the militia to "repel invasions." Thus endowed, in an ample manner, with the warmaking power, the corresponding duty is required that "the United States shall protect each of them (the states) against invasion." Now, how is it possible to afford this protection to California and our Pacific possessions, except by means of a military road through the territories of the United States, over which men and munitions of war may be speedily transported from the Atlantic States to meet and to repel the invader? In the event of a war with a naval power much stronger than our own, we should then have no other available access to the Pacific coast; because such a power would instantly close the route across the Isthmus of Central America. It is impossible to conceive that, whilst the Constitution has expressly required Congress to defend all the states, it should yet deny to them, by any fair construction, the only possible means by which one of these states can be defended. Besides, the government, ever since its origin, has been in the constant practice of constructing military roads. It might also be wise to consider whether the love for the Union which now animates our fellow-citizens on the Pacific coast may not be impaired by our neglect or refusal to provide for them, in their remote and isolated condition, the only means by which the power of the states, on this side of the Rocky Mountains, can reach them in sufficient time to "protect" them “against invasion." I forbear for the present from expressing an opinion as to the wisest and most economical mode in which the government can lend its aid in accomplishing this great and necessary work. I believe that many of the difficulties in the way which now appear formidable will, in a great degree, vanish as soon as the nearest and best route shall have been satisfactorily ascertained.

It is our glory that, whilst other nations have extended their dominions by the sword, we have never acquired any territory except by fair purchase, or, as in the case of Texas, by the voluntary determination of a brave, kindred, and independent people to blend their destinies with our own. Even our acquisitions from Mexico form no exception. Unwilling to take advantage of the fortune of war against a sister republic, we purchased these possessions, under the treaty of peace, for a sum which was considered at the time a fair equivalent. Our past history forbids that we shall in the future acquire terri tory unless this be sanctioned by the laws of justice and honor. Acting on this principle, no nation will have a right to interfere or to complain if, in the progress of events, we shall still further extend our possessions. Hitherto, in all our acquisitions, the people, under the protection of the American flag, have enjoyed civil and religious liberty, as well as equal and just laws, and have been contented, prosperous, and happy. Their trade with the rest of the world has rapidly increased; and thus every commercial nation has shared largely in their successful progress.

I shall now proceed to take the oath prescribed by the Constitution, whilst humbly invoking the blessing of Divine Providence on this great people.

Buffalo and Utica Conventions of 1848.

THE Utica Convention met on the 28th of June, 1848, the Hon. Sam. Young, president, Gilbert Dean, Esq., of Dutchess Co., N. Y., secretary. The credentials of the Barnburner delegation were returned. Messrs. Martin Grover, Preston King, B. F. Butler, and John Van Buren spoke. D. D. Field, Esq., read a letter from Martin Van Buren, taking ground against the action of the Baltimore Convention.

Wisconsin, was nominated for Vice President. Speeches were then made by Messrs. Rathbun, Nye, and Young. The resolutions adopted, assumed it to be the right and duty of Congress to expel slavery from the territories, and declared "domestic slavery a great moral, social, and political evil," and a "relic of barbarism."

It may be proper that, on this occasion, I should make some brief remarks in regard to our rights and duties as a member of the great family of nations. In our intercourse Simeon B. Jewett, Esq., of Monroe Co., moved with them there are some plain principles, the unanimous nomination of Martin Van approved by our own experience, from which Buren by acclamation for President, which we should never depart. We ought to culti-was carried with cheering. Henry Dodge of vate peace, commerce, and friendship with all nations, and this not merely as the best means of promoting our own material interests, but in a spirit of Christian benevolence towards our fellow men, wherever their lot may be cast. Our diplomacy should be direct and frank, neither seeking to obtain more nor accepting less than is our due. We ought to cherish a sacred regard for the independence of all nations, and never attempt to interfere in the domestic concerns of any, unless this shall be imperatively required by the great law of self-preservation. To avoid entangling alliances has been a maxim of our policy ever since the days of Washington, and its wisdom no one will attempt to dispute. In short, we ought to do justice, in a kindly spirit, to all nations, and require justice from them in

return.

The address reported by Mr. Butler was a strong Free-Soil one.

Senator Dodge wrote an immediate letter, declining the candidacy of Vice President. In order to fill this vacancy on their ticket, and extend the Free-Soil movement in other states, a "Convention of Free States" was called to meet at Buffalo on the 9th of August, 1848.

The Buffalo Convention met, all the non slaveholding states being represented, that is, having citizens upon the ground. Charles

"Resolved, That, in the judgment of this convention, Congress has no more power to make a slave than to make a king; no more power to institute or establish slavery than to institute or establish a monarchy; no such Whereas, The political conventions re- power can be found among those specifically cently assembled at Baltimore and Philadel-conferred by the Constitution, or derived by phia, the one stifling the voice of a great just implication from them.

constituency entitled to be heard in its delibe- "Resolved, That it is the duty of the federal rations, and the other abandoning its dis-government to relieve itself from all responsitinctive principles for mere availability, have dissolved the national party organization heretofore existing, by nominating for the chief magistracy of the United States, under slaveholding dictation, candidates, neither of whom can be supported by the opponents of slavery extension without a sacrifice of consistency, duty, and self-respect; and

"Resolved, That the true, and, in the judg ment of this convention, the only safe means of preventing the extension of slavery into Whereas, These nominations, so made, territory now free, is to prohibit its existence furnish the occasion and demonstrate the ne-in all such territory by an act of Congress. cessity of the union of the people under the banner of free Democracy, in a solemn and formal declaration of their independence of the slave power, and of their fixed determination to rescue the federal government from its control:

States, that we should also declare ourselves | great struggle that preceded the political on certain other questions of national policy; revolution of 1801, which brought Mr. Jeffertherefore,

FORT HILL ADDRESS OF JULY 26, 1831. THE question of the relation which the states and general government bear to each other, is not one of recent origin. From the commencement of our system, it has divided public sentiment. Even in the convention, while the Constitution was struggling into existence, there were two parties, as to what I am not ignorant that those opposed to the this relation should be, whose different senti- doctrine have always, now and formerly, rements constituted no small impediment in garded it in a very different light, as anarchical forming that instrument. After the general and revolutionary. Could I believe such in government went into operation, experience fact to be its tendency, to me it would be no soon proved that the question had not termi- recommendation. I yield to none, I trust, in nated with the labors of the convention. The a deep and sincere attachment to our political

government is vested in a majority, than where it is in a single or a few individuals; in a republic, than a monarchy or aristocracy. No one can have a higher respect for the maxim that the majority ought to govern than I have, taken in its proper sense, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Constitution, and confined to subjects in which every portion of the community have similar interests; but it is a great error to suppose, as many do, that the right of a majority to govern is a natural and not a conventional right; and, therefore, absolute and unlimited. By nature every individual has the right to govern himself; and governments, whether founded on majorities or minorities, must derive their right from the assent, expressed or implied, of the governed, and be subject to such limitations as they may impose. Where the interests are the same, that is, where the laws that may benefit one will benefit all, or the reverse, it is just and proper to place them under the control of the majority; but where they are dissimilar, so that the law that may benefit one portion may be ruinous to another, it would be, on the contrary, unjust and absurd to subject them to its will: and such I conceive to be the theory on which our Constitution rests.

institutions, and the union of these states. Iremark is correct, nor is it less true where the never breathed an opposite sentiment; but, on the contrary, I have ever considered them the great instruments of preserving our liberty, and promoting the happiness of ourselves and our posterity; and next to these, I have ever held them most dear. Nearly half my life has passed in the service of the Union, and whatever public reputation I have acquired, is indissolubly identified with it. To be too national has, indeed, been considered, by many, even of my friends, to be my greatest political fault. With these strong feelings of attachment, I have examined, with the utmost care, the bearing of the doctrine in question; and so far from anarchical or revolutionary, I solemnly believe it to be the only solid foundation of our system, and of the Union itself, and that the opposite doctrine, which denies to the states the right of protecting their reserved powers, and which would vest in the general government (it matters not through what department) the right of determining exclusively and finally the powers delegated to it, is incompatible with the sovereignty of the states, and of the Constitution itself, considered as the basis of a Federal Union. As strong as this language is, it is not stronger than that used by the illustrious Jefferson, who said, to give to the general government the final and exclusive right to judge of its powers, is to make "its discretion and not the Constitution the measure of its powers ;" and that "in all cases of compact between parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the operation, as of the mode and measure of redress." Language cannot be more explicit; nor can higher authority be adduced.

That different opinions are entertained on this subject, I consider but as an additional evidence of the great diversity of the human intellect. Had not able, experienced, and patriotic individuals, for whom I have the highest respect, taken different views, I would have thought the right too clear to admit of doubt; but I am taught by this, as well as by many similar instances, to treat with deference opinions differing from my own. The error may possibly be with me; but, if so, I can only say, that after the most mature and conscientious examination, I have not been able to detect it. But with all proper deference, I must think that theirs is the error, who deny what seems to be an essential attribute of the conceded sovereignty of the states; and who attribute to the general government a right utterly incompatible with what all acknowledge to be its limited and restricted character; an error originating principally, as I must think, in not duly reflecting on the nature of our institutions, and on what constitutes the only rational object of all political constitu

tions.

It has been well said by one of the most sagacious men of antiquity, that the object of a constitution is to restrain the government, as that of laws is to restrain individuals. The

That such dissimilarity of interests may exist it is impossible to doubt. They are to be found in every community, in a greater or less degree, however small or homogeneous, and they constitute, everywhere, the great difficulty of forming and preserving free institutions. To guard against the unequal action of the laws, when applied to dissimilar and opposing interests, is in fact what mainly renders a constitution indispensable; to overlook which in reasoning on our Constitution, would be to omit the principal element by which to determine its character. Were there no contrariety of interests, nothing would be more simple and easy than to form and preserve free institutions. The right of suffrage alone would be a sufficient guarantee. It is the conflict of opposing interests which renders it the most difficult work of man.

Where the diversity of interests exists in separate and distinct classes of the community, as is the case in England, and was formerly the case in Sparta, Rome, and most of the free states of antiquity, the rational constitutional provision is, that each should be represented in the government as a separate estate, with a distinct voice, and a negative on the acts of its co-estates, in order to check their encroachments. In England the consti, tution has assumed expressly this form, while in the governments of Sparta and Rome the same thing was effected, under different but not much less efficacious forms. The perfection of their organization, in this particular, was that which gave to the constitutions of these renowned states all of their celebrity, which secured their liberty for so many centuries, and raised them to so great a height

of power and prosperity. Indeed, a constitutional provision giving to the great and separate interests of the community the right of self-protection, must appear to those who will duly reflect on the subject, not less essential to the preservation of liberty than the right of suffrage itself. They in fact have a common object, to effect which the one is as necessary as the other-to secure responsibility; that is, that those who make and execute the laws should be accountable to those on whom the laws in reality operate; the only solid and durable foundation of liberty. If without the right of suffrage our rulers would oppress us, so without the right of self-protection, the major would equally oppress the minor interests of the community. The absence of the former would make the governed the slaves of the rulers, and of the latter the feebler interests the victim of the stronger. Happily for us we have no artificial and separate classes of society. We have wisely exploded all such distinctions; but we are not, on that account, exempt from all contrariety of interests, as the present distracted and dangerous condition of our country unfortunately but too clearly proves. With us they are almost exclusively geographical, resulting mainly from difference of climate, soil, situation, industry, and production, but are not, therefore, less necessary to be protected by an adequate constitutional provision than where the distinct interests exist in separate classes. The necessity is, in truth, greater, as such separate and dissimilar geographical interests are more liable to come into conflict, and more dangerous when in that state than those of any other description; so much so, that ours is the first instance on record where they have not formed in an extensive territory separate and independent communities, or subjected the whole to despotic sway. That such may not be our unhappy fate also, must be the sincere prayer of every lover of his country.

left under the control of the states separately, to whose custody only they could be safely confided. This distribution of power, settled solemnly by a constitutional compact, to which all of the states are parties, constitutes the peculiar character and excellence of our political system. It is truly and emphatically American, without example or parallel.

To realize its perfection, we must view the general government and the states as a whole, each in its proper sphere, sovereign and independent; each perfectly adapted to their respective objects; the states acting separately, representing and protecting the local and peculiar interests; acting jointly, through one general government, with the weight respectively assigned to each by the Constitution, representing and protecting the interest of the whole, and thus perfecting, by an admirable but simple arrangement, the great principle of representation and responsibility, without which no government can be free or just. To preserve this sacred distribution as originally settled, by coercing each to move in its prescribed orb, is the great and difficult problem, on the solution of which the duration of our Constitution, of our Union, and, in all probability our liberty, depends. How is this to be effected?

The question is new when applied to our peculiar political organization, where the separate and conflicting interests of society are represented by distinct but connected governments; but is in reality an old question under a new form, long since perfectly solved. Whenever separate and dissimilar interests have been separately represented in any government; whenever the sovereign power has been divided in its exercise, the experience and wisdom of ages have devised but one mode by which such political organization can be preserved; the mode adopted in England, and by all governments, ancient or modern, blessed with constitutions deserving to be called free; to So numerous and diversified are the inte- give to each co-estate the right to judge of its rests of our country, that they could not be powers, with a negative or veto on the acts of fairly represented in a single government, the others, in order to protect against enorganized so as to give to each great and lead-croachments the interests it particularly repreing interest a separate and distinct voice, as in governments to which I have referred. A plan was adopted better suited to our situation, but perfectly novel in its character. The powers of the government were divided, not as heretofore, in reference to classes, but geographically. One general government was formed for the whole, to which was delegated all of the powers supposed to be necessary to regulate the interests common to all of the states, leaving others subject to the separate control of the states, being from their local and peculiar character such that they could not be subject to the will of the majority of the whole Union, without the certain hazard of injustice and oppression. It was thus that the interests of the whole were subjected, as they ought to be, to the will of the whole, while the peculiar and local interests were

sents; a principle which all of our constitutions recognise in the distribution of power among their respective departments, as essential to maintain the independence of each, but which, to all who will duly reflect on the subject, must appear far more essential, for the same object, in that great and fundamental distribution of powers between the states and general government. So essential is the principle, that to withhold the right from either, where the sovereign power is divided, is, in fact, to annul the division itself, and to consolidate in the one left in the exclusive possession of the right, all of the powers of the government; for it is not possible to distinguish practically between a government having all power, and one having the right to take what powers it pleases. Nor does it in the least vary the principle, whether the dis