the time of her death (Decedent Estate Law | Individually and not as a class. Matter of [Consol. Laws, c. 13] § 14), and, according to Kimberly, 150 N. Y. 90, 44 N. E. 945. a well-settled rule, speaks from the time of the death of testatrix. Nellis v. Nellis, 99 N. Y. 505, 512, 3 N. E. 59. In England by the twenty-fourth section of the Wills Act (7 Wm. IV and 1 Vict. c. 26) it is provided that: "Every will shall be construed with reference to the real estate and personal estate comprised in it, to speak and take effect as if it had been executed immediately before the death of the testator unless a contrary intention shall appear in the will." 28 Halsbury's Laws of England, 691; Saxton v. Saxton, 13 Ch. Div. 359. The rule has been formulated somewhat differently in this state. A devise of real estate, universal in its terms, would carry after-acquired land without language pointing to the period of testator's death, but in the absence of unlimited terms in the will there must be language which will enable the court to see that the testator intended it to operate upon real estate which he should afterwards purchase. Lynes v. Townsend, 33 N. Y. 558. That is the canon of construction we shall apply. In 1837 Chancellor Walworth in Pond v. Bergh, 10 Paige Ch. 140, 150, failed to find such language in the will of the testator, who devised all his "real estate lying and being in, the county of Schoharie." He said: "There is good reason to suppose he means to speak in reference to the lands he has already acquired there" -and on this supposed actual intention he held that subsequently acquired lands in Schoharie county did not pass under the clause quoted. But the language of testatrix does enable the court to see what her intention was. She knew the difference between the words "one-half" and "all my right, title and interest," and "all the interest that I now possess." If she had limited her devise to the one-half interest in such premises that she then owned, one-half of the subsequently acquired one-half would have gone from her sister to the Skillinses. She had said in her will that "it is my wish that the homestead in which I now reside shall be retained by some member of my family as long as possible." It was more consonant with that wish to give it all to her sister, if she acquired title to the whole before her death, than to leave one-half of it to be disposed of by the residuary clause. The draftsman of the will, by a discriminating use of language, in few but apt words expressed the intention of the testatrix that her sister should take, not only the one-half interest in the homestead that testatrix then owned, but also all the interest she should own therein when she died. Quinn v. Hardenbrook, 54 N. Y. 83. [4] The provisions for S. Amelia Skillin, Florence Skillin Cloyd, Simeon D. Skillin, and Sarah E. Skillin, in the eighth, ninth, and tenth clauses of the will are for the legatees [5] Costs were properly allowed to defendants. Code Civ. Proc. § 3253, subd. 2; Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122, 56 N. E. 568. I recommend that the judgment be affirmed, with costs. CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, and CARDOZO, JJ., concur. WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., and HISCOCK and COLLIN, JJ., dissent. Judgment affirmed. (225 Mass. 287) SMITH V. NEW ENGLAND COTTON (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Bristol., Nov. 29, 1916.) 1. CORPORATIONS 428(3) KNOWLEDGE AND CONDUCT OF AGENT. Where a cotton mill's representative knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the absence of a plank covering a slot in a platform which a railroad employé switching cars on the premises might use, the cotton mill was bound by his knowledge and conduct. Cent. Dig. 8 1750; Dec. Dig. 428(3).] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Corporations, 2. NEGLIGENCE 136(18) JURY. QUESTION FOR In an action by a railroad's employé for injuries received while switching cars on the premises of a cotton mill, question whether the mill was negligent in leaving open a fire door slot in a platform held for the jury. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 307, 308, 310, 312; Dec. Dig. 136(18).] 3. NEGLIGENCE 122(1)-ACTION FOR INJURIES-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-Burden OF PROOF. A railroad's employé, suing for injuries received while switching cars on the premises of defendant cotton mill, had the burden to prove his own due care. Cent. Dig. §§ 221, 229, 233, 234; Dec. Dig. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Negligence, 122(1).] 4. NEGLIGENCE 132(1)—ACTION FOR INJURIES EVIDENCE. In an action against a cotton mill by a railroad's employé, injured while switching cars on its premises, evidence that plaintiff passed to the platform where he was injured by the contemporaneous direction of the railroad's freight agent was admissible in explanation of his conduct and as illustrative of his acts. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. 8 257, 2572, 262; Dec. Dig. 132(1).] 5. NEGLIGENCE 136(27) CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE QUESTION For Jury. In a railroad employe's action against a cotton mill for injuries received while switching cars on its premises, question whether plaintiff, by reason of the darkness and his unfamiliarity with the surroundings, should have paused and investigated his footing before attempting to held for the jury. pass along the platform where he was injured, [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. §§ 336, 337; Dec. Dig. 136(27).j For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 'VITEE. 6. NEGLIGENCE 32(2) - INJURIES TO INWhere a cotton mill asked a railroad to switch cars on its premises, the railroad's switching conductor, as an invitee, was on the premises to perform work, including whatever became reasonably necessary to remove the cars, even if it required him to go outside the line of the slot in a platform made for a fire door, and, if he was injured by falling into such slot, he was injured as an invitee. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. § 43; Dec. Dig. 32(2).] Exceptions from Superior Court, Bristol County; Hugo A. Dubuque, Judge. Action by Thomas F. Smith against the New England Cotton Yarn Company. There was a verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepts. Exceptions overruled. Defendant's fifth request, as modified and given, was: "If the defendant had no reason to anticipate that there was occasion to go back of that fire door, of course the defendant isn't liable, but on that you have a right to consider the layout of the track, what had been done before, why or how it happened that the car went back. If the difficulty with coupling the car is one of the things that are incident to the usual work of coupling cars then, of course, that might be anticipated by the defendant." H. F. Hathaway, of Taunton (J. P. Dunn, Jr., and J. E. Warner, both of Taunton, with him), for plaintiff. Jennings & Brayton, of Fall River, for defendant. BRALEY, J. [1-6] The jury would have been warranted in finding, that when injured by falling into the hole, slot or channel in the platform of the defendant's cotton storehouse, the plaintiff was in the performance of his duties as conductor of the switcher hauling cars therefrom, by direction of the freight agent of the railroad company his employer, who had been requested by the defendant to remove the cars on the spur track inside the house so that it could run in more cars for use in its business. The duty imposed on the defendant as an invitor under such circumstances was defined in Carleton v. Franconia Iron & Steel Co., 99 Mass. 216, 217: "The owner or occupant of land is liable in damages to those coming to it, using due care, at his invitation or inducement, express or implied, on any business to be transacted with or permitted by him, for an injury, occasioned by the unsafe condition of the land or of the access to it, which is known to him and not to them, and which he has negligently suffered to exist and has given them no notice of." The rule as thus defined has been followed in Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572, 587, 588, 3 Am. Rep. 506; Hart v. Cole, 156 Mass. 475, 31 N. E. 644, 16 L. R. A. 557; McNee v. Coburn Trolley Track Co., 170 Mass. 283, 284, 49 N. E. 437; Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. Rockport Lime Co., 184 Mass. 60, 63, 67 N. E. 863, 61 L. R. A. 946, 100 Am. St. Rep. 543; Pickwick v. McCauliff, 193 Mass. 70, 74, 78 N. E. 730, 8 Ann. Cas. 1041; Shaw v. Odgen, 214 Mass. 475, 476, 102 N. E. 61. The jury could find that the defendant while familiar with the nature of the work of taking out cars by a switching engine, also knew that the operation must be carried on within the limits of the spur track located on its own premises, which "had a capacity of three cars outside of the building." It appears, and the jury could find from the plaintiff's evidence, that the engine had been coupled to three cars standing "outside," and when he "motioned for it to go ahead the three cars were about two or three feet from the fourth or lone car standing inside of the building." The cars were equipped with automatic "selfcouplings," and this car by its failure to unite having been forced further "into the building," it could have been found that the conductor or those in charge, acting with ordinary care, would endeavor to ascertain "what was on the track back of this car" before making another attempt "to make a hitch." The space between the top of the roof of the cars and the "place in the building on which the outside doors run" was not over three feet, while the platform whose height corresponded with the level of the floor of an ordinary freight car extended the entire length of the track. If when the car failed to couple, the conductor under the orders of the freight agent, his superior, stepped to the platform to investigate whether the track inside was clear, "before I hit that car again," his use of the platform as a feasible means of communication could be found to be as natural and probable under the circumstances, as if the area traversed had been left open and unoccupied. It is not contended that before he was injured the plaintiff knew of the sunken slot or channel twelve inches in width where the fire door ran, which if left unguarded the jury could find might make the use of the platform hazardous to those unacquainted with the premises. The uncontradicted evidence of the defendant's superintendent shows, that when as on the day of the accident the door remained unclosed, the slot was covered by a moveable plank, the placing of which "was the business of the man that was sent to the storehouse in charge of the gang, to handle this plank; to put it into the slot;" and "that at the time of the accident the man who had charge of the gang that was sent to the storehouse determined whether the cars should be unloaded" on the portion of the track inside of the building, "or whether they should be unloaded on the outside." If the defendant's representative knew or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of the absence of the plank, the defendant is bound by his knowledge and conduct. Ruddy v. George F. Blake Mfg. Co., 205 Mass. 172, 181, 91 N. E. 310. It could have been further found (225 Mass. 273) AURINGER et al. v. COCHRANE. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. Nov. 29, 1916.) 1. PARENT AND CHILD 3(1)—LIABILITY FOR CHILD'S CLOTHING. Where a father had supplied and was ready to supply apparel sufficient for his daughter's welfare, and befitting the family's social and financial position, dressmakers could not recover against him for gowns and hats furnished the daughter, which were not necessaries, in the absence of an express or implied contract on his part to pay for them. on the evidence of the freight agent, that | 405, 19 Ann. Cas. 666, and cases cited; Mcwhenever the door was open the plank usual-Leod v. Rawson, 215 Mass. 257, 260, 102 N. ly was in the slot. And the entire evidence E. 429, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 547; Gallagher v. if believed was sufficient to convince the jury, Murphy, 221 Mass. 363, 108 N. E. 1081. that not only was the placing and removal The motion to direct a verdict for the deof the plank as well as the opening and fendant, and the fourth, sixth and seventh closing of the door wholly within the super- requests were denied rightly for reasons vision and control of the defendant, with previously stated. The fifth request could which the employés of the railroad never in- not have been given in terms. It omitted the terfered, but the use of the platform by train-essential element already pointed out, that men when switching cars had not been for- the plaintiff as an invitee was on the prembidden nor shown to be unreasonable or un-ises to perform work, which included whatnecessary. The evidence of the superintend- ever became reasonably necessary to remove ent being sufficient to justify them in finding the cars, even if this required him to go that the track and platform were concurrent- outside the line of the slot of the fire door. ly used in the prosecution of the defendant's The request as thus modified having been business, of which the switching in and out given, the exceptions should be overruled. of the cars on the entire length of the spur So ordered. track formed a part, it could not be ruled as matter of law that the platform or any part of it had been designed or reserved for the exclusive use of the defendant's own employés, over which the plaintiff would pass at his peril. It was a question of fact whether a reasonably prudent and careful man familiar with his own premises where the work he requested was to be performed, and the manner and means ordinarily required for its accomplishment, should have been aware that the men engaged in moving the cars might suffer injuries if the plank was not in place. Or if being ignorant of its existence they were not warned of the slot in the platform, which if left exposed might make the use of the premises in the prosecution of their work unsafe and dangerous. Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. Rockport Lime Co., 184 Mass. 60, 63, 67 N. E. 863, 61 L. R. A. 946, 100 Am. St. Rep. 543. The plaintiff, however, had the burden of proving his own due care, and the evidence that he passed to the platform by the cotemporaneous direction of the freight agent was admissible in explanation of his conduct, and as illustrative of his acts. Conklin v. Consolidated Ry., 196 Mass. 302, 306, 82 N. E. 23, 13 Ann. Cas. 857. Wigmore on Ev. § 1770. The accident happened in the day time. But on the plaintiff's evidence, which the jury were at liberty to follow, the storehouse was unlighted and quite dark, and never having been there before he was unfamiliar with the place. The only light visible to him came through the doorway as he walked down the platform followed by the freight agent immediately behind him. While we all agree that the question of the defendant's negligence was for the jury, only a majority of the court are of opinion that whether the plaintiff by reason of the darkness, and his unfamiliarity with the surroundings should have paused and investigated his footing before attempting to pass, was also for their determination. Hanley v. Boston Elev. Ry., 201 Mass. 55, 57, 58, 87 N. E. 197; Faxon v. Butler, 206 Mass. 500, 504, 92 N. E. 707, 138 Am. St. Rep. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Parent and 2. PARENT AND CHILD 3(3)—EVIDENCE furnished defendant's minor daughter, evidence In dressmakers' action for gowns and hats that when defendant's wife and daughter went 18, and she desired her to be suitably clothed, to plaintiffs the wife told them her daughter was and that defendant would be responsible, was admissible to show to whom plaintiffs understood they gave credit, and in explanation of tiffs supposed the mother's statement as to the the account, the court having found that plaindaughter's age was for plaintiffs' guidance in the selection of the proper styles and kinds of apparel to be ordered. Child, Cent. Dig. §§ 59-62; Dec. Dig. 3(3).] [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Parent and AGENCY OF Evidence that when defendant's wife and minor daughter went to dressmakers the wife told them that the daughter was 18, that she desired her to be suitably supplied with clothing, and that her father would be responsible, did not show a contract binding on the defendant. Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 142-144; Dec. Dig. ~23.] [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Husband and 4. EVIDENCE 271(19)-SELF-SERVING DEC LARATIONS-LETTERS. In an action by dressmakers for gowns and hats furnished defendant's minor daughter pursuant to her mother's order, letters written by plaintiffs to defendant, when bills for various months were sent him, were admissible as statements of defendant's contractual relations with plaintiffs, which rested on the statements of de For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes Where defendant's wife took his minor daughter to dressmakers and ordered gowns and hats for her on defendant's credit, if defendant desired to repudiate, as unauthorized, the pledging of his credit, he was bound to act with reasonable promptness when he became aware that his wife had pledged his credit, and that the dressmakers in good faith were acting on her representations. fendant's wife, not being self-serving declara Benoit, 193 Mass. 233, 236, 79 N. E. 245; tions. Niles v. Adams, 208 Mass. 100, 103, 94 N. E. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Evidence, 285. It did not however show a contract Cent. Dig. §§ 1097-1099; Dec. Dig. 271(19).] binding on the defendant, as the court cor5. HUSBAND AND WIFE 232-AGENCY OF rectly ruled. The plaintiffs after a month's WIFE FOR HUSBAND-REPUDIATION OF AUtrading sent to the defendant an itemized THORITY. bill to which he made no reply. A second letter and bill followed including additional charges for the succeeding month, and no answer being received a third letter and bill showing the previous items, as well as charges for the third month was mailed, and failing to obtain any response they then wrote to the defendant demanding an answer and settlement. The letters were admissible. They were not under the circumstances self-serving declarations, but statements of the defendant's contractual relations to them, which Where dressmakers had a right to assume and did assume that an indebtedness incurred rested on the statements of his wife. Thayer with them for gowns and hats for defendant's v. White, 12 Metc. 343; Foster v. Rockwell, minor daughter was being contracted with his 104 Mass. 167, 171, 172. It is plain that, aftauthority, defendant was liable for the amount er the transactions of the first month for of the indebtedness. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Husband and Wife, Cent. Dig. §§ 144, 147; Dec. Dig. 232.] 6. PARENT AND CHILD DAUGHTER'S CLOTHING. 3(1)—LIABILITY FOR [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Parent and Child, Cent. Dig. 88 33-51; Dec. Dig. 3(1).] Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; John A. Aiken, Judge. Action by Eva A. Auringer and another against J. Eugene Cochrane. There was finding for plaintiffs, and defendant excepts. Exceptions overruled. Warren, Garfield, Whiteside & Lamson, of Boston (Alex. Whiteside and Cleveland Bigelow, both of Boston, of counsel), for plainW. C. Cogswell, of Boston, for de tiffs. fendant. which he was found not to be liable, the defendant, as stated in the findings of the Court, had notice that the plaintiffs were dealing with his wife and daughter upon the implied understanding from his silence that he would be responsible for the articles furnished. It appears that his failure to communicate with them arose from his belief that his daughter's minority ceased at the age of eighteen years, and from the reception of the first bill two months elapsed before his counsel replied disclaiming all responsibility. If the defendant desired to repudiate as unauthorized the pledging of his credit, he was bound to act with reasonable ly held liable for the amount. Sturtevant v. Wallack, 141 Mass. 119, 4 N. E. 615; Lamson v. Varnum, 171 Mass. 237, 238, 50 N. E. 615. The request that "upon all the evidence the finding should be for the defendant" was rightly denied. BRALEY, J. [1-6] The plaintiffs are dress-promptness when he became aware of what makers who sue for gowns and hats furnish- had been done, and that the plaintiffs in ed to the defendant's daughter while a mem- good faith were acting upon his wife's repber of his household. It having been found resentations. Foster v. Rockwell, 104 Mass. by the trial court that "neither the goods 167, 172. The finding that the plaintiffs had furnished nor the work done were neces- a right to assume and did assume that the saries, they were not needed for the health indebtedness incurred in the last two months or comfort of the daughter, and the defend-was being contracted with his authority havant had supplied and was ready to supply ing been warranted, the defendant was rightapparel suitable and sufficient for her welfare and proper and befitting the family's social and financial position," the plaintiffs cannot recover unless there was evidence of an express or implied contract. The evidence that, when the defendant's wife and daughter first went to the plaintiffs, the wife told them that her daughter was eighteen years of age, and that she desired her to be suitably supplied with clothing, and that her father, the defendant, would be responsible for the bills, was competent not only for the purpose of showing to whom the plaintiffs understood they were giving credit, but in explanation of the account, and the court having found that they supposed the mother's statement as Parties who did not appeal from an order to the daughter's age was for their guidance overruling exceptions to a master's report, nor in the selection of the proper styles and kinds from the final decree, cannot object to such deof apparel to be ordered, there was no er[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and ror in the admission of this evidence. James Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3578, 3579; Dec. Dig. ~ V. Spaulding, 4 Gray, 451, 452; Pettey v.878(5).] 1. Exceptions overruled. (225 Mass. 292) POWERS REGULATOR CO. v. L. W. TAYLOR & CO. et al. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Bristol. Nov. 29, 1916.) APPEAL AND ERROR 878(5)—REVIEW— SCOPE ORDERS NOT APPEALED FROM. cree. 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 347(1)-ME-thorized to contract on behalf of city, a notice, CHANICS' LIENS-PROCEEDINGS TO PERFECT addressed by registered letter to their predeces-NOTICE. sors in office, to the mayor then in office and to the clerk of the committee, was not filed with the proper officers, as required by St. 1909, c. 514, § 23, although duly received. Under St. 1904, c. 349, re-enacted in St. 1909, c. 514, § 23, to obtain the benefit of a bond given to a city by a bonding company as security for payment by the contractor of the demands of labor and materialmen, every claimant is required to file with the officers who contract on behalf of the city a sworn statement of his claim within 60 days after completion of the work. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 876; Dec. Dig. 347(1).] 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS LIENS FOR LABOR AND MATERIAL 347(1) [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 876; Dec. Dig. 347(1).] 8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS —366, 374(1)— CONTRACTS-BREACH-COMPLETION BY CITY -RETENTION OF COST. Where a contractor fails in the performance of his contract with a municipality, the latter, even in the absence of express stipulation in the contract, may complete the work and deduct the Cost from the contract price, and where the bonding company completed such contract, the Under St. 1909, c. 514, § 23, requiring per-city may pay the reasonable cost to such comsons who furnish labor or material in perform- pany from the contract price. ance of city contract to file notice of claim with officers who contract in behalf of city, the filing of notice must be with officers actually in office, and a filing with former officers is of no avail. [Ed. Note,-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 876; Dec. Dig. 847(1).] 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 347(1)-MECHANICS' LIENS PROCEEDINGS TO PERFECT -NOTICE. Where the mayor and chairman of the committee on city property were the officers of the city empowered to contract in its behalf for the erection of a school building, the filing of labor and material claims with the city clerk, city treasurer, or clerk of the committee is of no effect to protect the claimant under St. 1909, c. 514, 23, requiring such claims to be filed within 60 days after the completion of the work with the officers who contracted in behalf of the city. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 876; Dec. Dig. 347(1).] 347(1)-PRO 5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal 6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 347(1)-PROCEEDINGS TO PERFECT--NOTICE-"FILE." Under St. 1909, c. 514, § 23, requiring persons who furnished labor and material in the performance of a city contract to file with the officers who contract in behalf of the city a sworn statement of such claims within 60 days after the completion of the work, in order to obtain the benefit of the bond given by the contractor, useless and vain formalities are not essential, and the word "file" as there used is equivalent to the words "give notice" or "serve [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 899, 905, 910; Dec. Dig. 366, 374(1).] Appeal from Superior Court, Bristol County. Action by the Powers Regulator Company against L. W. Taylor & Co. and others. From the decree of the superior court in equity, certain of the defendants appeal. Modified and affirmed. M. R. Hitch, of New Bedford, for appellant Geo. Howard & Sons Co. Robert A. Terry, of New Bedford, for appellant Powers Regulator Co. Edward A. Taft and L. R. Chamberlin, both of Boston, for appellant Richmond Radiator Co. C. Harold Baldwin, of Boston, for appellants Gillette and others. Sumner Robinson, of Boston, for respondent New England Iron Works Co. A. M. Schwarz and S. A. Dearborn, both of Boston, for respondents Jenkins Bros. Gaston, Snow & Saltonstall, of Boston (F. W. Bacon, of Boston, of counsel), for respondent Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. BRALEY, J. [1-8] The exceptions to the master's report having been overruled and the report confirmed by the interlocutory decree entered with the consent of the parties, the rights of the plaintiffs and interveners were left for determination on the pleadings and the findings of the master. While there were seven claimants who either brought suit or were joined as interveners, the final decree dismissed the bills as to the bonding company, the contractor, and five of the claimants, and the case is before us only on the appeal of four of the defeated claimants, and the trustees in bankruptcy of the contractor, plaintiffs in a cross bill, asking that the amount due under the contract from the city be ascertained and payment to them decreed. Masters v. Wayne Automobile Co., 198 Mass. 25, 84 N. E. 103. We shall refer to the contesting claimants as the appellants. The master reports that they furnished materials, -LIENS FOR LABOR AND MATERIAL-NOTICE or labor and materials as subcontractors in OF CLAIM. Where the mayor and the chairman of com- the erection and completion of the building, mittee on street property were the officers au- and that the debts due therefor as set forth notice." [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 876; Dec. Dig. 347(1). For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, File.] 7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 347(1) For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |