13. ATTORNEY CAN NOT RECOVER FEE from another interested party to the
same suit who has not employed him, no matter how valuable his services
may have proved to that party. Id.

14. ATTORNEY AT LAW PROCEEDED AGAINST WITH OBJECT OF STRIKING HIS
NAME FROM THE ROLL is entitled to have notice of charges against him
and opportunity to make his defense. People v. Turner, 295.

See JUDGMENTS, 21; Mandamus, 1.

ATTORNEY IN FACT.
See AGENCY, 5

AUTHENTICATION.

See EVIDENCE, 10-12.

AWARDS.

See ARBITRATION AND AWARD.

BAIL.

See ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, 6.

BANK CHECKS.

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 2–5.

BANK NOTES.

See JURY AND JURORS, 2; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 7, 9-11.

BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY.

1. DISTINCT AND UNEQUIVOCAL PROMISE TO PAY DEBT BARRED BY DISCHARGE
in bankruptcy, or a conditional promise, where the condition is fulfilled,
is binding. Way v. Sperry, 779.

2. PROMISE TO PAY DEBT DISCHARGED BY BANKRUPTCY NEED NOT BE WRITTEN
nor founded upon a new consideration. Id.

3. NEGOTIABILITY OF NOTE IS REVIVED BY NEW PROMISE AFTER DISCHARGE in
bankruptcy, and the new promise inures to the benefit of a subsequent
indorsee. Id.

4. NEW PROMISE BY DISCHARGED BANKRUPT IS MERE WAIVER of the dis
charge as a defense, and the original debt is the substantive cause of
action; so of a new promise to pay an outlawed debt, or by an infant
after maturity. Id.

5. DISCHARGE IN BANKRUPTCY DOES NOT AFFECT CLAIMS SO UNCERTAIN that
they can not be proved up against the estate of the bankrupt. Dok v.
Warren, 640.

See ASSIGNMENTS FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 7;
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 33; SURETYSHIP, 4.

BANKS AND BANKING.

See CORPORATIONS, 12; Evidence, 26, 32; Husband and Wife; Negotia-
BLE INSTRUMENTS, 2-5, 7, 9–11.

BARRATRY.

See INSURANCE-MARINE, 3.

BIAS.

Bee JURY AND JURORS, 3-7.

BIDS.

See EXECUTIONS, 32, 33.

BILLS OF EXCEPTIONS.

See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 32, 33.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 2, 4, 5, 8, 18-34.

BILLS OF LADING.

See SHIPPING, 3.

BILLS OF REVIEW.

See NOTICE; TRESPASS, 3.

BONA FIDE PURCHASERS.

'. WHERE DEFENSE "BONA FIDE PURCHASER WITHOUT NOTICE" IS RELIED
"PON, notice must be denied fully and positively, though it be not
charged in the bill; and if the facts be charged from which such notice
may be inferred, such facts must be denied also. Johnson v. Toulmin,
212.

2. BONA FIDE PURCHASER FROM EXECUTOR HAVING NO POWER TO SELL
acquires no title. Worthy v. Johnson, 399.

3. SUBSEQUENT PURCHASE WITH NOTICE OF UNRECORDED Bond of DEFEAS-
ANCE is not valid as against it. McLaughlin v. Shepherd, 646.

See DEEDS, 6; EXECUTIONS, 15, 22; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 6;
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES, 8; LIS PENDENS; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS,
1; SUBROGATION; SURETYSHIP, 1, 2; VENDOR and Vendee, 11, 13.

BONDS.

See BONA FIDE PURCHASERS, 3; MORTGAGES, 2; NE EXEAT, 5; Relzare;
SURETYSHIP, 5; Vendor and Vendee, 3.

BOOKS OF ACCOUNT.

See EVIDENCE, 3-6.

BREACHES OF THE PEACE
See CONTRACTS, 4.

BURDEN OF PROOF,
See EVIDENCE, 12

CANALS.

See WATERCOURSES, 6.

CARRIERS.

See COMMON CARRIERS

AM. DEO. VOL LII-51

CERTIFICATE.

See ACKNOWLEDGMENTS; EVIDENCE, 1, 10-12, 32; TRESPASS, 3 5; Wa

NESSES, 14.

CHALLENGE.

See JURY AND JURORS, 3.

CHARACTER.

Bee CRIMINAL LAW, 15, 19, 47; WITNESSES, 8.

CHARTERS.

See CORPORATIONS, 2, 7, 15.

CHATTEL MORTGAGES.

See MORTGAGES, 1.

CHECKS.

See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 2–5.

CHILDREN.

See PARENT AND CHILD; WILLS, 15, 18, 19.

CHOSES IN ACTION.

Bee ASSIGNMENTS OF CONTRACTS, 1; EXECUTIONS, 6; INSURANCE-Lina, 1.

CIRCUIT COURTS.

See JURY AND JURORS, 8.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 34-36, 38-41.

CITIZENSHIP.

1. NEITHER FOREIGNERS, UNLESS THEY HAD BECOME OR WERE BONA FIDE
RESIDENTS, nor the attorney general on their behalf, can avail themselves
of section 17, article 1, constitution of California; nor then, unless they
have property, in the possession, enjoyment, or inheritance of which they
have been molested. People ex rel. Attorney General v. Naglee, 312.
ALL MEXICANS "ESTABLISHED" IN CALIFORNIA HAVE ELECTED TO BECOME
AMERICAN CITIZENS, by treaty of Queretaro, who have not within one
year from exchange of ratifications, on May 30, 1848, declared their in-
tention to continue Mexican citizens.

Id.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1; CORPORATIONS, 1; WATERCOURSES, 1.

COLLISIONS.

See SHIPPING, 11, 12.

COMMERCE.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 15-20.

COMMON CARRIERS.

1. CARRIER WILL BE RELIEVED FROM LIABILITY if the owner of the goods, by
contract with the carrier, waive any of his rights touching the delivery.
Stone v. Waitt, 621.

2. CARRIER'S RESPONSIBILITY CEASES WHEN TRANSIT OF GOODS IS ENDED and
the delivery is completed or waived by the owner. Id.

3. CARRIER'S Risk Ends if the Consignee Assumes Control of the goods
before they have arrived at the place of delivery. Id.

4. CARRIER MAY BE RELIEVED FROM OBLIGATION TO STORE GOODS at the
place of delivery by the waiver of the consignor's agent. Id.

6. DELIVERY TO AND ACCEPTANCE BY COMMON CARRIER ARE ESSENTIAL to
make him liable for goods, but the acceptance may be either actual or
constructive. Merriam v. Hartford etc. R. R. Co., 344.

6. GENERAL RULE IS, THAT GOODS SHOULD BE DELIVERED INTO CARRIER'S
HANDS, or those of his servants or authorized agents, to render him liable
therefor. Id.

7. Deposit of Goods on CarriER'S WHARF WITHOUT NOTICE to and accept-
ance by him, or his servants or agents, is generally insufficient to charge
him with them; but if such deposit be made pursuant to a previous
arrangement between the parties, or to a known habitual usage on the
carrier's part to receive goods so deposited, it is good. Id.

8. LIABILITY OF Common Carriers on our NavigABLE STREAMS is fixed by
the common law. Friend v. Woods, 119.

9. ACT OF GOD WHICH EXCUSES COMMON CARRIER must be a direct and vio-
lent act of nature. Id.

10. WHERE COMMON Carrier Strands his VeSSEL ON BAR recently formed
in the ordinary channel of a navigable river, he is liable for the loss
thereby occasioned to the goods on board, although he was ignorant of
the existence of such bar. Id.

See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 36.

COMPLAINTS.

See PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 10, 11.

CONDITIONS.

See MORTGAGES, 2; NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS, 1, 19, 23; 8uRETYSHED

CONFESSION OF JUDGMENTS.
See JUDGMENTS, 21.

CONFIRMATION OF SALE.

Nee ADVERSE POSSESSION, 6; GUARDIAN AND WARD, 7; JUDICIAL SALES, 1

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

1. Revenue LAWS OF FOREIGN Nations are NOT NOTICED by our courts.
Kohn v. Schooner Renaisance, 577.

2. AGREEMENTS IN VIOLATION OF Revenue Laws of foreign nations may be
enforced in our courts. Id.

3. IN ACTION ON NOTE MADE AND INDORSED IN OHIO, the laws of that state
must govern. Smith v. Blatchford, 504.

See ASSIGNMENts for Benefit OF CREDITORS, 5; JUDICIAL SALES, 2.

CONSIDERATION.

See BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY, 2; COVENANTS; EXECUTIONS, 30; Mar-
RIED WOMEN, 1; NEGOTIABLE Instruments, 21.

CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEES.

Bee COMMON CARRIERS, 3, 4; Negotiable Instruments, 32; SHIPPING, 5, 6.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. CONSTITUTION OF WISCONSIN, IN TEMPORARILY ADOPTING OLD TERRITORIAL
LAWS not inconsistent therewith, did so that no inconvenience might
arise by reason of a change of government, but did not intend to extend
the political disabilities of certain inhabitants of the territory to the citi-
zens of the state. State ex rel. Dunning v. Giles, 149.

2. STATUTE OPEN TO INTERPRETATION SHOULD BE CONSTRUED TO OPERATE
PROSPECTIVELY, in all cases susceptible of doubt; but this rule does not
apply where legislature expressly declares its intention to make a statute
retroactive. Baugher v. Nelson, 694.

& ACT OF 1845, CHAPTER 52, declaring that any person thereafter seeking to
avail himself of the statute of usury must plead it specially, and set out
the sums, both principal and interest, due on the contract, reckoning in-
terest at the rate of six per cent. per annum, is retroactive but not un-
constitutional. Id.

4. POWER OF COURTS TO DECLARE LEGISLATIVE ACTS UNCONSTITUTIONAL is to
be exercised with the most guarded circumspection and care. Id.

5. THOSE ASSAILING Statute on GrounD OF ITS INVALIDITY must make out
a clear case of legislative usurpation, as it is presumed to be valid. Id.
6. EX POST FACTO LAW RELATES TO CRIMES, and not to private rights or civil
remedies. Id.

7. RETROACTIVE Statute DivESTING VESTED RIGHTS IS NOT UNCONSTITU-
TIONAL for that reason necessarily. Id.

& BILL OF RIGHTS OF THIS STATE, ARTICLE 15, though prohibiting passage of
ex post facto laws, recognizes the right of the legislature to pass retro-
spective laws relating to civil cases and contracts. Id.

9. Act of 1845 REGULATES REMEDIES upon usurious contracts, and does not
divest vested rights. Id.

10. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY OVER REMEDIES may be exercised at pleasure over
past or future contracts. Id.

11. ACT OF 1845 IS MERELY REMEDIAL, obliging the borrower seeking relief as
defendant against a usurious contract to do the same as he is obliged to
do when seeking relief as plaintiff. Id.

12. STATUTE DIVESTING RIGHTS UNDER PRETENSE of Regulating REMEDIES
is as objectionable as if attacking the rights directly. Id.

13. VESTED RIGHTS, GUARDED AGAINST LEGISLATIVE INTERFERENCE, are such
as may be adhered to without violating any principle of sound morality.
Id.

14. COURT CAN NOT DETERMINE REASONABLENESS OF LEGISLATIVE ACT.
Moor v. Veazie, 655.

15. POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE COMMERCE IS RESTRICTED to such
waters as can be employed in commerce between states, or between
state and a foreign nation. Id.