16. POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE COMMERCE IS NOT RESTRICTED to com.
17. POWER TO REGULATE COMMERCE INCLUDES LIKE POWER TO REGULATE
NAVIGATION, except as to Indian tribes. Id.
18. POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE COMMERCE WITH INDIANS does not
include navigation with the Penobscot Indians. Id.
19. COASTING LICENSE TO VESSEL ON INTERIOR WATERS, from which it could
not reach another state or nation, is wholly inoperative and unauthorized.
Id.
20. ACT GRANTING EXCLUSIVE NAVIGATION BY STEAM POWER on that part of a
river from which a vessel can not be navigated to another state or foreign
state is constitutional. Id.
21. STATUTE PROHIBITING CARRYING OF CONCEALED WEAPONS is constitu-
tional. State v. Chandler, 599.
See CITIZENSHIP; ELECTIONS; EVIDENCE, 10, 21; LICENSES.
See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 2; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2; CONTRACTS, 5; Cor-
PORATIONS, 13; DEDICATION, 4; DEEDS, 1-3; PLEADING AND PRACTICE,
33; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 10; WILL3, 6, 20.
1. WRITTEN CONTRACT ACQUIRES NO FORCE AS SUCH until signed and deliv-
ered. Hoen v. Simmons, 291.
PREVENTION OF PERFORMANCE OF WRITTEN CONTRACT by defendant ex-
cuses performance on the part of the party prevented, and he may main.
tain his action immediately. Rankin v. Darnell, 557.
4. PREVENTING PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT is not necessarily a rescission of
it. Id.
• AGREEMENT THAT ONE PARTY THERETO MAY, IF NECESSARY, USE FORC
in taking possession of certain property, in case the other party fails to
comply with its conditions, is not an agreement to do an unlawful act.
Such agreement releases the party using the force from the payment of
damages to the other party for injuries necessarily inflicted upon him
in obtaining the possession, but will not release him from a prosecu-
tion for a breach of the peace if he commits one. If greater force is
used than is necessary, the plaintiff may reply the excess, or give evi-
dence of it under the general replication de injuria. Ambrose v. Root,
456.
5. PROMISE TO PAY FOR HALF OF NEW PARTITION WALL, made to the owner
of one of two adjoining lots upon his erecting the same, by the husband
of a cestui que trust of the other lot, in case the promisor shall have any
occasion to use the wall for a different purpose from the old wall, is per-
sonal only and to be strictly construed, and the husband does not become
liable on his promise where he and his wife assent to a conveyance of
their lot by the trustees to a third person who afterwards makes a differ
ent use of the wall. Jenkins v. Spooner, 738.
Bee AGENCY; ASSIGNMENTS OF Contracts; AssUMPSIT; COMMON CARRIERS;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CORPORATIONS; DAMAGES, 4; EQUITY, 9-11;
FRAUD, 1; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 5; JUDGMENTS, 14; LANDLORD
AND TENANT; MARRIED WOMEN; PARTNERSHIP; SALES; SEALS; STAT UTE OF FRAUDS; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; SUNDAYS; SURETYSHIP, 4, 5; USURY; VENDOR AND VENDEE.
CONVERSION.
See TROVER, 3, 8, 9.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 6, 36, 40, 41.
CORONERS.
See EXECUTIONS, 31.
1. CORPORATION CREATED BY AND TRANSACTING BUSINESS IN STATE is to be deemed an inhabitant of such state, capable of being treated as a citizen for all the purposes of suing and being sued, and it can dwell only within the sovereignty of its creation, and can not migrate to another sover. eignty. Clarke v. Bank of Mississippi, 248.
2. CORPORATION IS RESPONSIBLE for the unskillful and improper manner in which its officers exercise the powers vested in it by its charter. Walling v. Mayor etc. of Shreveport, 608.
1. HOLDERS OF SHARES MAY MAINTAIN SUITS AGAINST OFFICERS and other shareholders of a corporation under certain circumstances. Veazie, 655.
4 RIGHT OF CREDITOR OF CORPORATION TO MAINTAIN SUIT IN EQUITY IN HIS OWN NAME, AGAINST STOCKHOLDERS not having paid up the capital stock subscribed for, exists independent of statutory enactments. But where the appointment of a receiver has been ratified by the legislature, the suit should be prosecuted in his name, unless some sufficient excuse is rendered, in which case such assignee should be made a party defend. ant. Hightower v. Thornton, 412.
5. EQUITABLE REMEDY AGAINST SUBSCRIBED BUT UNPAID CAPITAL STOCK ACCRUES When the legal assets of the corporation are exhausted. Id. 6. DEBTS DUE TO AND FROM CORPORATION are extinguished, at common law, upon its dissolution. Id.
7. INDIVIDUALS COMPOSING CORPORATION MAY, BY CONTRACT OR IN LAW, INCUR LIABILITIES, in respect thereto, which will survive their charter and be enforceable at law or in equity. Id.
8. CAPITAL STOCK OF CORPORATION IS DEEMED TRUST FUND for the payment of its debts. Id.
9. AMOUNT OF SHARES OF CAPITAL STOCK ORIGINALLY SUBSCRIBED FOR, AND NOT SUM ACTUALLY PAID IN, constitutes the capital stock of a corpora tion. Id.
10. BOTH BEFOre and after DISSOLUTION, DIRECTORS OR ASSIGNEES OF COR. PORATION MAY BE COMPELLED TO COLLECT amount of capital stock not paid up, and apply it to the payment of the corporation debts. Equity will hold the stockholder liable for said debts to the extent of his un paid subscription. Id.
11. EQUITY OF CREDITOR IS EQUALLY STRONG WHERE STOCKHOLDER HAS CON TRACTED TO PAY but never has paid his portion of the capital stock, as where it has been actually paid in and afterwards returned. Id.
12. BETWEEN BANKING AND OTHER CORPORATIONS there is no distinction as to
the liability of stockholders for capital stock not paid up. Id.
13. STATUTORY PROVISION FOR SALE OF DELINQUENT STOCK IS MERELY FOR
Benefit of CoRPORATION, and is not to be construed a privilege of the
stockholder to abandon his shares at will.
14. REMEDY BY SALE OF DELINQUENT STOCK IS CUMULATIVE, and does not
impair right to compel payment by action. Id.
15. DECREE BASED UPON STOCKHOLDER'S LIABILITY FOR UNPAID CAPITAL
STOCK should give him all the privileges to which he would have been
entitled under the charter, had the stock been called in by the directors
during the existence of the corporation. Id.
16. IN ASSUMPSIT BY PUBLIC CORPORATION, PLEA OF NON ASSUMPSIT ADMITS
CAPACITY of the plaintiff to sue. Alderman v. Finley, 244.
17. IN ASSUMPSIT BY PUBLIC CORPORATION, PROOF OF ITS POWER TO CONTRACT
is unnecessary, where the act under which the corporation was brought
into existence is a public law, defining the powers and capacities of the
corporation to contract, as the court is bound judicially to take notice
of it. Id.
18. ONLY QUESTION PRESENTED BY PLEA OF NON AssumpSIT TO ASSUMPSIT BY
PUBLIC CORPORATION is whether the contract was in fact made as al-
leged, and the damages which might arise from it. Id.
19. TRESPASS ON THE CASE LIES AGAINST A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION for
non-feasance in permitting a large ditch, gully, or chasm to remain at one
end of a public street, into which the plaintiff's mare falls and sustains
injuries from which she dies. City of Tallahassee v. Fortune, 358.
20. PLAINTIFF MUST SHOW HE ACTED WITH COMMON PRUDENCE AND CARE
to maintain an action of trespass on the case against a municipal corpora
tion for damages sustained for its non-feasance in permitting a public
nuisance to remain. Id.
21. PERSON HITCHING HORSE IN PUBLIC STREET IS NOT GUILTY OF NEGLI-
GENCE where the horse escapes and falls into a ditch in the street, which
the municipality carelessly allows to remain open, so as to bar his action
against the city. Id.
See HIGHWAYs, 2-4; StatutE OF LIMITATIONS, 6–8.
CORROBORATIVE EVIDENCE.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 36.
1. COSTS IN COURT BELOW ALLOWED RESPONdent, but LatTTER REQUIRED
TO PAY COSTS OF APPEAL, where judgment is affirmed in part and re-
versed in part. Cole v. Swanston, 288.
2 WHERE PLAINTIFF REJECTED OFFER BY DEFENDANT TO BE DEfaulted
for a certain sum, and the plaintiff recovered judgment for a smaller
sum than that specified in the offer, the costs of the defendant arising
subsequently to the filing of the offer will be allowed and set off against
the sum offered, plaintiff taking judgment for the balance, together with
costs accruing to the time the action was filed. Stone v. Waitt, 621.
See JUSTICES OF THE PEACE; PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 3; SALES, 10.
1. TENANCY IN COMMON IS CREATED BETWEEN LESSER AND LESSOB, in the
yearly profits of a farm, before division, where the consideration of the
lease is a share of such yearly profits. Thompson v. Mawhinney, 176.
2 POSSESSION OF ONE TENANT IN COMMON IS POSSESSION OF ALL, but where
one tenant parts with his right to possession he ceases to be a tenant in
common. Id.
& MERE AUTHORITY TO SELL JOINT PROPERTY given by one joint tenant to
another does not exempt the share of the former from levy and sale
under execution. Id.
4. WHERE Two or More TENANTS IN COMMON ARE PLAINTIFFS in an action
of trover, and part of them are subject to the operation of the statute of
limitations, it is no bar to the recovery of those not within it. Settle v.
Alison, 393.
4. WHERE LEGAL TITLE IS COMPLETE IN CO-TENANTS, THERE ARE CIRCUM-
STANCES UNDER WHICH ADVERSE CLAIM to the entirety may be set up
by one of the tenants, so as to bar the right of his co-tenant. John-
son v. Toulmin, 212.
See EXECUTION, 17; STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 4; TROVER, 2, 7; WITNESSES, 13.
COUNTY COURTS.
See TRESPASS, 3.
See JURISDICTION; JURY AND JURORS, 8; MANDAMUS, 1, 5; PROBATE COURTS;
TRESPASS, 3.
MEASURE OF DAMAGES IN ACTION FOR BREACH OF COVENANT of seisin is
the amount of the consideration expressed in the deed, with interest
thereon for six years from the time of the breach. Rich v. Johnson, 144.
See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 4; GUARDIAN AND WARD, 5; JUDG-
MENTS, 20.
1. INFORMATION MUST POSSESS THE SAME CERTAINTY AND TECHNICAL PRE-
CISION that are required in an indictment. Donnelly v. People, 459.
2. MISSPELLING PROPER NAME IN INDICTMENT, where the pronunciation is
but slightly affected, is not sufficient ground for a plea in abatement.
Edmundson v. State, 169.
& IMPROPER INSERTION OF MIDDLE NAME OR LETTER in indictment is imma-
terial, and may be disregarded. Id.
4. WILLFUL BURNING OF UNFINISHED HOUSE, WHICH WAS NEVER OCCUPIED,
though designed for a dwelling, and which was not appurtenant to any
other, is not arson; as where such house had not been painted, and the
glass in one of the doors had not been inserted. State v. McGowan, 336.
5. COURT ON TRIAL FOR ARSON SHOULD INSTRUCT JURY WHAT CONSTITUTES
DWELLING-HOUSE, leaving them to determine whether the house burned
comes within that definition. Id.
6. RECORD OF CONVICTION IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION of plaintiff for prior
assault on defendant, inadmissible in justification by the latter, in an
action for assault and battery. Robinson v. Wilson, 77.
7. LEGAL INFERENCE AS TO CHARACTER OF ASSAULT can not be drawn from
the verdict of a jury. Id.
8. CAPTION OF INDICTMENT IS SUFFICIENTLY EXPLICIT where it states that the
indictment was found, at a term of the court, by certain men duly im-
paneled, sworn, and charged as grand jurors in and for the county at
that term. Engleman v. State, 494.
9. OMISSION OF Words "of our Lord" AFTER YEAR NAMED IN INDICTMENT
does not make the indictment bad. When a year is mentioned in legis.
lative or judicial proceedings, without naming any other calendar, the
Christian calendar is the one that is understood to be used. Id.
10. INDICTMENT MAY CONTAIN SEVERAL COUNTS CHARGING SAME TRANSAC
TION in different modes, although the offense charged may amount to a
felony; and the prosecutor may give evidence relating to that transac-
tion, and apply it to whichever count of the indictment it will sustain.
Id.
11. PROSECUTOR IS NOT COMPELLED TO ELECT UPON WHAT COUNT HE WILL
PROCEED, unless it appears that more than one offense is charged in the
indictment. Id.
12. DESCRIPTION IN INDICTMENT CHARGING LARCENY OF CERTAIN COUNTY
ORDERS, which states the amount and value of each order, and that it
was drawn by the county auditor on the county treasurer, is sufficient.
Id.
13. INDICTMENT FOR LARCENY, WHICH CHARGES FELONIOUS TAKING and
carrying away of the property, is good, although it does not contain the
word "steal." Id.
14. EVIDENCE THAT STOLEN PROPERTY WAS FOUND UPON DEFENDANT is
always admissible in prosecutions for larceny. But the strength of the
presumption which it raises against him depends upon all the circum-
stances surrounding the transaction. Id.
15. STATE CAN NOT PROVE PARTICULAR ACTS OF BAD CONDUCT against the
accused in a criminal prosecution. Proof of his general character only
is admissible.
16. IN CHARGING JURY IN CRIMINAL TRIALS, the charge: a. Should be lim
ited to a full explanation of the law of the case; b. All irrelevant matter
found in the pleadings, evidence, or arguments of counsel should be
stricken out; c. The evidence for the prosecution and defense should
be clearly summed up; d. All strong expressions as to the guilt of the
accused should be carefully avoided. State v. Chandler, 599.
17. KILLING OF ASSAILANT WILL BE JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE in self-defense, if
there be an actual physical attack of such a character as to afford rea-
sonable ground to believe that the design is to destroy life or commit
felony upon the party assaulted. Id.
18. PRISONER INDICTED FOR MURDER and found guilty of the crime of man-
slaughter can not, upon a new trial, again be tried for the crime of
murder. Id.
19. EVIDENCE THAT "THE DECEASED WAS A QUARRELSOME MAN, violent in
temper, and dangerous when excited," rejected as inadmissible in a trial
for murder.
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