mission of the crime of murder, charging them as the actual perpetrators of the crime; and by the statute to which I have referred, both classes of offence, namely, that of an accessary before the fact and that of a principal, may now be dealt with alike in the mode of indictment and trial; and proof of the party being either an accessary before the fact, the perpetrator of the crime, or that he was present aiding and abetting in the commission of it, will support an indictment charging him as a principal. If it should appear that a person knowingly invited another to a certain place in order that he might be murdered, and he be murdered accordingly, that would constitute such person an accessary before the fact in the murder; and with regard to the act of being present, aiding and abetting at the commission of the crime, it is not necessary to show that the person was actually standing by, within sight or hearing of the act; it is quite sufficient if he or she was near enough to lend assistance in any way to the commission of the offence, by keeping guard or watch at some convenient distance, or in any other similar manner." With respect to the law on the subject of the presumed coercion of a wife in cases of crime committed jointly by her and her hus band, see Greaves's edit. Russ. C. 541. 1849. REGINA v. MANNING. NOVEMBER SESSION, 1849. BEFORE MR. JUSTICE CRESSWELL. REGINA V. MARY DEWITT. Nov. 29th. FELONY. The prisoner was indicted for having felo- A woman went niously caused a false entry of a birth to be made in the register of births in the parish of St. Clement Danes, the county of Middlesex. in It appeared, that, on the 13th of November, 1489, the prisoner went, accompanied by another woman, to Mr. to a registrar of births and ask ed him to regis ter the birth of a child, she stated to him the necessary for the entry, and he made the entry accord ingly, and she signed it as the person giving the information. Every particular which she stated was false-Held, that this amounted to the felony of causing a false entry to be made, within the stat. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 86, s. 43, and was not merely the misdemeanor of making a false statement, under sect. 41 of that statute. VOL. II. NNN N. P. 1849. REGINA v. DEWITT. Jones, the registrar of births for St. Clement's parish, and asked him to register the birth of a child; and she then stated to him that the child was her own, and that she was the wife of William Daley, of No. 77, Ship-yard, and that the child was born on the 1st of November, 1849. It further appeared, that Mr. Jones had cautioned her as to the necessity of making a true statement in the matter; and as she persisted in the truth of her statement, he made the entry according to it, and she signed the entry as the person giving the information. It was proved that the entry was false in every particular, and that the child was, in truth, the child of the other woman. At the close of the case for the prosecution, Bodkin, for the Crown, referred to the 43rd section of the stat. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 86, which makes it a felony to cause a false entry to be inserted in a register of a birth, and submitted that the offence of the prisoner came within the provisions of that section, and that she was not merely guilty of the misdemeanor of making a false statement, under the 41st section of the statute. CRESSWELL, J.-I entertain no doubt that that is so. M. Prendergast, jun., for the prisoner, asked the learned Judge to reserve the case for the opinion of the Judges. CRESSWELL, J.-I will not reserve the point, but I will mention it to Baron Alderson. Verdict-Guilty. Nov. 30th. CRESSWELL, J.-I have conferred with Baron Alderson, and we are both of opinion that the offence of the prisoner The prisoner was sentenced to be impri- Bodkin and Clerk, for the Crown. M. Prendergast, jun., for the prisoner. [Attornies-Solicitors for the Treasury, and Oliver.] (a) See the case of Regina v. Mason, ante, p. 622. 1849. REGINA V. DEWITT. NORTHERN WINTER CIRCUIT, 1849. YORK ASSIZES. BEFORE MR. JUSTICE VAUGHAN WILLIAMS. POISONIN REGINA V. CLUDEROY. OISONING.-This was an indictment under the stat. A. administered 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 2, for administering poison to Ruth Horsefield, with intent to murder her. two cocculus indicus berries, entire in the pod, to a child, with intent to murder the The prisoner was proved to have administered to Ruth child. The Horsefield, a child nine weeks old, two cocculus indicus berries. The child, after having swallowed the berries, threw up one by vomiting, and the other passed through her body in the course of nature, and was found next day in her clothes. Two medical witnesses, called on the part of the prosecution, proved that the cocculus indicus berry is classed with narcotic poisons; that the poison consists in the pre kernel is a poison, the pod is not, and will the stomach; therefore harm not dissolve in the berries were less-Held, istering of poi son with intent to murder, with c. 85, s. 2. in the stat.1 Vict. 1849. REGINA V. CLUDEROY. sence of an alkaloid, which is extracted from the kernel; that all the noxious properties are in the kernel; that it has a very hard exterior or pod, to break which, much force is required. One of these witnesses added, that the berry, if the pod is broken, is calculated to produce death in an adult human subject, though he did not know how many of the berries would be required for the purpose; that he thought the poison contained in the kernels of two berries, if the pods were burst, and if retained on the stomach, might produce death in a child nine weeks old; but that the berry could not be digested by the child, and that it would pass through its body without the pod being burst, and so would be innocuous, (as had, in fact, happened in the present case). Overend, for the prisoner, objected, that the berries were not poison within the meaning of the statute; for that, though the kernel of the berries contained poison, yet the pod rendered the poison innocuous. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, J., overruled the objection, and left the whole case to the jury. Verdict-Guilty. The learned Judge directed judgment of death to be recorded, but stayed the execution, in order to submit the point raised by the prisoner's counsel to the consideration of the Judges. R. Hall, for the prosecution. Overend, for the prisoner. [Attornies-Markland, and Naylor.] 1850. REGINA EXCHEQUER CHAMBER. BEFORE WILDE, C. J., ALDERSON, B., WIGHTMAN, J., PLATT, B., Overend, for the prisoner. This indictment is founded on the stat. 1 Vict. c. 85, s. 2, which makes it a capital felony to administer to, or cause to be taken by, any person "any poison or other destructive thing," with intent to commit murder. The real question is, whether the berries, in the state in which they were administered, were "poison." ALDERSON, B.-Do you say that this is not poison? Suppose a person gave arsenic in a globule of glass. Overend. There is poison in it, no doubt, but it is poison in a box. Taylor, in his Medical Jurisprudence, defines poison to be that which is deleterious to the body. PLATT, B.-A narcotic poison does no injury to the body; it quiets the nerves and causes death. It is better not to depend on definitions in books, as they often are not applicable to every case. Overend. The words "other destructive thing," in this section of the statute, shews that a poison, to be within this section, must be a "destructive" thing. The language in the 6th section, as to attempting to procure abortion, is different. There the words are "any poison or other noxious thing." In the one case, it is essential that the thing should be destructive, in the other, it is sufficient if it be noxious. WILDE, C. J.-If a person gave poison in too small a dose, you would say that was not within the statute, as it could not be destructive. If you are right in so saying, persons v. CLUDEROY. Jan. 19th. |