apportioned as in the said report specified, all the estate, shares, right and interest of them, the said defendants, as such executors as aforesaid, of and in the said iron works, and the said late copartnership of Crawshay and Hall, and in the leases, farms, lands and buildings, wharf, machinery, etc."

VICE V. FLEMING.

(1 Younge & J. 227. Court of Exchequer, 1827.)

'Continuing liability of partner after conditional notice. The defendant, a part owner in a mine, told the plaintiff, who had supplied the mine on the credit of the firm, that he had sold his share to A and B, who for the future would be his paymasters, and that he, the defendant, would be no longer responsible. He had not in fact sold, but had made an executory contract for sale, which was not consummated. Plaintiff kept on furnishing goods to the mine. Held, that a partner may by absolute notice save his liability although he still continues a partner; but that this was not an absolute notice in terms, and its effect should have been left to the jury..

Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered; with the usual money counts.

Plea, general issue. At the trial before GASELEE, J., at the Cornwall assizes, it appeared from the evidence of the plaintiff, that the defendant was part owner, and managing director of the St. Agnes consolidated mine, in the month of February, 1824, and that his name appeared in the cash book, in which the names of the adventurers were regularly entered after the account of each month's expenditure, during the time within which the goods, for which the action was brought, were supplied The action was for goods furnished to the mine from the 10th of February to the month of June, 1825, the plaintiff having supplied the mine from the year 1824 to that time. It was proved, on behalf of the defendant, that before the 10th of February he had entered into a negotiation with two of his co-adventurers for the sale of his shares in the mine, and that in consequence an agree

1 Nolan v. Lovelock, 9 M. R. 360.

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ment of that date was drawn up and executed by the defendant and one of the vendees, but that the other had refused to complete his contract. Within a few days after that time the defendant met the plaintiff, and told hm that he had sold his share in the mine to Jones and Campbell, who for the future would be his paymasters, and that he, the plaintiff, would be no longer responsible. The defendant, shortly after this conversation, left the country where he had before been regularly resident as managing director. Upon these facts it was contended for the plaintiff that the notice was conditional, and that inasmuch as the defendant continued to be a partner, the agreement never having been completed, he remained liable and the plaintiff was entitled to a verdict. It was answered for the defendant that a partner may limit his responsibility which is presumptive only, by notice; and that therefore, conceding that the defend nt was a partner, he would not be liable for goods furnished after the notice had been given. The learned judge left it to the jury to say whether the notice had been given, telling them, at the same time, that a partner was liable even after the partnership had been dissolved, unless the party furnishing goods to the firm had notice of that fact. The jury found a verdict for the defendant, and leave was given by the learned judge to the counsel to move to enter a verdict for the plaintiff.

In Michaelmas ter.n, WILLIAMS, C. F. (with whom was HOLCOMBE), obtained a rule to show cause why the verdict should not be entered for the plaintiff, or a new trial granted.

COLERIDGE (with whom was WILDE, Sergt.) now showed

cause.

ALEXANDEB, C. B.-This question turns entirely upon the construction of the notice, which is, in effect, that the defendant had sold his interest in the mine to certain persons, who, for the future, would be liable for all supplies to the mine, and that he, the defendant, would on that account be no longe: responsible. It is el ar that the defendant might, by an absolute notice, have discharged himself from all future liability, whether he continued or ceased to be a partner; but this is a representation only that the security of other persons was to be

substituted in his stead. Then, what construction is to be put upon this notice? It should have been left to the jury, as was done in the case of Willis v. Dyson, (1 Stark. 164) to say whether it amounted to a notice that he would not be answerab'e for any goods subsequently supplied. I don't find that that question was left to the jury, but only whether or not the notice was given. Upon this ground I think the plaintiff entitled to a new trial. But as the operation of the notice is a question for the jury I do not see how the court can assume to itself their province and direct a verdict to be entered for the plaintiff. We may have a strong o, inion upon the subject but still it is a question for the jury and must be left to their consideration only.

GARROW, B.-I am of the same opinion. All the partners of a firm are liable for the debts contracted by that firm; but this responsibility may be limited by express notice by one that he will not be liable for the acts of his copartners. The question is whether the defendant has done that in this case. He states the then condition of the firm, and says a new order of things is about to take place, by which I shall be discharged from all future liability; not I will not be responsible, but, I have sold my share, and shall in consequence be discharged. If the notice had been of the f rmer description the plaintiff might have declined to supply the mine for the future, but when he is told that the responsibility of others is to be subst.tuted for that of the defendant he is induced to continue the supplies upon the credit of the supposed new partner, and as none such existed I think the defendant, so long as he remained a partner, was liable. This view of the case entitles the plaintiff to a new trial, but I do not see how we can enter a verdict for the plaintiff, the effect of the notice being a question for the jury.

HULLOCK, B.-There are two questions which should have been left to the jury in this case: first, whether the defendant had ceased to be a partner, with notice to the plaintiff; and secondly, if that question were found in the negative, whether the declaration amounted to an absolute notice that he would not be answerable for any goo s subsequently supplied. The learned judge told the jury that the defendant would be liable if the partnership had been dissolved with notice to the plaintiff, and left to them, as the only question,

whether the notice had been given; but the effect and purport of that notice was not submitted to their consideration. The notice in the case of Willis v. Dyson was much stronger than in the present, and yet in that case Lord Ellenborough left the effect of it as a question for the jury.

It is to be lamented that we have no power to enter a verdict for the plaintiff, and that the case must be again set down to trial; but it is a question for the jury, and we can do no more than grant a new trial.

Rule absolute for a new trial.

VICE V. LADY ANSON.

(7 Barnewall & C., 409; 1. Manning & R., 113; 1 Moody & M., 96; 3 Carrington & P., 19. King's Bench, 1827.)

Holder of share not ipso facto liable. Where, in an action for goods supplied for the purpose of working a mine, it appeared that the defendant had paid money for certain shares and received a certificate that she was a proprietor of those shares, and that she had acknowledged that she was a shareholder, but no assignment of any interest in the mine had been made to her: Held, that the action could not be maintained. 'Belief of interest explainable. The belief that a party is interested in a mine or the expression of that opinion do not conclude a party contrary to the fact.

Assumpsit for goods sold and delivered. Plea, non-assumpsit. At the trial before Lord Tenterden, C. J., at the London sittings after Trinity term, 1827, it appeared that the action was brought against the defendant, as one of the adventurers in a mining company, to recover the price of goods sold, and work and materials furnished by the plaintiff for the working of the mine. The plaintiff himself, when he furnished the goods, had no knowledge of Lady Anson as a shareholder; it appeared that she had spoken and written of herself, in private letters and society, as being one, but she never signed any deed. She had paid her deposits on her shares and had re. ceived certificates in the following form: "Wheal Concord Tin and Copper Mine Company, No. 133. These are to certify, that the Viscountess Dowager Anson is the proprietor of the share

'Merrick v. Peru Co., 3 M. R. 584.

or number 133, being one share of the Wheal Concord Mine, situate in the parish of St. Agnes, in the county of Cornwall, and that her name is duly registered in the act book of said mine, subject to the rules, regula ions and orders of the said company; and that the said Viscountess Dowager Anson, her executors, administrators and assigns, are entitled to the profits and advantages of such share. By order of the directors, as witness my hand, this 14th day of June, in the year of our Lord, 1882. Christopher Vaux, secretary to the said mine." The mine, at one time, before the proposal to form a company, had been in the hands of one Thomas; but it did not appear distinctly in what character he acted, or that any interest had been transferred from him to the company. The attorney-general for the

defendant, on these facts, contended that the defendant was not liable. He admitted that there was some evidence to show that at one time she considered herself liable; but though that might be prima facie evidence against her, it could not make her so, if, on the other facts she was not. She never became known as a partner, nor was she one in fact, for she never had an assignment made to her of the partnership property, nor did she sign any deed, so as to bring this within the case of Lawler v. Kershaw, 1 Moody & Malkin, 93. The utmost she can have is a right in equity to call for an assignment of the partnership property; but until that is made she has no interest, for the certificate gives her none and if she has none she is not a partner. Lord Tenterden, C. J., addressed the jury as follows, see, 1 Moody & Malkin, 99: "It is clear, n this case, that the plaintiff did not actually give credit to Lady Anson, and that she never held herself out to the world as a partner. If, therefore, she is chargeable, she can only be so on the ground that she is really interested; and no mistaken supposition of her own that she was so, would make her liable, unless it were communicated to the plaintiff, so as to mislead him. The partnership, if any, is not strictly a trading partnership; it is one formed for the purpose of working a mine, a species of real estate, and the plaintiff's claim is for labor and goods employed in working that mine. An interest in a real estate can only pass by certain formalities; and it is clear that the certificates are not sufficient to pass it, nor would the registration in the act book of the company, as mentioned in them, even if it were made, of which there is