Alvin G. Weeks, of Fall River, for plaintiffs. Asa Auger, of New Bedford, for defendant. plaintiffs were prevented by the quarryman from paving blocks he wanted to either to the city removing the blocks, and his neglect to hinder it, of New Bedford or other parties." from his request for some of the blocks sold for his own use, and from the number of blocks taken from the quarry and sold by defendant to a city. the jury could find that defendant approved and ratified the acts of the quarryman. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Principal and Agent, Cent. Dig. § 661; Dec. Dig. 173(3).] 3. SALES 181(11)-REFUSAL TO DELIVERDEMAND EXCUSE SUFFICIENCY OF EVI DENCE. In an action for refusal to deliver paving blocks sold, from defendant's practical admission that he did not own the blocks, and from his actual sale of them to a city, the jury could find that plaintiffs were excused from making any demand for delivery. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 486, 487, 490; Dec. Dig. 181(11).] 4. APPEAL AND ERROR 171(1)—THEORY OF CASE BELOW. In an action for refusal to deliver paving blocks sold, where the trial proceeded on the ground that there was an actual sale, and not an executory contract to sell, the question whether action was founded on breach of an executory contract to sell was not open to defendant on his appeal. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 1053; Dec. Dig. 171(1).] HARMLESS 1067 CARROLL, J. This action is for the refusal to deliver paving blocks sold to the plaintiffs. There was evidence that the defendant in formed the plaintiffs that he was the owner of "all the blocks Denault was cutting," saying "Denault was practically turning the blocks over to him for his pay roll." An agent of the defendant visited the quarry every Saturday, to ascertain the number of blocks cut during the week; a bill of sale was then made and the number of blocks entered in a book by the defendant, the book showing that at the time of sale the defendant had at the Denault quarry 56,420 blocks. He wrote in the book, "July 8, sold all my pavings to La France Brothers at $42 per 1,000," which memorandum, Joseph La France, one of the plaintiffs, signed. On July 13, 1914, after the plaintiffs had removed 2,400 blocks, they were prevented by the Denaults from taking away what remained. Between July 8 and July 13, the Denaults carried off about 10,000 blocks. July 10, the defendant said to the plaintiffs, "The Denaults claimed to have some blocks that were not covered by the sales which they had 5. APPEAL AND ERROR ERROR-INSTRUCTIONS. In an action for refusal to deliver paving blocks sold, where the court charged that as long as defendant was prepared to carry out his contract with plaintiffs, he could sell paving blocks to other parties, defendant was not harmed by the refusal to instruct that plaintiffs had no right at any time to prevent defendant from sell-made," and asked the plaintiffs to allow Deing paving blocks to a city, although it might cause plaintiffs to lose a valuable contract with the city, or by the court's adding to the request that defendant had the right to sell to others, "That is true, so long as he was prepared and willing to carry out his contract." nault to take away a part of the blocks sold to them, so that Denault might fill an order from the city of New Bedford. This the plaintiff's refused. It was also in evidence that at this time the defendant told the plaintiff, Joseph La France, that he was going to let the su [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 4229; Dec. Dig. 1067; | perintendent of streets of New Bedford Trial, Cent. Dig. § 475.] 6. SALES 418(2) · REFUSAL TO DELIVER VALUE OF GOODS. In an action for refusal to deliver paving blocks sold, where there was no market in the town where they were quarried, their market value could be determined by considering their market value in a city where there was a market, less the cost of removal. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 1175-1179; Dec. Dig. 418(2).] Exceptions from Superior Court, Bristol County; Christopher T. Callahan, Judge. Action by Joseph A. La France and others against Stanislas Desautels. There was verdict for plaintiffs, and defendant excepts. Exceptions overruled. Defendant's twelfth request was: "The plaintiffs had no right at any time to prevent Desautels from selling paving blocks to the city of New Bedford, although it might cause the plaintiffs to lose a valuable contract with the city." Defendant's eleventh request was: "As long as the defendant Desautels was will ing, prepared, and able to carry out his contract with plaintiffs, he had a right to sell all the have some blocks; and in reply to La France's statement "I think I bought those blocks, and I should keep them," the defendant said: "Why, only 10,000 blocks; that would not be a great amount for you." La France also testified that he said to the defendant at this time, "I met young Denault this morning and he told me that they were going to cart the blocks away;" and the defendant knew the next morning that Denault was taking the blocks from the quarry. When the defendant's attention was called to the fact that Denault had taken away more blocks than he (Denault) claimed to own, the defendant said, "You see I can't sell you those blocks." "Don't you see I can't stop them from carting, because there is an agreement." From that time to July 20, the city of New Bedford received from the Denault quarry 18,000 paving blocks for which the defendant was paid. [1] As there was evidence of the sale and . of the refusal to deliver the blocks, it could not be ruled as matter of law, that the plaintiff could not recover. [2] From the defendant's knowledge that For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes the plaintiffs were prevented from removing | be determined by considering their market the material and his neglect to hinder it, his value in Fall River or New Bedford, less the request for some of the blocks sold for his cost of removing them from the quarry to the own use, and from the number of blocks tak- cities where there was a market for this maen from the quarry and sold by him to the terial. We see no error in this instruction. city of New Bedford, the jury could find that It might be inferred from all the evidence the defendant approved and ratified the acts that paving blocks for city streets were not of Denault. The first request was properly used to any great extent in the town of Dartrefused. Cohen v. Jackson, 210 Mass. 328, 96 mouth, and their value could be ascertained N. E. 669. in the manner pointed out by the judge. National Coal Tar Co. v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co., 189 Mass. 234, 75 N. E. 625; Barry v. Cavanagh, 127 Mass. 394; Hanson & Parker v. Wittenberg, 205 Mass. 319, 91 N. E. 383. [3] The defendant in his second request, asked the judge to rule, "If no proper demand for the delivery of the paving blocks, in accordance with the terms of the contract, was ever made by the plaintiff to the defendant, they cannot recover." Assuming that under the terms of the contract a demand was essential, from the fact that the defendant practically admitted he did not own the blocks sold when he said: "I can't sell you those blocks," and by his actual sale of them to the city of New Bedford, the jury could find that the plaintiffs were excused from giving any notice. The judge was therefore right in refusing this request. Exceptions overruled. (225 Mass. 266) HALLFORS et al. v. GOVE, Deputy Sheriff. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Worcester. Nov. 29, 1916.) 1. CHATTEL MORTGAGES 124 CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION-PROPERTY MORTGAGThe ninth request was given in substance ED-TITLE TO AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY. when the jury were told that the Denaults Title to chattels acquired by the mortgagor had a right to sell to the city of New Bedford, subsequent to the execution of a chattel mortgage does not pass where the mortgagee takes all the paving blocks which they had on hand possession for foreclosure purposes in the abat the quarry on July 8, 1914, above the num-sence of a provision to that effect in the mortber of 56,420 which had been sold by the defendant to the plaintiffs. gage. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 208, 209; Dec. Dig. 124.] [4] The defendant now argues that the action is not for the breach of a sale of des-2. ignated blocks, but is founded on the breach of an executory contract to sell a number of blocks. The parties went to trial on the first count in the declaration, which sets out an executory contract. No question of pleading, however, was raised at the trial. The attention of the court was not called to this point, and under the general request that upon the evidence and the law the plaintiff could not recover, this objection was not referred to. The trial proceeded on the ground that there was an actual sale, and not an executory contract to sell. Therefore, the question now argued by the defendant is not open to him. Oulighan v. Butler, 189 Mass. 287, 75 N. E. 726. [5] The judge said to the jury, at the request of the defendant, "As long as the de fendant was willing, prepared and able to carry out his contract with the plaintiffs, he had a right to sell all the paving blocks he wanted to, either to the city of New Bedford or to other parties"; and added, "That is true so long as he was prepared and willing to carry out his contract." In view of this, the defendant was not harmed by the refusal to give the twelfth request or by what was said in reference to the eleventh ' request. CHATTEL MORTGAGES 177(3)—CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION-PROPERTY COVERED. In an action by mortgagees for damages against a deputy sheriff for conversion of mortgaged property under trustee process, conflicting evidence held to warrant a finding that the property seized by the officer was not mentioned in or covered by plaintiffs' mortgage. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 352; Dec. Dig. 177(3).] 3. CHATTEL MORTGAGES 177(5) · CONVER In an action by mortgagees against deputy sheriff for conversion of the mortgaged property under trustee process, where the evidence was conflicting as to whether the property alleged to have been converted was covered by the mortgage, instructions, that plaintiffs were entitled to recover if the jury should find that the defendant carried the property away against the will and consent of the plaintiffs, were properly refused. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 357; Dec. Dig. 177(5).1 4. CHATTEL MORTGAGES 177(5) - CONVerSION-TRIAL-ISSUES AND FINDINGS. Where evidence was conflicting as to whether chattels seized on process by deputy sheriff was covered by mortgage, it was discretionary with court, in action for conversion by mortgagee, to submit to jury the question as to ownership of property by mortgagors, the defendants named in writ under which seizure was made. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 357; Dec. Dig. 177(5).] 5. CHATTEL MORTGAGES 177(3) CONVERSION-EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS AND BUR DEN OF PROOF. [6] When instructed on the question of damages, the jury were told that the market value of paving blocks in Dartmouth could In an action by mortgagees against a deputy sheriff for conversion of mortgaged property, the burden is upon plaintiffs to prove that at the time the goods were attached and removed by the defendant, plaintiffs had a complete property as well as actual possession or the right of possession. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 352; Dec. Dig. 177(3).] 6. CHATTEL MORTGAGES 177(3)-CONVER SION-TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS. In an action for conversion, the court properly refused an instruction that the burden was on defendants to show that property seized by them was not embraced in the plaintiffs' mortgage; the burden being upon plaintiffs to show their title and right of possession. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Mortgages, Cent. Dig. § 352; Dec. Dig. 177(3).] 7. CHATTEL MORTGAGES 177(5)-CONVER not embraced in the mortgage executed and delivered to the plaintiffs. J. G. Annala, of Fitchburg, for plaintiffs. Thos. Casey, of Fitchburg, for defendant. BRALEY, J. [1-3] The plaintiffs' title by purchase to the personal property for the alleged conversion of which they seek damages is derived from a duly recorded mortgage whose validity the defendant does not question. It is familiar law, however, that even if possession for the purposes of foreclosure had been taken, the title to after-acquired property would not pass in the absence of a provision in the mortgage to that effect, which is not shown by the record. Blanchard v. Cooke, 144 Mass. 207, 222, 223, 11 N. E. 83. It appears that nearly a year had elapsed between the date of the mortgage and the commencement of proceedings to foreclose, during which the business of the bakery had been carried on by the mortgagors, and the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Chattel Mort-jury were warranted upon conflicting evigages, Cent. Dig. § 357; Dec. Dig. 177(5).] SION-TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS. In an action against a deputy sheriff for conversion of mortgaged chattels, the jury were properly instructed that if the property belonged to the mortgagors and was not covered by plaintiffs' mortgage, the defendant under trustee process had a right to remove it for which he incurred no liability. Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; Philip J. O'Connell, Judge. Action by Arthur Hallfors and another against Horace F. Gove, a deputy sheriff, for damages for taking and carrying away property on which the plaintiffs held a chattel mortgage. From a judgment for the defendant, plaintiffs bring exceptions. Exceptions overruled. The following instructions were requested by the plaintiffs and refused by the court: (1) On all the evidence you must return a verdict for the plaintiffs for such sum as you may find from the evidence to be a fair market value of the property in question. (2) On all the evidence you must return a verdict for the plaintiffs for such sum as you may find from the evidence to be fair market value of 11⁄2 barrels flour, % bag rye meal, 22 ten-pound cans M. R. E. Baking Powder, 6 five-pound cans Knight's Baking Powder, 10 thirty-pound pails pie filling, and 2 gallons extracts. (3) In this case the plaintiffs are entitled to recover the fair market value of the property if you find from the evidence that the defendant carried the property away, or caused it to be carried away by his agents or servants, against the will and without the consent of the plaintiffs. dence in finding as they did in answer to the first question, that "the property described in the plaintiffs' declaration" had not been mentioned in or covered by the mortgage. It accordingly is plain that the first, second and third requests could not have been given. [4-7] But if the answer is conclusive on this issue, the plaintiffs further contend, that having taken possession before the defendant, a deputy sheriff, attached the goods on mesne process in an action against the mortgagors, they had a possessory title sufficient to enable them to recover damages. Shaw v. Kaler, 106 Mass, 448, 449. It was discretionary with the presiding judge whether he would submit to the jury the second question, namely, "Was the property described in the plaintiffs' declaration the property of the several defendants, or any of them, mentioned and described in the writ under which they were attached and removed by * the defendant in this action?" Hart v. Brierley, 189 Mass. 598, 604, 76 N. E. 286. The plaintiffs, on whom the burden of proof rested, could not recover unless at the time the goods were attached and removed by the defendant they had therein a complete property, either general or special, as well as actual possession or the right to immediate possession. Bacon v. George, 206 Mass. 566, 570, 92 N. E. 721. And the affirmative answer to this (5) If an officer, or his agents and servants, question having been fully justified by the acting under him, break open a dwelling-house evidence the fourth and fifth requests became or such shop or other part of a dwelling-house immaterial, while the seventh was properly that comes under the same roof and protection refused. Shaw v. Kaler, 106 Mass. 448. The of a dwelling-house itself, for the purpose of making an attachment of the property therein, without the owner's consent, he is a trespasser and such attachment so made by means of such unlawful breaking is invalid. (4) I instruct you, as a matter of law, that on the evidence produced, the plaintiffs were in possession of the property in question at the time of the alleged conversion of the same by the defendant. property in question having been in the bake shop, the jury were also rightly instructed that if when seized they found it belonged to (7) If you find from the evidence that the the mortgagors, the defendant had the right plaintiffs were in possession of the property of removal for which he incurred no liability in question, under their mortgage, for the pur- to the plaintiffs. Platt v. Brown, 16 Pick. pose of foreclosing the mortgage at the time of the alleged conversion, then the burden is on 553, 556. the defendant to prove that the property was Exceptions overruled. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (225 Mass. 276) BROWN et al. v. BISHOP. Action by J. I. Brown and another against Isador W. Bishop. Findings for the plain (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suf- tiffs, and from an order of the appellate divifolk. Nov. 29, 1916.) sion dismissing a report from the findings, 1. PAYMENT 67(3, 4)-PRESUMPTIONS-NOTE the defendant appeals. Affirmed. A finding on unreported evidence that a third person's note was accepted as conditional payment only by the creditor is conclusive on appeal. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 2911-2913, 2915, 2916; Dec. Dig. 907(2).] 3. PAYMENT Requests for rulings 4-8 were as follows: 4. That if plaintiffs were not induced by fraud of the defendant to accept said note as payment, the taking of said note by the plaintiffs constitutes payment of the debt, although plaintiffs thereafter fail to realize anything on said note. 5. That the plaintiffs must prove, not only an intent to defraud them by the defendant, but that they actually have been misled by the deceit of the defendant when they accepted said note. 6. That an acceptance by a creditor of another promise as payment is valid. 7. That if plaintiffs have not in their possession the said note given them by the defendant at the commencement of this action and they fail to surrender the said note to the defendant at the trial, in court, it is presumed that the said note was given and accepted as payment of the debt. 77-TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS. Where defendant claimed to have paid a debt by delivering a third party's note to plaintiffs, a request to rule that taking the note constituted payment of the debt, if not induced by defend-person, who has a right of action upon it. ant's fraud, was properly refused. said note is outstanding in the hands of a third 8. That there can be no recovery while the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Payment, Cent. Dig. § 249; Dec. Dig. 77.] 4. PAYMENT 67(3) · Nathan Barnett, of Boston, for appellant. BRALEY, J. [1, 2] The defendant having REQUISITES CONDI- admitted the sale and delivery of the goods nothing remained but the issue of payment. It is settled that where a debtor delivers to his creditor for the whole of his indebtedness the promissory note of another as in the case at bar, there is a presumption that it is received in payment. But this presumption may be rebutted by showing that the plaintiff did not intend to extinguish his original demand or claim, and the finding on evidence not reported that the promissory note of a third party payable to the defendant's order and indorsed by him to the plaintiff, was taken only as conditional payment disposes of 6. PAYMENT 67(1)-PRESUMPTIONS-NOTES this defence. American Malting Co. v. SouthOF THIRD PERSONS. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Payment, Cent. Dig. §§ 191, 193, 198; Dec. Dig. 67(3).] 5. PAYMENT 77-TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS. Where defendant claimed to have paid a debt by delivering a third party's note to plaintiffs, a request to rule that an acceptance by a creditor of another promise is valid was properly refused. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Payment, Cent. Dig. § 249; Dec. Dig. 77.] Plaintiffs' failure to produce a note which defendant claimed was given in payment of the debt sued upon does not create a presumption that the note was accepted as payment. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Payment, Cent. Dig. §§ 162, 189, 198; Dec. Dig. 7. TRIAL 252(15) INSTRUCTIONS FORMITY TO EVIDENCE. A request to rule that no recovery can be had while a note delivered to plaintiffs by defendant, but not produced at the trial, was in the hands of a person entitled to sue upon it, was properly refused, where there was no evi er Brewing Co., 194 Mass. 89, 94, 80 N. E. 526, and cases cited. [3-8] The fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh requests were properly denied. If the plaintiffs had negotiated the note there could be no 67(1).] recovery while it was outstanding in the posCON- session of a third person who had the right to collect it. Morton v. Austin, 12 Cush. 389. But there being no evidence of negotiation the eighth request could not have been given. The report states that the defendant in open court demanded of the plaintiffs a return of the note, "but the plaintiffs then failed and refused to surrender" the note claiming that it "was either lost or mislaid by them." The Where plaintiffs failed to produce a note in- defendant thereupon by the first request askdorsed to them by defendants as conditional pay-ed the court to rule that "upon all the eviment for the account sued upon, held not error dence * to refuse a ruling that plaintiffs could not recover, where judgment was stayed until the note was produced. dence of its negotiation. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trial, Cent. Dig. 605; Dec. Dig. 252(15).] 8. PAYMENT 53-ACTIONS-DEFENSES. * the plaintiffs cannot recov er." The court ruled: "If this means they cannot now have judgment I give it. If it [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Payment, means they cannot have a finding I refuse it." Cent. Dig. § 141; Dec. Dig. 53.] And the defendant contends, that the request Appeal from Municipal Court of Boston, should have been given without modification. Appellate Division. It is true that so long as the note is outstand ing he not only may be exposed to the hazard | been admitted that, after the lessee had enof being obliged to pay a second time, but tered under the lease the Massachusetts dismay suffer inconvenience from the loss of the trict police under authority of law adopted instrument if he brings an action against the certain regulations governing the construcmaker, yet the debt for which he has been tion and maintenance of garages, compliheld liable had not been ended. If instead ance with which "necessitated the expendiof suing on the account the action had been ture of considerable sums of money in the brought on his endorsement the plaintiffs making of changes and alterations to make could have had judgment on giving a bond of the demised premises conform thereto." indemnity. Fales v. Russell, 16 Pick. 315; Hinckley v. Union Pacific R. R., 129 Mass. 52, 37 Am. Rep. 297. And while upon the record it should be surrendered the order staying judgment until the plaintiffs produce and file the note in court affords him sufficient protection. See Davis v. Parsons, 157 Mass. 584, 588, 32 N. E. 1117. The question whether the plaintiffs upon giving bond would be entitled to judgment if they fail to file the note is not before us. Tuttle v. Standish, 4 Allen, 481, 81 Am. Dec. 712. Order dismissing report affirmed. In a lease describing the premises as "the garage," which contained a clause against subletting except to specified person for garage purposes, the use of the descriptive words, "the garage," held not to raise an implied warranty that the premises were or would continue fit for garage purposes. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. § 483; Dec. Dig. 134(2).] 2. LANDLORD AND TENANT 172(3)—WAR BANTIES. [1] The contention that the evidence was admissible rests on the assumption that the demise was limited to garage purposes, because it speaks of the leased premises as "The Garage" and because there is excepted from the covenant of the lease not to sublet, the right "to sublet or sublease the aforesaid premises to the Western Massachusetts Cadillac Co. for garage purposes." We are of opinion that the partial and restricted release of the covenant of the defendant not to lease or underlet, did not by implication destroy or cut down the right (otherwise created by the words "lease and demise") to use "The Garage" for any lawful purpose, and that the use of the descriptive words "The Garage" did not raise an implied warranty that the premises were when leased or would continue to be fit or usable for garage or any other purpose. Dutton v. Gerrish, 9 Cush. 89, 55 Am. Dec. 45; Taylor v. Finni(N. S.) 973; Lumiansky v. Tessier, 213 Mass. gan, 189 Mass. 568, 76 N. E. 203, 2 L. R. A. 182, 99 N. E. 1051, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1049. [2] The case at bar presents no fact to warrant a finding of actual or constructive expulsion of the lessee from the use and enjoyment of the whole or of any part of the premises by any intentional or wrongful act of the lessor. Bartlett v. Farrington, 120 Mass. 284; Skally v. Shute, 132 Mass. 367; Where defendant leased from plaintiff prem- Voss v. Sylvester, 203 Mass. 233, 240, 89 N. E. ises described as "the garage," and thereafter 241. The fact that the premises have remainpolice regulations were adopted, compliance with which would necessitate the expenditure of ed unoccupied by the lessee since the order considerable money to change or alter the de- of the district police went into effect, does mised premises in order that they might be not distinguish the case at bar from the used for garage purposes, held, that there was no actual or constructive expulsion of the lessee case of Taylor v. Finnigan, supra. from the use and enjoyment of the premises, by any intentional or wrongful act of the lessor, and his failure or refusal to make the necessary alterations did not justify the lessee in refusing to pay rent. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Landlord and Tenant, Cent. Dig. § 701; Dec. Dig. 172(3).] Report from Superior Court, Hampden County; Richard W. Irwin, Judge. Action by Morris H. Barnett against Edward R. Clark. Judgment for plaintiff on master's report. W. H. McClintock, E. A. McClintock, J. F. Jennings, and D. B. Hoar, all of Springfield, for plaintiff. Wm. H. Brooks, Thos. C. Maher, and Chase Brooks, all of Springfield, for defendant. PIERCE, J. The question presented on the report is whether in an action to recover unpaid rent due on a covenant contained in an indenture of lease, evidence should have It follows that the evidence was excluded rightly, and that in accordance with the terms of the report judgment is to be entered for the plaintiff in the sum of $227.38 with interest from September 28, 1915. So ordered. (225 Mass. 279) GUINEY v. UNION ICE CO. (Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Suffolk. Nov. 29, 1916.) 1. NEGLIGENCE 32(2)-LICENSEES. Where plaintiff entered a car from which ice was being transferred to his wagon, but had no duties to perform there and was injured by a glancing blow from an ice pick used by defendant's servant, held he was a mere licensee to whom defendant owed no active duty. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Negligence, Cent. Dig. § 43; Dec. Dig. 32(2).] 2. TRIAL 45(3)-RECEPTION OF EVIDENCEOFFER. Where plaintiff testified that he had no duties to perform in the car where he was injured For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |