issue patent for the same invention (with broader or enlarged claims) was obtained by the administrator of the original patentee. This reissue, therefore, took place nearly seventeen years after the date of the original patent. The reissue was declared to be valid by the Supreme Court. Wilson v. Rousseau, 45 U. S. 4 How. 646, 11 L. ed. 1141.

In the case of the Battin Coal Breaker invention the original patent was dated the 6th October, 1843. On the 4th September, 1849, the patentee took out a reissue patent with broader or enlarged claims for the same invention. This reissue, therefore, took place six years after the date of the original patent. The reissue was declared valid by the Supreme Court. Battin v. Taggert, 58 U. S. 17 How. 74, 15 L. ed. 37.

In the case of Goodyear's rubber vulcanizing invention the original patent was dated the 15th of June, 1844. The term of the patent was extended and a reissue in two divisions with enlarged claims was taken out by the executor of the inventor on the 20th November, 1860. This reissue, therefore, took place sixteen years after the date of the original patent. The reissue was declared valid by the Supreme Court. Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U. S. 9 Wall. 788, 19 L. ed. 566.

Many similar cases occurred in the United States circuit courts.

§ 94. Period Allowed for Reissue by New Legal'

Construction.

About 1879 a new departure in the matter of the extent of the period permitted for reissues, as well as in the matter of the invention claimable in a reissue, was taken by the United States Supreme Court. Thus in one case that court enunciated the dictum- ?

"The only mistake suggested is that the claim was not as broad as it might have been. This mistake, if it was a mistake, was apparent upon the first inspection of the patent, and if any correction was desired, it should have been applied for immediately." Miller v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 104 U. S. 350, 26 L. ed. 783.

This same doctrine was affirmed in the cases of Matthews v. Boston Mach. Co., 105 U. S. 54, 26 L. ed. 1022, and of Bantz v. Frantz, 105 U. S. 160, 26 L. ed. 1013.

95. View of the Mechanic as to the New Construction of the Period Allowed for Reissue.

To the inventor and mechanic this fabrication of law by judicial construction, when there is no language in the statute to justify it, appears to be not only unwarranted but is absurd in view of the following considerations:

1. An inventor undoubtedly knows the physical thing which he has produced or discovered, whether it be an art, a manufacture, or a composition of matter; but he never knows what particular matter or matters, part, improvement, or combination, in any one of those subjects produced by him is new and is his legal invention or discovery in view of the state of the art at the date his invention or discovery is produced. He cannot know this, because such knowledge would involve a knowledge of the entire history of inventions of the same class not only in the United States, but also in every foreign country. Even skilled experts, whose labors are restricted to the investigation of particular classes of inventions, often fail in this respect as is proved by the fact that even after the claims to an invention have passed the scrutiny of the Examiners in the Patent Office,

who individually confine their entire work to one narrow class of inventions, one of the commonest and most successful defenses against an action under the patent is that the invention was not new, some old matter which has escaped the attention of the examiner in the Patent. Office having been discovered.

2. An inventor is with but few exceptions a man ignorant of the legal language in which an invention must be described and defined in the specification of a patent. Nor does he apprehend the legal signification of the language in which his invention is described and claimed in his patent. Even the judges of the United States courts, with all their training, experience, and learning, and with the aid afforded them by the arguments of counsel, and the testimony of skilled experts, frequently differ as to the legal construction of the claims and specifications of patents. How then can an inventor, who as a practically universal rule has no knowledge of such matters, be expected to discover a mistake "upon the first inspection of the patent," "as soon as that document is taken out of its envelope and opened."

3. What the real legal invention is in an art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, is often one of the most difficult of all things to be found out; and often it is not apprehended until years have elapsed after the grant of the patent, as was the fact in the Goodyear case and also in the Woodworth planing machine case (§§ 83 and 93).

4. As long as no infringement of an invention is brought to the knowledge of the patentee he naturally supposes that his patent is operative and sufficient to protect him in the use of the full invention which he made or discovered; and, as a general rule, it is only

when he finds that his art, machine, manufacture, or composition is produced by some unauthorized party that any doubt arises in his mind as to the operativeness and sufficiency of his specification.

§ 96. Actual Invention Rarely set forth Correctly in an Original Patent.

With those who have had experience in the methods in which applications for patents are prepared and acted upon in the Patent Office, the general understanding is that the real legal invention made by an inventor is rarely set forth in his original patent:

1. Because a majority of the specifications of patents are prepared by persons who have had no experience in the courts and therefore do not appreciate the necessity of the utmost care in doing the work; and who, if able to determine what the real legal invention is, generally do the work of preparing an application for so small a compensation that they cannot afford to expend the time and labor required to ascertain it.

2. Because the practice of the majority of the examiners of the Patent Office for many years has been never to grant a claim broad in its scope if by repeated rejections they can get an inventor or his solicitor to take a narrow claim; and as many solicitors receive a fixed sum for soliciting a patent, it is the policy of many of them to take any claims they can get through the Patent Office with the least expenditure of time and labor, whether such claims cover the real invention or not.

§ 97. Effect of Value of Invention upon the Necessity for Reissue.

The great majority of patented inventions are of such small practical value that they are rarely used by others.

than their inventors, and there is no temptation to manufacturers to use them in preference to inventions which have become public property. With patents for such inventions of small value it is practically immaterial whether the claims are too narrow or not, and reissues of them are not sought for. But when the invention is really valuable the general rule is that the patent is issued with claims that are not broad enough to fully protect it, and the patent is inoperative to protect the full invention "by reason of a defective or insufficient specification." Consequently, a reissue for the enlargement of the claims is the general rule in cases of patents for inventions sufficiently valuable to justify the cost of legal proceedings for their enforcement.

§ 98. Injustice of Restriction to a Fixed Period for

Reissue.

Under the above circumstances to restrict a patentee in every case to a certain period in which an application for a reissue can be filed is unreasonable and would do him great injury and injustice.

99. Doctrine of Dedication to the Public for Part of full Invention not Claimed in Original Patent.

It has been held by the Supreme Court of late years that a patentee who from any inadvertence, accident or mistake whatever, failed to claim his full invention in his original patent, thereby dedicated to the public whatever he left unclaimed; the language of the Court being as follows:

"But it must be remembered that the claim of a specific device or combination, and an omission to claim other devices or combinations apparent on the face of