1846.

REGINA

1.

JONES.

The case of Rex v. Cabbage (a) is different from the present, and the case of Rex v. Godfrey (b) is in point.

POLLOCK, C. B.-I think that the facts stated do amount to a larceny, but I will reserve the point, whether there was such an appropriation of the property by the prisoner as would constitute larceny.

The prisoner pleaded guilty, and having been on bail, she gave the same bail to appear at the next assizes to receive judgment, if called upon; and a case for the opinion of the Judges was to be drawn and settled by the counsel.

Case.

"The prisoner, Elizabeth Jones, pleaded guilty to an indictment, under the 1 Vict. c. 36, s. 28, for stealing, at Ross, from an officer of the Post-Office, a post letter, the property of the Postmaster-General. The prisoner had been cook in the employ of a Mrs. Garbett, of Upton Bishop, whose service she was about to leave, having herself given notice to do so, and was in treaty with a Mrs. Dangerfield, of Cheltenham, for a similar situation. Mrs. Dangerfield had consented to employ her if a satisfactory answer from Mrs. Garbett should be returned to a letter to be written for the purpose of making inquiries respecting her character. This letter, the subject of the present indictment, was written by Mrs. Dangerfield, directed to Mrs. Garbett, and posted at Cheltenham, and was from thence duly forwarded to the post-office at Ross. Mrs. Garbett, having found fault with the prisoner for allowing the friend of another servant to breakfast in the kitchen without her leave, discharged her from her service, and told her that a character would not be given to her. The

(a) R. & R. C. C. 292.

(b) 8 C. & P. 563.

day after her dismissal she went to the post-office at Ross, and there applied to the clerk on duty for a letter from Cheltenham addressed to Mrs. Garbett, stating that she was a servant in Mrs. Garbett's employ, and that Mrs. Garbett expected a letter from Cheltenham that morning, which she was to take; but, upon being informed that the one letter by itself could not be given, the prisoner took from the officer all the letters for Mr. and Mrs. Garbett, including that written by Mrs. Dangerfield, the subject of the present indictment, which she burnt, but delivered the others to the person who was in the habit of conveying the letters from the Ross Post-office to the inhabitants of Upton Bishop, and they reached Mr. and Mrs. Garbett in safety.

"The question for the opinion of the Judges is, whether the taking and destroying of the letter, under these circumstances, amounted to larceny."

1846.

REGINA

v.

JONES.

BEFORE LORD DENMAN, C. J.; TINDAL, C. J.; POLLOCK, C. B.;
PARKE, B.; PATTESON, J.; WILLIAMS, J.; COLTMAN, J.;
ROLFE, B.; CRESSWELL, J.; ERLE, J.; AND PLAtt, b.

Huddleston, for the prisoner.-This indictment is framed on the 28th sect. of the stat. 1 Vict. c. 36, which makes it a felony to "steal" a post letter; and sect. 40 of that statute allows the property to be laid in the PostmasterGeneral. The word "steal" in the statute makes it necessary that the offence should have all the requisites of a larceny, and all the authorities shew, either expressly or impliedly, that a lucri causâ is necessary. Mr. East, in his Pleas of the Crown (c), says, that " Lord Coke (d), and after him most others, have defined simple larceny to be the felonious and fraudulent taking and carrying away by any person of the mere personal goods of another, neither from the

(c) 2 East, P. C., c. 16, s. 2.

(d) 3 Inst., c. 4, p. 47.

1846.

REGINA

v.

JONES.

person nor by night from the house of the owner. Perhaps
it
may with as much propriety be defined at large to be the
wrongful or fraudulent taking and carrying away by any
person of the mere personal goods of another from any place,
with a felonious intent to convert them to his (the taker's)
own use, and make them his own property, without the con-
sent of the owner. Thus, Bracton (e) defines it to be 'con-
trectatio rei alienæ, fraudulenter, cum animo furandi, invito
illo domino cujus res illa fuerit;' and Mr. Justice Blackstone
says (f), that the taking must be felonious, that is, done
animo furandi, or, as the civil law expresses it, lucri causá.
On the debate in Pear's case (g), Eyre, B., defined larceny to
be the wrongful taking of goods, with intent to spoil the
owner of them, lucri causá;'" and Mr. East adds in a note (h),
"By the civil law, which seems to go further than the com-
mon law, furtum est contrectatio fraudulosa lucri faciendi
causá vel ipsius rei vel etiam usus ejus possessionisve” (i). The
other authorities do not quite bear out that part of the de-
finition of Mr. East which relates to the thief making the
goods his own property; but in Hammond's case (k), Mr.
Justice Grose, in delivering the opinion of the Judges, de-
fined larceny to be "the felonious taking of the property of
another without his consent and against his will, with intent
to convert it to the use of the taker." And, even in the case
of Rex v. Cabbage (1), where a horse was backed into a coal-
pit, it appeared to have been done for the advantage of one
the parties concerned, and not merely to injure the owner;
and, with respect to the lucri causâ, the criminal law com-
missioners, in their first report (m), say (n), that "several
decisions have proceeded upon the ground that a stealing
has been lucri causâ, but that a very vague and almost ridi-

(e) Bract., lib. 3, c. 32.
(f) 4 Bl. Com., c. 17.

(g) 2 Ea. P. C. 685.

(h) 2 Ea. P. C. 553.

(i) Just. Inst., lib. 4, tit. I.
(k) 2 Leach, 1089.

(1) R. & R. C. C. 292.

(m) Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, July 30, 1834.

(n) 1st Report p. 17.

culously extensive meaning might be assigned to the term lucrum; and they then advert to the cases of Rex v. Morfit (n) and Rex v. Cabbage (o).

TINDAL, C. J.-Do you confine "lucri causa" to pecuniary benefit?

Huddleston.-I take it to mean a substantial advantage to be measured by money.

POLLOCK, C. B.-If the prisoner had seen the letter in the post-office, and had thrown it into the fire there, would that be larceny?

Huddleston.-I apprehend not. In the cases of Rex v. Morfit (p) and Regina v. Handley (q), where servants had clandestinely taken corn to give to their master's horses, it was decided that it was done lucri causâ, because they diminished their own labour. So, in the case of Regina v. Richards (r), where the prisoner was charged with stealing an iron axletree, by melting it down with other iron for his master, for doing which he was paid by the ton, Lord Chief Justice Tindal left it to the jury to say whether the prisoner did it to convert the iron "to a purpose for his own profit." And in the case of Rex v. Blyton (s), tried in the year 1791, "where a person, having obtained the keys to an uninhabited house belonging to a gentleman to whom he was a domestic servant, entered it, and threw several articles of furniture into a river which ran near, in which they were destroyed, and the jury found that this was done in revenge for a supposed affront, and with no intention of converting the goods to his own use, the prisoner being tried for larceny, was, under the direction

1846.

REGINA

v.

JONES.

1846.

REGINA

v.

JONES.

of the Judge, acquitted. In the present case the prisoner merely intercepts a letter which she herself had caused to be written, and thus stops a matter which she herself had put in motion. In the case of Rex v. Godfrey (t), it was held, that, where a person from idle curiosity, either personal or political, opens a letter addressed to another person, and keeps the letter, this is no larceny, even though a part of his object might be to prevent the letter reaching its destination.

PATTESON, J.-Mr. Godfrey was in that case a bailee.

PARKE, B.-But he opened the parcel in which the letter was.

Huddleston.-He broke bulk. Another view of the case is, that Mrs. Dangerfield is the agent of the prisoner in making the inquiry; and a third view of the case is, that this was an obtaining of the letter by a false pretence, and not a larceny, as the letter was parted with entirely.

Bros, for the Crown.-If this conviction is to be supported, it can only be by the offence of the prisoner being a larceny; but the question of property is entirely disposed of by the 40th section of the stat. 1 Vict. c. 36, which allows the property to be laid in the PostmasterGeneral. With respect to the larceny, it appears that the prisoner gets this letter into her possession by a fraud, and if this was done animo furandi, I submit that it was a larceny.

POLLOCK, C. B.-If she had seen the letter in the postoffice, and had thrown it into the fire there, would that have been larceny?

Bros.--I apprehend that it would.

(t) 8 C. & P. 563.