the insurer or pleaded as a defense.-Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 155 P. 524. 623 (Okl.) The limitation clause of an insurance policy issued in the Indian Territory held not a condition precedent to liability on the policy, but to merely fix a limitation of time within which suit could be commenced after death of insured, which could be waived by the insurer or pleaded as a defense.-Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 155 P. 524. (D) Forfeiture or Suspension. 755 (Colo.) Where the local camp clerk re ceived the ordinary assessment, though insured had entered a hazardous occupation which insurance did not cover, unless certificate was issued and additional assessments paid, held, that the insurer could defeat a claim for death resulting from the hazards of such occupation, no certificate having been issued.-Frain v. Modern Woodmen of America, 155 P. 330. (E) Beneficiaries and Benefits. A clause prohibiting waiver of any condition of the policy unless in writing, signed by an officer of the company, held not to refer to conduct of the company's general counsel, who by787 (Colo.) The death of a member of a fraternal insurance order held directly tracepromise of settlement induced claimant to deferable to hazards of an occupation as to which suit until expiration of the time limit pre- the by-laws provided the insurance should not scribed by the policy.-Id. apply, unless hazardous occupation certificate should be procured.-Frain v. Modern Woodmen of America, 155 P. 330. 646 (Cal.) Where execution and delivery of the accident policy were admitted, the burden was on defendant to sustain its contention that statements made by insured by way of warranty were false.-McEwen v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 155 P. 86. 654 (Cal.) Evidence that the hazard was less at a new location held admissible, where the insured asserted it was agreed that the goods were covered by the policy after removal, though there was no indorsement on the policy. -Steil v. Sun Ins. Office of London, 155 P. 72. 665(5) (Kan.) Evidence, in an action on an accident policy insuring against injuries from burning of building, held to show that insured's death was due to an explosion, and not to the burning of a building resulting therefrom.-L'Ecuyer v. Indemnity Life & Accident Co. of Minneapolis, Minn., 155 P. 1088. INTEREST. I. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES IN 15519(1) (Okl.) Interest cannot be recovered 669 (Kan.) In an action on a bond indemnifying an employer against loss from embezzlement by an employé, it is not error to instruct that one issue is whether the employé was guilty of embezzlement.-Kansas State Mut. Hail Ass'n v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 155 P. 13. 675 (Kan.) Under Gen. St. 1909, §§ 4262, 4263, the court in rendering judgment against a fire insurance company on a Kansas policy may allow a plaintiff a reasonable sum as attorney fee, though the policy relates to Oklahoma property.-Merriam Mortgage Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 155 P. 17. XX. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE. (B) The Contract in General. 719(1) (Kan.) A member's agreement to be bound by future amendments to the laws of a beneficiary society implies a reservation that the amendment shall be fair and reasonable. Uhl v. Life & Annuity Ass'n, 155 P. 926. Where the by-laws of a fraternal beneficiary society permit "necessary" changes, it is not essential that changes be indispensable in order to be necessary.-Id. Whether the changes made in the by-laws of a fraternal beneficiary society are reasonable is ordinarily a question of law, where the facts are not in controversy.-Id. Where a certificate provides that after a certain time it shall be nonforfeitable and that the INTERLINEATION. See Wills, 173. INTERLOCUTORY DECISIONS. See Appeal and Error, 870, 874. INTERMEDIATE COURTS. See Appeal and Error, 1095. INTERPLEADER. I. RIGHT TO INTERPLEADER. 13 (Idaho) Where a controversy arises as to the disposition to be made of bank stock and money placed in escrow, the depositary may sue to require the parties to interplead, and the court may permit him to turn the stock and money into court and thus be relieved from further responsibility.-First Nat. Bank of Wallace v. Callahan Mining Co., 155 P. 673. INTERSTATE COMMERCE. See Commerce. INTERVENTION. member shall be entitled to a paid-up certificate See Attachment, 291; Parties, 38. in proportion to payments made, a change in the laws of the society is unreasonable which denies him, unless he make further payments, INTESTACY. any benefit from his admitted present share of See Descent and Distribution. the accumulated reserve fund.-Id. 719(3) (Kan.) The rates of a fraternal beneficiary society, as fixed by a change in the bylaws, held not to be unreasonably high.-Uhl v. Life & Annuity Ass'n, 155 P. 926. INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See Fines, 12; Municipal Corporations, 111. intoxicating liquors, should not be construed to require that the liquor, property, or premises be described with that particularity required for common-law search warrants.-Milwaukee Beer Co. v. State, 155 P. 200. I. POWER TO CONTROL TRAFFIC. 10(2) (Idaho) Laws 1915, c. 97, § 2238k, amending Rev. Codes, § 2238, does not delegate to municipalities authority to prohibit by ordinance the possession of intoxicating liquors and to inflict a punishment for possession there-251 (Okl.) Under Rev. Laws 1910, § 3613, of.-State v. Frederic, 155 P. 977. held, that an interpleader in proceedings under a search warrant was entitled to a hearing on its interplea claiming liquor seized, and that it was error to dismiss such plea on demurrer.Milwaukee Beer Co. v. State, 155 P. 200. X. ABATEMENT AND INJUNCTION. (Idaho) A city police magistrate held without jurisdiction of the offense of unlawfully having possession of intoxicating liquors, except as a committing magistrate, notwithstanding an ordinance purporting to confer such jurisdiction; such ordinance being void.-State v. Frederic, 155 P. 977. VI. OFFENSES. 139 (Ariz.) It is not unlawful to introduce intoxicating liquors into the state for one's own personal use. Stansbury v. State, 155 P. 301. 139 (Ariz.) Defendant, who brought intoxicating liquors into the state for his personal use, was not guilty of unlawfully introducing such liquors.-Godfrey v. State, 155 P. 966. VIII. CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS. 198 (Idaho) In a prosecution for violation of a city ordinance, prohibiting the unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, held that the police magistrate should have held a preliminary examination under Rev. Codes, §§ 7565 7589, and, if warranted by the evidence, should have held defendant to answer to the district court.-State v. Frederic, 155 P. 977. A defendant, accused of having unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, held entitled to a preliminary examination, unless he had expressly waived his right thereto, before he could be lawfully placed on trial.-Id. 279 (Kan.) Evidence in a prosecution for contempt for violating an injunction against maintaining a liquor nuisance held, under Gen. St. 1909, §§ 4361, 4364, to sustain a finding that the liquor sold was intoxicating.-State v. Trione, 155 P. 29. tents of a bottle, to see if they were the same XII. RIGHTS OF PROPERTY AND 327 (Cal.App.) Under Pen. Code, § 435, Civ. Code, § 1668, sale of intoxicating liquors for saloon business to be carried on by persons, one of whom was not qualified to obtain license, held invalid.-Scheeline v. Pezzola, 155 P. 127. 329 (Cal.App.) Evidence that seller of intoxicating liquors knew one of the purchasers violate county ordinance by engaging in saloon was not qualified to obtain license and would business held erroneously excluded.-Scheeline v. Pezzola, 155 P. 127. INTOXICATION. 202 (Okl.Cr.App.) An information, charging that defendant had possession of intoxicating liquors, held demurrable, where it did not See Drunkards. allege an intent to violate the prohibitory law, or to sell, barter, give away and otherwise furnish such liquors.-Park v. State, 155 P. 494. IRRIGATION. See Waters and Water Courses, 247. ISLANDS. 213 (Kan.) Under Cr. Code, § 110, subd. 7 (Gen. St. 1909, § 6686), held that the fact that an information, charging maintenance of a liquor nuisance, described the building as a See Public Lands, 54. frame building on a certain location and the amended information described it as a concrete building on the same location did not authorize ISSUES. the amended information to be quashed.-State See Pleading, 376–381. v. Berger, 155 P. 40. 222 (Ariz.) An information for introducing JITNEYS. 661. intoxicating liquor into the state need not al- See Municipal Corporations, 230 (Kan.) Testimony of the officer as to JOINDER. the conditions which he found when he served See Action, 45, 48; Death, 42; Par the warrant held competent, though the information charging maintenance of a liquor nuisance was filed on the preceding day.-State v. Berger, 155 P. 40. 236 (Okl.Cr.App.) Evidence held to sustain a conviction of unlawfully conveying intoxicating liquor.-Browder v. State, 155 P. 198. ties, 32. JOINT LIABILITIES. See Set-Off and Counterclaim, 44. JOINT TENANCY. 236 (Okl.Cr.App.) Evidence held insufficient See Tenancy in Common. to sustain a conviction of violating the prohibi tory law.-Park v. State, 155 P. 494. 236(1) (Okl.Cr.App.) Evidence held to war JOURNALS. rant a conviction of unlawfully selling intoxi- See Statutes, 285. cating liquors.-Flowers v. State, 155 P. 904. 238 (Ariz.) In a prosecution for introducing | Trial, 321. JUDGES. liquor into the state, the question whether the See Justices of the Peace; Prohibition, 5; accused brought it into the state for his personal use is one of fact for the jury.-Stansbury v. State, 155 P. 301. IX. SEARCHES. SEIZURES, AND FOR- 249 (Okl.) Rev. Laws 1910, § 3612 et seq., relative to search warrants directing search for IV. DISQUALIFICATION TO ACT. of a bank in its behalf by virtue of Code Civ. 45 (Cal.App.) In an action by the cashier brother of the bank's director, was disqualified Proc. § 369, as trustee, the presiding judge, under Code Civ. Proc. § 170, providing that no judge related to an officer of a corporation | which is a party shall act.-Lynip v. Alturas School Dist. of Modoc County, 155 P. 109. A director of a bank is its officer within Code Civ. Proc. § 170, providing that no judge shall sit or act as such in any action when he is related to an officer of a corporation which is a party.-Id. 49 (Cal.) Erroneous rulings against a litigant, even when numerous and continuous, furnish no ground for a change of judge on account of bias or prejudice, to hear a motion for new trial, especially where they are subject to review.-McEwen v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 155 P. 86. A statement of the trial judge that he did not see how the jury could have reached the verdict returned for plaintiff held not to entitle plaintiff to a change of judge to hear motion for new trial. where it appeared that the statement was based on his conclusions from the testimony. -Id. That the judge's expression of dissatisfaction with the verdict was inconsistent with his previous act in refusing a directed verdict and submitting the case to the jury did not show bias or prejudice entitling plaintiff to a change of judge to hear the motion for new trial.-Id. 106 (Cal.App.) Where the complaint was, but the answer was not, verified, as required by Code Civ. Proc. § 446, plaintiff was entitled to a default judgment upon the answer being stricken, or to judgment for want of an answer in the absence of an order striking.-Johnson v. Dixon Farms Co., 155 P. 134. (B) Opening or Setting Aside Default. 136 (Cal.App.) Code Civ. Proc. § 473, providing for relief from a judgment suffered through mistake, inadvertence, etc., is best observed by disposing of causes upon their substantial merits, rather than with strict regard to technical rules of procedure.-McMunn v. Lehrke, 155 P. 473. 155 (Kan.) On filing a petition to open judgment, no new summons need be issued to a defendant who has permitted the judgment to be taken against him by default.-Wetmore State Bank v. Courter, 155 P. 27. 163 (Wash.) Where the affidavits to excuse a default were contested by plaintiff, denial of a motion to vacate, made eight months after the judgment was entered, was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion.-Hazeltine v. Rockey, 155 P. 1056. VI. ON TRIAL OF ISSUES. 49 (Mont.) Habeas corpus to release incompetent from guardian's custody is civil proceeding entitling respondent to disqualify judge for (A) Rendition, Form, and Requisites in bias and prejudice under provision therefor of Rev. Codes, § 6315.-State v. Clements, 155 P. 271. 51 (Cal.) A motion to strike from the trial judge's affidavit, as conclusions, statements disclaiming the bias and prejudice on which plaintiff sought a change of judge was properly denied.-McEwen v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 155 P. 86. Affidavit of judge disclaiming bias and prejudice held sufficient to overcome slight showing made by plaintiff to secure change of judge to hear defendant's motion for new trial.-Id. General. 199 (Wash.) Entry of formal recital of reception of verdict, as required by Rem. & Bal. Code, § 77, is not an entry of judgment under section 431, and does not bar judgment notwithstanding verdict.-Mattson v. Griffin Transfer Co., 155 P. 392. The trial court's jurisdiction after reception of verdict is not limited to granting new trial, but it may order judgment notwithstanding verdict.-Id. A motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict involves no discretion, and can be granted only when court can say there is neither evidence nor reasonable inference to sustain the verdict.-Id. 51 (Cal.App.) Under Code Civ. Proc. § 170, providing that the disqualification of a judge may be waived in writing, in an action by the cashier of a bank in its behalf, where defend-199 (Wash.) Entry of plaintiff's verdict in ants objected that the judge was disqualified as soon as it appeared on plaintiff's cross-examination, the objection did not come too late, nor did defendants waive their privilege to object.Lynip v. Alturas School Dist. of Modoc County, 155 P. 109. In an action by the cashier of a bank on its behalf, where it was objected, as soon as the fact appeared on plaintiff's cross-examination, that the judge was disqualified because he was a brother of a director of the bank and so related to an officer of a corporation which was a party, the objection to the motion for disqualification that it did not show the bank was a corporation should have been made.-Id. minute book, with recital of filing of defendant's motion non obstante, and that verdict was filed and judgment entered thereon, held not a judgment, where entry of decision on such motion in court's journal recited court had ordered entry of judgment to be held in abeyance pending decision on motion.-Frescoln v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co., 155 P. 395. Plaintiff's verdict against street car company supported by circumstantial evidence, though for death of husband thrown from car held throwing, so that it was error to render judgthere was no direct testimony of a negligent ment for defendant non obstante veredicto.-Id. 219 (Kan.) A journal entry reciting that the obligation sued on was contracted for erection of improvements on a home held to show a judgment that the homestead was not exempt under Const. art. 15, § 9, from sale for its payment.-Wichita Acetylene Mfg. Co. v. Haughton, 155 P. 1078. (B) Parties. 233 (Wash.) In contractor's action against subcontractors and surety, entry of judgment for lienors, with provision that plaintiff might pay it and have judgment against surety, held not erroneous, though new trial was otherwise granted.-Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. Guardian Casualty & Guaranty Co., 155 P. 771. (C) Conformity to Process, Pleadings, Proofs, and Verdict or Findings. 251 (Kan.) Where in a pedestrian's action for injuries from being struck by an automobile the jury found that the driver of the car was negligent in a particular not complained of in 1 the petition, the driver was entitled to judg- his remedy, held no bar, under Rev. Law 1910, ment.-Keck v. Jones, 155 P. 950. § 4662, to a subsequent action brought in proper form within one year.-Town of Cross v. De Roberts, 155 P. 496. 251 (Or.) A plaintiff can recover only on the ground of the negligence alleged in the complaint.-Bamford v. Van Emon Elevator Co., 155 P. 373. 256 (Okl.) Where the court makes the caption of the verdict part of his instructions, and it appears that the jury, by striking the name of one defendant from the caption and striking "s" from word "defendants," intended to find for him, it is error to disregard such intent in entering judgment.-St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Williams, 155 P. 249. IX. OPENING OR VACATING. 341 (Okl.) Courts of general jurisdiction have inherent power to set aside a judgment and grant a new trial for prejudicial error, at the same term at which the judgment is rendered.-Scanland v. Board of Com'rs of Ottawa County, 155 P. 898. 342(3) (Kan.) A judgment not void cannot be set aside on motion after expiration of the term, unless attacked in due time pursuant to some express statutory procedure.-Schultz v. Stiner, 155 P. 1073. 360 (Kan.) A judgment rendered on a note without determining whether any of the parties jointly and severally bound are sureties may be opened and modified to show who is principal and who is surety, on any of the grounds provided for opening and modifying judgments.-Emery v. Farmers' State Bank of Washington, 155 P. 34. 384 (Kan.) Where defendant incorporated nonjurisdictional grounds in a motion to set aside a judgment for defective service, he placed himself in the same position as though he had appeared at the trial.-Schultz v. Stiner, 155 P. 1073. X. EQUITABLE RELIEF. (A) Nature of Remedy and Grounds. 407 (Mont.) Grantor, having had opportunity for adversary trial to set aside default, under Rev. Codes, § 6589, in grantee's suit to establish forfeiture of reconveyance contract of property deeded to pay debt, held precluded from maintaining suit in equity to set aside decree for grantee.-Dunne v. Yund, 155 P. 273. 443 (Mont.) Grantor suffering default in action brought by grantee of property conveyed in payment of debt to establish forfeiture of reconveyance contract held not entitled to set aside decree for grantee on ground of grantee's fraudulent suppression of facts, resulting in such decree.-Dunne v. Yund, 155 P. 273. 447(1) (Idaho) A judgment decreeing foreclosure will not be set aside for fraud in its procurement where it has been held in a prior decision of the Supreme Court that the facts sought to be set up by defendant constitute no defense to the note and mortgage.-Anderson v. Coolin, 155 P. 677. XII. CONSTRUCTION AND OPERA- 526 (Mont.) A decree must be construed in the light of the pleadings.-Sharkey v. City of Butte, 155 P. 266. XIII. MERGER AND BAR OF CAUSES (A) Judgments Operative as Bar. 563 (Okl.) A judgment that plaintiff in an action on municipal warrants had misconceived 572(2) (Colo.) Under Code Civ. Proc. $$ 260-263, sustaining a demurrer to a petition to revive a judgment for its failure to state some necessary fact is not conclusive against the judgment as a claim against decedent.-Henry v. Thisler, 155 P. 1177. 576(1) (Colo.) The erroneous sustaining of a demurrer to a petition to revive a judgment under the statute of limitations is not conclusive against the judgment as a claim against decedent.-Henry v. Thisler, 155 P. 1177. 576 (Mont.) Where judgment on directed verdict recited that motion therefor was sustained, after hearing the evidence, specifically because the cause was barred by Rev. Codes, & 6447, subd. 3, limiting certain actions to three years, it was conclusive on that question, and the only remedy was by appeal, in the absence of which, whether erroneous or not, the judgment was a bar to another action on the same cause, under sections 7914, 7917.-Peterson v. City of Butte, 155 P. 265. (B) Causes of Action and Defenses Merged, Barred, or Concluded. 584 (Cal.App.) The denial of a party's application to the probate court for administration of an estate already administered and distributed bars his subsequent action to set aside the decree of the probate court, distributing the estate on the first administration.-O'Brien v. Reardon, 155 P. 534. 619 (Mont.) Where grantor of property deeded to pay debt, with reconveyance contract back, had full opportunity of adversary trial on issue whether transaction constituted mortgage in grantee's suit to declare contract forfeited, but suffered default, decree for grantee held, in spite of Rev. Codes, §§ 5715, 6861, conclusive, though court erroneously found transaction to be mortgage.-Dunne v. Yund, 155 P. 273. XIV. CONCLUSIVENESS OF ADJUDI CATION. (B) Persons Concluded. 698 (Wash.) Judgment recovered by indorsee of note held not res judicata in action by maker's executrix against payee, claimed to have agreed to cancel the note in consideration of stock transferred to him.-Johnson v. Carr, 155 P. 778. (C) Matters Concluded. 714(1) (Wash.) A finding of the court on appeal from an assessment that it was void is res judicata as to all matters concerning the first assessment, but not as to matters connected with a reassessment.-East Hoquiam Co. v. City of Hoquiam, 155 P. 754. A finding of a court on appeal from an assessment for public improvement that the benefits to the property were of specified value is conclusive as to benefits on appeal from a reassessment involving the same improvement. -Id. re 715 (Colo.) Former judgment that plaintiff had no right to office of assessor of the city and county of Denver, that defendant was the lawful assessor, and ousting plaintiff, never versed or superseded, was res adjudicata in his subsequent action to recover the salary paid to defendant as such officer.-Arnold v. Hilts, 155 P. 316. 720 (Kan.) Where, in an action on a note, the court has determined whether any of the parties jointly and severally bound are sureties, and no appeal has been taken, a party claiming to be surety is not entitled to have the question redetermined in another action.-Emery v. Farmers' State Bank of Washington, 155 P. 34. 735 (Cal.) Where accounting was not asked and findings laid no foundation therefor, judgment dissolving partnership and providing that plaintiff take nothing by his action held not to bar an action for an accounting.-Miller v. Kraus, 155 P. 838. 735 (Wash.) A judgment on appeal from assessment of a public improvement tax which attempts to impose a limit to the power to reassess other than the natural limit of cost proportioned to benefits conferred, is not binding on the court on appeal from the reassessment.East Hoquiam Co. v. City of Hoquiam, 155 P. XV. LIEN. 754. See Appeal and Error, ~736-764; New Trial, 344. 200; Criminal Law, 143; Trial, 779(1) (Kan.) While under Code Civ. Proc. § 416 (Gen. St. 1909, § 6011), judgments are liens on the realty of the judgment debtors, judgment lien holders are not bona fide purchasers, if purchasers at all, and their liens are only in lands in fact belonging to their debt-16(1) (Okl.) The court and not a jury tries ors. Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 155 P. 791. the issues of fact arising on a hearing of an application to strike the assignment of a judg 780 (Kan.) Where a judgment debtor has transferred his entire equitable estate in land to a third person before rendition of the judgment and retains merely the legal title, the judgment is not a lien on the land.-Emery v. Farmers' State Bank of Washington, 155 P. 34. A judgment lien attaches to no interest greater than that possessed by the judgment debtor when the judgment was entered.-Id. XVII. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS. 818 (Kan.) A Texas judgment reciting that a notice was duly iven and jurisdiction acquired held conclusive as against collateral attack.-Barnes v. Brownlee, 155 P. 962. XVIII. ASSIGNMENT. 842 (Okl.) The jurisdiction of a county court to strike an assignment of a judgment for fraud may be invoked by motion and notice.Leonard v. Ross, 155 P. 885. XX. PAYMENT, SATISFACTION, MERGER, AND DISCHARGE. 898(4) (Okl.) The jurisdiction of a county court to vacate a satisfaction of a judgment may be invoked by motion and notice.-Leonard v. Ross, 155 P. 885. XXI. ACTIONS ON JUDGMENTS. 929 (Okl.) Recovery cannot be had on the transcript of a foreign judgment entered on the confession of an attorney where it appears therefrom that the proceedings were not had according to Rev. Laws 1910, §§ 5132, 5134, and there is no proof that the laws of the other state were different from those of Oklahoma.- 949 (Or.) Under L. O. L. § 87, providing that in pleading a judgment of a court of special jurisdiction it may be stated to have been duly given or made in mandamus to compel a constable to serve an execution issued by the district court of the Portland district, existing under General Laws 1913, c. 355, where the petition did not recite facts giving such court jurisdiction, and did not use the statutory short form of statement, the writ could not issue.Canuto v. Weinberger, 155 P. 190. JUDICIAL NOTICE. See Evidence, 944. JUDICIAL POWER. See Constitutional Law, 70. II. RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY. ment and satisfaction thereof from the record. Leonard v. Ross, 155 P. 885. 19 (Cal.App.) One against whom proceedings are pending for commitment to state hospital as inebriate is not entitled to jury trial, and Pol. Code, § 2185c, as added by St. 1911, p. 396, authorizing commitment without such trial, is not unconstitutional.-Ex parte O'Connor, 155 P. 115. V. COMPETENCY OF JURORS, CHALLENGES, AND OBJECTIONS. jurors for implied bias are permitted other than 97(1) (Idaho) No challenges to individual those enumerated in Rev. Codes, § 7834.-State v. Scoble, 155 P. 969. That a juror in a criminal case had been summoned by the county coroner on an open venire and by the sheriff on a previous open venire, which had been quashed for implied bias of the sheriff held not ground for challenge of the individual juror for implied bias under Rev. Codes, § 7834.-Id. 103(14) (Okl.Cr.App.) Under Rev. Laws 1910, § 5861, held that, before the court could overrule a challenge to a juror for an opinion, it was essential that it be shown, not only that the opinion was founded solely on rumor, newspaper publications, or common notoriety, but that the juror swear that he felt able notwithstanding such opinion to form an impartial verdict.— Stone v. State, 155 P. 701. The refusal to sustain a challenge for cause will not be disturbed where it appears that the juror had merely heard neighborhood rumor and had no opinion other than that derived therefrom, and was positive he could disregard that opinion.-Id. 129 (Idaho) Under Rev. Codes, § 7820, where accused desires to challenge the jury panel for implied bias of the summoning officer, he must make his challenge in writing before any jurors are sworn.-State v. Scoble, 155 P. 969. a 133 (Okl.Cr.App.) The issue raised on challenge to a juror for cause, because he has formed or expressed an opinion founded on rumor, or newspaper publication, is one of mixed law and fact for the court.-Stone v. State, 155 P. 701. JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. JURISDICTION AND AU- 31 (Idaho) Under Const. art. 1, § 8, the jurisdiction of justices of the peace is limited to such cases as are, by statute, made cognizable by such courts.-State v. Frederic, 155 P. 977. |