estate of Robert M. Robinof sound mind," cannot be said to be clearly son, against Jacob Saperstein. There was a wrong, as it is supported by reported testi- directed verdict for defendant, and plaintiff mony and by subsiduary facts. Harvey- excepts. Exceptions sustained. Watts Co. v. Worcester Umbrella Co., 193 Mass. 138, 142, 78 N. E. 886, and cases cited. Blanchard & Blanchard, of Boston, for de
Jacobs & Jacobs, of Boston, for plaintit. We do not find it necessary to decide
fendant. whether a constructive trust could be enforeed were the facts such as they are claimed to have been by the plaintiff. See Basford BRALEY, J. [1-4] The jury would have v. Pearson, 9 Allen, 387, 85 Am. Dec. 764; been justified in finding on the evidence of the Twomey v. Crowley, 137 Mass. 184; Moran bankrupt and of the expert accountant who v. Somes, 154 Mass. 200, 28 N. E. 152; Ames had examined the books, that through the Lectures on Legal History, 429, 431. Compare: months of October and November, 1913, when 12 Mich. Law Rev. 444. The facts as found the defendant received the payments which do not establish an express or constructive the trustee seeks to recover, the bankrupt, a trust and the decree must be affirmed.
trader, was unable to meet his financial obSo ordered.
ligations as they matured in the ordinary
course of business. And upon a comparison (225 Mass. 300)
of assets and liabilities as shown by the recJACOBS V. SAPERSTEIN,
ord it clearly appears, that during that time
as well as at the date of adjudication he was (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
hopelessly insolvent. U. S. St. July 1, 1898, Suffolk, Dec. 1, 1916.)
c. 541, § 1, cl. 15, 30 Stat. 544 (U. S. Comp. 1. BANKRUPTCY_M303(1) RECOVERY OF St. 1913, $ 9585); Hewitt v. Boston Straw PREFERENCE-KNOWLEDGE OF CREDITOR.
In action by a trustee in bankruptcy to re- Board Co., 214 Mass. 260, 263, 101 N. E. 424. cover a preference, the trustee need not prove The plaintiff being no longer required to absolute knowledge by the creditor, but only prove the intention of the bankrupt to confer such circumstances as would lead an intelligent a preference, and there being no contention and prudent man to believe that the transfer would give him a preference over other credi- that if the payments stand the defendant will tors; the creditor comes within the inhibition of not obtain a greater percentage than other the Bankruptcy Act where the substantial facts, creditors of the same class, or that the payare of such significance as fairly to warrant the inference that he knew or ought to have known ments were not made within four months of the bankrupt's financial condition.
prior to adjudication, the only question for [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bankruptcy, decision is, whether there was any evidence Cent. Dig. &458, 459; Dec. Dig. Om303(1).), for the jury, that when the payments were 2. BANKRUPTCY 304 PREFERENCE received the defendant had reasonable cause
KNOWLEDGE OF CREDITOB QUESTION OF to believe that his debtor was insolvent. FACT.
In an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to Hewitt v. Boston Straw Board Co., 214 Mass. recover a preference, the question of the credi- 260, 264, 265, 101 N. E. 424; Rogers v. Amertor's knowledge is one of fact, depending on ican Halibut Co., 216 Mass. 227, 229, 103 N. the evidence in each case. (Ed. Note. -For other cases, see Bankruptcy, The trustee need not prove absolute knowl
E. 689, and cases and statutes there cited. Cent. Dig. 8 463; Dec. Dig. Om304.) 3. BANKRUPTOY 303(3) PREFERENCE
edge, but only such circumstances as would NOTICE TO CREDITOR-SUFFICIENCY OF EVI. lead an intelligent and prudent business man DENCE.
to entertain the belief that the transfer In an action by a trustee in bankruptcy to would give him a preference over other credirecover a preference, evidence held sufficient to jusify finding that the creditor had notice of tors. Rogers v. American Halibut Co., 216 material conditions sufficient to have aroused the Mass. 227, 229, 230, 103 N. E. 689; In re Egattention of an intelligent man, acquainted with gert, 102 Fed. 735, 43, C. C. A. 1. The questhe nature and character of his debtor's busi- tion ordinarily is one of fact dependent on ness, and to have put him upon inquiry when receiving payment of his debt.
the evidence in each case, and no rule can be [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bankruptcy, formulated by which all cases can be matheCent. Dig, $ 462; Dec. Dig. 303(3).] matically adjusted. Batchelder v. Home Nat. 4. BANKRUPTCY O 166(4) PREFERENCE-NO- Bank, 218 Mass. 420, 422, 105 N. E. 1052; TICE TO CREDITOR-KNOWLEDGE.
Brown v. Pelonsky, 210 Mass. 502, 96 N. E. A bankrupt's creditor receiving payments on his debt with notice of conditions sufficient to 1102; Bicknell v. Mellett, 160 Mass. 328, 329, have put him on inquiry was chargeable with 35 N. E. 1130; Forbes v. Howe, 102 Mass. notice of all the facts relating to the bank- 427, 437, 3 Am. Rep. 475; Putnam v. U. S. rupt's financial situation which such inquiry Trust Co., 223 Mass. 199, 111 N. E. 969; In would have disclosed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bankruptcy,
re Andrews (D. C.) 135 Fed. 599; Kaufman Cent. Dig. 8$ 250, 251, 256; Dec. Dig. v. Tredway, 195 U. S. 271, 25 Sup. Ct. 33, 49 166(4).]
L. Ed. 190. Direct evidence may be unob
tainable. But this is not essential. The 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 277, 21 L. Ed. 280. The creditor comes within the inhibition where defendant accordingly is chargeable with nothe substantial facts are of such significance tice of all the facts relating to the bankrupt's as fairly to warrant the inference, that he financial situation which such inquiry would knew or ought to have known of the bank- have developed and disclosed. Forbes rupt's financial condition. The parties had Howe, 102 Mass. 427, 3 Am. Rep. 475; Hewbeen associated as partners, but the bank- itt v. Boston Straw Board Co., 214 Mass. 260, rupt, having purchased the interest of the 263, 101 N. E. 424; Rogers v. American Halidefendant, giving in payment his promissory but Co., 216 Mass. 227, 103 N. E. 689; Batchnotes maturing at different dates, continued elder v. Home Nat. Bank, 218 Mass. 420, 105 the business on his own account until his N. E. 1052; Merchants' Nat. Bank v. Cook, failure. The jury would have been warrant- 95 U. S. 342, 24 L. Ed. 412. The verdict for ed in finding that during this period of two the defendant having been improperly directand one-half years the defendant visited the ed the exceptions must be sustained. place of business of the bankrupt, "with So ordered whom he was very friendly," "about once in every two weeks," and whenever the bank
(225 Mass. 313) rupt "needed assistance" he "gave it to him
MEANS v. COTTON. and continued to do it down to the spring (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. and summer previous to the bankruptcy."
Suffolk. Dec. 6, 1916.) It further appeared that some of the notes 1. APPEAL AND ERROR W1071(2) HARMgiven at the dissolution were not paid at ma LESS ERROR-RULINGS-CURE BY FINDINGS. turity, but were renewed from time to time, Where the court found that the informality during which the bankrupt and the defend- not waived so as to release the tenant from lia
of a notice of the termination of tenancy was ant were "swapping and exchanging checks," bility for the first month's rent after vacating as the jury could find, for the financial ac- the premises, error in rulings as to waiver of commodation and assistance of the bankrupt. the informality was not prejudicial. It also was in evidence that the notes for Error, Cent. Dig. 8 4235; Dec. 'Dig. Om 1071(2).
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and money lent were not paid until overdue, while
2. LANDLORD AND TENANT 231(8)-ACTION some of them were renewed. The bankrupt
FOR RENT - SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE testified that in the spring of 1913 he “took TERMINATION OF TENANCY, a larger place of business
* and in In an action by a landlord to recover rent creased his purchases upon the same terms of accruing after the vacation of the premises by
the tenant, evidence held sufficient to warrant credit, and when the debts matured he had the court in finding that the landlord's use and to borrow to meet the indebtedness, and he control of the premises was inconsistent with borrowed from Saperstein.” The defendant the relation of landlord and tenant so that the
tenancy was terminated. was called by the plaintiff and while he testi
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and fied that on his visits to the bankrupt's store Tenant, Cent. Dig. 8 933; Dec. Dig. Om 231(8).] he observed no diminution of the stock of 3. TRIAL E 398-FINDINGS-RULINGS-CONclothing as displayed on the shelves, the jury SISTENCY. from the volume of sales in the three months
The refusal of the court to rule that plaintiff preceding bankruptcy could have found, that was evidence to sustain bis findings of fact
is entitled to recover is not error, where there there must have been a visible, continuous, which defeated plaintiff's recovery. and substantial depletion of which the de
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent. fendant from his experience in this line of Dig. 88 946, 947; Dec. Dig. 398.] trade must have been aware. If with the 4. LANDLORD AND TENANT 55(2)—LIABIL
ITY OF TENANT-OMISSION TO ACT. circumstances of the personal relations of the While a tenant at will impliedly agrees to debtor and the defendant, the practice of ex- use the premises in a tenantlike manner, and is changing or "swapping" checks, the opportun- liable for voluntary waste, he is not liable for ities for observation of the bankrupt's stock a mere omission or failure to act or for perof merchandise, and the constant hiring of
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and money, often in small amounts, is coupled the Tenant, Cent. Dig. 88 140-142; Dec. Dig. fact which could have been found of volun- 55(2).] tary payments aggregating a large amount |5. APPEAL AND ERROR Om1071(2)—HARMLESS within fifty days of adjudication, although
ERROR-REFUSAL OF RULINGS-REPETITION
OF RULING GIVEN. the bankrupt apparently had been unable to The refusal of proper rulings requested by pay in full the notes given in the partnership plaintiff was not prejudicial error where the settlement, the jury well could say that the judge gave another request which correctly statdefendant had notice if not actual knowledge fairly ask on that branch of the case.
ed the law and included all that plaintiff could of material conditions sufficient to have
[Ed. Note.–For other cases, see Appeal and aroused the attention of an intelligent man Error, Cent. Dig. & 4235; Dec. Dig. ew1071(2); acquainted with the nature and character of Trial, Cent. Dig. $ 940.] bis debtor's business, and to have put him Appeal from Municipal Court of Boston, upon inquiry. Rubenstein v. Lottow, 223 Appellate Division. Mass. 227, 111 N. E. 973; Buchanan v. Smith, Action by Katie A. Means against A. H. H.
For other cases-see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
Cotton in the municipal court. Case reported month of October and while the defendant still to the appellate division, after findings for remained in actual occupation placed such signs plaintiff for part only of the amount claimed. upon the premises in question, these are facts
from which the court may find that the plainOrder dismissing the report, and plaintiff ap- tiff by her words and conduct led the defendant peals. Affirmed.
reasonably and properly to understand that she
so far waived any informality in the aforesaid The rulings requested by the parties and notice as to release the defendant from his tenreferred to in the opinion were as follows: ancy at the expiration of the rental month of
3. Any acts which are equivalent to the exRequests by Plaintiff.
pression of an intention on the part of a tenant 1. On all the evidence the plaintiff is entitled to abandon, and on the part of the landlord to
resume possession of demised premises amounts 2. On all the evidence the plaintiff is entitled to a surrender of the same by operation of law. to recover on the first count of the declaration during the month of November or the month of
4. Certain of the acts which the plaintiff did 3. On all the evidence the plaintiff is entitled December or during both of those months in to recover on the second count of the declara- 1912, in the so-called upper fat portion of the tion.
11. The defendant by becoming a tenant at demised premises now in question, including the will of the plaintiff of the premises impliedly making of repairs having no relation to the inagreed with the plaintiff to exercise reasonable juries alleged to have been caused by the escare while using the property to prevent dam-cape of water or the defendant's neglect, are age thereto, and if he failed in this respect he is such acts as will justify the court in finding liable to the plaintiff for any damages to the that the plaintiff exercised during one or both property caused thereby; and this liability can of those months such dominion or occupation be enforced in this action.
over the demised premises as are inconsistent 12. The defendant by becoming a tenant at with a right on her part to hold the defendant will of the plaintiff of the premises impliedly for use and occupation thereof during the agreed with the plaintiff to exercise reasonable months within which she did such acts. care while using the property to prevent dam J. Porter Crosby, of Boston, for appellant. age thereto, unless such implied agreement was Frank H. Noyes, of Boston, for appellee. excluded by the operation of some express agreement, and if he failed in this respect he is liable to the plaintiff for any damages to
CARROLL, J. The plaintiff received from the property caused thereby; and this liability the defendant, who was her tenant at will can be enforced in this action.
at a rental of $35 per month, a written no 13. If the defendant was a tenant of the tice stating his intention to vacate the premplaintiff of the premises and, through his negligence occurring before he had vacated or while ises November 1, 1912. The notice was rehe was vacating the premises, the same were ceived October 2, 1912, and on the same day injured, he is liable in this action for the dam- the plaintiff informed the defendant that the ages caused thereby.
14. If the defendant was a tenant of the notice was not sufficient to terminate the plaintiff of the premises and vacated them after tenancy and she would hold him for a propa stove in the house had been disconnected from er month's notice. Following the suggestion the water pipes in such a way as to leave said of the defendant, she placed "To Let" signs pipes open, and he did not have the water fully shut off or take other reasonable means to pre-on the premises. November 2, all of the vent the water from flowing out of said pipes defendant's furniture had been taken from and the water did flow out of said pipes and in the tenement. He paid rent to November 1, jure the house, the defendant was negligent and and on or about that day sent the keys of is responsible in this action for the damages caused thereby.
the tenement to the plaintiff. On November The court refused to make the first and 4, she wrote him saying she did not accept second rulings as requested, but made them the keys as a surrender or termination of the
tenancy and would continue to hold him rein the following modified form, namely:
1. On all the evidence the plaintiff is entitled sponsible for the rent, but would let the to recover something.
premises if possible, and would use the keys 2. On all the evidence the plaintiff is entitled for that purpose. November 5, the plaintiff to recover something on the first count of the entered the premises and found that the declaration.
kitchen stove, when removed, had been disThe court at the request of the defendant connected from the hot water pipes in such made the following rulings:
a way that the ceilings and walls were soak1. If the plaintiff, knowing that the writtened with water. She repaired the damaged notice given to her by the defendant was intended to terminate the tenancy at a time stated premises and also made repairs on other therein, waived any objection to its informalities parts of the house, not injured by water. She or, by her words and conduct, lead the defend- rented the second floor apartment in Decemant reasonably and properly to understand that ber, 1912, the tenant occupying it December she waived such informalities, she cannot now 26, the tenancy beginning January 1. object that the notice was insufficient.
The 2. If the plaintiff, having on or about Oc- other apartment was rented beginning Febtober 2, 1912, received from the defendant a ruary 1, 1913. written notice of his intention to terminate the
The defendant offered evidence tending to tenancy as of a date specified therein, being on or about November 1, 1912, thereupon at once show that the plaintiff on October 2, asked went to the defendant and told him that his no- permission to place the signs in the house, tice was not sufficient and that she should “hold and his consent to this; that at this time she him to a full month's notice," and thereupon did not say whether the notice was sufficient asked or received from the defendant permission to place "To Let" signs on the property in or insufficient, and did not say she would re