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provided in the preceding section, the magistrate or judge shall fix a time, not less than ten days nor more than thirty days thereafter, for hearing of said return, when he shall proceed to hear and determine whether or not the property so seized, or any part thereof, was used in violation of any of the provisions of this chapter. At such hearing, any party claiming an interest in any such property, may appear and be heard, and if upon such hearing it shall appear that any property so seized was knowingly used, or permitted to be used, in violation of any provision of this chapter, the same shall be adjudged forfeited by the state, and shall be delivered to the custody of the superintendent, to be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter. If upon such hearing it shall appear that any property so seized was not kept or used for an unlawful purpose, or if any person shall show that he is the owner of any furniture, fixtures or other property seized under such warrant, and that the same, or any part thereof, were unlawfully used without his knowledge or consent, the same shall be returned to its lawful owner.'

"3615. No such warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation describing as particularly as may be the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be

seized."

The usual complaint or information, under oath, was filed, and search warrant issued thereon. Upon the return of the sheriff, showing the seizure of 19 barrels of beer from the possession of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company the court fixed the 2d day of August, 1913, for hearing on said return, "to determine whether said property or any part thereof was used in violation of law." At the time set for the hearing, the plaintiff in error, Milwaukee Beer Company, appeared and filed the following interplea, duly verified:

"The said interpleader represents and shows to the court the following facts, to wit:

"(1) That the seizure made by the said sheriff of Pawnee county, state of Oklahoma, under and by virtue of the search warrant issued herein was unlawful for the reason that the premises described to be searched, was too indefinite and uncertain to conform to the statute of the

state of Oklahoma.

"(2) That the said 19 barrels of beer seized by the said sheriff is not described in the application for the search warrant nor in the search warrant, and that the seizure of the same by the sheriff was unlawful and without authority. "(3) That the time the same was seized by the sheriff of Pawnee county, Okl., the same was in possession of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, and was awaiting to be transported from Keystone, Okl., to Joplin, Mo., and that the same was not in the possession of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company for the purpose of violating any laws of the state of Oklahoma, but was held by the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company for the sole and only purpose of transporting the same from Keystone, Okl., to Joplin, Mo., over its line of railroad. The said railroad company, operating a line of railroad engaged in the interstate commerce between Keystone, Okl., and Joplin, Mo., and at the time the same was seized the same was held by the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, for no other purpose than for the purpose of transporting the same from Keystone, Okl., to Joplin, Mo. "Wherefore, your interpleader prays that the court hold said seizure as unlawful and illegal and without authority of law, and that said 19 barrels of beer seized herein was not the intoxicating liquor, described in the search warrant

at the time of said seizure said liquor was in the possession of the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, and was held by the said company for the purpose of transporting the same from Keystone, Okl., to Joplin, Mo., as an interstate shipment of intoxicating liquor, and was not held at the time by the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, for the purpose of sale; and that said intoxicating liquor be returned to the St. Louis & San Francisco Railroad Company, to redeliver and ship to your interpleader at Joplin, Mo., and for such other relief as your interpleader may be entitled to."

To this interplea the county attorney, representing the state, filed a demurrer, based upon the following grounds:

"1. That said interplea does not state a cause of action against the plaintiff.

"2. That said interplea wholly fails to establish any right of said interpleader to the goods in question.

"3. That said interplea states no defense to the case of the state against said liquors.

"4. That said interplea states no facts upon which the court could render a judgment ordering the return of said liquors."

The demurrer was sustained by the court, and the interpleader elected to stand upon the interplea. The court then dismissed the interplea and ordered the property confiscated, and costs thereof taxed to interpleader, to all of which exceptions were saved, and appeal taken to this court.

Counsel for plaintiff rely on two assignments of error, as follows:

demurrer of the defendant in error to the inter"First. That the court erred in sustaining the plea of said plaintiff in error.

"Second. That the court erred in rendering judgment against said interpleader and holding that said interplea did not state sufficient facts upon which said intervener was entitled to judg

ment."

Plaintiff's briefs were filed on the 19th day of November, 1915, and although more than 60 days have passed, for some reason, the defendant has failed to file answer briefs, or offer any reason or excuse for not doing so. This court has many times reiterated the rule that:

"When the defendant in error chooses not to aid this court with a brief, and the brief of the plaintiff in error appears reasonably to support the assignments of error, it is not the duty of this court to search the record with a view of ascertaining some possible theory on which the case may be affirmed." Taby v. McMurray, 30 Okl. 602, 120 Pac. 664.

[1] The language of the third paragraph of the plaintiff's interplea is, in substance:

"That at the time the 19 barrels were seized, they were in possession of the Frisco Railway Company, waiting to be transported from Keystone, Okl., to Joplin, Mo., and that the same was not in the possession of the railway company for the purpose of violating any law, but was held by said company for the sole and only purpose of such transportation as interstate commerce. That said railway company was operating a line of railroad engaged in interstate commerce, between the points named, and at the time the same was seized it was the property of the interpleader, and held by the railway company for no other purpose than that of transportation from the state of Oklahoma to the state of Missouri, and that said barrels

purpose of sale or any other unlawful or illegal term, 1911. No briefs have been filed for purpose." plaintiff in error; no counsel noted for defendants in error.

Section 3613, supra, provides especially for a hearing in such cases "to determine whether or not the property (liquor) so seized or any part thereof, was used in violation of this act. * * And if it appears that any property so seized was not kept, or used for an unlawful purpose, * the same shall be returned to its lawful owner." It would be difficult to make language more definite or certain. The interplea comes clearly within the statute, and under the demurrer the facts set out therein are admitted to be true. If true, if was a good defense, and, on proof of such facts, the property should have been released, or returned to the owner.

[2] The question of the sufficiency of the description of the place to be searched as set out in the complaint and warrant is also raised, but we cannot sustain that contention. We are of opinion that this particular statute should receive a somewhat broader and more liberal construction than the statutes in reference to common-law search warrants.

It appearing that the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the interplea, and in dismissing the same, the judgment should be reversed and remanded.

PER CURIAM. Adopted in whole.

SPAULDING MFG. CO. v. DILL et al.
(No. 1457.)

(Supreme Court of Oklahoma. May 14, 1912.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 22, 1914.)
(Syllabus by the Court.)
APPEAL AND ERROR 773-BRIEF-FAILURE
TO FILE COPIES-DISMISSAL.

Where plaintiff in error fails to comply with the rules of this court requiring him to serve a brief on counsel for defendant in error within 40 days after filing his petition in error, and at the same time to file 15 copies of his brief with the clerk of the court, his case, on being reached for submission, will be dismissed. Davis v. Elliott, 25 Okl. 433, 106 Pac. 838.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 3104, 3108-3110; Dec. Dig. 773.]

Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 2. Error from District Court, Pontotoc County; R. M. Rainey, Judge.

Action by the Spaulding Manufacturing Company, a partnership, against W. H. Dill and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Dismissed.

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Rule 7 of this court (38 Okl. vi, 137 Pac. ix) requires the plaintiff in error in each civil cause to serve his brief on counsel for defendant in error within 40 days after the petition in error has been filed, and at the same time file 15 copies of his brief with the clerk of the court. Although more than 11⁄2 years elapsed between the time of filing the petition in error and the time the cause was reached for submission, and although more than 6 months has elapsed since same was assigned for submission, the plaintiff in error has filed no brief in support of its assignments. By thus failing to comply with rule 7, ante, plaintiff is deemed to have waived its right to have its appeal heard in this court. Following Le Breton v. Swartzel, 14 Okl. 521, 78 Pac. 323, Walker et al. v. Hannewincle, 24 Okl. 152, 103 Pac. 585, and Davis v. Elliott, 25 Okl. 433, 106 Pac. 838, the appeal is dismissed.

It is so ordered.

PER CURIAM. Adopted in whole.

ROBINSON v. OKLAHOMA FIRE INS. CO. (No. 5997.)

(Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Jan. 25, 1916.) (Syllabus by the Court.)

1. BROKERS 63-COMMISSIONS-RIGHT OF

ACTION-CONTRACT-DAMAGES.

with a broker to procure a purchaser for the An owner of certain property contracted same, at a certain price, net to the owner, with the further agreement that the broker was to look to the purchaser for his commissions for such deal. The broker procured a purchaser able, willing, and ready to take over the property at the owner's price, and pay the broker's commissions, but the owner, without any fault of the broker or purchaser, failed to complete the contract. Held, that the broker could not recover on contract for commissions in an action against the owner of the property; and held, further, that the broker's remedy, if any, would be in an action against the owner of the property for damages for failure to comply with his contract to sell.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. §§ 79, 81, 94-96; Dec. Dig. 63.] 2. BROKERS 63, 82-ACTION FOR COMMISSION-JUDGMENT FOR DAMAGES.

Where the gravamen of the action is to recover commissions claimed to be due the plaintiff upon a contract to furnish the defendant a purchaser able, ready, and willing to purchase certain property, a judgment for damages for failure on the part of the vendor to comply with the contract of sale cannot be sustained.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Brokers, Cent. Dig. §§ 79, 81, 94-96, 101-103; Dec. Dig. 63, 82.]

3. ACTION 32 ABOLITION OF DISTINCTIONS OPERATION OF STATUTE.

While section 4650, Rev. Laws 1910, abolished the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, as well as the forms of all such actions and suits, and provided that there should

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

be but one form of civil action, it never intend- | 1912, said defendant undertook to negotiate reed to, and did not, abolish the distinction be- insurance on its Oklahoma and Texas fire intween an action for tort and an action on con- surance business, through one Alfred A. Moser, tract. of New York City, as broker, and on said day said Moser telegraphed defendant from New York City, in regard to such reinsurance as follows:

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Action, Cent. Dig. §§ 257-261, 316; Dec. Dig. 32.]

4. BROKERS 82-ACTION-VARIANCE-FAILURE OF PROOF.

When the cause of action alleged in the complaint is on contract and the proof shows it to be a cause for tort, it is not a variance, but a failure of proof.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, Cent. Dig. §§ 101-103; Dec. Dig. ing, Cent. Dig. § 1334.]

see Brokers,
82; Plead-

Commissioners' Opinion, Division No. 4. Error from District Court, Oklahoma County; Tom D. McKeown, Judge.

Action by George H. Robinson against the Oklahoma Fire Insurance Company, a corporation. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

"April 30, 1912.

"The Oklahoma Fire Insurance Company, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Officials here will not accept reinsurance proposition. If I can assist you will turn subject over to party well acquainted with market. Wire approximately unearned premiums Texas and Oklahoma; also number of agents each state and lowest commission. Alfred A. Moser.'

"The 'party' referred to by Moser in said telegram as the person to whom he would turn subject over' was this plaintiff, George H. Robinson; after receiving said telegram from Moser and on the same day, the defendant, acting by and through its manager, E. F. Tebbe, telegraphed Moser in answer as follows:

"Oklahoma City, Okla., Apl. 30, 1912. "Alfred A. Moser, 95 William St., New York. Texas approximately thirty-five thousand, OklaScothorn, Caldwell & McRill, of Oklahoma homa thirty-one thousand. Two hundred sixCity, for plaintiff in error. Burwell, Crock-ty-seven_agents Texas, two forty-seven, Oklaett & Johnson, of Oklahoma City, for de- homa. Ought to have thirty-five per cent. comE. F. Tebbe, fendant in error. "Mgr. Oklahoma Fire Ins. Co.' "Thereafter, on the following day, Moser telegraphed defendant in answer to the telegram last set forth, as follows. "May 1, 1912.

ROBBERTS, C. This case was brought in the district court of Oklahoma county by George H. Robinson against the Oklahoma Fire Insurance Company, a corporation, to recover $1,650, as broker's commission for having procured for said company a reinsurer for its Oklahoma and Texas business. The parties will be designated plaintiff and defendant herein, the same as below. It is conceded by all parties that the plaintiff procured the Citizens' Fire Insurance Company of Baltimore, which was satisfactory to defendant, and was ready, able, and willing to accept and take over said insurance on the terms agreed upon by the parties, which will fully appear herein. While the terms were agreed upon, the deal was not closed, because of the inability of the defendant to pay the reinsurance premiums.

The plaintiff's petition is a concise statement of his cause of action, the substance of which, with the pertinent parts of the correspondence attached thereto, composing the agreements between plaintiff and defendant, and also between the defendant and the Baltimore Company, is as follows:

The plaintiff, for his cause of action against the defendant, states:

"Said defendant now is, and at all times hereinafter mentioned was, a fire insurance corporation, organized under the laws of the state of Oklahoma.

"That during the months of April and May, 1912, one E. F. Tebbe was manager of defend ant, the Oklahoma Fire Insurance Company, and was then and at all times mentioned in this petition, duly authorized and empowered to act for and on behalf of defendant, in the matters hereinafter set forth; and was at all other times herein authorized and empowered by the defendant, to do the things which said defendant, acting through him, did, as hereinafter set forth; that on or about the 30th day of April,

mission.

"Mr. E. F. Tebbe, Oklahoma Fire Insurance Company, Oklahoma City, Okla. Telegram received, subject turned over to George H. Rob inson, well posted matter of this kind, commis sion rather high account conditions, but will do best possible; mail me promptly complete list agents. Alfred A. Moser.'

on

"Plaintiff further alleges that the matter of procuring reinsurance for defendant was said day turned over to and placed in the hands of plaintiff by said Alfred A. Moser, as stated in said telegram, and that, acting thereon, plaintiff undertook as broker to find and procure a responsible fire insurance company, ready, able, and willing to reinsure the defend ant's Oklahoma and Texas business, and that plaintiff undertook such employment as such broker for and on behalf of said defendant, on the basis of a 30 per cent. commission net to the defendant, plaintiff to receive for his services all that the reinsurer would pay over and above said 30 per cent. commission net to the defendant; that thereupon plaintiff procured a fire insurance company, ready, able, and willing business upon the basis of a commission of 32% to reinsure defendant's Oklahoma and Texas per cent., viz., the Citizens' Fire Insurance Company of Baltimore, Maryland, and immediately upon procuring said reinsurer, plaintiff communicated the fact to defendant by wire, as follows:

"New York, May 1, 1912.

46 'Day Letter.

Co. Oklahoma City, Okla. Acting on Mr. Mos"E. F. Tebbe, Manager, Oklahoma Fire Ins. er's instructions I have been able to secure for you an offer of thirty per cent. commission for your entire business. Company first class and not entered in states, but will do so at once and probably appoint special agents covering the official will come at once to examine business. two states. Wire if acceptable and company Answer night letter. Doubt if better commisGeo. H. Robinson.' sion can be secured.

"Thereafter, on the same day, defendant, acting through its manager, Tebbe, who was duly

authorized to act for defendant in the premises, telegraphed its acceptance of said offer, as follows:

""Oklahoma City, Okla., May 1st, 1912. "Geo. H. Robinson, No. 95 William Street, New York City. We will accept offer of thirty per cent. commission for our entire business, but must have quick action. Send company representative at once.

66

E. F. Tebbe. "Mgr. Oklahoma Fire Ins. Co.' "On May 2, 1912, plaintiff replied by telegram to defendant's telegram as follows:

"New York, May 2, 1912. ""Oklahoma Fire Insurance Company, Oklahoma City, Okla. Your night letter accepting thirty per cent. commission for your entire business is hereby acknowledged. Walter W. Alexander, Secretary, and A. D. Legg, Assistant Secretary, Citizens' Fire Insurance Company of Baltimore, will arrive Oklahoma City, five o'clock Saturday evening, prepared to go over business at once. Geo. H. Robinson.'

"On May 6, 1912, defendant telegraphed with reference to said reinsurance commission as follows:

Defendant answered as follows:

(1) "It admits that it is a corporation, as set forth in plaintiff's petition, and that E. F. Tebbe is its manager."

(2) "Denies each and every other allegation in the said petition contained."

At the conclusion of the plaintiff's testimony, the defendant lodged a demurrer to the evidence on the ground that it fails to prove the cause of action; the demurrer was sustained, motion for new trial overruled, judgment returned in favor of defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

Three assignments of error are presented, but they raise but one question, and that is, the action of the court in sustaining the demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence.

We gather from the entire record that the contract between the Oklahoma Fire Insurance Company, which for convenience we will designate the “Oklahoma Company," and the Citizens' Fire Insurance Company, of Baltimore, which we will designate as the "Baltimore Company," was, that the Oklahoma Company agreed to pay the Baltimore Com

"'Oklahoma City, Okla., May 6, 1912. "A. A. Moser, 95 William St., N. Y. City. We accepted offer of Citizens' of Baltimore thirty per cent. commission net to us. Robinson must get his commission from Citizens' of Bal-pany 100 cents on the dollar, for all unearned timore. See him for us and wire answer.

“‘Oklahoma Fire Insurance Co.'

"Thereafter, on the same day, Moser telegraphed defendant the following reply:

66

'May 6th, 1912. ""Oklahoma Fire Insurance Company, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Showed your telegram Robinson, he says thirty per cent. commission to you all right. A. A. Moser.'

"Plaintiff further alleges that in accordance with the agreement between defendant and plaintiff, as evidenced by the telegrams herein set forth, the said W. W. Alexander and A. D. Legg, acting for said Citizens' Fire Insurance Company came to Oklahoma City, and called upon defendant and between May 2, 1912, and May 10, 1912, examined defendant's Oklahoma and Texas business, and as a result of such examination, said Citizens' Fire Insurance Company then and there was ready, able, and willing to reinsure defendant's Oklahoma and Texas business on the basis of a commission of 321⁄2 per cent., thereby netting defendant a commission of 30 per cent., and entitling plaintiff to the surplus of 22 per cent. as broker's commission; that defendant's Texas business then amounted to $35,000 and its Oklahoma business to $31,000, making a total of $66,000, 22 per cent. of which amounts to $1,650.

premiums on policies issued by the latter, then in force and effect, in the states of Texas and Oklahoma, in consideration of which the Baltimore Company agreed to assume and carry the risk of said policies, and in effect hold the Oklahoma Company harmless from all liability on said risks (it was estimated that the unearned premiums would amount to approximately $80,000 to $70,000), and as a commission to cover the expense in securing the business the Baltimore Company agreed to pay back to the Oklahoma Company 30 per cent. of the amount to be paid by the Oklahoma Company to the Baltimore Company for such reinsurance; or, to make it shorter, and perhaps plainer, the Oklahoma Company was to deduct 30 per cent. out of the amount to be paid the Baltimore Company, as "commissions" for securing the original business. That is what is meant by the terms "commission" used by the parties, and no doubt, perfectly plain to them, as common parlance used in such business. It was agreed and understood, and so alleged in plaintiff's petition, and established by the proof, that the 30 per cent. "commission" was to be net or "clean" to the defendant, and that the Baltimore Company agreed to pay 22 per cent. of the amount of the unearned premiums, to the plaintiff, as commission or compensation for his services in consummating the deal. Quoting again from the petition, plaintiff states that he "Plaintiff further alleges and states that de- "undertook such employment as such broker fendant has at all times failed, neglected, and for and on behalf of the Oklahoma Fire In refused to pay plaintiff said indebtedness of $1,-surance Company, on the basis of 30 per cent 650 or any part thereof, although often requested so to do, all to plaintiff's damage in the sum of $1,650.

"Plaintiff further alleges that by reason of having procured for defendant, said Citizens' Fire Insurance Company, as such reinsurer, in accordance with the offer submitted by and through plaintiff and accepted by defendant, and by reason of the fact that said Citizens' Fire Insurance Company stood ready, able, and willing to effect a reinsurance of defendant's Oklahoma and Texas business in accordance with defendant's said broker's agreement with plaintiff, defendant thereby became and is indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $1,650.

"Plaintiff prays judgment against defendant for $1,650, with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent. per annum from this date, together with such other and further relief as it may be entitled to under the law and the facts."

commission, net to the defendant; the plain tiff to have and receive for his services all that the reinsurer would pay, over and above the 30 per cent. commission net to the defendant." Before the deal was closed the de

fendant wired to Moser:

"We accepted offer of Citizens' of Baltimore | fered an injury, and was damaged by reason thirty per cent. commission net to us. Robin- of the defendant's failure to comply with son must get his commission from Citizens', of the contract made by plaintiff with the Baltimore Company, at the defendant's instance, request, and authority.

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Baltimore. See him at once and answer us."
To this wire Moser replied on the same
day:

"Showed your telegram to Robinson; he says thirty per cent. commission to you all right." In further corroboration of the fact that there was no agreement on the part of defendant to pay plaintiff for his services, and that he was to look to the Baltimore Company for pay for his commissions, A. D. Legg, assistant secretary and agent of the Baltimore Company, in closing the deal in Oklahoma City, testified as follows:

C. 597, 19 S. E. 628, cited by counsel, seems The case of Atkinson et al. v. Pack, 114 N. to be clearly against the contentions of the plaintiff. As said before, the instant case is an action to recover a debt based upon contract, while the case cited by counsel, supra, is an action for damages for breach of contract. The headnotes of that case, as well as the opinion, plainly show that fact; they are as follows:

land for a person who agreed with him, in writ"A real estate broker negotiating a sale of ing, to convey it to the intending purchaser, from whom he was to receive his commission, may maintain an action for breach of contract upon refusal of such person to convey, upon showing that the purchaser was ready to take and pay therefor.

"Q. In reference to the 22 per cent. commission to be paid Mr. Robinson, will you state what arrangements was made for that? A. It was understood that this commission would be added to the commission we would pay for the business. Q. Will you state how much the Citizens' Fire Insurance Company was to pay Mr. Robinson? A. 22 per cent. of the unearned premiums. Q. And what was that compensa"In such case the measure of plaintiff's damtion to be for? A. Bringing about the reinsur-ages is the amount he would have received as ance deal. Q. Is that the customary commis- commission from the intending purchaser, had sion paid for reinsurance? A. Yes; it is the defendant complied with his contract." prevailing custom."

In the body of the opinion this is clearly plain-shown from the following language:

[1, 2] In the face of all these facts, tiff brought this action, as stated by counsel in their brief, "to recover $1,650 as broker's commission for having procured for defendant, Oklahoma Fire Insurance Company, a reinsurer of its Oklahoma and Texas business," and in his petition he alleges that defendant became indebted to him in that sum for securing the Baltimore Company able, ready, and willing to effect a reinsurance of defendant's business. All this shows that plaintiff was standing on and brought this action to recover on contract, when the entire record shows that there never was such a contract, either express or implied, between the parties.

The case of Ford v. Brown, 120 Cal. 551, 52 Pac. 817, appears to be in point, wherein

it is said:

"Real estate brokers agreed to sell property at a commission, to be paid when the property was sold or a purchaser was found. The brokers found a purchaser, and the owner authorized the sale at a net price to her, but, owing to a defect of title, the sale was not completed. Held, that under the arrangement of a net price to the owner the brokers contracted to get their commissions from the purchaser or the purchase money, and could not recover commissions of the owner when the sale was not completed."

So likewise in the case of Seattle Land Co. v. Day, 2 Wash. 451, 27 Pac. 74, the court says:

"Where a broker agrees to sell land upon condition that the owner shall first make $500 out of the sale, the broker to have the rest of the profit as his commission, he is not entitled to commission for merely finding a purchaser, where the sale to such purchaser falls through on account of a defect in the title."

Under the actual facts as they exist in the case, the plaintiff possibly might have had an action, sounding in tort, against the defend

"In the course of their business the plaintiffs negotiated with the defendant for the sale of agreed to be paid on a day certain, the plainthe property named to one Harding, at a price tiffs' commissions upon said sale to be paid by the purchaser, Harding. Every detail of the transaction seems to have been arranged, and upon the day set for the completion of the sale the plaintiffs, during business hours, notified the defendant that Harding was ready and willing to comply with the terms of sale; whereupdefendant declined to fulfill his contract. This on, without giving any valid reason therefor, action is brought, not to recover commissions out of defendant, for it was expressly stipulated that defendant was to receive $25,000 net for the land, and that plaintiffs must look to Harding for their commissions. But the action is brought to recover damages for the nonperformance of a contract, the evidence of which was in would sell the said land to Harding at the price writing, made with plaintiffs, that defendant stated. The defendant seems to admit that there was a breach of contract on his part with some one, but he contends that it was with Harding, and that the latter is the party responsible to plaintiffs for their commissions. But there were plainly two contracts made by plaintiffs-the one with defendant, the effect of which was that plaintiffs would provide a purchaser of the land at the agreed price, commissions to be paid by the purchaser; the other with the purchaser that he would pay the plaintiffs' commissions upon the conclusion of the parties had been brought together and had consale. If through the negotiation of plaintiffs the cluded the trade between them, the plaintiffs would have been entitled to their commissions terms of their contract. But this action is for from Harding, the purchaser, according to the damages. The gravamen of the charge is that defendant committed the wrong and injury upply with his contract with plaintiffs to sell the on plaintiffs by a refusal, without cause, to comland to plaintiffs' principal, with the distinct understanding that plaintiffs were to be compensated by the purchaser. The natural effect and consequence of this refusal by defendant was the loss by plaintiffs of their commissions; and, in arriving at the measure of damages, his

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