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appropriating money may be submitted to the

(94 Ohio St. 364) electors of the state for their approval, this STATE V. MARANDA.' (No. 15137.) requirement does not comprehend its applica (Supreme Court of Ohio. May 23, 1916.) tion to the condition requiring competitive

(Syllabus by the Court.) bids in an appropriation relating to the current expenses of the state government and 1. CRIMINAL LAW Ow563—"CORPUS DELICTI”

-WHAT CONSTITUTES. state institutions.

By the "corpus delicti” of a crime is meant Section 1d of article 2 of the Ohio Constitu- the body or substance of the crime, included in tion specifically provides that appropriations which are usually two elements: "(1) The act;

(2) the criminal agency of the act. for such current expenses shall go into im

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal mediate effect. The appropriation in ques. Law, Cent. Dig. & 1269; Dec. Dig. Om563. tion was an appropriation for the current ex For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, penses of the state government, and the limi- First and Second Series, Corpus Delicti.] tation with reference to competitive bidding 2. CRIMINAL LAW Om517(4)—CORPUS DELICTI was simply a condition under which an ap

-CONFESSION. propriation should be drawn. The referen- rule in Ohio that there must be some evidence

It has long been established as a general dum provision applying to items for the ap- outside of a confession, tending to establish propriation of money does not apply to ap- the corpus delicti, before such confession is propriations for current expenses.

admissible. The quantum or weight of such out

side or extraneous evidence is not of itself to [2] In the present case there was no such be equal to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, nor competitive bidding as contemplated by law. even enough to make it a prima facie case. It While it is true that there are no positive is sufficient if there is some evidence outside statutory requirements relating to the prep. material element of the crime charged.

of the confession that tends to prove some aration of specifications and the employment

(Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal of specific methods by the state to secure Law, Cent. Dig. $ 1147; Dec. Dig. Om517(4).) competitive bidding, still reasonable efforts

Exceptions from Court of Common Pleas, to secure such competitive bidding must be

Summit County. made by the secretary of state in order to

Elizabeth Maranda was indicted for arson. comply with the provisions of the appropria-Verdict directed for defendant, and the State tion act referred to, and if the same is not excepts. Exceptions sustained. done the state auditor has power to refuse to honor vouchers for the payment of money un

Charles P. Kennedy, Pros. Atty., and Don der the provisions of section 6 of the act. W. Harter and J. C. Musser, Asst. Pros. The competition required must be open to Attys., all of Akron, and Emerson L. Taylor,

T. W. every one, as it was evidently the policy of of Columbus, for the exceptions. the statute to require that current require- Kimber and C. H. Stahl, both of Akron, ments should be obtained at the lowest and

against the exceptions. best price for the same quality of work and

WANAMAKER, J. The defendant, Elizamaterials.

beth Maranda, was indicted by the grand In the present case the secretary of state frankly stated that he acted under the belief jury of Summit county, Ohio, on the charge that section 6 of the act did not require dwelling house, and the other the burning of

of arson, in two counts, one the burning of a competitive bidding, and it may be conceded certain personal property then and there that there was some legal doubt as to the potency of section 6 to justify such belief. ed a plea of not guilty to the indictment, the

within said dwelling house. Defendant enterWhile there was a limited competition in the

jury was impaneled and sworn, and trial procurement of the tag contract, we are con

commenced. vinced that open, competitive bidding was not

During the trial the state had offered evi. resorted to, but that it was unduly restricted. dence tending to show that three fires had ocIt should have been more general and pro-curred at the house during the afternoon and nounced and a wider opportunity therefor night of September 3, 1915—the first at about presented. And since it was the duty of the 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon; the second at auditor of state, under the section of the about 9:53 o'clock that same night; and the law noted, to scrutinize vouchers of this third about midnight. The 9:53 fire was the character, it is the opinion of the court that particular one upon which the defendant was under the facts stated there were sufficient

then being tried. grounds to justify him in bis refusal to hon

The state offered evidence tending to show or the voucher in question.

that the defendant, Mrs. Maranda, occupied For the reasons stated, the writ is de the house in question as a boarding house; nied.

that on the aftersoon in question the defendWrit denied.

ant requested her boarders to leave the

house, saying that she was going to dress and NICHOLS, C. J., and JOHNSON, DONA- go down town; that said boarders left the HUE, NEWMAN, JONES, and MATTHIAS, house, walked to the post office some blocks JJ., concur. WANAMAKER, J., not partici- away, and then returned to the house to find pating.

it closed and full of smoke; that upon enter

ing, one of the boarders found the gas jets, ing to be a voluntary confession of all the in one of the downstairs rooms turned on and facts and circumstances connected with the gas escaping; that at this time Mrs. Maran- several firings of the boarding house in quesda appeared from some place on the outside tion on September 3, 1915. This written of the building; that upon going upstairs statement gave in detall the circumstances the boarders found some rags burning on the leading up to each fire, contained an acknowlfloor of the closet off of one of the bedrooms; edgment of writing the letter, which Mrs. that this fire was extinguished without call- Maranda discussed with a neighbor, formering the fire department; that about 7 o'clock ly referred to in the state's evidence, and asin the evening defendant was seen a short signed as the reason for writing the letter distance from the house, 491 South Main an attempt upon her part to divert suspicion street, and at that time stated to a neighbor from herself. that she was going to her Wheeler street Upon the offering of the written confession home, telling her neighbor that in the after the defendant by her counsel objected to noon of that day she had received a letter the admission thereof, upon the ground that from some person, with whom she had previ- the corpus delicti had not been sufficiently ously had some trouble threatening her with proved. Upon considering this objection, the personal harm, and that by reason of that let- court ordered an exclusion from the considter she was going to be compelled to give up eration of the jury of the oral testimony of the house that was burned in the afternoon, the witnesses Miller and Williams, and then and that she had closed the house for the sustained the defendant's objection to the innight; that on the day preceding the fires troduction of the written confession. Furthe neighbors had seen numerous articles of ther, the court arrested all the testimony household goods removed from the house; from the jury and directed a verdict for the that about 9:20 p. m. this September 3d Mrs. defendant, saying, in that connection, as the Maranda, her two daughters, and two young reason for such directed verdict: men were joined by one George Sewell, one of "The court cannot allow the jury to specuthe boarders, and walked away from the late whether the state has proved the corpus house in question east toward Wheeler delicti, and I will sustain the motion." street; that about a block away from the

The only question therefore for the conburning dwelling the defendant, Mrs. Maran. sideration of this court is as to whether or da, said to the others of the party that she not under the evidence of the case the corhad forgotten to lock the door of the house, pus delicti had been sufficiently proven to and started back toward the house ostensibly warrant the introduction of any claimed for that purpose; that she was seen going to confession against the defendant, whether the house by some of her neighbors, and that that confession was oral or written. the house at that time was dark; that this

[1, 2] There are three leading cases in was about a half an hour before the first Ohio dealing with the question of corpus alarm was turned in, which was 9:53 p. m.; delicti in connection with what is known as that the neighbors also saw Mrs. Maranda extrajudicial confessions. leave the house several minutes after enter The first leading case is Blackburn v. ing the same; that the firemen upon arriving State of Ohio, 23 Ohio St. 146, decided in at the Maranda house shortly after 9:53, the 1872. The third paragraph of the syllabus time of the alarm, found there were two fires reads as follows: in different parts of the house, one burning

“Although extrajudicial confessions alone are in a closet downstairs on the north side of not sufficient to prove the body of the crime in the house, and the other in a closet upstairs for that purpose 'in connection with other evi.

cases of homicide, they may be taken and used off of a room on the south side of the house, dence." the upstairs closet being the same one in The second case is the State of Ohio v. which the fire had been located in the after- Leuth, 5 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 94, decided in 1890, noon; that the chandelier in one of the and subsequently affirmed by the Supreme front rooms was broken off at the ceiling, al. Court of Ohio, without report. The third lowing the gas to escape; and that the de- paragraph of the syllabus reads as follows: fendant carried insurance in the amount of “This confession before the coroner was not a $1,500 on the contents of the house.

judicial confession, and it was necessary that The state also offered evidence tending to there should be other proof of the corpus deshow the location of these several fires in of the accused should be proved by other evi

licti; but it is not necessary that the agency the house, the surroundings, the presence of dence which alone would prove the guilt of the Mrs. Maranda, her peculiar conduct, to say accused beyond a reasonable doubt." the least, and thereafter offered in evidence The third case is State of Ohio v. Knapp, statements and declarations made by the de- 70 Ohio St. 380, 71 N. E. 705, 1 Ann. Cas. fendant to Charles Miller and Thomas B. 819, decided in 1904. The third paragraph Williams of the state fire marshal's office, of the syllabus reads as follows: which statements were in the nature of con "If the facts extrinsically proved by the state fessions, made on September 6, 1915. This corroborate the confession, then full, direct, evidence was admitted by the court. Later and positive evidence of the corpus delicti is not

indispensable to admit the confession in evithe state tendered a written statement sign- dence; and if such extrinsic corroborative ed by the defendant, Maranda, and purport- / facts, when considered with the confession, per

suade the jury beyond a reasonable doubt of The commission of arson is as common the prisoner's guilt as charged, such evidence nowadays as the convictions for arson are un. will support a verdict of guilty. Blackburn v.

common. It is a crime difficult to prove at State, 23 Ohio St. 146, approved and followed.”

best. The more complete the burning, the From the foregoing Ohio cases it seems to less the evidence surviving. be conclusively settled:

If the defendant, Maranda, had come into (1) That an extrajudicial confession is not open court and entered a plea of guilty to the sufficient in and of itself to sustain a con. charges made in the indictment, the court viction of a crime.

would have proceeded to impose sentence and (2) That some corroborating circumstances judgment upon her, and that without any tending to prove criminal agency should be proof of the corpus delicti. The judicial conoffered by the state before such extrajudicial fession by her plea of guilty would have been confession is competent.

sufficient in itself. But, this being an extraThis doctrine touching corpus delicti is of judicial confession, one made outside of ancient origin, and was born out of great court, corroborating circumstances tending caution by the courts, in consideration of cer- to prove the criminal burning are necessary tain cases of homicide wherein it had turned as a prerequisite to the admission of the conout that by reason of a failure the govern- fession, and, notwithstanding the confession ment to prove the death of the person charg. is offered in evidence, the court still must ed as having been murdered it so happened charge the jury that the defendant is prethat such person sometimes survived the per- sumed in fact and in law to be innocent, and son accused as his murderer; therefore the that before they can return a verdict of rule that there must be some evidence tend- guilty they must find from all the evidence ing to prove the fact that death had actual of the case that the defendant willfully and dy ensued, which was later followed by an ad- maliciously burned the building, as charged ditional requirement of some evidence that in the indictment. that death was brought about by some crim This would seem to afford ample protection inal agency.

for innocence, and yet not make conviction Now, in this case there was no doubt about so difficult as to well-nigh make it impossible. there having been a ire, two or three of the rule as to corroborating evidence should them, that afternoon and night, in the house be substantially the same as it is in the case in question; secondly, the state's evidence set of an accomplice. It has become the settled out the whereabouts and conduct of the de- practice of our courts to advise juries not to fendant covering the period in question, the convict upon the uncorroborated evidence of location of the fires, facts and circumstances an accomplice, but no court will undertake tending to show that the fires could not have to define with precision and exactness how been accidental, the letter that defendant, much corroboration shall be necessary, or Maranda, had told her neighbor that she had how many elements of the offense charged received, the broken chandelier allowing the the corroborating evidence shall tend to gas to escape so as to facilitate the burning prove. It is enough if it ten to prove some of the building, and other facts and circum- material element of the offense. It would be stances tending to prove either guilty knowl. an insuperable handicap to the state if the edge or guilty participation, or both, upon court were to charge that the corroborating the part of the defendant.

evidence must prove guilt beyond a reasonaIt will be noted from the Ohio cases cited, ble doubt, beyond a probability, or even esas well as from the text of approved authori- tablish a prima facie case. It is enough, if, ties on criminal law and procedure, that no under all the evidence, when considered and court has yet undertaken to declare a fixed weighed by the jury, every essential element and fast rule as to the quantum of additional of the offense has been proven against the de or outside evidence necessary to supplement fendant beyond a reasonable doubt. or corroborate a confession before such con The exceptions, and each of them, are susfession shall be admissible. They do agree, tained. however, that the outside evidence need not Exceptions sustained. be proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or even a prima facie case of guilt against the de NICHOLS, C. J., and JOHNSON, DONA. fendant, but that there must be some proof, HUE, NEWMAN, JONES, and MATTHIAS, not necessarily direct and positive, usually JJ., concur. but circumstantial, tending to prove the fact that a crime was committed. If such addi.

(94 Ohio St. 435) tional or outside circumstances are offered

STATE ex rel. D'ALTON, Pros. Atty. V. tending to prove the guilt of the accused as

MORSE. (No. 15322.) charged, and are corroborative of an extra (Supreme Court of Ohio. July 1, 1916.) judicial confession, such confession, if otherwise voluntary and competent, should be ad

(Syllabus by the Court.) mitted. It would be error to exclude such 1. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE m2—WHO ARE

OFFICERS. confession, or withdraw the same from the

The officers named in section 1772, General consideration of the jury.

Code, are justices of the peace within the mean

ing of that term as used in section 1711-1, Gen- , amended in 1912, to establish courts inferior eral Code (103 0. L. 214).

to the Court of Appeals, the General Assem[Ed. Note. -For other cases, see Justices of the Peace, Cent. Dig. Sg 24; ' Dec. Dig. Em 2. bly on April 18, 1913, enacted section 1711—1,

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, General Code (103 O. L. 214), which is as folFirst and Second Series, Justice of the Peace.) | lows: 2. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 52-JURISDIC

"That there be and is hereby established in TION--AUTHORITY OF JUSTICE.

each of the several townships in the several Where a part of a township is attached to counties of the state of Ohio, except townships the city of Toledo and Port Lawrence township, in which a court other than a mayor's court a justice of the peace residing within the lim- pow exists or may hereafter be created baving its of that part of the township so attached may, jurisdiction of all cases of which justices of the under the provisions of section 1716, General peace have or may have jurisdiction, the office of the peace in the city of Toledo and Port Law- office, and the number of justices of the peace Code, execute the duties of the office of justice of justice of the peace.

“The jurisdiction, powers and duties of said rence township and may hols court therein. [Ed. Notę. -For other cases, see Justices of provided by the laws in force on September 3.

in each such township shall be the same as was the

Peace, Čent. Dig. 146; Dec. Dig. Om 52.] 1912. All laws and parts of laws in force on

Original petition by the State, on the rela- said date, in any manner regulating such powtion of John C. D'Alton, Prosecuting Attor- ers and duties, fixing such jurisdiction or per

taining to such office or the incumbents thereof ney, for a writ of quo warranto against Wil- are hereby declared to be and remain in force bur S. Morse. Writ denied.

until specifically amended or repealed, the same

as if herein fully re-enacted." John C. D’Alton, Pros. Atty., and Allen J.

[2] Defendant claims the right to execute Seney, both of Toledo, for relator. Cornell

the duties of the office of justice of the peace Schreiber, of Toledo, for defendant.

in the city of Toledo and Port Lawrence NEWMAN, J. The relator invokes the township by virtue of the provisions of sec

tion 1716, General Code, which reads as foloriginal jurisdiction of this court in quo war

lows: ranto. His petition is challenged by demurrer upon the ground that facts sufficient to er township, justices of the peace residing with

"If a part of a township is attached to anothconstitute a cause of action are not stated in the limits of that part so attached shall exe. therein. On the 2d day of November, 1915, cute the duties of their office in the township the defendant, Wilbur S. Morse, was elected, to which such part is attached in the same man

ner as if elected for such township, and may in Adams township, Lucas county, Ohio, a hold court therein." justice of the peace, and duly qualified as

This section was in force on September 3. such officer and exercised the duties and 1912, and, being a law pertaining to the office privileges of said office in that township. of justice of the peace, it was one of the Thereafter the city of Toledo, Port Lawrence laws which section 1711—1, General Code, sutownship, Lucas county, duly aunexed to said pra, declared to be in force, and, not having city of Toledo and Port Lawrence township been specifically amended or repealed, has that part of Adams township in which de- remained in force. fendant resided and held court. Defendant

But it is urged that there was no office of was not elected or appointed a justice of the justice of the peace in the city of Toledo peace of Port Lawrence township, nor was and Port Lawrence township on September he elected or appointed a judge and justice 3, 1912, and that therefore the provisions of of the peace of the city and justice's court section 1711—1, General Code, are not apof the city of Toledo and the township of plicable. If the office of justice of the peace Port Lawrence.

did not exist in that city and township, it It is alleged that defendant unlawfully was because it had been abolished by section holds and exercises the privileges, franchise, 1772, General Code, which reads as follows: rights, and jurisdiction of a justice of the

"In the city of Toledo and the township lying peace of Port Lawrence township without wholly therein. the boundaries whereof are or any legal warrant, grounds, or right whatso- hereafter may be concurrent with the boundaries ever, to the damage and prejudice of and of such city, there shall be three judges and against the laws of the state of Ohio. The township. They shall be elected at the regular

justices of the peace in and for such city and prayer of the petition is that defendant be municipal election therein in the same manner, required to answer by what warrant he shall hold office for the same term, possess the claims to hold, exercise, and enjoy the of- and be subject to the same qualifications and

same jurisdiction, powers, duties and liabilities, fice of justice of the peace in and for Port disqualifications as justices of the peace for Lawrence township, Lucas county, and that townships." he be adjudged not entitled thereto, and that It is to be presumed that the General judgment of ouster therefrom be pronounced Assembly was mindful of section 9, art. 4, against him.

of the Constitution of 1851, which provided [1] By force of the amendments to the Con- for a competent number of justices of the stitution of this state, effective January 1, peace in each township of the several coun1913, the office of justice of the peace then ties. In the enactment of section 1772, Gen. ceased to be a constitutional office. Acting eral Code, that body was complying with the under the authority conferred upon it by mandate of the Constitution and was providsection 1, art. 4, of the Constitution, as ing for three justices of the peace in the

For oiher cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
114 N.E.-66


the peace.

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city of Toledo and Port Lawrence township. Action by Stanislaus Nowakowski, an inIt is true that in section 1772, General Code, fant, by John Nowakowski, his guardian ad these officers are designated by a different litem, against the New York & North Shore name; yet they are nothing more nor less Traction Company. A judgment for plaintiff than justices of the peace. They are elected on verdict of the jury was reversed by the at the regular municipal election, hold office Appellate Division, and the complaint disfor the same term, possess the same judicial missed (162 App. Div. 881, 148 N. Y. Supp. powers, duties, and liabilities, and are sub- 456), and plaintiff appeals. Judgment of ject to the same qualifications and disquali. Appellate Division reversed, and case fications as justices of the peace. This be- mitted to that court for consideration of the ing true, when the General Assembly in sec- weight of evidence. tion 1711-1, General Code, declared that all laws and parts of laws in force on September

Vine H. Smith, of New York City, for ap3, 1912, in any manner regulating the powers,

pellant. James A. MacElhinney, of New duties, and fixing the jurisdiction of justices York City, for respondent. of the peace should be and remain in full force until specifically amended or repealed,

CHASE, J. This is an action to recover it was legislating with reference to the offi. cers named in section 1716, the same as tiff on May 26, 1912, was struck by a trolley

damages for personal injuries. The plainthough they had been designated justices of

car of the defendant, and his right leg was so In the city of Toledo and Port injured that it was necessary to amputate it Lawrence township there was, then, the office of justice of the peace. There did not a little below the knee. At the time of the

accident he was between eight and nine years esist "a court other than a mayor's court

old. The accident occurred on Crocheron having jurisdiction of all cases of which justices of the peace have or may have a venue, in Bayside, on the double-track troljurisdiction,” and therefore that city and It occurred on a Sunday. The plaintiff left

ley line running from Bayside to Flushing. township did not come within the exception his home a short time before the accident to named in section 1711—1, General Code. Our attend a Sunday school at the Polish Cathoconclusion is that when a part of Adams township was attached to the city of Toledo lic church, which is situated on the north and Port Lawrence township, the relator, the place where the accident occurred.

side of the avenue, a short distance east of residing within the limits of that part so while waiting for the hour at which the attached, was, under the provisions of section 1716, General Code, entitled to execute the Sunday school was to convene, he, with 15 or

20 other children, was playing upon water duties of his office in the city and township to which such part was attached.

pipes that had been distributed along the

north side of the avenue near the west-bound Writ denied.

track of the defendant. The trolley line as it NICHOLS, C. J., and JOHNSON, DONA- comes from the east enters Crocheron avenue HUE, JONES, and MATTHIAS, JJ., concur. at right angles thereto from Chambers street WANAMAKER, J., not participating.

at a point about 500 feet east of the place

where the accident occurred. The defend(220 N. Y. 51)

ant's motorman testified that he came up NOWAKOWSKI V. NEW YORK & NORTH Chambers street to the avenue, and "started SHORE TRACTION CO.

to go on down the road, and saw a lot of (Court of Appeals of New York. Jan. 9, 1917.) children playing along the pipes, running

back and forth and jumping off, and I [he] STREET RAILROADS 117(31)-INJURIES TO PERSONS ON TRACK-CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI- went slowly down there and blew the whistle

and rung the bell, and when I [he] got within In an action for injuries to a nine year old five or six foot this boy jumped off the boy, where there was evidence that just as he pipe and ran right straight out in front of reached the first of two tracks of a street rail. road, at a point 500 feet from where the tracks the car.” The motorman was substantially made a right-angle turn onto the street, he look- corroborated by disinterested witnesses, but ed in the direction of the turn, and, seeing no the testimony presented on behalf of the car, continued across in a direction diagonally plaintiff was different. away from the turn, and was struck, just as he

We must assume from the record that the was crossing the last rail of the second track, by a car which came around the turn at a rapid jury had a right to find that the trolley car speed and sounded no warning signal, it cannot was run “fast” and that the motorman did be said as a matter of law that the boy, consid- not blow the whistle or ring the bell. From ering his age, was contributorily negligent in not the testimony offered in behalf of the plainagain looking before he started across the second track.

tiff the jury could have found that a few [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Street Rail- minutes before the trolley car in question roads. Cent. Dig. $8 250, 255; Dec. Dig. came in sight from Chambers street, the 117(31).]

plaintiff left the pipes where he was playing Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Di- and went across the car tracks into the bushvision, Second Department.

es south of the avenue, and after remaining


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