tentions of the parties. The lawyer who forms his opinion. on the mere words without the context, goes only skin deep into the argument. (Touchstone, 87.)

We have seen what the difficulties in the way of parting this estate into severalty were, and that they were inherent and enduring. So long as the ore should last, the estate would be incapable of equal partition; and yet so long as these furnaces and forges should continue to manufacture iron, that ore would be wanted. They used words to obviate the difficulty. The remedy was commensurate with the evil. Experience had proved it possible for these tenants in common to supply the wants of their respective establishments by occupying, each his mine hole; and the fullest investigation had demonstrated that this was the nearest to a partition in severalty to which these hills could be brought, without "the greatest injustice to some of the parties." Just in that condition, therefore, shall the mine hills be left: "remain" is the word. How long, it is asked? I answer, as long as the "difficulties" remain. As long as the ore endures and continues to be wrought in these furnaces and forges. "Remain together, undivided," not for a day, or month, or year, so that at any of these intervals either party should be at liberty to sue out partition, and bring on the difficulties again, but these words meant that partition should not be sought whilst the difficulties, the convenience, and the interests of the parties as iron masters continued as they were. We see in these words, when taken in connection with the history of the case, a clear intention to exempt the mine hills from partition, and continue the participation of the parties in the manner experience had suggested and established. If the ore should fail, (a contingency which at that day may have been deemed probable,) or the manufacture of iron on the estate should cease, the agreement would have accomplished its mission, and the hills might then be parted. But, until the happening of one or the other of these events, they were to remain appurtenant to the rest of the estate as before. The stipulation about the Bingham tract is an example of a more temporary, as that about the water right is a more permanent, arrangement than this concerning the mine hills. The Bingharu tract was to remain undivided "for the present," indicat

ing a right to partition at any convenient time future. The water right was to remain to Curtis Grubb and Robert Cole. man, their heirs and assigns forever. This was assignment to them of the water right in fee. But the mine hills should remain undivided, not only for the present, but whilst existing circumstances continued; and yet not necessarily forever, for these circumstances might cease to exist.

That this is the true construction of the agreement may be very clearly inferred from the conduct of the parties and those claiming under them.

For more than sixty years they have used the mine hills ast appurtenant to their respective properties. They have invested large sums of money in purchases and improvements made on the faith of the relation established by this agreement. Their expensive and valuable furnaces and forgesvaluable because of their connection with this fountain of supply-will, if severed now, be left on their hands only to decay, and embarrassment and ruin will befall the productive industry in which they are engaged. Did they stake these important interests on the relations of a day? Did they understand that the connection of some of these establishments with the mine hills was to cease whenever the caprice or the interests of any co-tenant should dictate a demand for partition?

The construction of all contracts, whether sealed or simple, should be reasonable, and as near the minds and apparent intents of the parties as possible. Words are primarily the proper signs of their ideas; but, when the meaning of their words is disputed, what higher evidence of their intention can we obtain than their acts and conduct? These are a

practical interpretation of their agreement; and we should do violence, both to their intentions and their interests, if we failed to adopt that construction to which not only their words but their acts so unequivocally point.

The interpretation of the writing being such as we have expressed, it is next to be observed that the parties made it part of a judgment in partition.

By the agreement of 6th May, 1786, amicable actions of partition were to be entered in Lancaster and Dauphin counties, and partition was to be decreed agreeably to the report

of the persons appointed to make partition; and that report was to be binding and conclusive on all parties to the agreement, and no "obstructions, either in court or elsewhere, were to be made by any of the said parties, to the carrying of said report into full and complete effect, and making the said partition perfect and comformable thereto." These provisions were carried into the agreement of 30th August, 1787, by the words, "and it is further agreed that the article in the former agreement respecting the entry of amicable action in case and partition, and the report of the persons before appointed, and process and proceedings therein, shall be fully adopted according to the true intent and meaning of this agreement."

The persons named in these two agreements proceeded to make partition by assigning Cornwall Furnace and certain designated tracts of land to Curtis Grubb and Robert Coleman, three undivided fourths to the former and one to the latter; Union Forge situated on Swatara Creek, with a contiguous tract of land, to Curtis Grubb; two certain houses and lots of land in the town of Lebanon to Robert Coleman; Hopewell Forges with certain designated tracts of land, to Burd Grubb and Henry Bates Grubb; and, for equality of partition, they awarded certain sums of money to be paid among the parties, and then added the following: "And we do further report that the tract of land called Bingham's place, at Conewaga, together with a small tract of fifty acres of land adjoining thereto, and also the ore banks and mine hills of Cornwall Furnace, do still remain undivided, to be held by the said Curtis Grubb, Robert Coleman, Burd Grubb, and Henry Bates Grubb, as tenants in common, according to their respective shares and to the covenants and articles in the said agreement hereinafter recited contained." This report, so made, was confirmed in the Courts of Common Pleas of Lancaster and Dauphin Counties, (then including Lebanon) on the day of November,

1787, and partition in said action was fully executed, and the parties entered upon the purparts respectively assigned to them, which they and those claiming under them have continued to hold ever since.

Thus the agreement of 1787 became the judgment of a court of record. These titles afterward, by sundry conveyances,

VOL. XI-13

united in Robert Coleman and Henry B. Grubb, who, on 30th November, 1802, entered into an agreement for the amicable partition of Mount Hope Furnace and Hopewell Forges; but "the ore banks," said the agreement, "shall be excluded from said partition, and shall not be taken into consideration by said inquest." By this partition, Hopewell Forges and 2,311 acres of land were allotted to Henry Bates Grubb. The ore banks and mine hills continued to be used as appurtenant to these properties.

Robert Coleman made his will on the 3d March, 1822, and died 3d September, 1825. He devised Cornwall Furnace, Elizabeth Furnace and Hopewell Forge, and all his right, title and interest in the ore banks and mine hills, to his three sons, William, James, and Edward.

By virtue of conveyances, descents cast, and actions of partition, Elizabeth Furnace, with its appurtenances, became vested in the plaintiffs below, defendants in error, Robert Coleman and George Dawson Coleman; Cornwall Furnace, with its appurtenances, in Robert W. Coleman; Colebrook Furnace, with its appurtenances, in William Coleman; and Mount Hope Furnace, with its appurtenances, in Edward B. and Clement B. Grubb, defendants below and plaintiffs in error. All these establishments continued to be used for the manufacture of iron.

The incorporeal hereditament reserved in the deed of 9th May, 1786, from Peter Grubb to Robert Coleman, became vested in Henry P. Robeson and Clement Brooke; and they use it to supply Reading Furnace with ore.

The parties before us, it is thus seen, derive their titles through that judgment in partition in 1787 which was “according to the covenants and agreements" of 30th August, 1787. The covenant of 1787 was inwrought into the titles of the parties by the judgment of the law, whose decree was, that the partition thus made should remain firm and stable forever. That decree is conclusive until reversed or set aside. If mistake or fraud be committed in n aking up a record, it can neither be averred nor proved in a collateral proceeding, nor in an action founded on it. The record must be received as absolute verity, and speak for itself. If wrong, the only mode of having it corrected or set right is by an application to the court where the judgment was had, of which the rec

ord is a memorial. In no other manner can a party ora privy to the judgment be relieved, as I apprehend, in any case: Morrs v. Galbraith, 8 Watts, 168; Hoffman v. Coster, 2 Whar. 474.

A covenant, founded in sound reason and experienced necessities, bound the parties to hold the mine hills together, for the use of the whole estate. A decree of a court of justice in partition recognized and incorporated that covenant. As between the parties, the continuance of the mine hills in common became a consideration for submitting to the partition of the rest of the estate. The implied warranty which attends partition attached here, and if now all that was done is to be overthrown as to the mine hills, it must necessarily destroy the whole of that partition: Feather v. Strohoecker, 3 Penn. R. 506.

If these parties are not to hold the mine hills as tenants in common, then they no longer hold their respective parts of the rest of the estate as tenants in severalty. But if they hold these parts in severalty by virtue of a record unimpeachable collaterally, then by the same record they are to hold the mine hills in common. That record is as sure for the one purpose as the other. And the decree fixed the mode of enjoyment, as well as the tenancy in common. Each party was to occupy his appropriate mine hole. Insurmountable difficulties being found in the way of dividing this part of your estate, we obviate them by decreeing that you hold it in common, as appurtenant to each of your estates in severalty, and that you use each his proper mine hole. The ore taken by each can then be estimated, and equity will compel an account among you for the adjustment of balances. Such, in effect, was the language which the decree of the court addressed to the tenants in 1787, and has ever since sounded in the ears of their successors. That voice is as potential now as it was then, and these parties are as much bound to heed it as their ancestors were, for it is the voice of the law, echoing only the terms of the covenant under which they hold their estates.

This was, in effect, The soil was valueless.

tition of the profits of the mine hills. The ore was the object to be secured and this was indivisible into equal parts. The law did not enable one tenant to compel a sale, and

there was the out