making it a part of the primary act. The language is: "And all the provisions of section 1096 of the Political Code, so far as they are consistent with the provisions of this act, are hereby made applicable to primary elections within the meaning of this act.' ANGELLOTTI, C. J. In this matter a peremptory writ of mandate in accord with the alternative writ heretofore granted was ordered issued at the close of the oral argument, the views of the court being very briefly expressed from the bench. That the ground of the decision may be understood, it is proper to very briefly state it in writing. [1] The question presented was whether or not an elector is entitled to state in his affidavit of registration the name of the political party with which he intends to affiliate at the ensuing primary election, notwithstand-ed such a provision. We are satisfied that it ing the amendment of section 1096, Political Code, at the regular legislative session of 1915 (St. 1915, p. 285, § 6), by striking from said section the provision that an elector may state this in such affidavit. They had done the same thing in the primary act of 1911 (St. 1911, p. 769), and in a still earlier primary act when section 1096 contained no provision for statement of party affiliation, they had so expressly referred to section 1366a, Political Code, which contain must be held that it was the intent to make this section, as it then stood, in so far at least as this matter so vital to the maintenance of the act is concerned, an integral part of the primary law itself for so long as such primary law required the registration to show party affiliation. The question is one that must necessarily be decided in accord with the law as it now exists, entirely regardless of certain acts Conceding the power of the Legislature to adopted at the recent extra session of the legislate in this manner-1. e., by incorporatLegislature, which, by virtue of the refering the provisions of some other statute by endum provisions of our Constitution, are reference, as must be conceded-we have renot as yet effective, and which are still sub-maining simply the question of intent, and as Ject to be suspended until the next election to that we have already indicated our views. by the filing of a petition for a referendum thereon. The case then is simply that presented in People v. S. B. Whipple (No. 2) 47 Cal. 592, It is conceded by all that the partisan por- where an act provided that township astion of the primary act of June 16, 1913 (St. sessors shall have all the powers and per1913, p. 1379), as it now exists, a valid sub- form all the duties of county assessors presisting law of the state, is practically ren- scribed by the provisions of the general revdered a nullity, if the amendment of section enue act of 1861 (St. 1863-64, p. 243), and 1096 in 1915 deprived an elector of the right wherein it was held that the subsequent rehere sought to be exercised. No one could peal of the act so referred to did not operate qualify for a party primary as required by to defeat or curtail the scope of the act in the primary act, either to sign nominating which the reference was contained, "for the petitions for candidates for party nomina- legal effect of such reference, in the first intions, or to vote at a party primary. The stance, is the same as though the act so reprimary act from beginning to end shows the ferred to had been inserted therein in exabsolute necessity for party registration in tenso." This is a principle well sustained order to make it a workable system for party by the authorities, and is applicable whenprimaries at all, and learned counsel for re-ever the intent is apparent to make by refspondent frankly admitted that the express-erence another provision of law an actual ed design of its framers was that no one could participate in any of the party primary elections provided for thereby unless in his affidavit of registration he had stated the name of the political party or organization with which he intended to affiliate. This was the "test and condition" provided in the primary act upon which electors might partici-inate party registration. pate in such a party primary, and that the As stated from the bench, the decision of Legislature had the right to prescribe such a test in the primary act itself cannot be doubted in view of the language of section 21⁄2, article 2, of the Constitution. [2] Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the framers of such primary act should substantially provide therein, as they clearly had the right to do and as we think they have done, that electors should be allowed to register in such a way as to make them eligible to participate in the party primaries provided thereby. In our opinion they did this, in a way not novel at all in legislation, by referring to section 1096, Po part of the law under consideration. Section 1096, so far as essential to the maintenance of the party primary provisions of the primary act, was thus made an actual part of such act, and the Legislature could not subsequently affect such primary act by simply amending said section 1096, so as to elim the court was based on this ground, as to which all participating agreed, although other grounds were stated by some of the justices in addition. It follows that petitioner is entitled to the relief sought, and accordingly a peremptory writ of mandate was ordered issued. I concur: SLOSS, J. SHAW, J. I concur. I want to add to the opinion of the Chief Justice another ground on which I think the decision may rest. Section 1097 as amended in 1915 contains in 'sub ed in the section before its amendment, that "the affidavit of the party must show all the facts required to be stated." This means that, if there is any fact required to be stated by any other law, the affidavit must state it, although such fact is not expressly mentioned in the form given in section 1097. And inasmuch as the primary law of 1913, in almost every section, implies that the registration shall show the party affiliation of the voter, making it necessary to the operation of the primary law, I think the above-quoted phrase of the present section 1097 necessarily means, under the law as it now stands, that the registration affidavit must show the party affiliation. HENSHAW, J. I concur in the foregoing. Viewed in the broadest and most liberal aspect, it is imperative that the writ should issue. The Constitution of this state (Const. art. 2, § 22) makes recognition of the existence of political parties, declares for a primary law and empowers the Legislature to prescribe tests controlling the right to vote at such primary. It is not necessary here to consider the full import of this constitutional provision, whether it is not in itself a guaranty of partisan primaries, through which alone under our system of laws political parties, the existence of which is certainly guaranteed by the Constitution, can alone live. It is truly said that the intent of the Legislature expressed in its acts is to be considered in interpreting those acts. No doubt can be entertained of the legislative intent in passing the primary law of 1913. It provided a complete plan for registration declaring party affiliations, though there was no compulsion upon the elector to declare such an affiliation. There was upon the statute books at that time a registration law authorizing the elector to declare his party affiliation and compelling county clerks and registrars of voters to enter such declarations of party affiliation when made, to the very legitimate end that those and those only who belonged to a political party should, at the primary designed for the selection of its candidates, have a voice in that selection. There can be no doubt but that it made this registration law as it then stood, by distinct reference, a part of itself. Equally no doubt can be entertained of the purpose of the Legislature in passing the primary law of 1915. Compelled to recognize the existence of political parties, so far as national officers are concerned, it proposed to and did do away with all party nominations for state offices. It was designed, and avowedly designed, to destroy all political parties so far as they operated upon state officers and affairs. In the accomplishment of this purpose the act of 1915 repealed the partisan primary law of 1913, and to harmonize legislation under its new proposed scheme of politics it struck out from section 1096 the provision touching the registration of the po litical party with which the elector was affiliated. Turning again to the intent of the Legislature, there is no room for doubt but that the law of 1915 was intended primarily and fundamentally to destroy party primaries and party nominations to state and county offices. Under the guaranty of the Constitution the people of the state under the initiative and the referendum become the highest legislative body in the state. Under the initiative they may pass laws beyond the power of the Legislature to modify or repeal. Under the referendum they may perform the high legislative function of vetoing an act of the Legislature. We are thus not only entitled, but it is our duty, to consider the legislative intent of the people at a referendum election quite as much as the legislative intent of the Legislature itself. They took under consideration the question as to whether or not the primary law of 1915 should be permitted to remain upon the statute books. If their vote at the polls favored it, it became the law of the state. If their vote at the polls repudiated it, their repudiation was a declaration that the primary law of 1915 should be repealed, and the primary law of 1913 should be restored to full life. Such was not only the intent, but such was the necessary effect, of the act of the sovereign people at the polls in striking from the statute books the primary law of 1915. What, then, stands in the way of the officers of the state giving effect to this plainly expressed will of the people solemnly registered at the polls? Nothing saving the specious argument that, because the people in the same referendum election did not veto the law of 1915 amending section 1096, it must be concluded that they desired that law to stand as amended, and, standing as amended, it will operate to subvert the whole partisan primary law of 1913, and thus undo everything which the people of the state thought they were doing when in terms they destroyed the primary law of 1915. But what is the broad and complete answer to this argument? It is that the people plainly designed to restore to full life the primary law of 1913; that to restore this act on the statute books required partisan registration; that the primary law of 1913 makes specific reference to and adopts as part of itself section 1096, but section 1096 as so adopted is the section as it originally stood, calling for the registration by party affiliation; even if section 1096 had been totally repealed it would, under familiar principles and under all of the authorities, be the subject of reference to determine what was meant by the primary law of 1913 and to give that meaning due effect; that, therefore, section 1096 for the purposes of the primary law of 1913, and for registration thereunder, would remain in force, even though the section had been wholly eliminated from our statute books, and that such has always been the rule of construction. People v. Whipple, 47 Cal. 591; Potter, Dwar. on Stats. pp. 190, 192; Reg. v. Merionethshirs, 6 Adol. & Ellis, 343; Rex v. Laxdale, 1 Burrows, 445; 2 Lewis, Sutherland, Stat. Construction (2d Ed.) §§ 405, 453, 489. We concur: MELVIN, J.; LENNON, Judge pro tem. Ex parte DART. (Cr. 1913.) (Supreme Court of California. Feb. 3, 1916.) 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 611-REGULATION OF CHARITIES-POLICE POWER. The occupation of soliciting contributions for charitable purposes may be regulated by laws or ordinances providing for reasonable supervision of the persons engaged, and for the application or use of the contributions received to the purposes intended, to prevent unscrupulous persons from obtaining money or other things under the pretense that they are to be applied to charity, to prevent the wrongful diversion of such funds to other uses, and to secure them against waste. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 1344-1349; Dec. Dig. 611.] 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 594-REGU- [Ed. Note.-For other cases see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 1316-1320, 1327, 1328; Dec. Dig. 594.] port and to indorse such of them as meet actual needs of the community, attain a reasonable to insure the public of the wise use of the standard of efficiency and are so conducted as funds." The second of these ordinances prohibits begging in the public streets or places in the city and regulates the soliciting of alms and contributions for charitable purposes. It provides as follows: "Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association to solicit alms, food, clothing, money or contributions within the city of Los Angeles, without first securing a permit so to do from the Municipal Charities Commission of said city. Provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to properly accredited solicitors of established churches of said city soliciting for purely religious purposes, but it shall apply to the various institutional works carried on by said churches in like manner as other persons, firms, corporations and associations. The permit from the charities commission above referred to shall consist of a written certificate issued by the said commission certifying that the object of said solicitation is worthy and meritorious and authorizing the soliciting of gifts and donations therefor; said permits may be revoked by said commission at any time. "Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for any person to solicit or collect for any charitable or philanthropic organization, without first obtaining a written permit so to do from the Municipal Charities Commission; said permit shall be revocable at any time in the discretion of said commission, which may adopt such regulations regarding the soliciting and collecting of funds as its judgment may dictate, and it shall be obligatory upon the holders of such permits to abide by such rules and regulations. "Sec. 4. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association to give or promote any entertainment, fair, bazaar or benefit in the name of charity or philanthropy, without first obtaining a written permit so to do, from the Municipal Charities Commission, said permit to be revocable at any time at the discretion of said commission. "Sec. 5. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association to solicit funds within the city of Los Angeles for any ethical, evangelistic, religious, missionary or charitable purposes without having first obtained an indorsement certificate from the Municipal Charities Commission. Provided, however, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to established and recognized churches or other reL.ligious organizations in the city of Los Angeles. "Sec. 6. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or association to sell, or offer for sale, any clothing, household goods, or other goods, wares or merchandise which have been solicited or donated for charity or philanthropy without first obtaining a written permit so to do from the Municipal Charities Commission, said permit to be revocable at any time at the discretion of said commission." In Bank. Application for writ of habeas corpus by William J. Dart against Charles E. Sebastian, Chief of Police, and Ray Chesebro, Police Judge, of the City of Los Angeles. Applicant discharged from custody. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and Edward E. Bacon, all of Los Angeles (Wm. A. Barnhill, of Los Angeles, of counsel), for petitioner. Warren L. Williams, City Prosecutor, and Samuel Barnes Smith, Deputy City Prosecutor, both of Los Angeles, opposed. HENSHAW, J. The authorities of the city of Los Angeles adopted two ordinances. By one was created a Municipal Charities Commission, whose powers and duties were defined. Amongst those powers and duties are: "(1) To investigate all charities dependent upon public appeal or general solicitation for sup Petitioner was arrested under two criminal complaints charging violations of these ordinances. By the first of these complaints he was accused of soliciting "alms, food, clothwithing, money and contributions out first securing or having a permit or written certificate so to do from the Municipal Charities Commission." By the second of these complaints his crime was in "selling and offering for sale clothing, household goods and other goods, wares and merchan dise which had been solicited and donated for charity and philanthropy, without first obtaining or having a written permit so to do from the Municipal Charities Commission." has ever voiced any complaint touching the honesty and efficiency of the Army's administrative work. After its creation, the charities commission, claiming the power so to do under the aforesaid ordinances, on or about the 6th day of October, 1913, demanded, in writing, of the Salvation Army, that it should, as a condition precedent to obtaining the indorsement or permit of the commission for carrying on or soliciting contributions for any of its above described charitable work in said city, be governed by a local board of managers, or trustees, all of whom should be residents of the city of Los Angeles, and representative Los Angeles citizens, and that all the property of the Salvation Army in the city should be conveyed to and held by such local board, and that the financial work of the Salvation Army in the city should be conducted by such local board; that no budgets for funds should be prepared and enforced on the Los Angeles workers for any purpose other than Los Angeles work; and that no funds should be sent out of Los Angeles for the use of the Salvation Army elsewhere, except by the direction of such local board, or of the Municipal Charities Commission; and that Christmas offerings, self-denial, harvest festival, and like accustomed contributions of the Salvation Army should not be used except for local purposes; and that all proceeds derived by the Salvation Army from the conduct of its aforesaid institutions in Los Angeles (whether self-sustaining or not) should be used exclusively for the extension of its work in the city, and not be subject to assessment by territorial (i. e., national) officers of the Salvation Army. Next, the charities commission exacted that title to all property of the Salvation Army in Los Angeles should be vested in a corporation, and this was done. Thereafter the Salvation Army and its corporation petitioned the charities commission for a permit allowing it to continue its charities, and its petition was denied. Always desirous of yielding obedience to the law, and of "rendering to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's," the Salvation Army endeavored to comply with the exactions of the charities commission, but was unable to comply with some of them without impairing its efficiency and integrity as an organized society for religio-charitable work. Failing to secure the permit, the Salvation Army continued this work. The petitioner is one of its officers. In the per The following facts appear without controversy: The Salvation Army is a religious organization founded on and believing in the teachings of Christ. It has been established for 50 years. It has its churches and charitable organizations throughout the United States and other countries. Profoundly impressed with the Founder's sympathy for the poor and afflicted and with His teachings that, "Now abideth faith, hope and charity, these three, but the greatest of these is charity," and, "Now the end of the commandment is charity out of a pure heart," it has made its special field of religious work the relief of the destitute and the rescue of society's outcasts. It has found that it cannot lead the spirit of the weary and heavy burdened without first ministering to his physical necessities. While "man does not live by bread only," he cannot live at all without bread. Therefore the charitable organizations of the Salvation Army are vital, integral parts of its religious life and work. For 25 years it has prosecuted its religious and charitable work in the city of Los Angeles. It there maintains an "Industrial Home," where men out of employment are given food and lodging without charge, but are required, for their own self-respect and to the end that mere professional beggary be not fostered, to perform such labor as is within their power, being paid the value thereof. It maintains a "Rescue Home and Maternity Hospital," in which, without charge, food, lodgings, and hospital service are afforded needy married women and unfortunate girls. It maintains a "Young Woman's Boarding House," giving for an extremely low price to homeless girls and women clean, wholesome food and lodging and helpful moral influences. It maintains four other hotels and lodging houses where the destitute are housed and homed free of charge and where but a small charge is exacted from those able to pay. An average of 27 persons per night are given shelter in these hotels free of all charge. It also maintains nine stores where secondhand clothing, furniture, rags, paper, and junk of various kinds, contributed by the charitable, are sold at low prices. In these stores and in the renovatory work necessary to make many contributed articles salable, employment is given to the needy, who thus become self-formance of his duties as such officer, and sustaining and self-respecting. In the years of its labors the Salvation Army has acquired properties of much value in Los Angeles, In setting forth the foregoing facts we are all of which are used for one or another of not unmindful of the limitations put on our the described purposes. It has alleviated suf- inquiry under this writ. The validity of fering, and given relief and employment in these ordinances is to be determined from thousands of cases. Its books of financial their provisions, and the question of their vaaccount are and always have been open to lidity or invalidity is all that concerns us the inspection and examination of its con- here. Nevertheless, and assuming for the tributors, and no one of those contributors | moment the validity of the ordinances, these not otherwise, he has been subjected to these arrests and charged with these crimes. ate zone, between a law imposing reasonable regulations to effectuate these ends on all such charitable institutions, and a law which makes the right to solicit at all, and thus the right of a given charity to exist dependent on the arbitrary will of a charities commission. Again, let us illustrate. Re spondent in its brief thus defines the power of the charities commission: facts are highly instructive as illustrating cuss the distinction, as broad as the temperthe extent of the power conferred and the manner of its exercise. Here is a great and living charity doing good to thousands of the needy and heavy-laden of Los Angeles, struck dead because it does not make over the management of its affairs to a local board of "representative citizens" and cannot agree that it will dispense the bounty which it receives exclusively for local purposes. Charity is not only to begin at home, but to end at home saving as under "permit" it may be suffered to go abroad. The quality of Mercy (and so necessarily of Charity), we are told -"is not strained; It droppeth as the gentle rain from Heaven Upon the place beneath." But in Los Angeles it is to be strained and drop as from a sprinkling pot in the guiding hand of the charities commission. But this exemplification of the use of the power is not, of course, an argument against the existence of the power itself. Conceding the existence of the power, if in any instance an illegal exercise of it has been made, that fact will constitute a defense to a prosecution, but will not be effective to destroy the validity of the grant of power itself. The basic question still remains: May a private charitable association, order, or organization be denied the right to fulfill the purposes of its existence saving under a "permit" from the authorities? We here use the term "private charity" as meaning one not supported in whole or in part by state or municipal funds. Over the latter class manifestly the power of regulation and control is great, if not plenary. Certain features of these ordinances at once strike the reader. Money may be freely sent abroad by any "established church" for the uplift of the soul of the Senegambian, and this is very well; but no penny can be sent to Belgium, to Poland, to Serbia to still the wailing of the children or allay the anguish of the women except under a "permit" from the charities commission. Nay, more, in the city of Los Angeles itself its needy childhood goes unfed and unclothed, its dependent womanhood unprotected and uncared for by organized charities except they have a "permit." Surely here, if anywhere, is "The organized charity, scrimped and iced In the name of a cautious, statistical Christ." Respondent argues that charitable institutions soliciting contributions from the general public thus secure public trust funds, and that it is quite within governmental powers for the state or its municipal agencies to regulate the collection and disposition of such trust funds. It is freely conceded, indeed it is proclaimed, that reasonable regulations may be adopted touching and to a limited extent controlling the operation of charitable institutions dependent in whole or in part on public beneficence. But respondent fails to perceive or at least to dis "The Municipal Charities Commission is delegated power to indorse (which means grant alone they are entitled to live) such charitable permits to charitable institutions under which institutions as meet the actual needs of the community, attain a reasonable standard of efficiency and are so conducted as to insure the public in the wise use of funds." In This language taken from the first of the ordinances above quoted sounds reasonable. But as interpreted by the Municipal Charities Commission, what does it mean? their own language it is this: Such a charity is "one that will execute every trust for charity with the least possible delay, with the greatest possible efficiency and with the least possible deduction for expense." Here is a mark set, and that mark is the absolute perfection of human endeavor. No tolerance, no charity is shown by this commission of charities, for any human effort, however self-sacrificing and efficient, that does not attain human perfection. Charities in Los Angeles must reach a pitch of perfection unattained by any other human institution, or in the view of the Municipal Charities Commission they are unfit to live. But let us eliminate from consideration these constructions put by the Municipal Charities Commission on their own powers, which are but delegated powers, and meet the question of the existence of this power at its source. Can the municipal authorities of a city arbitrarily say what person or what institution may or may not engage in charitable work dependent wholly or in part upon voluntary contributions from the public? Unhesitatingly we answer that this cannot be done, that it constitutes an attempt to use the police power in an arbitrary, unreasonable, and oppressive manner. It necessarily contains an assertion of the power to prohibit and suppress vocations and occupations which, entirely aside from their religious character, are from a worldly point of view in and of themselves not only harmless but positively beneficial to humanity. The power to pass reasonable regulations in such a case bears no relationship to the power to prohibit or suppress. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220; Los Angeles v. Hollywood Cemetery Ass'n, 124 Cal. 344, 57 Pac. 153, 71 Am. St. Rep. 75; In re Johnston, 137 Cal. 115, 69 Pac. 973; Sonora v. Curtin, 137 Cal. 583, 70 Pac. 674. Such charitable work is not to be confounded with beggary, which imports per |