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$. FERBIES OM 32-DUTY OF FERBYMAN-40• , Weehawken to West Forty-Second street. A TOMOBILES.

A ferryman, as part of his general duty to portion of the boat called the "horse runway" exercise reasonable cate, is under duty to rec

was set apart for vehicles, the foremost of ognize that automobiles, wbile not inherently which were placed about 70 feet from the dangerous, may, from conditions of place and bow. Passengers used the forward part of circumstances, become dangerous instrumentali. ties.

the boat in front of the vehicles. At each [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Ferries, Cent. end of the boat were gates, 3 feet high, made Dig. $$ 79-87; Dec. Dig. 32.)

of iron bars bolted together. Back of these 4. FERRIES 32-FEBRYMAN AS INBUREB.

werę two chains to be stretched across the Strict diligence and a due regard for the val- width of the ferryboat and hooked to posts. ue of human life, required of a ferryman by the When properly in place they swung 15 inches rule of reasonable care, do not make him an in- above the deck. The purpose for which these surer of the safety of his passengers.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Ferries, Cent. chains were so placed was, according to the Dig. 88 79-87; Dec. Dig. Om 32.]

testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, to check

careless drivers from running their teams or 5. FERRIES 32-DUTY OF FEBBYMAN IN RE- machines past the lines thus indicated. LATION TO AUTOMOBILES.

It was the duty of a ferryman transporting Chocks were also provided to be used by the automobiles to provide a practical barrier deck hands in blocking vehicles. against the cars running forward and injuring

Edward Barry drove his automobile onto a passenger, and to exercise reasonable supervision over the automobiles while on the fer. the ferryboat at Weehawken and stopped it ryboat.

about 10 feet back of the chain nearest the (Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Ferries, Çent. gates at the forward end of the boat. The Dig. $8 79–87; Dec. Dig. Om32.]

occupants of the car then left it. Only one 6. FERRIES 33-NEGLIGENCE OF FERBY- chain was in use at the time, which was lyMAN-QUESTION FOR JURY.

ing on the deck of the ferryboat for its enIn an administratrix's action against a rail. road operating a steam ferryboat for death tire length. Plaintiff's intestate was standof her intestate by drowning when an automo ing in the bow of the ferryboat back of the bile on the boat ran forward and knocked dece gates and in front of the automobile. When dent into the river, defendant having interposed the ferry boat reached a point about 60 feet no obstacle to the progress of the car once it was started, question of defendant's negligence from the New York dock, one of the occuheld for the jury.

pants of the car cranked it, starting the en[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Ferries, Cent. gine. Immediately the automobile started Dig. 88 88-93; Dec. Dig, m33.)

forward, ran over the chain which was ly7. APPEAL AND ERBOR ww1177(7) DISPO8T-ing on the deck of the boat, struck plaintiff's TION REVERSAL FOR NEW TRIAL-STATUTE. intestate, and forced him through the gates

Under Code Civ. Proc. $ 1346, providing that with it into the river, causing his death by an appeal may be taken to the Appellate Division on questions of law or on the facts or on drowning. Plaintiff recovered a verdict in both from a judgment on a verdict, or on trial the trial court against the defendant for by the referee or court without a jury, on appeal to the Court of Appeals from a judgment of the causing the death of the intestate by its negAppellate Division reversing a judgment for ligence. The Appellate Division held that plaintiff entered upon a verdict and dismissing there was no evidence to justify a finding the complaint, where it appears that the Ap. that the defendant was negligent, or that it not satisfied therewith, the Court of Appeals, could have anticipated the accident, reversed reversing, should grant new trial.

the judgment of the court below and dis[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and missed the complaint. We think that this Error, Cent. Dig. $ 4609; Dec. 1177(7).]

[1] That no ordinarily prudent eye would Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Di- see that an automobile on a ferryboat might vision, First Department.

be carelessly or accidentally started, and Action by Nellie Meisle, as administratrix, that an aceident might occur to a passenger etc., of Frank Meisle, deceased, against the if no safeguards were maintained against it, New York Central & Hudson River Rallroad cannot be asserted without running counter Company. From a judgment of the Appel- to human experience. In the hands of a nerlate Division (168 App. Div. 939, 153 N. y. vous or unskilled chauffeur an automobile Supp. 1128), reversing a judgment entered on might be awkwardly stopped or started and verdict for plaintiff and dismissing the com- thus driven off the boat it no proper barriers plaint, plaintiff appeals. Judgment reversed, were interposed. “It was not necessary that and new trial granted,

the defendant should have had notice of the Frank X. Sullivan, of New York City, for occur, if the possibility of an accident was

particular method in which an accident would appellant. Robert A. Kutschbach, of New clear to the ordinarily prudent eye." Munsey York City, for respondent.

v. Webb, 231 U. S. 150, 156, 34 Sup. Ct. 44, 45

(58 L. Ed. 162]; Condran v. Park & Tilford, POUND, J. On November 26, 1911, plain- 213 N. Y. 341, 107 N. E. 567. Automobiles, tiff's intestate, Frank Meisle, was a passen- like horses, do run off ferryboats, and runger on defendant's steam ferryboat from away horses and motor cars do not choose

was error.

their course with regard to the safety of by-, Whitridge, 213 N. Y. 499, 108 N. E. 192, Ann. standers.

Cas. 1916C, 856. [2, 3] The defendant urges that it exercised The judgment should be reversed, and new reasonable care, and that no more is requir- trial granted, with costs in this court and in ed. Its contention as to the rule is correct, the Appellate Division to abide the event. but"ferrymen, by reason of the nature of the fran WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., and HISchise they exercise, and the character of the COCK, CHASE, COLLIN, HOGAN, and CARservices they render to the public, are held to extreme diligence and care, and to a stringent DOZO, JJ., concur. liability for any neglect or omission of duty;" Wyckoff v. Queens Co. Ferry Co., 52 N. Y. Judgment reversed, etc. 32, 34, 11 Am. Rep. 650. [4-7] Reasonable care is a relative term,

(219 N. Y. 312) and such is the rule of reasonable care for

FIRST NAT. BANK OF LITCHFIELD, ferrymen. If we add to that general duty the further duty of recognizing that automo

CONN., V. JONES et al. biles, while not inherently dangerous, may (Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 21, 1916.) from conditions of place and circumstance 1. GUARANTY Ow47-CONSTRUCTION -UNCON

DITIONAL AGREEMENT. brcome dangerpus instrumentalities,

the meaning of reasonable care in this connection anty of the payment of notes payable to plaintiff,

If an agreement was an unconditional guaris readily suggested. Strict diligence and a the plaintiff's right of action on the guaranty due regard for the value of human life do was complete when the makers of the notes fail. not constitute the ferryman an insurer of ed to pay according to the terms thereof. the safety of his passengers. Even unreason- Cent. Dig. $ 58; Dec. Dig. 47.]

(Ed. Note. For other cases, see Guaranty, able expense and trouble are not insisted


INupon as against all possible accident and mis

TENTION OF PARTIES. adventure. But as Andrews, J., said in The meaning of a guaranty of the payment Loftus v. Union Ferry Co. of Brooklyn, 84 of notes depends upon the intention of the parN. Y. 455, 460, 38 Am. Rep. 533, the line

ties. which separates accidents for which the cent. Dig. 28; Dec. Dig. 27.]

(Ed. Note. For other cases, see Guaranty, defendant is not liable and accidents creating responsibility by reason of negligence is "oft


While every word of an agreement should be en narrow and difficult to be drawn,” and it presumed to have been used with some purpose, is well not to draw the line dogmatically. the meaning of each word must be determined, This is not a case of sufficient barriers and and its effect considered, in connection with othsafeguards and proper supervision unavailing

er words of the agreement.

Ed. Note. For other cases, Bee Contracts, against unforeseen calamity. The chain

Cent. Dig. 88 732, 733, 738; Dec. Dig. Om 152.) which properly swung 15 inches above the

4. GUARANTY 35 - CONSTRUCTION “ULTIdeck lay flat on the deck. The chocks were

MATE"_"FULL AND PROMPT PAYMENT." not placed under the wheels of the automo An agreement guaranteeing the “full, prompt, bile. Nothing was done to prevent the start and ultimate payment" of notes and of “any and ing of the engine. Not the slightest obstacle all renewals thereof or either of them,” etc., as

the words “full and prompt payment would be was interposed to the progress of the car inapt it all that the parties intended was a guarwhen once started. Perhaps no practical ap- anty of collection, the word “ultimate" was inpliances and no ordinary watchfulness on tended to include renewal notes and not to limit the part of the defendant's employé would the

guaranty to loans unpaid after diligent effort

to collect, and the intention of the parties and have been availing, but we cannot say this as effect of the agreement was an unconditional matter of law. We do not sufficiently under- guaranty of the payment of the notes or renewstand the operation of ferryboats to know als according to the terms thereof. how careful it may be in this regard. In any

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Guaranty, event, the automobile did not break down Cent. Dig. $ 37; Dec. Dig. 35. suitable barriers, for no barriers were inter- First and Second Series, Ultimate; Prompt Pay

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, posed. The case is therefore unlike McGrell ment.] v. Buffalo O. B. Co., 153 N. Y. 265, 47 N. E. 305, and cases cited. The duty of the de

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Ditendant was to provide a practical barrier vision, First Department. and exercise reasonable supervision over the

Action by the First National Bank of automobiles while they were on the ferry. Litchfield, Connecticut, against Mary E. Jones boat. Wyckoff v. Queens Co. Ferry Co., $u- tor of the last will and testament of Oliver L.

and Charles H. Jones, executrix and execupra. The question of defendant's negligence should therefore be submitted to the jury. Jones, deceased. From a judgment of the As the Judgment appealed from was rendered Appellate Division (168 App. Div. 950, 153 N. after September 1, 1914, and it appears that I. Supp. 1114), affirming a judgment directthe Appellate Division has reviewed the facts ed by the court for plaintin, defendants apand is not satisfied therewith, this court

peal. Affirmed. should reverse the judgment and grant a new The nature of the action and the facts, so trial. Code Civ. Proc. § 1346; Middleton v. I far as material, are stated in the opinion.

for other casa mo namo topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests und Indexos

John Burlinson Coleman, of New York | not alone for the specific notes mentioned in City, for appellants. Dickinson W. Richards, the agreement, but for “any and all renewals of New York City, for respondent.

thereof or either of them when the same

shall become due and payable until all of CHASE, J. The defendants' intestate at said loans and notes and any and all renewhis special instance and request, in 1906 pro- als thereof are fully paid and discharged." cured from the plaintiff a loan to the Mine The use of the words “full and prompt Hill Quarry Company of which he was a

payment” would be inapt if all that stockholder, upon its promissory notes in the parties intended was a guaranty of colvarious amounts aggregating $10,000, and lection. also at his special instance and request, a Upon examination of all the words in the loan to one Eckerson upon the promissory agreement it would seem to have been the innotes of said Eckerson, indorsed by said tention of the parties in the use of the word company, in various amounts aggregating “ultimate” to make sure of including the $10,000, and he gave to the plaintiff a con-notes finally given in renewal, and that the tract in writing reciting said loans, the ma- word “ultimate" was not used to limit the terial part of which contract is as follows: guaranty to loans unpaid after diligent ef

“Now, therefore, I hereby covenant and agree fort to collect them had been made. with said bank to guarantee, and I do hereby We are of the opinion that the word "ultiguarantee the full

, prompt, and ultimate pay-mate" was used to cover notes ultimately givment of all of said notes, aggregating twenty thousand dollars ($20,000) and of any and all re- en in whole or in part in renewal of the notes newals thereof or of either of them when the given at the time of the guaranty and thus same shall become due and payable, until all of to clearly continue the obligation of guaranty said loans and notes and any and all renewals

so long as the loans were extended. Althereof are fully paid and discharged.”

though the guaranty was made in New York The notes were renewed from time to time

state, it relates to loans by a Connecticut until August 9, 1913, when the defendants' bank to a corporation and an individual each intestate, the guarantor, died. At that time doing business in the state of Connecticut there remained unpaid of said loans one note and upon notes made and payable in that of the Mine Hill Quarry Company of $10,000,

state, and one of said Eckerson indorsed by said

The case of National Exchange Bank v. company of $6,500. Both were payable at the Gay, 57 Conn. 224, 17 Atl. 555, 4 L. R. A. 343, plaintiff's bank and were there duly present is so similar in the material part of the form ed for payment when they respectively be of guaranty under consideration that it has came due, but there was no money at the been suggested that it may have been specialbank to pay them of either of them. This action was then commenced. The only ques- when the contract of guaranty was prepared.

ly considered and followed by the parties tion involved herein is whether under the In that case the language of the guaranty is agreement the plaintiff was required to make

for "full, prompt, and ultimate payment of diligent effort to collect the notes of said

all promissory notes, drafts, bills of exEckerson and said company before insisting change, or other evidences of indebtedness upon payment thereof from the defendants, which the said National Exchange Bank has

[1] if the agreement was an unconditional discounted or may hereafter discount for the guaranty of payment, then the plaintiff's

said" company referred to, “not to exceed right of action on the guaranty was complete $15,000 in all at any one time.” when the makers of the notes failed to pay

The court in that case held that: according to the terms thereof. Brown v. Curtiss, 2 N. Y. 225, 227; Stein v. Whitman, would meet the case of a note, on usual bank

“To guarantee 'full and prompt' payment 209 N. Y. 576, 103 N. E. 1133.

time, actually to be paid in full at maturity. To [2] The meaning of the guaranty depends guarantee in addition to 'full and prompt' pay. upon the intention of the parties. Hamilton ment, the ultimate' payment can have no other v. Van Rensselaer, 43 N. Y. 244; Melick v. I meaning than that the obligor should continue

beyond to the end of all substitutions, renewals, Knox, 44 N. Y. 676; Catskill Nat. Bank v. and extensions." Dumary, 206 N. Y. 550, 100 N. E. 422.

[3, 4] The intention of the parties to the In the case of Hermandez v. Stillwell, 7 agreement under consideration to make an Daly, 360, there was a guaranty of "the absolute and unconditional guaranty would ultimate payment of the sum named herein, be entirely clear were it not for the use of together with interest and all lawful charges, the word “ultimate.” While every word of or so much thereof as shall be due and owan agreement should be presumed to have ing," and in Walker v. Forbes, 25 Ala. 139, 60 been used with some purpose, the meaning of Am. Dec. 498, there was a guaranty to a mereach word must be determined and its effect chant that if he “can sell Mr. C. any grocerconsidered in connection with the other words ies I (the guarantor) am willing to guarantee of the agreement. The words “full, prompt the ultimate payment of any bill he may

payment” have a very important make with you, to the amount of $500," both part in the phrase "full, prompt, and ultimate of which cases are cited by the appellants as payment.” In construing the phrase it is authority for their contention-the intention

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in substance that a guaranty of collection construction of a will, is proper under Code Civ. was intended. The decisions so called to Proc. § 3253, subd. 2. our attention are not controlling or even per- Dig. § 1684; Dec. Dig. Ow707(1).]

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. suasive because they were each decided upon the intention of the parties as found by the

Willard Bartlett, C. J., and Hiscock and Col

lin, JJ., dissenting. court on the particular language used in the guaranties respectively. The intention of Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Dithe parties in the case before us seems to ac- vision, Second Department. cord with the intention of the parties as it Action by Eldred A. Carley, executor of was found in the National Exchange Bank Augusta M. Harper, deceased, against ElizaCase, and so it has been found by the courts beth F. Harper and others. From a judgbelow. We think it appears from the con- ment of the Appellate Division (166 App. tract that the parties intended an uncondi- Div. 473, 151 N. Y. Supp. 1056), modifying, tional guaranty, and that intention must con- and, as modified, affirming, a judgment of the trol.

Special Term, construing the will of deceasThe judgment should be affirmed, with ed, defendants Florence Skillin Cloyd and costs.

Simeon D. Skillin, residuary legatees, appeal.

Affirmed. WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., and AIS Percival H. Gregory, of New York City, for COCK, COLLIN, HOGAN, CARDOZO, and appellants. Augustus H. Skillin, of New POUND, JJ., concur.

York City, for respondents Dallas H. Skillin

and others. James W. Treadwell, of New Judgment affirmed.

York City, for respondents Elizabeth F.

Harper and others. Daniel Whitford, of New (219 N. Y. 295)

York City, for respondents James Harper CARLEY V. HARPER et al.

and others. George L. Day, for respondents

Ella Virginia Miller and others. (Court of Appeals of New York. Nov, 21, 1916.) 1. WILLS 820(1) - LEGACIES — CHARGE ON POUND, J. Testatrix was a widow who REAL ESTATE. Whether a legacy is charged by implication

had, in 1896, received a considerable amount on real estate is to be determined from the lan- of property from her husband's estate. She guage of the will in the light of extrinsic circum-made her will in July, 1900. She died in Destances; testator's intention being the guide. cember, 1911. The general legacies given by

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. her will aggregated $132,200. They are not Dig. 88 2114-2119; Dec. Dig. Om 820(1).]

specifically charged upon the real estate. She 2. WILLS 820(3) LEGACIES — CHARGE ON left personal property, exclusive of specific REAL ESTATE.

That the legacies of $132,000 to relatives bequests, amounting to less than $82,000. and strangers exceeded personal property when She also left real estate not specifically devisthe will was made by $35,000, and that the will ed. In 1903 she had expended $29,500 in the gave a power of sale, mingled the real and per purchase of real estate specifically devised. sonal property in the residuary clause, and di- The trial court found and the Appellate Divirected payment of the transfer tax out of the residue justifies a finding that the legacies are sion has not disturbed the finding, that "when a charge on the real estate.

she made her will, the testatrix possessed, [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. and knew or believed she possessed, exclusive Dig. $8 2116-2119; Dec. Dig. Om820(3).j

of personal property specifically bequeathed 3. WILLS Om578(1)-PROPERTY DEVISED-AFT- by her will,” the sum of $97,589.77. Upon ER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY.

A devise of "all my right, title and interest” the finding that “testatrix intended and did in certain parcels and "the whole of” another charge the general pecuniary legacies menparcel, testator at the time owning but an un- tioned in her will upon her real estate not divided half interest in the first tracts, passes specifically devised," the Appellate Division the remaining half interest therein afterwards was not unanimous in affirming the judgment acquired by testator.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Wills, Cent. of the trial court. And the first question to Dig. $$ 1258, 1261, 1264, 1265; Dec. Dig. Om be considered here is whether such finding is 578(1).]

based on sufficient evidence. 4. WI1.LS m523-LEGACIES TO SEVERAL-IN [1, 2] The principles to be applied in deDIVIDUALLY OR AS A CLASS.

termining whether a legacy is charged by imLegacies to one and her three children, desig. nated by name, with direction that they be diviä. plication upon the real estate of a testator ed among the four equally, with provision for have been frequented stated, and were recentsubstitution of descendants, are to them individ- ly considered in this court in Ely v. Megie, 219 ually, and not as a class.

N. Y, 112, 113 N. E. 800. The intention of the [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Wills, Cent. testator is the guide. It is determined from Dig. $ 1115; Dec. Dig. Om 523.)

the language of the will, read in the light of 5. WILLS Ow707(1) — ACTION TO CONSTRUE

extrinsic circumstances. We are not to lose COSTS-ADDITIONAL DISCRETIONARY ALLOW

sight of the rules which discriminate beAllowance in the discretion of the court of tween wills of real and personal property. additional costs to defendants, in a suit involving We are not to "act upon a conjecture, how

em For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes


ever plausible." Denio, O. J., in Lynes v., and to die intestate as to his real estate. Townsend, 33 N. Y. 558, 569. If the intent is The fund here is not so inadequate as to not expressed, it must be fairly and satis- carry that suggestion. Testatris owed no factorily inferred. Lupton V. Lupton, 2 debts. She may have expected to increase Johns. Ch. 614. The relation of the bene- her estate. The personal property is not ficiaries of the will to the testator is not to be disposed of in such fashion that unless the overlooked, and the presumption favors chil. legacies are charged on the real estate, the dren rather than strangers. Scott v. Steb natural objects of testatrix's bounty receive bins, 91 N. Y. 605. The condition of testa- nothing, or less than equity suggests as their tor's estate as he knew or believed it to be at share. It would not be "a mockery and an the time he made his will may reveal a absurdity" to impute to testatrix an intendeficiency of personal property so great and tion that the legacies should not be paid it so obvious as to preclude any possible infer- the personal estate was insufficient. Miller, ence other than that he intended to charge J., in Scott v. Stebbins, supra. At the same the legacies upon the real estate (Briggs v. time we cannot give effect to the entire plan Carroll, 117 N. Y. 288, 292, 22 N. E. 1054), and purpose of the will without charging the but an intention to charge the land will not legacies upon the real estate not specifically be inferred from such disparity, even though devised. Whether or not when she executed serious, if the testator might have been un- it she expected that such real estate would conscious of its existence, mistaken in judg. be sold to pay legacies we cannot say, but we ment as to the value of his personal property, can say that everything in the will is consists or in reasonable expectation of increasing his ent with such an intention, and that the pow. personal estate before his death. Briggs. v. er of sale and the blending of real and perCarroll, supra. The presence of a power of sonal property in the residuary clause compel sale of real estate otherwise unnecessary may the conclusion that she intended to mingle help the legatees (Kalbfleisch v. Kalbfleisch, the personal and the real, not specifically de67 N. Y. 354; Dunham v. Deraismes, 165 N. vised, in a common fund. While we should Y. 65, 58 N. E. 789), as may the blending of not vex established rules to sustain mere real and personal property in the residuary conjectures, the artificial distin tons be clause (Scott v. Stebbins, 91 N. Y. 605, 613; tween wills of real and personal property McOorn v. MeCorn, 100 N. Y. 511, 3 N. E. should not be magnified when the circum480; Brill v. Wright, 112 N. Y. 129, 19 N..E. stances surrounding the execution of the will 628, 8 Am. St. Rep. 717; 2 Jarman on Wills, permit the conclusion from the language 1413). The direction to the executors to pay thereof that the testatrix intended that the the transfer tax on the legacies from the legacies should be paid (Bevan v. Cooper, 72 residue is a circumstance suggesting that N. Y. 317), and that they were not meant to the legacies should be paid in full. Subse be nugatory or unavailing (Taylor v. Dodd, quent reduction of personal property and in- 58 N, Y. 335). The language of this will, concrease of real estate has a bearing on the strued by the aid of the surrending circumquestion. Scott v. Stebbins, supra. But these stances, reveals such intention juristically, are circumstances merely, and each will is to and Justifies a finding that the legacies are be considered as a harmonious whole, and la charge upon the real estate. not as a combination of ill-fitting fragments [3] The next question has to do with the (Crumpe v. Crumpe, [1900] A. O. 127, 130, proper construction of the residuary clause. 132), and if the will is drawn by a competent In July, 1900, when the testatrix made her lawyer, the failure expressly to charge the will, she owned an undivided one-half of premlegacies upon the real estate should be, but ises called parcel C, an undivided one-half of perhaps is not, as significant a drcumstance the premises at Hempstead on which she reas any.

sided (which clearly enough included parcels In the case before us we have, as evidence A, B, and D), the whole of parcel F on Washof intention of the testatrix at the time of ington street, and an undivided ball of parmaking the will, many legacies to relatives cel E. Sbe devised to her sister, Julia A. and strangers, aggregating $132,200, to be Harper, "all my right, title and interest” in paid, together with debts and expenses of parcel C and in parcels A, B, and D, and administration, out of a fund which was “the whole of" parcel P. By the residuary about $35,000 less than the amount of the clause she gave one half of the rest, residue, legacies. We have also the incidents of a and remainder of her property to her said power of sale, a mingling of real and personal sister, and the other half to Sarah E. Skillin property in à residuary clausė, and a direc- and her children. Three years thereafter she tion for the payment of the transfer tax out acquired the other one-half interest in par. of the residue, all of which harmonize with cels A, B, and D from her sister Julia. Her an intention to charge the real estate. interest in parcel 5 was disposed of before

In the Ely Case Judge Hogan says the sug- her death. The question is wbether the subgestion is incredible that testator should, at sequently acquired interest in parcels A, B, the end of his days, with full knowledge of and D passed under the devise to her sister his affairs, intend to leave a wholly inade or nnder the residuary clause. The will pass

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