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ing the removal of the walk, and its recon- is given exclusive power over the streets. struction, and in failing to remove obstruc- Section 8961, Burns 1914. It is evident, tions, were acting as agents of the abutting therefore, that in improving and caring for owners and not for the city. This point has its streets the aty, and not the abutting in effect been passed on by this court in the owners, is the principal. The duty to imcase of city of Valparaiso v. Spalth (1905) prove the streets is imposed on it and it in 166 Ind. 14, 76 N. E. 514, 8 Ann. Cas. 1021, turn may tax the abutting owners for the where it was said:

cost of the improvement. “The entry of the order by the city councu [2] It is also contended that the demurrer that the improvement be made had the effect of should have been sustained for the reason constituting the board of commissioners the agent of the city in the improvement of that that the contract and statute under which part of the bighway within the city limits." the improvement was made both specifically See, also, State v. Kohnke (1903) 109 La. shall be paid by the abutting owners by as

provide that the cost of the improvement 838, 33 South. 793; 1 Dillon, Munic. Corp. p. sessment, and that therefore the corporation 153; 11 Dillon, Munic. Corp. p. 1255.

is not liable as alleged. This is true of those It is further to be noted that the statute costs arising out of the improvement itself, under which the improvement was brought but the position of appellees in their comexpressly required the contract to be entered plaint is that appellant violated the terms of into between the city and the contractor. the contract, and for that act it is liable to Indeed the authority to improve the street eminates, under the wording of the statute, of the extra work they were compelled to

appellees in damages, measured by the cost from the city. The property owners have perform. This position of appellees is corremonstrance rights only. They in no way rect. The cost of improvements is to be disauthorize the city to enter into relations with tinguished from the damage done to appelcontractors on their behalf so as to bind them lees by the failure of the appellant to do as to all acts done by the municipality or its its duty under the contract. Appellees alagents during the progress of the improve lege that they were compelled to replace ment. Acts 1905, pp. 404–406. he capacity portions of the walk because of the failure of in which a city enters into contracts for im- the city to do its duty. It is therefore an provements of its streets is not the same as action to recover for breach of the contract, that of purely governmental agencies such as and not for extra compensation under the counties and townships. A municipal corporation exercises other functions than those lant is liable in damages. Gearty v. Mayor

contract. For this breach of contract appelgranted to it or imposed upon it as an agent of New York, 171 N. Y. 61, 63 N. E. 804; of the state. It exercises some rights as a corporation as such, and in exercising these O'Neill v. Milwaukee, 121 Wis. 32, 98 N. W. rights it is in general responsible as other 963; Wren v. City of Indianapolis, 96 Ind. corporations for injuries and damages re- 219; City of Dunkirk v. Wallace (1897) 19 sulting from such acts. There is some con

Ind. App. 298, 49 N. E. 463; McQuillin, fusion as to the capacity in which a city acts Munic. Corp. vol. 4, 88 1942, 1943; Dillon, in the care of the streets. In a few states it Munic. Corp. (5th Ed.) § 813. has been held that in the absence of special

We conclude, therefore, that the position of statutory duty imposed on a municipality appellant in these particulars is not well takthere is no liability for failure to keep streets en, and the demurrer to the complaint propin repair. Winbigler v. Los Angeles, 45 Cal. erly overruled. 36; Arkadelphia v. Windham, 49 Ark. 139,

[3] Although it was not assigned as one of 4 S. W. 450, 4 Am. St. Rep. 32; Young v. the reasons for sustaining the demurrer to City Council, etc., 20 S. C. 116, 47 Am. Rep. the complaint, it is insisted on by appellant, 827; Detroit v. Blackeby, 21 Mich. 84, 4 Am. under the assignments of error in giving cerRep. 450; Hill v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. Itain instruction and in its motion for a new 344, 23 Am. Rep. 332. The conclusion in trial, that the complaint for damages was these states is based on the theory that the not the proper remedy under the facts allegduty to keep streets in repair is a public ed, for the reason that it was the duty of duty rather than that of the corporation as appellees to bring proceedings in mandamus such. But in the great majority of states, to compel the proper officials of appellant including our own, the opposite conclusion city to accept the walks as first completed. as to the nature of the duty is reached, and In Dillon on Municipal Corporations, $ 813, in consequence an opposite conclusion as to p. 1231, that eminent authority states the the liability of the city for failure to keep rule as follows: the streets in repair. Higert v. City of “A provision in the contract that work_shall Greencastle (1873) 43 Ind. 574; Glantz v.

be done to the satisfaction of the city officials City of South Bend, 106 Ind. 305, 6 N. E. 632, that work not done to their satisfaction shall

under whose direction it is to be performed, and and cases there cited. For a list of cases be made good by the contractor, does not jusfrom other states to the same effect, see 30 tify the city official in acting arbitrarily, or imAm. St. Rer. 385, note; Dillon, Munic. Corp. properly exercising the power conferred upon

them by the contract. If these powers are er(5th Ed.) § 165.

ercised arbitrarily, or improperly, the contractor Moreover, by our statute the municipality has either of two remedies. He may stop work

upon receiving an order to remove a portion of bond, the city cannot be heard to set up any his work and do it over again, and stand upon irregularity in the execution of the contract his contention that the work is properly done, and bring an action to recover for labor and and bond to which it was a party and, as materials furnished and performed, under the alleged in the reply, for which it was to contract, and for the loss of his prospective blame. It was its duty to either accept or profits, or he may do the work over as required reject the bid of appellees at the time, and and sue to recover damages on the ground that he has been unlawfully compelled to do the not after it had received all the benefits for work a second time."

which the contract and bond provide. Wren And on page 1254 of the same work it is v. City of Indianapolis (1884) 96 Ind. 206, said:

217–218; City of New Albany v. Iron Sub“But mandamus may not be the only remedy structure Co., 141 Ind. 500, 507, 40 N. E. 44; of the contractor against the city if it has plain Moore v. Mayor, etc., 73 N. Y. 238, 29 Am. ly violated its duty towards the contractor by Rep. 134; . Hallock v. Lebanon, 215 Pa. 1, unreasonably and persistently neglecting or re-64 Atl. 362. See, generally, 28 Cyc. p. 674; fusing to make and collect the assessment or to 2 Dillon, Munic. Corp. $ 793, and note, where make a new assessment. In support of this declaration he cites the cases are cited; McQuillin, Munic. Corp. $8

1906, 1907, 1916, 1920. following authority: Gearty v. Mayor, etc., of New York, 171 N. Y. 61, 63 N. E. 804; discussion of the questions raised by the al

It is unnecessary to enter further into the Lentilhon v. New York, 102 App. Div. 548, 92 N. Y. Supp. 897, affirmed in 185 N. Yleged error in overruling the motion for a 549, 77 N. E. 1190; O'Neill v. Milwaukee, raised by the demurrers to the complaint

new trial, since they are identical with those 121 Wis. 32, 98 N. W. 963.

and reply, except as above noted with reThis seems to us to be the correct statement of the law. It is in harmony with the spect to the correctness of the position of the

court on the kind of relief asked for. law of private corporations and persons, and we see no reason why it should not apply below as shown by the record, and the judg

There was no error committed by the court with equal force to municipal corporations ment is sustained. with respect to acts done in their corporate capacity. Roehm v. Horst (1899) 178 U. S. 1, 20 Sup. Ct. 780, 44 L. Ed. 953.

(67 Ind. App. 654) [4] Appellant also contends that the de- HUGHES v. PATTON, Auditor. (No. 9773.)* murrer to appellee's reply was improperly (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1. overruled. It is earnestly insisted upon that

Nov. 29, 1916.) the failure to enter into a written contract

APPEAL AND ERROR O77(2) APPEALABLE and file a bond as required by statute (Acts

ORDER—“FINAL JUDGMENT.' 1905, § 265, p. 406), prior to the date of the An order, on objection of county auditor to acts complained of, is a bar to a recovery, an administrator's final report, that the estate the facts set up in reply notwithstanding. was indebted for omitted taxes, that the reThe statute provides:

port be not approved, and that the administra

tor be not discharged, and that the auditor “Upon the acceptance of any such bid the prosecute the claim for taxes, is not a "final successful bidder shall enter into a written con- judgment," from which appeal will lie, within tract for the faithful execution of such work Burns' Ann. St. 1914, § 671. and shall give bond

to the approval of [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and said common council or board of trustees to se- Error, Cent. Dig. 88 444 447; Dec. Dig. cure the performance of such contract and to 77(2). hold such city or town harmless from the pay For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, ment of any debt or damage by the reason of First and Second Series, Final Judgment.) the act of such contractor and to secure the payment of all claims for labor and material used Appeal from Probate Court, Marion Coun. in such improvement, which bond shall be in lieu ty; Mahlon E. Bash, Judge. of any and all other bonds heretofore provided for by any other law or laws of this

Charles F. Hughes filed final report as ad. state,

ministrator, to which William T. Patton,

auditor of Marion county, filed objection. It will be noted that the bond is to secure From an order the administrator appeals. the performance of the contract, and to save the city harmless from the acts of the con

Appeal dismissed. tractors. As alleged, the contract is perform

Bachelder & Bachelder, of Indianapolis, ed. That consideration is disposed of. There for appellant. Frank T. Brown and Jos. W. is no indication that there was any harm Hutchinson, both of Indianapolis, for apdone to the city by acts of appellees, and if pellee. there had been, the execution of the bond and contract at a later date with date of execu HOTTEL, J. On January 12, 1914, Charles tion recited as of the original date of the F. Hughes, administrator, de bonis non, of letting of the contract, would furnish as the estate of Lovina Streight, deceased, filed adequate guaranty against wrong or injury his final report, in which he showed a total as a bond and contract executed at the time. of receipts and disbursements, leaving a bal. Moreover, after having accepted the work ance of $19,017.16, of which amount he repreand consequent benefits of the contract and sented that $5,705.14 should be paid to certain

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For other cases see same lopic and KSY-NUMBER ID all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes


attorneys named, and the balance distributed | Pfeiffer v. Crane, Gd'n, 89 Ind. 485; Thieamong certain named heirs, in the amounts baud v. Dufour, 57 Ind. 598; Wood v. Wood, therein set out. On February 7, 1914, W1l- 51 Ind. 141; Goodwin v. Goodwin, 48 Ind. liam T. Patton, auditor of Marion county, 584; Angevine v. Ward, 66 Ind. 460; Leach filed objection to this report, in which he v. Webb, 113 N. E. 311; Mak-Saw-Ba Club alleged that:

v. Coffin, 169 Ind. 204, 210-213, 82 N. E. 461, “Said estate is indebted to the state of In- and cases there cited. diana, county of Marion, city of Indianapolis, The appeal is therefore dismissed. and Center township, for omitted taxes which said Lovina Streight omitted and failed to return on her schedule of taxes to the township, assessor or the proper authorities as follows."

(63 Ind. App. 151) Here follows certain notes owned by de-CRITTENBERGER, Auditor, v. STATE SAVceased which she had omitted from her sched INGS & TRUST CO. OF MARION COUNule of taxes. Notice to the administrator of

TY et al. (No. 9718.) such omission, and his failure to appear be

(Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2. fore such auditor, is alleged, with a state

Nov. 28, 1916.) ment that such auditor is credibly informed

RIGHT OF APand believes that said estate owes taxes 1. APPEAL AND ERROR ml amounting to $1,181.69, and a prayer that

There is no vested right of appeal, and such the court withhold the approval of said re right is the subject of legislative discretion, to port until steps could be effected whereby be given or withheld as the General Assembly such taxes could be collected off of said es

sees fit. tate. Thereupon, to wit, on February 13, Error, Cent. Dig. 8$ 1-4; Dec. Dig. eml.]

(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and 1914, the administrator filed a report, show

2. TAXATION O900(5) — INHERITANCE TAXing a distribution of the balance in his hands

APPEAL. to the persons shown in his first report to be Appeal from judgment of a probate court on entitled thereto, accompanied by the receipts the rehearing and redetermination of an inof such distributees. On March 27, such ad-|(Acts 1913, c. 47) may be taken under Burns'

heritance tax under the inheritance tax law ministrator filed a demurrer to said excep-Ann. St. 1914, § 2977, providing that any person, tions to his report, which was overruled. considering himself aggrieved by any decision of On April 7, 1914, said matter was submitted any matter connected with a decedent's estate, to the court for trial, with a request by said 15, subd. 3, of the inheritance tax law provides

may appeal to the Supreme Court; that section administrator for a special finding of facts for rebearing of the determination of such tax, and conclusions of law.

not barring appeal. In its finding, the court found the condi (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, tion of the estate to be substantially as set Cent. Dig. $ 1723; Dec. Dig. Om 900(5).] out in the administrator's report, and also 3. APPEAL AND ERROR 374(4) APPEAL

BOND-INIIERITANCE TAX DETERMINATION. found that the deceased omitted from her schedule of taxes in the years named the ing that in civil suits by the state in its own

Under Burns' Ann. St. 1914, $ 9270, providdotes set out in the exceptions to said rename, or in its name on the relation of the Atport, and that their amount in value had not torney General, or on the relation of any state been placed on the tax duplicate of Marion board, etc., any relief to which the state is encounty as omitted property of the deceased, bond for costs or damages, no bond is required

titled therein may be obtained without filing any and that the final report of said administra- on appeal by the state in a proceeding to rehear tor had never been approved. Upon this and redetermine an inheritance tax, although finding the court stated, as a conclusion of brought in the name of the auditor of the state,

where the trial court and the parties treated it law, that said final report should not be ap- as an action brought, and it was as a matter of proved or the administrator discharged; fact, prosecuted, by the Attorney General. that the estate should be kept open, and said (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and auditor be permitted to prosecute said claim Error, Cent. Dig. 88 2008–2010; Dec. Dig.

374(4).) for taxes. Upon such finding and conclusion of law, the court entered the following or


APPEAL. der, viz.:

Where no bond is required to be given by a “It is thereupon adjudged and decreed by the party appealing under Burns'. Ann. Št. 1914, & court that the report in final settlement of said 2977, as to appeals from decisions upon matters estate filed by the administrator, de bonis non, connected with a decedent's estate, the appelbe not approved and that said administrator be lant has 120 days from the date of the decision not discharged, and that William T. Patton, within which to perfect his appeal. auditor of Marion county, Indiana, prosecute (Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and the claim for taxes on the personal estate de- Error, Cent. Dig. § 1883; Dec. Dig. Om339(1).] scribed in the exceptions to report in final settlement."

Appeal from Probate Court, Marion CounFrom this order this appeal is prosecuted. ty; Mahlon E. Bash, Judge. The order indicated is not a final judgment Action by Dale J. Crittenberger, Auditor from which an appeal will lie within the of the State of Indiana, against the State meaning of section 671, Burns' 1914, as con- Savings & Trust Company of Marion County, strued by the Supreme Court and this court. Ind., and others. From the judgment plain

marci other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

114 N.E.-15

ar appeals, and defendants move to dis | Ind. 448, 82 N. E. 1030; City of Indianapolis miss the appeal. Motion overruled.

v. L. C. Thompson Mfg. Co., 40 Ind. App. 535, Evan B. Stotsenburg, of New Albany, and 81 N. E. 1156, 82 N. E. 540; State v. RockCharles J. Orbison, of Indianapolis, for ap

wood, 159 Ind. 94, 95, 64 N. E. 592, and cases

cited. pellant. Pickens, Cox & Conder, of Indianapolis, for appellees.

[2] An analysis of the act in question and a study of its provisions as a whole indicate

that the Legislature intended to make the IBACH, J. Appellant appeals from a judg- ascertainment and collection of inheritance ment rendered in the matter of the rehear tax a part of our probate law, and to vest our ing and redetermination of the inheritance

county courts with probate jurisdiction tax in the estate of William L. Higgins, de

over such matters. Said act provides, among ceased.

other things, that the value of the estate and After the filing of the transcript in this the amount of tax to which it is liable shall court, and before the filing of appellant's be determined by the court after notice and brief, appellees, other than Charles Latham, hearing; that such tax shall be a llen on the whose death is suggested, have filed a motion property transferred until paid, and the adto dismiss the appeal for each of the follow-ministrator shall be personally liable there ing reasons:

for; that no administrator shall be entitled "(1) No right of appeal iş by law provided to a final accounting until he produces a refrom the judgment of the probate court of Mar. ion county, Ind., set forth in the transcript of celpt for its payment; that he shall have the record in the above-entitled cause, and no power to sell the property of his decedent appeal from any such judgment of the probate to pay such tax; that he shall not deliver, or court of Marion county, Ind., is permitted by law. (2) No bond was 'filed with the clerk of be compelled to deliver, any specific legacy or Marion county, Ind., or with the clerk of the property subject to such tax to any person probate court of Marion county, Ind., as pro- until he shall have collected the tax thereon; vided by law, as a condition upon which an ap- that in the collection of unpaid taxes the propeal may be had from a judgment such as is cedure shall conform, as near as may be, to disclosed in the said transcript of record, it being

a judgment growing out of a matter connected the provisions of the law governing probate 1 with a decedent's estate. (3) No appeal bond practice of this state; that the powers con

was filed with any officer or person in connection ferred on the circuit court shall be conferred with the said attempted appeal within 30 days after the decision complained of was made. 4) on certain other courts having jurisdiction No transcript was filed in the office of the clerk in probate matters. With this construction of this court within 90 days after the filing of an it follows that the right of appeal, if not exappeal bond with any officer or person whatso, pressly denied by the act itself, is provided ever in connection with an attempted appeal from the decision and judgment of the probate by section 2977, Burns 1914, which reads in court of Marion county disclosed in the tran- part as follows: script of record, in the above-entitled cause, as is “Any person considering himself aggrieved by by law provided as a condition upon which ap- any decision of a circuit court, or judge thereof peals are allowed in decisions of the probate in vacation, growing out of any matter connectcourt of Marion county, growing out of any mat-ed with a decedent's estate, may prosecute an ter connected with a decedent's estate, and in appeal to the Supreme Court," etc. fact no appeal bond has been, at any time, filed in connection with this attempted appeal, or any

As tending to sustain our conclusion, see attempted appeal from the decision and judg- Bennett v. Bennett, 102 Ind. 86, 89, 1 N. E. ment of the probate court of Marion county, dis- 199; Baker v. Edwards, 156 Ind. 53, 59 N. closed in the transcript in the above-entitled E. 174; Rogers v. State, 26 Ind. App. 144, cause. (Our italics.)

59 N. E. 334; Holderman v. Wood, 34 Ind. [1] The act in question (Acts 1913, p. 79 App. 519, 73 N. E. 199; Vail v. Page, 175 et seq.) contains no express provisions au- Ind. 126, 130, 93 N. E. 705, and cases cited. thorizing an appeal. Proceedings had under

Appellees, while contending that no right of the provisions of such act are in the nature appeal is created by section 2977, supra, also of special proceedings. It is thoroughly set-contend that the act contains language which tled that there is no vested right of appeal, practically forbids an appeal. The language and that such right is the subject of legisla- referred to is found in section 15, subd. 3, of tive discretion, to be given or withheld as such act, and is as follows: the General Assembly sees fit. It has also

"The auditor of state, county treasurer, or any been held that the general right of appeal person dissatisfied with the appraisement or asallowed from final judgments does not apply sessment and determination of such tax may apto special proceedings, and that statutory ply for a rehearing thereof before the circuit

court within sixty days from the fixing, assessing provisions for the improvement of streets and determination of the tax by the circuit court and other highways, and for the assessment as herein provided on filing a written notice of the costs thereof against the property which shall state the grounds of the application benefited are special in character, and, un- for rehearing. The rehearing shall be upon the less expressly granted, no appeal lies from the hearings as herein provided as a new trial

records, proceedings and proofs had and taken on any action or decision of the board or tribu- shall not be had or granted unless specially ornal conducting such proceedings. Stockton dered by the court." v. Yoeman, 179 Ind. 61, 65, 66, 100 N. E. 2; The language indicated has reference to

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the right of appeal. The act contains no ex-lhe fell over a guy wire, where the complaint press denial of the right of appeal.

averred that defendant bad erected its poles [3] The remaining reasons on which a dis- officer in the city, and was walking on the street

and wires in a street, that plaintiff was a police missal is urged may be treated together. in the performance of his duties, the averments They in effect deny that any appeal has been that the wire was "carelessly, negligently, and perfected. It is urged that appellant has not unlawfully constructed and built in said 'high

way, and has been carelessly, negligently, and complied with section 2977, supra, by failing unlawfully maintained,” by defendant, sufficientto file an appeal bond. While it may be con- ly charged a negligent violation of its duty to ceded that this action was not brought in use reasonable care to maintain its guy wire so

that it would not endanger the use of the street the form of the “State of Indiana” or the by the public, including plaintiff, there being "State of Indiana, on the relation of the Ato nothing shown by the complaint destroying the torney General" yet the trial court and both effect of such general allegations of negligence. the parties treated it as an action so brought, (Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Telegraphs and it was, as a matter of fact, prosecuted by and Telephones, Cent. Dig. $ 13; Dec. Dig.

20(4).] the Attorney General, so we are of the opinion that the action falls within the provisions 3. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES w 15(2)—

MAINTENANCE OF GUY WIRE DUTY OF of section 9270, Burns 1914, and an appeal

TELEPHONE COMPANY. bond was not required. Furthermore, by The fact that a police officer, when injured statute the state auditor is given authority by falling over a telephone company's guy wire, to represent the state in these proceedings highway, while pertinent to the question wheth

was outside the usually traveled part of the before the trial court, and we have held that er the Officer was negligent, did not discharge the right of appeal existed in such cases. It the telephone company of its duty to use reawould therefore be entirely foreign to the sonable care not to render hazardous the use

of the highway. spirit of our law to hold that the state audi

[Ed. Note.--For other cases, see Telegraphs tor, representing the state in an effort to and Telephones, Cent. Dig. $ 9; Dec. Dig. obtain taxes, should be required to furnish a 15(2).] bond before the state's appeal could be per. 4. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES en 2017)fected. See 3 C. J. 1122, 81161; Ew INJURIES FROM GUY WIRE-CONTRIBUTOBY bank's Manual (2d Ed.) $ 9; Humph NEGLIGENCE reys v. State, 70 Ohio St. 67, 70 N. E. 957, 65 way at night, was called' by his superior officer

Where a police officer, walking along a highL. R. A. 776, 101 Am. St. Rep. 888, 1 Ann. Cas. from the other side of the street, and started to 233; People v. Sholem, 238 Ill. 203, 87 N. E. cross, but fell over a telephone company's guy

wire, such officer was not negligent as a matter 390.

of law in crossing the street there instead of at [4] Where no bond is required to be given the point where a crossing was provided. by a party appealing under section 2977, [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Telegraphs supra, the appellant has 120 days from the and Telephones, Cent. Dig. 8 13; Dec. Dig. Om date of the decision within which to perfect 2007).] his appeal. The judgment in this case was 5. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES Om 15(2)rendered May 29, 1916, and the transcript


-DUTY OF TELEPHONE COMPANY. of the record filed in this court on August 16,

Portions of a sidewalk devoted by the proper 1916, within the 120 days.

municipal officers to the use of telephone poles Motion to dismiss appeal overruled.

and guy wires, in the absence of an ordinance showing the contrary, are still a part of the street which the pedestrian may use for travel,

and any authority or license to use such part of (64 Ind. App. 136)

the street for the poles and wires must be exer

cised with reference to the possible use thereof LAFAYETTE TELEPHONE CO. V. CUN by pedestrians, and the licensee to maintain NINGHAM. (No. 9057.)

telephone poles is under duty to use ordinary

care not to expose pedestrians to unnecessary (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1. danger in using such portion of the street. Nov. 28, 1916.)

(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Telegraphs

and Telephones, Cent. Dig. & 9; Dec. Dig. ēmas 1. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES O 15(2)— 15(2).]


6. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES O 15(5)— Though a telephone company may have the INJURIES FROM GUY WIRE-LIABILITY OF right to occupy a highway with its poles, if it TELEPHONE COMPANY-CBOSSING STREET IN secures them in the highway with guy wires, ABSENCE OF CROSSWALK. its duty is to use reasonable care to so erect That a police officer went upon a grassplat and maintain such wires as not to endanger between curb and sidewalk to cross the street public travel or the safety of individuals in the at a point where there was no crosswalk, and so reasonable and ordinary use of the highway. fell over a telephone company's guy wire, did

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Telegraphs not relieve the telephone company of responand Telephones, Cent. Dig. 8 9; Dec. Dig. Om sibility, to him, since a pedestrian is not re15(2).)

stricted to crosswalks or street intersections

in crossing a street, but may cross at any place, 2. TELEGRAPHS AND TELEPHONES em 2004).

and is not necessarily negligent because he INJURIES FROM GUY WIRE - COMPLAINT


(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Telegraphs In an action by a police officer against a and Telephones, Cent. Dig. $ 9; Dec. Dig. Om telephone company for injuries received when 15(5).]

Paw For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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