the gauntlet Austria intended to throw in the face of the two small Slav States. There was talk of mobilizing the Russian army. The Russian press became utterly angry, bitter, and bellicose. France and the French press naturally took the side of Russia, Germany and her newspapers were pouring invectives on the curse of Pan-Slavism. Great Britain only was able to guard her sangfroid, and the British press was preserving a conciliatory attitude in the matter.

The danger of a general European conflagration loomed ominous on the horizon. The atmosphere was overcharged with electricity, and Europe stood watching in breathless anxiety the dreadful situation. Still, the conciliatory attitude of Sir Edward Grey did much to allay the fear of a conflagration; after all, the danger of general war was not so imminent as when Sir Edward Grey confessed, later in March, that the Albanian question almost brought about the dreaded European war.1

Yet, that very question was to suffer the penalty of its becoming so notorious within a fortnight. In fact, the cause of Albania was completely overshadowed by the effects of the bitter rivalry that broke out between the two gigantic political blocs, the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente; the issue of the Albanian question was treated merely as a means of testing the comparative strength and solidity of the two great coalitions. The intrinsic merits of the Albanian question were forgotten; nobody cared for Albania, as a nation. During the Albanian revolt of 1912, which ended with the granting of administrative autonomy and which preceded the Balkan war 1 "American Year Book," 1913, p. 102.

by a few months only, the press of all Europe sang the high praises of the Albanian victories over the Young Turks. Now, however, the Albanian aspirations were regarded only as "a very clever Austrian scheme" by which the government of Vienna was seeking to rob the Balkan allies of their laurels and lawful acquisitions. It was openly declared that Russia and France would never tolerate the creation of a "new little Turkey" under the protection of Austria and for the benefit of the Italian imperialist policy.

The result was that the Albanian question was relegated into the background in order to make place for the spectacular diplomatic and press battles which were fought daily between the two European blocs. The rights of the Albanian nationality were utterly discredited by the bellicose attitude of Austria which gave to the world the impression that the cause of Albania was merely an Austrian issue which should be fought with every available weapon in order to cut short the extravagant pretensions of the Dual Monarchy. This ominous feeling pervaded all the actual and future discussions regarding Albania, and the upshot was that the Albanian nation was designated, from the very beginning, as the scapegoat for all the troubles and complications that befell Europe. Even after the reluctant recognition of the independence and the creation of the Albanian principality, the new State was looked upon with holy horror as the illegitimate child of Austrian diplomacy, with Italy figuring as the mid-wife.

REFERENCES

DURHAM, M. E., The Struggle for Scutari, Arnold, London, 1914, Chapters XI-XIII.

ISMAIL KEMAL BEY, Albania and the Albanians, Quarterly Review (July, 1917), Vol. 228, pp. 153–162.

YOUNG, GEORGE, Nationalism and War in the Near East (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), Oxford, 1915, pp. 225240, and Ch. VII.

CHAPTER IX

THE LONDON CONFERENCE

I. SIR EDWARD GREY

As time went on, war feelings were running wild, and the European peoples were shuddering at the prospect of seeing the flare of the spark which was to set fire to the heaps of inflammable material the great European Powers had been accumulating and storing for a quarter of a century. Every hour, every minute that passed by was adding to the general anxiety. It was evident that, unless the Balkan allies suspended their advance into the Albanian territory, Austria would draw her sword against Serbia and Montenegro, Italy against Greece, Russia would rush to the assistance of the Slav nations by attacking Austria, Germany would make common cause with her allies, Austria and Italy, and France would naturally join her own ally, Russia. Everything depended now on the attitude of Great Britain, and especially on that of the man who directed her foreign policy: Sir Edward Grey.

And Sir Edward Grey acted at the right moment. In the midst of the unbearable international tensity, "Le Temps" of Paris announced, on November 27, that England was contemplating tendering her good offices for the peaceful settlement of the Albanian question by means of an international conference. The tensity was somewhat relieved, but

not to any great extent till after Sir Edward Grey himself came forward with the official proposal that the ambassadors of the Great Powers accredited to the Court of St. James should form a Conference which should decide the Albanian question as well as that of granting to Serbia a commercial outlet to the Adriatic Sea. After the customary exchange of notes and reservations, the proposal was accepted, and the ambassadors of the six great Powers sat around the green table to determine the fate of Albania, and, thereby, to put an end to the conflict. Thus, the thorny dispute was taken out of the hands of the Provisional Albanian Government and the Balkan States.

This Conference is known as the Conference of Ambassadors, in contra-distinction to the Conference which was likewise held in London by the belligerents, Turkey and the Balkan States, with the view of terminating the armed conflict.

II. THE CREATION OF THE ALBANIAN STATE

The first formal meeting of the Conference took place on December 17, 1912, at the British Foreign Office. Three days later, the world at large was notified, through the issuing to the press of the following communiqué from the Foreign office, that an armed conflict between the great Powers was averted:

"The ambassadors have recommended to their governments and the latter have accepted in principle Albanian autonomy, together with a provision guaranteeing to Serbia commercial access to the Adriatic Sea. All six governments have agreed in principle on these points."