judgment is no bar to the present action. I also agree that it is not sufficiently shewn by the plea that, by the law of the colony, such a judgment was binding on the Defendant.

Judgment for the Plaintiff on the fifth plea.

Jan. 26.

In an action THIS

for false imprisonment the Court

allowed Defendant to

plead - 1.

CURRIE V. ALMOND.

HIS was an action of trespass, for subjecting the Plaintiff to a false imprisonment, on a charge of having committed an offence, to wit, a felony.

The Defendant pleaded, in the first instance, that he had apprehended the Plaintiff, having reasonable cause that Plaintiff to believe he had forged the acceptance of a bill of had forged exchange. But

the acceptance

of a bill of

exchange; 2. that he

had issued an acceptance

Jervis obtained a rule nisi to withdraw this plea, and plead instead, four pleas.

1. That the Plaintiff had forged the acceptance of

knowing it to a bill of exchange.

be forged;

3. that de

fendant had

reasonable

2. That he had issued a forged acceptance, knowing it to be forged.

3. That the Defendant had reasonable cause to bebelieve Plain- lieve the Plaintiff had forged the acceptance.

cause to

tiff had forged

the acceptance; 4. that Plaintiff had obtained

money on the bill by false pretences;

the Plaintiff

refusing

4. That the Plaintiff had obtained money on the bill by false pretences.

Henderson, who shewed cause, contended that the Defendant ought to be confined to the plea he had pleaded in the first instance, which contained the charge on which he had actually apprehended the Plaintiff:

to allow the circumstances to be given in evidence under one plea; and it not necessarily appearing that they were only one transaction.

That the other pleas were merely various modes of stating the same defence, and in direct contravention of the rule which prohibits such a mode of pleading.

The Court offered to reject the three new pleas if the Plaintiff would allow the subject matter of them to be given in evidence under the plea first pleaded.

Henderson declined the offer, and insisted that the Defendant should be confined to the charge he had made in the first instance. The last plea, at all events, disclosed no justification for apprehending the Plaintiff, and was therefore demurrable.

TINDAL C. J. I think this case does not fall within the rule on which the Plaintiff relies.

It is true that it is not competent to a defendant to state in various ways the same facts and circumstances: but here, it is not certain what the circumstances may turn out to be in proof; the Defendant may rely on different facts, and the Plaintiff's counsel, by refusing to allow them to be given in evidence under one plea, admits that the facts alleged in these several pleas are not the same. It is advantageous to the Plaintiff that he should have notice by the record of all the facts on which the Defendant means to rely; and we should repeal the statute of Anne if we were to refuse to allow the pleas now required.

VAUGHAN J. concurred.

BOSANQUET J. It appears to me that the three first pleas allege distinct offences; and as to the fourth, the Court will not enter into the question of its validity on a motion like the present.

ERSKINE J. Concurred.

1839.

CURRIE

v.

ALMOND.

1839.

Jan. 26.

Ex parte ANN SHIRLEY.

Under 88.77. WHATELEY applied under the 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 74.

& 91. of 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 74., the Court of

C. P. autho

rized a feme covert to con

ss. 77. 91., for the sanction of the Court to a conveyance of copyhold property by a married woman, without the concurrence of her husband.

The property in question had been devised to the applicant, to her sole and separate use, by her father, hold property, who died in 1826.

vey her copy

her husband having resided abroad for more than

twenty years with another

woman.

Her husband had been living abroad with another

woman ever since 1817.

(Tindal C. J. If the property is copyhold you need not come here.)

By s. 91. this Court may dispense with the concurrence of the husband in any case where he is living apart from his wife.

TINDAL C. J. That over-rides the seventy-seventh section, which seems to exclude copyholds.

Fiat.

Jan. 29.

An affidavit

of acknow

ledgment by

taken before a

IN

Ex parte MARY ANN MANN.

N a commission to take the acknowledgment of a married woman to bar dower, one of the commis

a feme covert, sioners was described as Judge M'Roberts, counsellor at law, of Danville, Illinois, in the United States. In his affidavit he signed himself Samuel M'Roberts.

notary public in Illinois, Held, sufficient.

The affidavit of acknowledgment was taken before a notary public.

B. Andrews, upon affidavit, that on enquiry at the American Ambassador's it appeared, that in Illinois judges often practise as counsellors, and that there was a judge in that State named Samuel M'Roberts; moved, that the certificate of acknowledgment might now be

received.

He cited Domville dem., Kinderley ten., Collier vouchee (a), where the objection was, that the affidavit had not been taken before a notary public; and Lovibond v. Morshead (b), where it was taken before two English magistrates in France; the object being merely to satisfy the Court as to the authenticity of the proceedings: but

The Court requested him to ascertain whether or not notaries public are authorised to take affidavits in Illinois; and upon his afterwards producing an affidavit that upon enquiry in a proper quarter it appeared that such is the practice, the Court acceded to his appli

cation.

1839.

Ex parte

ΜΑΝΝ.

Fiat.

(a) 3 Taunt. 275.

(b) 2 New Rep. 57.

THIS

WILLIAMS . DAVIS.

HIS was a country cause, in which issue was joined

on the 12th of June last, but no notice of trial was

given for the ensuing assizes.

Jan. 28.

Issue was joined, in a country cause, on the 12th

A rule nisi having been obtained for judgment as in of June, but case of a nonsuit,

no notice of trial was given for the ensu

ing assizes: Held, that it was too soon to move for judgment as in case of a non-suit in the ensuing Hilary term.

1839.

WILLIAMS

v.

DAVIS.

Clarkson, who shewed cause, contended that the application was premature. The Plaintiff was not bound to take more than one step in a term, and, therefore, had been guilty of no default. Evans v. Barnard (a), Apperley v. Morse. (b)

Under the old prac

step in a term; but

Barstow, in support of the rule. tice it was sufficient to take one under the new, a Plaintiff is in default, if, after joining issue in an issuable term, he do not give notice of trial for the next assizes. The authorities are conflicting. Harrison v. Williams. (c)

TINDAL C. J. It is a clear and intelligible rule, that where issue is joined in an issuable term, there is no default, provided notice of trial be not given, till after two assizes. The case last referred to seems to confirm the rule, for there, issue was joined in Michaelmas vacation in a country cause, and notice of trial not being given for the ensuing assizes, it was held to be too early to move for judgment as in case of a nonsuit, in Easter term following.

VAUGHAN J. I am of the same opinion, because a party must have made default before you can apply for judgment as in case of a nonsuit; and as a Plaintiff is not bound to take more than one step in a term, there has been no default here.

The rest of the Court concurring, the rule was

Discharged.

(a) 6 Dowl. 367.

(b) Id. 505.

(e) Id. 772.