Page images
PDF
EPUB

treaties with foreign powers in general, or the treaty of Queretaro in par-
ticular. People ex rel. Attorney General v. Naglee, 312.

& LEGISLATURE NOT PROHIBITED FROM ENACTING LICENSE LAWS, by section
13, article 11, constitution of California, declaring that taxation shall be
equal and uniforın. Id.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 19.

LIENS.

Ben EQUITY, 10, 12; EXECUTIONS, 13-15, 36; JUDGMENTS, 11; MORTGAGE,
4, 9; SHIPPING, 1; VENDOR and Vendee, 4–11.

LIMITATIONS.

See STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,

LIS PENDENS.

See ATTACHMENTS, 4; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 8; NOTICE.

LUNACY.

See INSANITY.

MAINTENANCE.

See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS, 5; GUARDIAN ANnd Ward, 9.

MALICE.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 24-29, 32, 33; LIBEL, 4; TRESPASS, 3-5.

MANDAMUS.

1. MANDAMUS IS THE PROPER REMEDY to compel district court to vacate an
order striking the name of an attorney from the roll and to restore the
attorney. People v. Turner, 295.

2 PEREMPTORY OR ALTERnative Writ OF MANDAMUS MAY BE AWARDED IN
FIRST INSTANCE, according to the exigencies of the case, when notice of
application has been given, and copics of papers served. Id.

& ALTERNATIVE MANDAMUS MUST SHOW ON ITS FACE CLEAR RIGHT to the
relief demanded by the relator, and must distinctly set forth all the ma
terial facts on which he relies, so that the same may be admitted or
traversed. If it fails to do this, it is fatally defective. Trustees v. Peo
ple, 488.

4. OBJECTIONS TO SUBSTANTIAL DEFECTS IN ALTERNATIVE MANDAMUS may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings. Id.

& APPELLATE JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT ATTACHES AND MAY BE EX-
ERCISED BY MANDAMUS, when the object and effect of the application is
to bring under review a decision of a district court. People v. Turner,
295.

See JURISDICTION, 1.

MANSLAUGHTER.

Bee CRIMINAL LAW, 18, 23, 25, 26, 30, 31, 33.

MARKET OVERT.

See SALES, 1.

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE.

ACTION FOR DIVORCE BY HUSBAND UPON GROUND OF VOLUNTARY DESERTION can not be maintained where it appears that the wife's abandonment was caused by unfounded accusations of unchaste conduct. Hardin v. Hardin, 170.

See MARRIAGE Settlements; Ne Exeat, 2.

MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS.

1. MARRIAGE ARTICLES MADE BETWEEN INFANT FEME AND HER INTENDED HUSBAND will be enforced by a court of equity, where they are beneficial to her and to her contemplated issue. Healy v. Rowan, 94.

2. MARRIAGE ARTICLES MADE BETWEEN GUARDIANS OF INFANT FEME and her intended husband, but to which she is not a party, do not bind her. Id. See MARRIED WOMEN, 3.

MARRIED WOMEN.

1. MARRIED WOMAN HAS LEGAL CAPACITY TO TAKE GIFTS, transfers of stock, etc., and to have deposits made to her credit in a bank, or to be the payee of a note, or obligee of a bond, or the like, and may hold the same to her own use against her husband's heirs if she survives him, and he has not reduced the same to possession, although the consideration may have proceeded from him. Fisk v. Cushman, 761.

2 CONTRACT OF THIRD PERSON TO PAY MONEY TO FEME COVERT, or to hold as her bailee, or to vest her with title to corporate stock, inures to her sole benefit as against her husband's heirs if she survives him, wherever by a clear and distinct act he has indicated his assent, and her name is introduced into the contract as the person having the legal interest. Id. 8. SEPARATE PROPERTY OF MARRIED WOMAN, CONFERRED UPON HER BY MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT, which provides that she shall have "the complete control of it as though the marriage had never taken place," and contains no restraint upon alienation, causes her to be regarded in a court of equity, with regard to such property, as a feme sole, and she may, by her agreement, freely entered into, charge it for the payment of her hus. band's debts. Bradford v. Greenway, 203.

4. MARRIED WOMAN CAN NOT BE Divested of her REAL ESTATE, except in the mode prescribed by the statute. Mason v. Brock, 490.

See ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; HUSBAND AND WIFE; MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE; MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS; WILLS, 28; WITNESSES, 7.

MARSHALING OF ASSETS.

See EQUITY, 12; EXECUTIONS, 12; MORTGAGES, 9. *

MASTER AND SERVANT.

MASTER AND SERVANT ARE NOT JOINTLY LIABLE FOR SERVANT'S NEGLI. GENCE, in the master's absence, in so driving a team as to cause an injury to another. Parsons v. Winchell, 745.

MASTERS.

See SHIPPING, 1, 5, 8.

MEDICAL BOOKS.

See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 39.

MEDICAL EXPERTS.

See INSANITY, 1; WITNESSES, 12.

MERGER.

See JUDGMENTS, 14.

MILLS.

See WATERCOURSES, 6, 7; WITNESSES, 11.

MISTAKE.

Bee ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, 5; ARBITRATION AND AWARD, 2; Equity, 9-11;
GUARDIAN ANd Ward, 7; Judgments, 12, 13; Statute or LIMITATIONS,
5; WILLS, 16, 17.

MONEY HAD AND RECEIVED.

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 22.

MORAL OBLIGATIONS.
See USURY, 2, 3.

MORTGAGES.

1. DELIVERY OF CHATTEL MORTGAGE TO ONE OF THREE MORTGAGEES named
therein, though such delivery is stated to be for the use of such mort-
gagee only, is good as to all, notwithstanding the fact that the mortgage
shows on its face that it was given to secure the payment of three sev
eral sums to the several mortgagees. Hubby v. Hubby, 742.

2. DEED, WITH BOND TO RECONVEY upon performance of certain conditions,
is a mortgage. McLaughlin v. Shepherd, 646.

3. MORTGAGEE'S INTEREST IN LAND IS NOT ATTACHABLE or subject to levy
on execution.

Id.

1. SIMULTANEITY OF RELEASE OF ONE MORTGAGE AND GIVING ANOTHER on
the same property to the same mortgagee does not avoid the loss of the
first mortgage lien by the release. Woollen v. Hillen, 690.

5. MORTGAGOR IS ESTOPPED from setting up the defense that the mortgagee's
agent was not authorized to accept the mortgage, when the mortgages
sues to recover the amount due on the mortgage. Squier v. Stockton, 583.
6. MORTGAGEES TAKING POSSESSION OF MORTGAGED PROPERTY, and appro-
priating it to their own use, must account ratably to the other joint
mortgagees. Robinson v. Collier, 572.

7. MORTGAGOR MAY PREFER ONE CREDITOR OVER ANOTHER, or designate
the order in which mortgage debts shall be paid. Id.

8 WARDS ARE NECESSARY PARTIES TO SUIT BY JOINT MORTGAGEE, to fore-
close a mortgage made to secure money due them. Id.

9. EQUITY WILL NOT MARSHAL ASSETS AGAINST PRIOR MORTGAGEE obtain.
ing his twofold lien from two mortgagors, one being surety for the other,

the subsequent mortgagee having a lien on the principal's estate only.
Woollen v. Hillen, 690.

See AGENCY, 5, 7; EQUITY, 12; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 16; STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS, 8; TRUST DEEDS; Vendor and Vendee, 3, 7.

MOTIONS.

See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 2, 17, 19, 28, 36.

MULTIFARIOUSNESS.
See EQUITY, 2.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.

See CORPORATIONS, 16-21; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 13.

MURDER.

See CRIMINAL LAW; JURY AND JURORS, 3-7.

NAMES.

See AGENCY, 5, 8-10; ASSIGNMENTS OF CONTRACTS, 3; CorpoRATIONS, 4;
CRIMINAL LAW, 2, 3; Deeds, 4; HUSBAND AND WIFE; WILLS, 7, 9, 17.

NAVIGABLE WATERS.

See COMMON CARRIERS, 8, 10; DEDICATION, 4, 5; WATERCOURSES.

NAVIGATION.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 17-20; WATERCOURSES, 1, 2, 5, 6.

NE EXEAT.

1. ON OATH OF COMPLAINANT ALONE THE WRIT NE EXEAT REPUBLICA IS
GRANTED according to the constant practice of the courts. McGee v.
McGee, 407.

2. AFFIDAVIT OF WIFE SUING FOR DIVORCE IN HER OWN NAME is sufficient
foundation for the issuance of a ne exeat republica. Id.

& THAT DEFENDANT IS GOING out of State, or that he has said so, must be
charged positively by complainant in a bill for the writ ne exeat republica.
Id.

4. BEFORE DECREE OF ALIMONY, the courts, under statutes of this state, may,
giving due weight to the rank of the parties and the fortune of the hus-
band, and taking care that the writ is not used for oppression and extor⚫
tion, grant the writ of ne exeat republica. Id.

5. DEFENDANT MAY SHOW THAT NE EXEAT OUGHT NOT TO HAVE BEEN
GRANTED, notwithstanding a statutory provision discharging him on his
giving a sufficient bond not to leave the state, or for the satisfaction of
the ultimate recovery. Id.

NEGLIGENCE.

DEFENSE TO ACTION FOR SETTING FIRE TO PRAIRIE.-Ordinary prudence
and honest motives in setting fire to a prairie, and due diligence in pre-
venting it from spreading, are all that is necessary to constitute a good

defense to an action for damages occasioned by such fire. De France v. Spencer, 533.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; CORPORATIONS, 2, 19-21; EQUITY, 8; Inns, 3; JUDGMENTS, 1; MASTER AND SERVANT; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 24, 34; SHIPPING, 8, 11, 12; StatuTE OF LIMITATIONS, 5.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS.

1. PAROL CONDITION TO PROMISSORY NOTE will not affect innocent holders. Smith v. Moberly, 543.

2. BANK CHECK DRAWN "PAYABLE TO ORDER" renders the indorser liable to the same extent as the indorser of a bill of exchange. Barbour v. Bayon, 593.

3. BANK CHECKS ARE PAYABLE IMMEDIATELY on presentment. Id.

4. BANK CHECKS ARE NOT ENTITLED to days of grace. Id.

5. BANK CHECKS, in many respects, are governed by the same rules which govern bills of exchange. Id.

6. ONE WHO, FOR VALUE, TRANSFERS NEGOTIABLE NOTE WITHOUT INDORSEMENT, thereby guarantees the genuineness of the instrument, but not the solvency of the parties thereto. Lyons v. Miller, 129.

7. HOLDER OF BANK NOTE PAYABLE TO BEARER, or to PARTICULAR PERSON or bearer, can maintain an action thereon against the corporation that issued it. New Hope Del. B. Co. v. Perry, 443.

8. STATUTE OF ANNE MAKING PROMISSORY NOTES TRANSFERABLE in the same manner as bills of exchange was never in force in Illinois. Id.

9. BANK NOTES WERE ALWAYS NEGOTIABLE AT COMMON LAW, and are not within the provisions of the Illinois statute making promissory notes, and certain other instruments in writing, transferable by indorsement. Id.

10. POSSESSION OF BANK NOTES IS PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF TITLE in the holder.

Id.

11. ACTION AGAINST BANK ON ITS NOTES CAN NOT BE DEFEATED BY PLEA that those to whom the notes were issued have not complied with the terms of an agreement then made by them, to so use the notes as to best prevent their return to the bank for redemption. The title to the notes vested in the parties to whom they were issued, before the time when the stipulations of the contract were to be performed, and the continu. ance of their title depended in no degree upon the performance of those stipulations. Id.

12. IN ACTION ON NOTE MADE PAYABLE AT PARTICULAR PLACE, demand of payment at that place need not be averred or proved, but readiness to pay at the time and place may be pleaded in bar of damages and costs. Id.

13. DEMAND AT PLACE OF PAYMENT designated in a promissory note is not essential to charge the maker. Ripka v. Pope, 579.

14. MAKER OF NOTE MUST, IN HIS Defense, show wherein any injury has resulted from the holder failing to make demand for payment at the place designated. Id.

15. INDORSER OF PROMISSORY NOTE having possession thereof is considered as being the true owner. Squier v. Stockton, 583.

16. INDORSER IS NOT BOUND TO SHOW HOW HE ACQUIRED POSSESSION of a

« PreviousContinue »