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Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Di- findings of fact made by the surrogate, and vision, Second Department. particularly the following:

In the Matter of the judicial settlement of the account of the Union Trust Company of New York, as Trustee, etc., of Charles F. Hoffman, deceased. The account was contested by Rosalie A. Avery and Joseph L. Bourdette. From an order of the Appellate Division (170 App. Div. 953, 155 N. Y. Supp. 1145), affirming a decree of the Surrogate's Court of Kings County (86 Misc. Rep. 392, 149 N. Y. S. 324), overruling objections of contestants to the account, contestants appeal. Affirmed. D-Cady Herrick, of New York City, for appellants. Perry D. Trafford, of New York City, for respondent.

CHASE, J. The last will of Charles F. Hoffman created several trusts and named the respondent, the Union Trust Company of New York, the trustee thereof. The appellants have a reversionary interest in the principal of said trusts, and they have filed objections to the form and manner in which certain of the trust investments have been made.

"(17) That the 'Book of Declarations of Mortgages' is kept in said transfer department and locked in a safe at night. It contains a record of all declarations which have been made on account of any given mortgage and the full title with the registration of the declaration of ownership of parts of mortgages held by said trust company for sundry trusts.

"(18) That immediately after said declarations are completed, signed, and entered, records are made in a memorandum book labeled 'Schedtrust department in the said trust company, and ule of Mortgages in Trust,' which is kept in the which contains a record of all mortgages held by said trust company for several trusts, and gives a description of each mortgage and shows the several trusts for which it is held. *

"(25) That the life beneficiaries of each trust are always notified by letter by said trustee of investments and of changes in investments at the time they are made, being given full statements thereof, which show any difference in the principal or income, and on whose accounts moneys are paid or collected. Principal accounts, recapitulating all the mortgages, are sent to the life beneficiaries at regular intervals dependent upon any important changes which are made, and to the remaindermen if they wish them. "(26) That from the notices of investments and changes of investments which are always sent by said trustee to the life beneficiaries of said trusts, the ownership of any mortgage or share in mortgage held for such trusts can be established."

in the investments, so that the rights of the several persons or trusts therein can be fully established thereby, are sufficient to answer all objections made upon an accounting to the form of the investments theretofore made of the trust funds. The decree upon an accounting in such a case rests upon the fact that declarations of trusts have been actually made and delivered, and not in approval of the original or other investments made in the individual name of the trustee.

The trust investments to which objections are made by the appellants herein are investments previously made upon bonds and mort[1] Declarations of trust when full, comgages taken in the name of the trust complete, and open to inspection in, a public ofpany. It has been the practice of the trust fice, or where they are full and complete and company to use the money of several trusts in the possession of the parties interested held by it as trustee, whether created by one or several instruments, to loan on bonds and mortgages given as security for such loans. It has also been its practice to take such bonds and mortgages in its name and in its own right. The amount of the investment so taken by it in its own right is then distributed among the various trusts by charging against such trusts on the books of the trust company the amount of money which it then determines or has determined as a part of the transaction in making the loan to use from each of the several trusts so combined in making the loan. Such shares and also parts of such shares are frequently, and from time to time transferred from one trust to another by entries upon the books of the trust company. In the account filed herein the trust company credited itself with certain investments on bonds and mortgages which stand in its name and are held by it either entirely for one trust, or in shares for several trusts. The following item from the account illustrates the form of the investments to which objections are made.

"One share in $30,000 bond and mortgage, Max Teichler to Union Trust Company of New York on 159 Rivington street, New York City, dated June 16, 1911, and maturing July 1, 1916, at 5%, interest due January and July 1st. $10,000."

[2] The advantages that are frequently to be secured by combining trust funds to make a large and more satisfactory investment than can be made of the funds of one trust without combination are of sufficient importance and value to the several trust funds to overcome any disadvantage that may arise from the fact that the several owners of the investment may thereafter differ in the matter of handling the same. Trust funds have been, from time to time, combined for investment with satisfactory results, and the practice is generally recognized as proper for a trustee. 11 Ruling Case Law, 143; Barry v. Lambert, 98 N. Y. 300, 50 Am. Rep. 677.

[3] When trust or other funds are combined for a single investment the instrument acknowledging and securing the investment or some contemporaneous instrument executThe decree in this case was made as ap-ed by those to be bound thereby should show pears from the opinion of the surrogate (much the true owners thereof and the interests of which we commend), not because the Sur- therein of the several persons or trusts whose rogate's Court approved the form in which funds have been combined in making the in

While this is so of securities payable to bearer, the lack of any stamp of ownership on such securities arises from the peculiarity of the investment, and it does not affect the rule in regard to investments that can properly be made distinctive and bear upon their face evidence of their ownership.

The trust company in this case has, wholly | may be payable to bearer, and consequently for its own convenience, invested different lack any stamp of ownership by the trust. trust funds in bonds and mortgages in its name and in its own right, without always executing and delivering a contemporaneous trust instrument. The interest from time to time of the several persons or trusts in the investments has been made to appear from and be established by its books of account and the records and papers on file with itself, a private corporation, and upon informal notices subsequently given to those interested therein. The manner of keeping the trust funds is more fully shown by a typical page from the record in connection with the statement in the account as quoted above. The Max Teichler mortgage was given June 16, 1911. The page relating to the Max Teichler mortgage mentioned is as follows:

[8] The effect of investing trust securities in the name of a trust company and in its own right is the same as if the trust company took the trust fund as a deposit, leaving its investment and the account relating thereto wholly to its bookkeeping and the form adopted by it for keeping its accounts. Such holding of a trust fund does not outwardly distinguish the funds held by it as trustee from the funds of individual depositors with

Registration of declarations of ownership of parts of mortgages held by Union Trust Company of New York for sundry accounts:

Appor

No. of

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[Opposite the second and third items in the last column above is the following:] Date. June 25, 1912:

Transferred or Terminated.

$7,500

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2,500

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The typical "statement of investments" | the trust company. Such manner of investmade to Miss Margaret Hoffman is dated ing a trust fund violates the long-established June 21, 1911. The dates included in the rule that a trustee should invest trust funds "Registration of declarations of ownership," in the name of the trustee as such, and also quoted above, are each subsequent to the the rule that trust funds should, at all times, giving of the mortgage, and the date of the be kept, so far as reasonably possible, in informal statement to Miss Hoffman is sub- the name of the trust, so that they can be sequent to the date of each of the mortgages identified, distinguished, and followed by all mentioned in such statement. persons interested therein. Although trust funds do not lose their character as such when invested by a trustee in his own name, yet when they are so invested, their character as such not infrequently has to be established by a suit at law.

[4, 5] It has been quite universally held that a trustee should not invest trust funds in his own name. Such rule of law should not be abandoned, qualified, or in any way impaired. If an individual trustee should continuously and intentionally invest trust funds in his individual name, his conduct in so doing would meet with condemnation by the courts. There is no difference between a corporate trustee and an individual trustee in its or his duty in respect to investments. Trust funds should not only be kept inde pendent of individual and other trust funds, but the investments thereof should, so far as possible, be clearly defined, and at all times stamped with the individual trust to which they severally belong. It is suggested that corporate or municipal bonds in which a trustee is authorized to invest trust funds

It would not have been necessary to commence the action of Barry v. Lambert, supra, had the mortgage under consideration in that case shown the true ownership of the moneys loaned. The plaintiff was compelled to maintain the action to identify and establish her interest in the mortgage.

[7] The identity of investment of trust funds should not, when otherways reasonably possible, be wholly dependent upon the continuance of rules relating thereto by corporate trustees or the accuracy and honesty of bookkeepers and employés.

It appears that the trust company when

foreclosing a mortgage so held by it does so in its own right, treating it at least as property the legal title to which is absolutely and unqualifiedly in it.

[8] The order of the Appellate Division affects only transactions which have been reported to the beneficiaries, and for that reason should be affirmed, with costs to respondent payable out of the estate.

WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J. (concurring in part). I concur with everything said in the opinion of our Brother CHASE, except his conclusion that the order under review should be affirmed. If his views are correct —and I think they are the parties objecting to the account are entitled to have those views carried into effect. This can only be done by a modification of the order appealed from. I, therefore, vote to modify the order so as to require the respondent to alter the form of the investments of the trust fund so as to conform to the practice approved in the opinion of CHASE, J., and, as thus modified, to affirm.

BAKER, Appellant, v. MAGUIRE et al., Respondents. (Court of Appeals of New York. December 12, 1916). Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (171 App. Div. 1916, which reversed an order of Special Term 216, 157 N. Y. Supp. 293), entered February 14, granting a motion for an alternative writ of mandamus directing the respondents to rescind a resolution transferring the petitioner, a janitor engineer in the department of education, from one school to another at a probably reduced salary and to reinstate him in the school from which he was transferred or to show cause why the command of the writ should not be obeyed. John E. O'Brien, of New York City, for appellant. Lamar Hardy, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (Charles McIntyre and Terence Farley, both of New York City, of counsel), for respondents.

PER CURIAM. Order affirmed, with costs, on the ground that the proceeding is against the wrong party.

WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, CARDOZO, and POUND, JJ., concur.

BALDWIN et al., Appellants, v. BAY REALTY CO., et al., Respondents. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 15, 1916.) Appeal from a COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, CAR-judgment of the Appellate Division of the SuDOZO, and POUND, JJ., concur with preme Court in the Second Judicial Department (169 App. Div. 941, 153 N. Y. Supp. 886), en

CHASE, J. WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., tered July 8, 1915, affirming a judgment in faconcurs in part in memorandum.

Order affirmed.

MEMORANDUM DECISIONS

ALSBERG, Respondent, v. NEWGENT et al., Appellants. (Court of Appeals of New York. December 28, 1916). Appeal from a judgment, entered July 21, 1915, upon an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (169 App. Div. 936, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1109), affirming an interlocutory judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term in an action brought for a dissolution of the partnership between the plaintiff and defendants, and for an accounting in respect of the partnership business upon the ground that the business had sustained a loss of a substantial part of its capital, and to continue the business would result in a greater loss and probably in the loss of the entire capital, that the defendants had after demand failed to contribute their share of such losses, and that the business could no longer be carried on at a profit. The defendants, in addition to denying these allegations of the complaint, interposed a counterclaim alleging that plaintiff had excluded defendants from possession of partnership books and assets, and had, by the commencement of this action, committed a breach of the partnership agreement. George H. D. Foster, of New York City, for appellants. Isaac N. Jacobson, of New York City, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with

costs.

WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., and HISCOCK, CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK,

vor of defendants entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court on trial at Special Term. The action is one to have declared void a conveyance by the defendant, the Bay Realty Company, of a tract of land at Brighton Beach, substantially all its property, to the Brighton Beach Racing Association, on the ground that such transfer was prohibited by section 28 of the Stock Corporation Law (Consol. Laws, c. 59). Plaintiff's testator held a certificate of stock of the Bay Realty Company indorsed in blank as collateral for a loan. The complaint alleged that the Bay Realty Company owned the land; that it did not receive the consideration for the transfer to the Brighton Beach ed was all the property of the corporation; that Racing Association; that the property conveythe deed of October 26, 1908, was void, being the transfer of all the property of the corporaceive the consideration; and that it was in eftion, and because the corporation did not refect a withdrawal of the capital of the Bay Realty Company; that thereby the collateral held by the plaintiffs and their testator decreased in value; and they, therefore, ask that the transfer be set aside. Martin Conboy and Leonard D. Baldwin, both of New York City, for appellants. James M. Gray and Lynn C. Norris, both of Brooklyn, for respondents.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with costs.

WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., and CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, CARDOZO, and POUND, JJ., concur.

BROOKLYN

(Court

BRIDGES, Respondent, V. UNION GAS COMPANY, Appellant. of Appeals of New York. Oct. 10, 1916.) Motion to dismiss an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (160 N. Y. Supp. 186), entered July 17, 1916, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict in an action to recover for legal services. The motion was made upon the grounds

MEMORANDUM DECISIONS

unanimous; that no questions of law were in-
volved and that the appeal was frivolous. Mey-
er Nebenzahl, of Far Rockaway, for the motion.
Herbert C. Smyth, of New York City, opposed.
PER CURIAM. Motion denied, with $10

costs.

1061

COCK, CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK,
HOGAN, and POUND, JJ., concur.
WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., and HIS-

BURKE, Appellant, v. NEW YORK CENT. In re BROOKLYN TRUST CO. (Court of a judgment, entered December 26, 1914, upon & H. R. R. CO., Respondent. (Court of Appeals Appeals of New York. Oct. 24, 1916.) Appeal an order of the Appellate Division of the Suof New York. from an order of the Appellate Division of the preme Court in the Fourth Judicial DepartNov. 21, 1916.) Appeal from Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (165 App. Div. 946, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1078), ment (158 N. Y. Supp. 1109), entered April 14, sustaining defendant's exceptions ordered to be 1916, which affirmed a decree of the Kings heard in the first instance by the Appellate DiCounty Surrogate's Court settling the account vision, setting aside the verdict in favor of plainof the trustee herein and overruling objections tiff and directing judgment in favor of defendthat the charges for maintenance and expenses ant in an action to recover for personal injuries of certain real property were improperly charged alleged to have been sustained by plaintiff against income, and that the proceeds of a pol- through the negligence of defendant. Plaintiff icy of fire insurance received by the trustee while waiting at a railroad crossing for the should be apportioned between principal and in- passing of a freight train looked towards the come. David Joyce, of Brooklyn, for appellant. rear and saw the lights that are usually displayFrancis L. Archer, of Brooklyn, for respondent. ed on the sides of the rear car or "caboose" of PER CURIAM. Order affirmed, with costs. HISCOCK, CHASE, CUDDEBACK, HO- had got past the sidewalk the plaintiff continued a freight train, the intervening freight cars beGAN, CARDOZO, and POUND, JJ., concur. his journey across the track and was struck by ing dark. Immediately after the lighted caboose WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., absent. a dark caboose attached to and immediately following the lighted one, was whirled under the port, for appellant. Maurice C. Spratt and H. wheels of that dark car and received the injuW. Huntington, both of Buffalo, for respondent. ries complained of. George D. Judson, of Lockcosts. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with

BROWN, Appellant, v. TOWN of EVANS et al., Respondents. York. (Court of Appeals of New Dec. 15, 1916.) Motion to dismiss an appeal from or to affirm a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department (164 App. Div. 967, 149 N. Y. Supp. 1073), entered October 14, 1914, affirming a judgment in favor of defendants entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court at a Trial Term. The motion was made upon the ground that the administrator of the estate of Elizabeth T. Brown, deceased, had died and no one had been appointed to succeed him, nor has any person been substituted in place of the plaintiff named herein. Eugene M. Bartlett, of Buffalo, for the motion. PER CURIAM. costs, and $10 costs of motion. Appeal dismissed, with

COCK, CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, and
HOGAN, JJ., concur. POUND, J., not sitting.
WILLARD BARTLETT. C. J.. and HIS-

CADMAN, Respondent, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant. York. Nov. 28. 1916.) (Court of Appeals of New appeal from a judgment of the Appellate DiviMotion to dismiss an cial Department (160 N. Y. Supp. 1125), entersion of the Supreme Court in the Second Judied August 2, 1916, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a verdict in an action BRUCK, Respondent, v. NEW YORK CENT. water alleged to have been occasioned through to recover damages to personal property from & H. R. R. CO., appellant. (Court of Appeals tion was made upon the ground that the Apof New York. Dec. 28. 1916.) Appeal from an pellate Division had unanimously decided that the clogging of defendant's sewers. order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme there was evidence sufficient to sustain the verThe moCourt in the Third Judicial Department (165 App. Div. 621, 151 N. Y. Supp. 286), entered dict. Percival C. Smith, of New York City, for November 10, 1914, reversing a judgment in the motion. favor of defendant entered upon a verdict and New York City (Thomas F. Magner and Frank granting a new trial in an action to recover for Julian Price, both of Brooklyn, of counsel), opLamar Hardy, Corp. Counsel, of the death of plaintiff's intestate alleged to have been occasioned through the negligence of the posed. defendant, his employer. employed as a fire cleaner in one of defendant's The testator, while round houses, was run over by an engine and died from the injuries received. The answer denied any negligence on the part of the defendant, alleged that the accident which caused the death of plaintiff's intestate was occasioned by reason of his own negligence or the negligence of a fellow servant, and that his death was due to one of the risks incident to his employment, obvious, well known and assumed by him, and further alleged that the cause of action. in so far as the sole next of kin was concerned, had been satisfied and released. of Kingston, for appellant. N. Frank O'Reilly, Amos Van Etten, John T. Loughran, and William H. Grogan, all of Kingston, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Order of Appellate Division reversed, and judgment of Trial Term affirmed, on the dissenting opinion of Smith, P. J., below, with costs in the Appellate Division and in this court.

PER CURIAM. Motion denied, with $10

costs.

(Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 28, 1916.)
CALKINS, Respondent, v. HART, Appellant.
nied, with $10 costs. See 219 N. Y. 145, 113 N.
E. 785.
PER CURIAM. Motion for reargument de-

al., Appellants. (Court of Appeals of New York.
Dec. 15, 1916.)
CALLIGARI, Respondent, v. SARTORI et
the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial De-
from a judgment of the Appellate Division_of
partment (174 App. Div. 102, 160 N. Y. Supp.
Motion to dismiss an appeal
affirming as modified a judgment in favor of
plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on
931), entered October 17, 1916, modifying and
trial at Special Term in an action to set aside
an alleged fraudulent conveyance.
was made upon the ground that the Court of
The motion

Appeals had no jurisdiction of the appeal. Louis | SECURITIES CO. et al. (TOLAND et al., InJ. Altkrug, of Brooklyn, for the motion. David terveners.) (Court of Appeals of New York. J. Wagner, of New York City, opposed. Nov. 3, 1916.) Appeal from Supreme Court, Action PER CURIAM. Motion granted, and appeal Appellate Division, First Department. dismissed, with costs and $10 costs of motion. by the Chester County Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Company and others as executors of Ann W. Roberts, deceased, against the Securities Company and others, in which Edward D. Toland and others intervened. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (165 App. Div. 329, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1010), modifying, and affirming as modified, a judgment for plaintiffs, entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term, and dismissing the crossclaim of the Equitable Securities Company against the interveners for indemnity. with judgment for that company against the Securities Company, the Equitable Securities Company and the Securities Company appeal. Judgment affirmed. Carl M. Owen and Winthrop H. Kellogg, both of New York City, for appellants. Marvin W. Wynne and John M. Lowrie, both of New York City. for respondents Chester County Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co. and others. Reynolds D. Brown, of Philadelphia Pa., and Yorke Allen, of New York City, for respondents Toland and others. PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with costs.

CARBONE, Respondent, v. LOFT et al., Appellants. (Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 24, 1916.) Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department (159 N. Y. Supp. 1104), entered July 5, 1916, which affirmed an award of the state industrial commission under the Workmen's Compensation Law. Claimant while employed in a factory became involved in a verbal exchange of insulting language with a fellow employé, as a result of which the latter violently assaulted claimant three-quarters of an hour later. In defending himself from the assault claimant sustained injuries. Edward P. Mowton, of New York City, for appellants. Egburt E. Woodbury, Atty. Gen. (E. C. Aiken, Deputy Atty. Gen., of counsel), for respondent. PER CURIAM. Order affirmed, with costs. WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., and HISCOCK, CHASE, COLLIN, CUDDEBACK, and CARDOZO, JJ., concur. HOGAN, J., not voting.

WILLARD BARTLETT, C. J., and HISCOCK, CHASE, COLLIN. CUDDEBACK, and for modification in accordance with the opinPOUND, JJ., concur. CARDOZO, J., votes

CARLEY v. HARPER et al. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 15, 1916.) PER CURIAM. Motion for reargument de-ion of Ingraham, P. J., below. nied, with $10 costs. See 219 N. Y. 295, 114 N. E. 351.

CASTLE et al., Appellants, v. ARMSTEAD, Respondent. (Court of Appeals of New York. Nov. 21, 1916.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department (168 App. Div. 466. 153 N. Y. Supp. 266), entered May 15, 1915, affirming a judgment in favor of defendant entered upon a dismissal of the complaint by the court at a Trial Term without a jury. Between September 6, 1910, and April 1, 1912, Henry D. Lott and John Watt were, successively, the owners and entitled to possession of the premises described in the complaint. On September 6, 1910, defendant made a contract for the purchase of those premises with the then owner's agent, in the latter's name, but with the owner's knowledge and consent, paid $500 thereon, and on September 15, 1910, moved into the premises. On April 1, 1912, the defendant rescinded the contract and moved out, and thereafter received back the $500, with interest. The reasonable value of the occupancy of this house, during that period, was $60 per month, and the claims against the defendant for occupying it during that time have been assigned by the said owners to these plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sue for the use and occupation of the premises from September 15, 1910, to April 1, 1912 (a period of a year and a half during which the defendant occupied and used the premises), claiming that the rescission of the contract vitally changed the entire relations of the parties to it, and destroyed all rights under it from its date to its rescission. Frank E. Johnson, Jr., and George W. Titcomb, both of Brooklyn, for appellants. Edward H. Lockwood, of New York City, for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with

costs.

HISCOCK, CHASE. COLLIN, HOGAN CARDOZO, and POUND, JJ., concur. WIL LARD BARTLETT, C. J., absent.

CHESTER COUNTY GUARANTEE

CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. BROOKLYN & M. FERRY CO., Appellant. (Court of Appeals of New York. Oct. 31, 1916.) Appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department (170 App. Div. 897, 154 N. Y. Supp. 1115), entered August 3, 1915, affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff entered upon a decision of the court on trial at Special Term in an action for an accounting in accordance with the terms of a certain lease and amended lease of a ferry operated by the defendant between the borough of Manhattan and the borough of Brooklyn in the city of New York. The question presented to the court was whether the ferry company was entitled to set up as a deduction in arriving at net profits, only moneys actually paid out in cash, or whether it was entitled, as it claimed, to set up as a deduction an expense in the nature of depreciation, even though that expense had not acA. S. Gilbert, tually been paid out in cash. of New York City, for appellant. Lamar Hardy, Corp. Counsel, of New York City (Terence Farley and Josiah A. Stover, both of New York City), for respondent.

PER CURIAM. Judgment affirmed, with

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V.

CITY OF NEW YORK, Appellant, SCHOENECK et al., Respondents. (Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 12, 1916.) Appeal from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Third Judicial Department 159 N. Y. Supp. 1105), entered September 25, 1916, which affirmed an order of Special Term denying a motion for a peremptory writ of mandamus requiring the state board of equalization of the state of New York to convene and prepare a statement of the aggregate amounts of assessments upon which the state comptroller shall compute the state tax for

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