20. WOUND WHICH UNDER FAVORABLE CIRCUMSTANCES MIGHT HAVE HEALED,
but which ultimately caused death, is sufficient to constitute the crime
of murder in him who inflicted it. McAllister v. State, 180.
21. VIEW OF PREMISES WHERE HOMICIDE WAS COMMITTED may be granted,
under the Massachusetts statute. Commonwealth v. Webster, 711.
22. EVIDENCE THAT THERE WAS PERSON STRONGLY RESEMBLING PERSON
ALLEGED TO BE MURDERED going about at the time of the latter's dis-
appearance is inadmissible, on a trial for murder, to rebut evidence intro-
duced by the defense that the man said to be murdered was seen at
various times after the alleged killing. Id.
23. COMMON-LAW DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN MURDER, MANSLAUGHTER, and
justifiable homicide are a part of the law of Massachusetts. Id.
24. MURDER IS THE KILLING OF A HUMAN BEING WITH MALICE AFORE-
THOUGHT, express or implied. Id.
25. MANSLAUGHTER IS THE UNLAWFUL KILLING OF ANOTHER WITHOUT MAL-
ICE, whether the killing be voluntary or involuntary. Id.
26. MALICE DISTINGUISHING Murder from ManslaughteR IS NOT CONFINED
TO ILL-WILL against a particular person or persons, but denotes an action
flowing from any wicked and corrupt motive, a thing done malo animo,
attended with circumstances indicating a heart regardless of social duty
and fatally bent on mischief. Id.
27. MALICE IS IMPLIED FROM ANY DELIBERATE OR CRUEL ACT against an-
other, however sudden.
28. MALICE IS IMPLIED IN EVERY INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE, and any circum-
stances of accident, necessity, or infirmity extenuating or excusing the
act must be satisfactorily proved by the accused, except so far as they
are disclosed by the proof against him. Id.
29 FROM ASSAULT WITH DANGEROUS WEAPON likely to kill, and which does
in fact produce death, an intent to take life or do great bodily harm
is presumed, and malice is implied in the absence of proof to the con-
trary. Id.
30. HOMICIDE, THOUGH VOLUNTARY, COMMITTED IMMEDIATELY AFTER PROVO-
CATION by the deceased, consisting of a blow or an assault, or other act
which the law deems adequate to excite sudden and angry passion, is
manslaughter, and not murder. Id.
81. PROVOCATION BY WORDS ONLY, HOWEVER OPPROBRIOUS, IS NOT SUFFI
CIENT to mitigate an intentional killing to manslaughter. Id.
82. MALICE AFORETHOUGHT DOES NOT IMPLY DELIBERATION for any length of
time before the killing, but it is sufficient if the intent to kill precedes
and accompanies the act, however sudden it may be. Id.
33. HOMICIDE COMMITTED IN MUTUAL COMBAT, where the parties meet with.
out intending to quarrel and a conflict springs up, is manslaughter and
not murder, if no unfair advantage is taken in the outset, and the occa-
sion is not sought for the purpose of gratifying malice. Id.
34. CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES is competent, and is
sometimes the only mode of proof. Id.
35. GREAT CARE MUST BE EXERCISED IN DRAWING INFERENCES FROM CIR-
CUMSTANCES proved in criminal cases.
86. TO JUSTIFY CONVICTION ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE EVERY FACT
NECESSARY to the conclusion must be distinctly and independently
proved by competent evidence; but a failure of proof of some collateral
circumstance not necessary to the conclusion, but offered by way of
corroboration, does not destroy the chain. Id.
87. ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE ON PART OF ACCUSED, EXPLAINING SUSPICIOUS
CIRCUMSTANCES, after proof of a probable state of facts tending to crimi-
nate him, is to be considered, though not alone entitled to much weight.
Id.
38. ATTEMPTS BY ACCUSED TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, SUGGESTIONS OF DECEP-
TIVE EXPLANATIONS, and endeavors to cast suspicion upon other persons,
without just cause, are circumstances to be considered against him, but
are not to be pressed too urgently. Id.
89. INFERENCES FROM INDEPENDENT SOURCES TENDING TO SAME CONCLU.
SION, though differing from each other, not only support each other, but
do so with increased weight in a criminal case depending upon circum-
stantial evidence. Id.
40. IN CASE Depending on CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE FACTS PROVED MUST
BE CONSISTENT with each other, and with the main fact sought to be
proved, to justify conviction. Id.
41. CIRCUMSTANCES TAKEN TOGETHER SHOULD BE OF CONCLUSIVE Nature
and tendency, leading on the whole to a satisfactory conclusion, and pro-
ducing a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused, beyond a
reasonable doubt, and no one else, committed the offense, to warrant a
conviction on circumstantial evidence. Id.
42. REASONABLE Doubt, to WARRANT ACQUITTAL in a criminal case, is not a
mere possible doubt, but is such a doubt as, after the entire comparison
and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in
such a condition that they can not say they feel an abiding conviction,
to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. Id.
43. MURDER MUST BE COMMITTED BY SOME ACT AFFECTING THE PERSON
either directly or indirectly, and a death caused by grief or terror is not
murder. Id.
44. INDICTMENT MUST STATE CHARGE WITH AS MUCH CERTAINTY as the cir
cumstances of the case will permit, but nothing more is required. Id.
45. INDICTMENT CHARGING ASSAULT AND KILLING "IN SOME WAY and
manner, and by some means, instruments, and weapons to the jurors
unknown,
⚫ feloniously, willfully, and of malice aforethought,"
is sufficient where the mode of killing can not be more particularly de-
scribed. Id.
46. EVIDENCE THAT PERSON ALLEGED TO BE KILLED WAS SEEN ALIVE after
the time when the killing is charged to have occurred is competent, but
to warrant an acquittal, must be made out by satisfactory proof. Id.
47. EVIDENCE OF GOOD CHARACTER OF PRISONER ACCUSED OF MURDER is
competent, though of less weight than in crimes of inferior grade, and the
defendant must prove a high character by strong evidence to counter.
balance a strong case made by the prosecution. Id.
See CONTRACTS, 4; JURY AND JURORS, 3-7; QUO WARRANTO.
See Co-TENANCY, 1; TROVER, 2; WITNESSES, 13.
1. IN ESTIMATting Damages, IT IS COMPETENT TO CONSIDER loss of mercantile
credit, stoppage of business, and prevention of sales caused by the
wrongful levy of an attachment. Donnell v. Jones, 194.
2. NET PROFITS WHICH PARTY WOULD PROBABLY HAVE MADE by the prosecu-
tion of his business may be considered in estimating his damage by the
stop page of his business. Id.
3. WHEN EVIDENCE OF FUTURE NET PROFITS CAN BE INTRODUCED, discussed.
Id.
4. DAMAGES NOT LEGALLY RESULTING FROM BREACH OF CONTRACT ought not
to be allowed when not specially alleged; as damages for the vendee's in-
ability to comply with the contract of resale because of non-delivery of
chattels. Cole v. Swanston, 288.
See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 3; CONTRACTS, 4; CORPORATIONS, 18-21; Cov
ENANTS; DECEIT; HIGHWAYS; JURY AND JURORS, 2; NEGLIGENCE; SALES,
3, 4, 10; TROVER, 4-7, 9; WATERCOURSES, 6, 7; WITNESSES, 11.
DAYS OF GRACE.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 4.
ACTION OF DEBT WILL LIE UPON JUDGMENT, AFTER FIRST EXECUTION HAS
been Returned UNSATISFIED, and within the time allowed by the stat-
ute for issuing an alias; the statutory provision giving the plaintiff the
right to coerce the payment of the judgment is merely cumulative, and
does not take away the common-law privilege. Kingsland v. Forrest, 232
DECEASED WITNESS.
See EVIDENCE, 17.
UNSOUND HORSE WARRANTED SOUND MAY BE SOLD BY VENDEE, AND DAM-
AGES FOR DECEIT will be the difference between what the horse sold for
and what he would have been worth if as warranted, if common prudence
and discretion are exercised in the sale. Woodward v. Thacher, 73.
See AGENCY, 1; ASSIGNMENTS OF CONTRACTS, 3; DEDICATION, 2, 3; ESTOPPEL,
1, 5; EVIDENCE, 18, 21, 23-26; WILLS, 13, 15, 27.
1. WHERE OWNERS OF LAND SURVEY AND LAY OFF GROUND FOR PUBLIO
Use as a street or landing, under an agreement among themselves, and
make sales of adjoining lands in reference to and recognizing the exist
ence of such street or landing, this amounts to a dedication of the land
to the public, although no map be made of the survey. Godfrey v. City
of Alton, 476.
2. STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY TO DEDICATION OF LAND to the
public. Such dedication may be made by grant or written instrument,
or it may be evidenced by acts and declarations, without writing, and is
purely a question of intention. Id.
8. DEDICATION OF LAND MAY BE MADE BY SURVEY AND I'LAT ALONE, without
any declaration, either oral or on the plat, where it is evident from the
face of the plat that it was the intention of the proprietor to set it apart
for the use of the public. Id.
4. DEDICATION MUST BE UNDerstood and CONSTRUED with reference to the
objects and purposes for which it was made, particularly in case of a
public landing upon a navigable watercourse.
6. WHERE PERSON HAS DEDICATED BANK OF NAVIGABLE RIVER to the
public, he has no interest in the bed of the stream which he can reservo
to the prejudice of the enjoyment of the public easement over it. Id.
1. CONSTRUCTION OF DEED WHICH REQUIRES REJECTION OF WHOLE CLAUSE
thereof will not be adopted, except from unavoidable necessity. City of
Alton v. Illinois T. Co., 479.
2. WHERE PLAT REFERRED TO in Deed HAS UPON ITS FACE that to which the
expressions of the deed can apply, the court will make the application
rather than reject the words of the deed. Id.
3. DEED CAPABLE OF Two CONSTRUCTIONS MUST BE CONSTRUED MOST STRONGLY
against the grantor. Id.
4. GRANTOR'S NAME SIGNED TO DEED BY THIRD PERSON IN HIS PRESENCE
with his verbal assent, with the addition "by G.," the person signing,
is sufficient without an authority under seal to the person so signing, be-
cause it is deemed the grantor's own act. Gardner v. Gardner, 740.
5. PAROL EVIDENCE IS ADMISSIBLE TO EXPLAIN AMBIGUITIES IN DEED exe-
cuted by a guardian on a sale of his ward's real estate, such ambiguities
arising from an insufficient description of the grantees, and in an omis.
sion to give the number of the block in which the lots conveyed were
situated. Young v. Lorain, 463.
6. ACTUAL POSSESSION UNDER Unregistered Deed is Notice to subsequent
purchasers of the prior conveyance. McLaughlin v. Shepherd, 646.
See ACKNOWLEdgments; AdvERSE POSSESSION, 5; BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, 3;
EQUITY, 9; EVIDENCE, 14, 16, 31; GuardDIAN AND WArd, 4–7; Judg.
MENTS, 15; JUDICIAL SALES; MORTGAGES, 2; PARTNERSHIP, 6; Statute
OF LIMITATIONS, 4; TRUST Deeds; Trusts AND TRUSTEES, 1; VENDOR
AND VENDEE, 13.
See COSTS, 2; TRESPASS, 2.
See BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, 3; MORTGAGES, 2.
DEFINITIONS.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 24, 25.
Bee ASSIGNMENTS OF CONTRACTS, 1; COMMON CARRIERS; CONTRACTS, 1;
DAMAGES, 4; EXECUTIONS, 13; MORTGAGES, 1; RELEASE, 2; SALES, 2, 3;
SHIPPING, 3, 4; SURETYSHIP, 3.
See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 13, 14, 17, 19, 24-28; PLEADING AND PRAG
See JUDGMENTS, 8; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 14.
See COMMON CARRIERS, 7; HUSBAND AND WIFE; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 36.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 12, 13; DEEDS, 5.
See MARRIAge and DivORCE.
See JUDGMENTS, 15; WILLS, 10, 20-22
DIRECTORS.
See CORPORATIONS, 10.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 8; GUARDIAN AND WARD, &
DISCOVERY.
See EQUITY, 3, 4.
See JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; PLEADING AND PRACTION, 2-5,
See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 2-5.
See-ATTACHMENTS, 9, 10; CORPORATIONS, 6, 18.
DISTRICT COURTS.
See MANDAMUs, 1.
See MARRIAGE and DIVORCE.
See NEGOTIABLE Instruments, 19, 21, 22, 22
See DEDICATION, 5; WATERCOURSES, 12,
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