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Service Commission should be annulled, with: CUDDEBACK, J. The State Industrial costs in the Appellate Division and this court. Commission made an award in this case to
the widow and minor children of Franz CHASE, CUDDEBACK, HOGAN, CAR- Glatzl, deceased, under the Workmen's ComDOZO, and POUND, JJ., concur.
pensation Law, and the determination of the Order reversed, etc.
Commission has been unanimously affirmed by the court at the Appellate Division. The
following are substantially the findings of the (220 N. Y. 71)
Commission on the facts of the case:
On November 8, 1915, Franz Glatzl was In re STANDARD ACC. INS. CO.
employed by G. E. M. Stumpp, who was en(Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 30, 1917.) gaged in the florist business. The duties of 1. MASTER AND SERVANT O361-WORKMEN'S Glatzl were to drive a delivery wagon, and,
COMPENSATION LAW-"HAZARDOUS EMPLOY- if necessary, to assist in delivering goods, MENT"-DELIVERY DRIVER.
An employe of a florist, whose duty it is to such assistance to be rendered to a man who drive the delivery wagon, is within the protec- went on the wagon for the purpose of making tion of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Con- deliveries. On the date mentioned Glatzl sol. Laws, c. 67), which enumerates the opera- drove his employer's wagon to No. 4 East tion of vagons and other vehicles as a bazard: Sixty-Fourth street, in the borough of Manous employment, though the business of a florist is not of itself hazardous.
hattan, where some flowers were to be de(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and livered. Arriving at that place, the other Servant, Dec. Dig. 361.)
man on the wagon delivered the flowers, and 2. MASTER AND SERVANT 373_WORKMEN'S Glatzl and the other man proceeded to ad
COMPENSATION ACT-INJURIES INCIDENT TO just a window box in the house. For this EMPLOYMENT.
Where the driver of the florist's delivery purpose Glatzl got up on a ladder in front of wagon, who was to assist in making deliveries the house, and while working there he lost when necessary, received injuries which resulted his balance and fell into the front areaway, in his death when the ladder, on which he was and the window box fell on top of him, causstanding while arranging a window box after making a delivery, fell, those injuries were ing a compound fracture of left thumb and not an incident of his hazardous employment lacerations of the same. On or about Novemas driver of the delivery wagon, and his de- ber 17th the wound showed evidence of infecpendents are not entitled
tion. On November 24th Glatzl died from therefor under the Workmen's Compensation Law.
tetanus, which had developed as a result of [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Master and his injury. Servant, Dec. Dig. 373.]
 The Workmen's Compensation Law, in 3. MASTER AND SERVANT O418(6)-REVIEW- its enumeration of hazardous employments DECISION OF INTERMEDIATE COUBT - FIND-covered by the act, mentions the following:
“The operation, otherwise than on tracks, on detail the circumstances of the accident in which streets, highways, or elsewhere, of cars, trucks, an employé was injured, and also found that wagons or other vehicles.” Section 2, group 41. the work he was doing when injured was in
It has been said that the employer of Franz cidental to his hazardous employment, the unanimous affirmance of the award by the Ap- Glatzl was engaged in carrying on the busipellate Division was not a finding of fact that less of a florist, which is not a hazardous the injury was incidental, but a mere conclu- employment, under the act, and that Glatzl, sion from the specific facts, and it can be re- his employé, was not, therefore, protected in viewed by the Court of Appeals.
[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Master and any degree by the statute. We do not accept Servant, Dec. Dig. 2418(6).]
that view. It is true that the business of flor
ist is not mentioned in the act as a hazardous Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Dir employment; but in this case, as incident to vision. Third Department.
his business, the florist undertook to deliver Claim under the Workmen's Compensation to his customers the flowers which they purLaw by Eugenie Glatzl and others for com-chased, and in carrying on that branch of pensation for the death of Franz Glatzl, op the business he operated a wagon on the posed by G, E. M. Stumpp, employer, and the streets and highways of the city. That was Standard Accident Insurance Company, in- within the words of the statute a hazardous surance carrier. The State Industrial Com-employment, and Glatzl was hired to drive mission made an award of compensation, the wagon. If the injury which he received which was affirmed by the Appellate Division had arisen out of and in the course of that (159 N. Y. Supp. 1115), and the employer and employment, it would seem plain that a case insurance carrier appeal. Order of Appellate under the statute was made out. Matter of Division reversed, and determination of In- Larsen v. Paine Drug Co., 218 N. Y. 252, 112 dustrial Commission annulled.
N. E. 725. Then the widow and children See, also, 160 N. Y. Supp. 1131.
would be entitled to the award, but Glatzl William A. Jones, Jr., of New York City, was not engaged in such service when he fell. for appellants. Egburt E. Woodbury, Atty.  I can observe no connection between Gen. (E. C. Aiken, Deputy Atty. Gen., of the driving of the delivery wagon by Glatzl counsel), for respondents.
and his fall from the ladder which resulted For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
in his death. In order to charge the em men in hazardous employments." Section 3, ployer with liability under the Workmen's subd. 3. “Employment" included "employ. Compensation Law, the court must be able ment only in a trade, business or occupation to see that the hazards which accompanied carried on by the employer for pecuniary the duties of the employé have turned against gain.” Section 3, subd. 5. him to his loss and damage. If there is only If employment means employment only in a casual or remote connection between the a hazardous trade, business, or occupation hazard of the employment and the loss, if carried on by the employer, the test of liathe one does not flow naturally from the oth- bility for compensation is the trade, business, er, the liability is not established. It was or occupation of the employer. The florist's not because Glatzl was the driver of the de- business is not classified as hazardous; there livery wagon that he fell from the ladder. fore his employés were not protected. Em. Any other person adjusting the window box ployment as a driver by a florist is not emmight have been injured in the same manner. ployment in the occupation of operating wag. The case of Matter of Costello v. Taylor, 217 ons or other vehicles, for that is not found to N. Y. 179, 111 N. E. 755, on which the Attor- be the florist's occupation. If the business ney General relies, does not authorize a re- of the employer in certain cases may be such covery here,
that it may be said that he operates wagons  The Industrial Commission found in de- as a part thereof, although his principal busitail the circumstances of the accident in ness is nonbazardous, that does not help which Glatzl was injured, and also found in Glatzl, for the findings are that his employer substance that the work which he was doing was engaged in the florist's business, and when injured was incidental to driving the there is no finding that the employer was endelivery wagon.
The determination of the gaged in the occupation of operating wagons. Appellate Division affirming the award of the While I think that the law originally did Commission was unanimous, and it has been not contemplate the occupation of the emsaid that the unanimous affirmance prevents ployé as a test, it does so now, for by Laws this court from reviewing the question wheth- 1916, c. 622, "employe" is defined to mean er the work of the decedent when injured was either a person engaged in one of the occupaor was not incidental to the operation of the tions specified or who is in the service of an delivery wagon. That was simply a conclu- employer whose principal business is that of sion drawn from the facts found in detail, carrying on a specified hazardous employ. about which there was no dispute at the Ap- ment. pellate Division, and about which there is no dispute in this court. We have, therefore,
CHASE, COLLIN, HOGAN, and CARpower to review the determination made at DOZO, JJ., concur with CUDDEBACK, J.
HISCOCK, C. J., and POUND, J., concur in
Otten v. Manhattan the Appellate Division. Ry. Co., 150 N. Y. 395, 44 N. E. 1033.
result; POUND, J., in memorandum. The order of the Appellate Division should
Order reversed, etc. be reversed, and the determination of the State Industrial Commission annulled, with
(220 N. Y. 18) costs against the State Industrial Commis
WADDLE v. CABANA, sion.
(Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 9, 1917.)
1. APPEAL AND ERROR 1175(7) APPELPOUND, J. (concurring in the result). As LATE DIVISION RENDERING FINAL JUDGit is clear that Glatzl was not engaged in the MENT. occupation of a driver, or in doing anything cision of the trial court without a jury, the Appel
On appeal from judgment entered on the de. incidental thereto, when he was injured, the late Division may deal with the evidence as the decision of the question whether he was pro trial court should have done, and may render tected in any degree by the Workmen's Com- final judgment accordingly without granting a pensation Law is unnecessary to the proper judgment or order of Appellate Division upon
new trial, under Code Civ. Proc. § 1317, as to disposition of the case; but I am decidedly
appeal. of the opinion that under the Workmen's
(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Compensation Law (Laws 1914, c. 41) as it Error, Cent. Dig. $ 4581; Dec. Dig. Om 1175(7).) was at the time of the accident, unless the 2. APPEAL AND ERROB W1083(3)-APPELLATE employer was engaged in an enumerated DIVISION-REVERSAL. hazardous trade, business, or occupation, his
A judgment of reversal by the Appellate Di. employés did not have the benefit of the law. vision, expressly disapproving a finding of fact,
presents to the Court of Appeals a question of Compensation was provided for injuries law whether there was any evidence in the trial sustained or death incurred “by employés en- court to support the finding disapproved of by gaged in the following [42 enumerated) haz- the Appellate Division. ardous employments." Section 2. But "em
(Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and
Error, Cent. Dig. SS 4278, 4279, 4345, 1346; ployé" meant “a person who is engaged in a
Dec. Dig. m1083(3).) hazardous employment in the service of an
3. APPEAL AND ERBOB Oma 1083(3)—DECISIONS employer carrying on or conducting the
REVIEWABLE-MARKET VALUE OF STOCK. same." Section 3, subd. 4. "Employer" In action for specific performance of conmeant a person
employing work- I tract to sell stock, where there was no conten
tion that the stock had an ascertainable market, to plaintiff's intestate 100 shares of stock, value and it appeared that no price had been and dismissing the complaint on the merits, established by public sales in the way of ordinary business, nor had any other property of plaintiff appeals. Reversed, etc. the same kind been the subject of purchase and Carlton E. Ladd, of Buffalo, for appellant. sale, the Appellate Division's disapproval of the Daniel J. Kenefick, of Buffalo, for respondfinding of the trial court that there was known or ascertained market value for the stock ent. was erroneous as a matter of law, and the finding should be reinstated.
POUND, J. This is an appeal from the (Ed. Note. For other cases, see Appeal and Appellate Division, Fourth Department, Error, Cent. Dig. $$ 4278, 4279, 4345, 4346; unanimously reversing a judgment of the Dec. Dig. Ow1083(3).] 4. APPEAL AND ERROR 1083(3)-APPELLATE
Erie Equity Term, directing that defendant DivisioN—REVERSAL-EXERCISE OF DISCRE- sell and transfer to the plaintiff, as adminisTION.
tratrix of the estate of her deceased husIn action where relief may depend upon the band, 100 shares of the capital stock of the discretion of the court, and where judgment of corporation known as the Buffalo Specialty the Appellate Division, reversing a judgment granting relief, shows such reversal was on the Company, at the agreed price of $250 the facts in the exercise of discretion, no question share, in specific performance of a contract of law remains for the consideration of the therefor entered into between respondent Court of Appeals. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and by the terms of which appellant's intestate
and the appellant's intestate in his lifetime, Error, Cent. Dig. $$ 4278, 4279, 4345, 4346; Dec. Dig. m1083(3).]
was to execute his promissory note for $25,5. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. 70 – CONTRACT
000, payable $2,500. annually, the stock to FOR PURCHASE OF STOCK.
remain as collateral security for the indebted. A contract for the purchase of stock freely ness until it was fully paid. sold in the market is not specifically enforceable, The contract is not in dispute. The only as an adequate remedy at law exists in such stock in the corporation not owned by re
(Ed. Note.-- For other cases, see Specific Per- spondent consists of 11 out of 5,000 shares. formance, Cent. Dig. 8 203; Dec. Dig. Ow70.] Respondent has entire control of the busi. 6. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 70 – CONTBACT ness; success therein depends largely upon FOR PURCHASE OF STOCK.
the success of specialties manufactured by Where stock was not sold on the market, but secret processes. Appellant's intestate was was practically all owned by one man and could the general manager of the company. The be obtained only from him and only as a favor and for special reasons, a purchaser to whom the contract was made on the 1st day of August, sale of such stock had been contracted was en-1912, and he died on the 8th day of Septemtitled to specific performance of such contract ber, 1912. The order of the Appellate Dias a matter of law.
vision provides as follows: [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Specific per: formance, Cent. Dig. 8 203; Dec. Dig. Erw70.) be, and the same hereby is, reversed, and judg.
"Ordered, that the judgment so appealed from 7. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE Om70_MUTUALITY ment directed for the defendant, dismissing the -PROMISSORY NOTE.
complaint, with costs, including the costs of this Specific performance of a contract to sell appeal, and the fifth finding of fact, so far as it stock will not be denied to administratrix of the states that the said stock has no known or aspurchaser because the contract called for the certained market value.' is hereby disapproved. note of her decedent as evidence of his indebt. Held, that the plaintiff did not make a case for edness, and because performance became impos- specific performance, or show that she did not sible by his death; the contract being one for have an adequate remedy at law for damages." the payment of money, and not a personal one.
As the answer admits, in substance, that [Ed. Note.–For other cases, see Specific Per; the stock had no market value, and that any formance, Cent. Dig. § 203; Dec. Dig. Om 70.]
price placed upon the same has been by pri8. TAXATION 533, New, vol. 11 Key-No.vate agreement, and as the evidence and the Series-TRANSFERS OF STOCK.
A contract for the purchase of corporation findings fully sustain the allegations of the stock was not unenforceable for failure to com- complaint in this regard, the reasons for the ply with Tax Law (Consol. Laws, c. 60), 88 270 reversal are not clear from the statement of 278, relative to taxable transfers of stock, for the court below that it disapproves the findthe statute would be fully satisfied when the stock certificates were actually transferred, since ing set forth in its order, and holds that the seller would then have to stamp them to plaintiff had not made out a case for specific make an effective delivery in fulfillment of his performance. The necessary inference seems contract.
to be that the Appellate Division was not Cuddeback, J., dissenting.
satisfied on the evidence with this finding Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate of the trial court, and by disapproving it Division, Fourth Department.
intended to leave the appellant without findAction by Edna P. Waddle, as adminis- ings sufficient to make out a case for specific tratrix, etc., against Oliver Cabana, Jr. performance, because it would not then apFrom a judgment of the Appellate Division, pear that she did not have an adequate remFourth Department (169 App. Div. 968, 154 edy at law. It left undisturbed the findings N. Y. Supp. 1149), reversing judgment of the that the stock of the Buffalo Specialty ComErie Equity Term, which required defendant pany was almost entirely owned by the reto perform his contract to sell and transfer | spondent; that it had a large, special, and
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
peculiar value, and that it could not be ob- late Division thought that on the facts the tained on the market.
stock had no ascertainable value. This court [1-4] On an appeal from a judgment en-reversed the Appellate Division, and ordered tered on the decision of the trial court with-judgment on the report of the referee (186 out a jury, the Appellate Division may deal N. Y. 259, 78 N. E. 1002), because the order with the evidence as the trial court should of reversal was silent as to the grounds. If have done and may render final judgment ac- it had appeared that the Appellate Division cordingly without granting a new trial. Code bad reversed on the facts in the exercise of Civ. Pro. § 1317; Lamport v. Smedley, 213 N. discretion, this court would have affirmed the Y. 82, 106 N. E. 922; Acme Realty Co. v. Appellate Division, but it was compelled to Schinasi, 215 N. Y. 495, 109 N. E. 577, L. R. assume that the judgment was reversed on A. 1916A, 1176. In this case, in the exercise the law only, and as no error of law appear. of its original jurisdiction, it disapproved a ed and there was evidence to sustain the finding of fact, as appears on the face of the findings of the referee, the judgment entered order (Code Civ. Pro. $ 1338), and then re- upon the report of the referee was necessaversed the judgment. It follows that in this rily affirmed. In Clements v. Sherwood-Dunn, court the question of law is presented—this 108 App. Div. 327, 95 N. Y. Supp. 766, the being a judgment of reversal and not of af- trial court granted specific performance, the firmance whether there was any evidence to Appellate Division reversed and granted a permit a finding that the stock bad not a new trial. It appeared that there had been known or ascertainable market value (Liv- sales of the stock, and that the defendant did ingston v. City of Albany, 161 N. Y. 602, 604, not own a large majority of it. Plaintiff 56 N. E. 148), for the court below could not stipulated for judgment absolute, and came disapprove the finding of the trial court ex- to this court, which affirmed the Appellate Di. cept on the evidence. The case is destitute vision (187 N. Y. 521, 79 N. E. 1102) without even of the contention that the stock had any opinion, presumably because it appeared that known or ascertainable market value. No on the law a case for specific performance price therefor has been established by pub- had not been established. lic sales in the way of ordinary business. No [6, 6] The value of the stock in suit can be other property of the same kind has been the ascertained only in the most speculative way. subject of purchase and sale. Sloan v. Baird, A contract for the purchase of stock freely 162 N. Y. 327, 330, 56 N. E. 752. The disap- sold in the market would not be thus enproval of the finding of the trial court was forced, for an adequate remedy at law extherefore erroneous, and, as matter of law, ists in such cases, but to deny this remedy the finding should be reinstated. The when the stock has no ascertainable value, is findings are sustained by the evidence and nearly all owned by one man, and can be obsustain the judgment. It follows that the tained only from him, and only as a favor judgment of the Appellate Division should be and for special reasons, would be to deny to reversed and that of the Trial Term affirm- appellant the substantial benefit of the coned, but it does not appear that the Appellate tract (Butler v. Wright, supra; Adams v. Division reversed in the exercise of discre- Messinger, 147 Mass. 185, 188, 17 N. E. 491, tion. In an action for specific performance 9 Am. St. Rep. 679; Northern Ry, Co. v. of a contract relating to personal property, Walworth, 193 Pa. 207, 44 Atl. 253, 74 Am. the case presented may be a proper one for St. Rep. 683), and defeat the relief which such relief in the sound discretion of the should in conscience be given. On the law, court, but not as matter of right (Butler v. the appellant was entitled to the judgment Wright, 186 N. Y. 259, 78 N. E. 1002), and if of the trial court, and it was error to reverse the judgment below had proceeded on the on the law. theory that no case had been made out to jus  Respondent urges that relief should be tify the exercise of discretion in appellant's denied for lack of mutuality, because the confavor, no question of law would remain. The tract called for the personal promissory note Appellate Division was authorized to reverse of Waddle for $25,000 as evidence of his inin its discretion, upon a consideration of the debtedness for the purchase price of the facts, but it was not bound or authorized to stock, and that by his death performance bedo so as a question of law. Butler v. Wright, came impossible. But the contract is not one supra. The reversal was because the facts for the personal services of Waddle, and did found by the Appellate Division were held not depend on his continued existence. It to be insufficient to sustain the judgment was for the payment of money by him, and on the law. The practice has been indicated his death did not put on end to the obligain two recent cases in this court. In Butler tion of the parties. Lorillard v. Clyde, 142 v. Wright, 103 App. Div. 463, 93 N. Y. Supp. N. Y. 456, 462, 37 N. E. 489, 24 L. R. A. 113. 113, the referee had found for plaintiff, and His estate is bound by the obligations in the ordered specific performance because the contract. The trial court has found, and the stock had no market or ascertainable value. finding remains undisturbed, that the note The Appellate Division reversed, but the or- was not a material condition of the agreeder of reversal did not specify the ground. ment, and was not insisted upon by the de
fendant as collateral security for the indebt- 13. TRUSTS 217(1)—TRUST FUNDS--COMBIedness and to be released only when the same
NATION OF TRUST FUNDS-MANNER OF KEEP
ING ACCOUNTS. was fully paid, the note was to be merely
When trust or other funds are combined for evidence of the indebtedness. The contract a single investment, the instrument, acknowlwas mutual in its obligation and remedy. It edging and securing the investment or some binds the plaintiff, and the defendant must contemporaneous instrument executed by those
to be bound thereby, should show the true own. perform. Catholic Foreign Mission Society ers thereof and the interests therein of the sevV. Oussani, 215 N. Y. 1, 8, 9, 109 N. E. 80. eral persons or trusts whose funds have been The question at most addressed itself to the combined in making the investments. discretion of the court, and no error of law Dig. 301-303, 309 ; Dec, Dig. Ew217(1).]
(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. is presented in the finding thereon.  The contract is not unenforceable for 4. Trusts em 217(1)—Trust Funds-INVEST
MENT. failure to comply with the Tax Law (sec The rule that a trustee should not invest tions 270-278) relative to taxable transfers trust funds in his own name should not be of stock. When the stock certificates are ac- abandoned, qualified, or in any way impaired ; tually transferred, the seller must stamp ing the same in this respect.
the duty of a corporate or individual trustee bethem to make an effective delivery in fulfill
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. ment of his contract (Bean v. Flint, 204 N. Dig. 88 301-303, 309; Dec. Dig. 217(1).] Y. 153, 157, 97 N. E. 490), and the statute 5. TRUSTS 217(1)-TRUST FUND8-INVESTwill then be fully satisfied.
MENT. The Judgment of the Appellate Division
Trust funds should not only be kept indeshould be reversed, and the judgment enter- pendent of individual or other trust funds, but
the investments thereof should, so far as possied upon the decision of the trial court af- ble, be clearly defined, and at all times stamped firmed, with costs in the Appellate Division with the individual trust to which they severaland in this court.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. COLLIN, HOGAN, and CARDOZO, JJ., Dig. SS 301-303, 309; Dec. Dig. 217(1).] concur. CUDDEBACK, J., dissents. HIS- 6. TRUSTS 217(1)-TRUST FUNDS-INVESTCOCK, C. J., absent.
MENT BY TRUST COMPANIES.
The investment by a trust company of trust
funds in securities in its own name and in its Judgment reversed, etc.
own right, leaving the account relating thereto wholly to its own bookkeeping and the form
adopted by it for keeping accounts, violates (219 N. Y. 514)
the rule that trustee should invest trust funds In re UNION TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK. | in the name of the trustee as such, and also the AVERY et al. v. UNION TRUST CO. OF
rule that trust funds should, at all times, be NEW YORK.
kept so far as reasonably possible in the name
of the trust, so that they can be identified, dis(Court of Appeals of New York. Dec. 28, 1916.) tinguished, and followed by all persons interest
ed therein. 1. TRUSTS 324 INVESTMENT OF TRUST [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. FUNDS-DECLARATIONS OF TRUST.
Dig. $8 301-303, 309; Dec. Dig. Om 217(1).) Declarations of trustee that certain investments previously made on bonds and mortgages 7. Trusts, w217(1)—Trust FUNDS-INVESTwere allotted to certain trust estates when full,
MENT-KEEPING IDENTITY OF TRUST FUNDS complete, and open to inspection in a public of
SEPARATE. fice, or where they are full and complete and in
The identity of investment of trust funds the possession of the parties interested in the in- should not, when otherways reasonably possible. vestments, so that the rights of the several per- be wholly dependent upon the continuance of sons or trusts therein can be fully established rules relating thereto by corporate trustees or thereby are sufficient to answer, upon an ac
the accuracy and honesty of bookkeepers and counting, all objections to the form of invest employés. ments theretofore made of the trust funds, for [Ed. Note.- For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. the decree upon an accounting in such case rests Dig. 88 301-303, 309; Dec. Dig. Om 217(1).] upon the fact that declarations of trust have been actually made and delivered, and not in an
8. TRUSTS 217(1)-TRUST FUNDS-LEGALproval of the original or other investments made
ITY OF TRUST COMPANY'S INVESTMENTS. in the individual name of the trustee.
Where a trust company in charge of trust [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. I in its own name and in its own right, and clear
funds made investments in bonds and mortgages Dig. § 482; Dec. Dig. 324.)
ly allotted on its own records the proportion of 2. TRUSTS 217(1)-TRUST FUNDS-INVEST- each investment held by each trust, and notified MENT-COMBINATION OF TRUST FUNDS. the life beneficiaries of each trust by letter of
The combination of trust funds for invest investments and changes in investments at the ment is generally recognized as proper for a time when made, with full statements thereof, trustee, the advantages that are frequently to and sent at regular intervals to the life benebe secured by combining trust funds to make a ficiaries, and to the remaindermen if they wishlarge and more satisfactory investment than can ed, principal accounts, recapitulating all the be made of the funds of one trust without com- mortgages, and the ownership of any mortgage, bination being of sufficient importance and val- interest, or share in mortgage held for such ue to the several trust funds to overcome any trust could be established, the beneficiaries could disadvantage that may arise from the fact that not complain of the investments so reported to the several owners of the investments may there them. after differ in the matter of handling the same. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent.
[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Trusts, Cent. Dig. $$ 301-303, 309; Dec. Dig. 217(1).] Dig. $S301-303, 309: Dec. Dig. Ow217(1).] Willard Bartlett, C. J., dissenting in part.
For other cases see samo topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 114 N.E.-67