ridicule or contempt, when the same is circulated in writing or print, is actionable. A distinction has always been taken between verbal and written slander; and this not only in reference to the consequences, as subjecting the party to an indictment, but also as to the character of the accusations or imputations essential to sustain a civil action to recover damages.

The rule is stated thus in a note to 1 Saunders, 248: “To write or publish anything of another, which makes him ridiculous, or holds him out as a dishonest man, is held to be actionable, when the speaking the same words would not be." The cases Villers v. Monsley, 2 Wils. 403; Austin v. Culpeper, Skin. 123; S. C., 2 Show. 313; Bell v. Stone, 1 Bos. & Pul. 331, are all to the same effect. See also 3 Bla. Com. 126; 2 Kent's Com., 6th ed., 17.

The question, whether this was a libel upon the plaintiff, as tending to expose him to ridicule and disgrace, was submitted to the jury under proper instructions. The verdict was for the plaintiff, and the exceptions taken must be overruled.

ACTION FOR LIBEL IS MAINTAINABLE AGAINST Two where the offense is their joint act: Harris v. Huntington, 4 Am. Dec. 728.

PUBLICATION OF LIBEL, WHAT CONSTITUES, GENERALLY: See Respublica ▾. Davis, 2 Am. Dec. 366; Commonwealth v. Blanding, 15 Id. 214; Fonville v. McNease, 31 Id. 556; Cochran v. Butterfield, 45 Id. 363.

WHETHER SENDING LIBELOUS LETTER TO PERSON LIBELED OR ANOTHER IS PUBLICATION or not, see State v. Avery, 18 Am. Dec. 105; Swindle v. State, 24 Id. 515; Fonville v. McNease, 31 Id. 556; Howard v. Thompson, 34 Id. 238; Hart v. Reed, 35 Id. 179. See also as to libel by a private letter: Atwill v. Mackintosh, 120 Mass. 182, citing the principal case.

PUBLICATION OF WRITING CALCULATED TO REFLECT SHAME AND DISGRACE upon another, or to hold him up to public ridicule, hatred, and contempt, is an actionable libel, though no crime is imputed: McCorkle v. Binns, 6 Am. Dec. 420; Colby v. Reynolds, 27 Id. 574; Fonville v. McNease, 31 Id. 556; Rice v. Simmons, Id. 766; Hart v. Reed, 35 Id. 179; O'Baugh v. Finn, 37 Id. 773, and the notes thereto. So held also in Worthington v. Houghton, 109 Mass. 487; Atwill v. Mackintosh, 120 Id. 182, citing the principal case.

OTHER PARTS OF PAMPHLET ALLEGED TO BE LIBELOUS may he read in evidence, when: See Morehead v. Jones, 36 Am. Dec. 600. Two articles in different papers can not be coupled together in an action for libel to ascertain whether or not one of them is libelous: Usher v. Severance, 37 Id. 33. Evidence of libels by the defendant against other persons than the plaintiff are, in general, clearly incompetent: Cochran v. Butterfield, 45 Id. 363.

TESTIMONY AS TO HOW WITNESSES UNDERSTOOD PUBLICATION alleged to be libelous is held generally incompetent, in Maynard v. Beardsley, 22 Am. Dec. 595; but it is said that a contrary rule seems to prevail where the alleged libel is shown to but one person, or only to a few. In Van Vechten v. Hopkins, 4 Id. 339, it is held, contrary to the doctrine of the principal case, that where, in an alleged libel concerning the plaintiff, he is not expressly

named, it can not be proved by witnesses that they understood from the reading of it that it referred to the plaintiff: See the note to that case. In Snell v. Snow, 46 Id. 730, it is held that in an action of slander a witness having testified to the words spoken can not state what meaning he understood the defendant to convey by them. The principal case is approved and followed in Russell v. Kelly, 44 Cal. 644, on the point that where the plaintiff is not named in an alleged libel, it is competent to show by witnesses who read it that they understood it to apply to the plaintiff. And generally, where an alleged libel is at all ambiguous, it is held, in Nelson v. Borehenius, 52 Ill. 240, that the witnesses may testify as to the sense in which they understood it, referring to the principal case as virtually overruling Snell ▼. Snow, supra. So in Leonard v. Allen. 11 Cush. 245, it is held, citing the principal case, as somewhat extending the rule, that where a slander is made up of obscure expressions, gestures, intonations, etc., witnesses may state what they understood the defendant to mean

WOOD v. GOODRIDGE.

[6 CUSHING, 117.]

ATTORNEY IN FACT SIGNING PRINCIPAL'S NAME ALONE to a note or mort gage, without adding his own name as agent or attorney, is not a valid execution of such instrument.

AGENT HAS ONLY SUCH Powers as are EXPRESSLY GIVEN OR NECESSARY and proper for carrying out those expressly given.

AGENT HAS NO AUTHORITY TO MORTGAGE REALTY UNDER POWER "TO BUY AND SELL real and personal property;" to make "good and sufficient deeds • in transferring and conveying the same;" to prosecuto all necessary suits for collecting demands; to vindicate the principal's rights; to defend all suits instituted against him; and especially to carry on a certain saw-mill, buy and sell logs and lumber, etc.; and generally to make contracts for the profitable improvement and use of the princi pal's property, for the enlargement of his estate, unless it appears that the making of such mortgage was necessary to the execution of the authority given.

TRESPASS for an injury to land. The plaintiff claimed the locus in quo under a mortgage made to one Sewall Goodridge. The defendants claimed under Benjamin Goodridge. The mortgage in question was executed by Levi Goodridge in the name of Benjamin Goodridge. He signed the latter's name alone, without adding his own name as agent or attorney, and there was nothing in the body of the mortgage to show that it was executed by attorney, but the said Levi acknowledged the same as attorney to be the deed of Benjamin. The note secured by the mortgage was signed: "Benjamin Goodridge, by his attorney, Benjamin Goodridge," the latter name being written by the defendant. The substance of the power of attorney under which

Levi acted is sufficiently stated in the syllabus. The case was appealed from the common pleas, and submitted upon an agreed statement.

E. Washburn and C. Mason, for the plaintiff.

F. H. Dewey, for the defendants.

By Court, FLETCHER, J. The first question, as to the plaintiff's title to the land, is, whether the form of executing the mortgage and note by the attorney was a legal execution of his power as such; whether signing the name of the principal, Benjamin Goodridge, as if it were his own personal act and signature (it not appearing upon the instruments to be done by Levi as attorney), was a good execution of the instruments under the power, so as to make them valid as the deed and note of Benjamin, and thus effectually to convey the land to Sewall Goodridge by the mortgage, under which the plaintiff's title is derived.

When one writes the name of another to a deed, in his presence, at his request, and by his direction, the act of writing is regarded as the party's personal act, as much as if he had held the pen, and signed and sealed the instrument with his own hand: Story on Agency, sec. 51; Ball v. Dunsterville, 4 T. R. 313; Lovelace's Case, W. Jones, 268; Hibblewhite v. McMorine, 6 Mee. & W. 200, 214, 215; Gardner v. Gardner, 5 Cush. 483 [ante, 740].

In the present instance, the deed and note were not executed by Benjamin personally; nor in his presence, but in his absence; and, so far as appears, without his knowledge. But, upon the face of the papers, they appear to have been signed by him personally and with his own hand. In fact, they were signed by Levi; but it does not appear, upon the face of the papers, that in signing the name of Benjamin, Levi acted as his agent, or intended to act under the power of attorney from Benjamin, or meant to execute the authority given by that power.

The deed and note, which thus appear to be signed by Benjamin personally, when, in fact, they were signed by Levi, are not such instruments as Levi was authorized to make. He was authorized to make instruments in the name of Benjamin; not as made by Benjamin personally; but by Levi, in his name, as his attorney. It should appear upon the face of the instruments that they were executed by the attorney, and in virtue of the authority delegated to him for this purpose. It is not

enough that an attorney in fact has authority, but it must appear, by the instruments themselves, which he executes, that he intends to execute this authority. The instruments should be made by the attorney expressly as such attorney; and the exercise of his delegated authority should be distinctly avowed upon the instruments themselves. Whatever may be the secret intent and purpose of the attorney, or whatever may be his oral declaration or profession at the time, he does not in fact execute the instruments as attorney, and in the exercise of his power as attorney, unless it is so expressed in the instruments. The instruments must speak for themselves. Though the attorney should intend a deed to be the deed of his principal, yet it will not be the deed of the principal, unless the instrument purports on its face to be his deed. The authority given clearly is, that the attorney shall execute the deed as attorney, but in the name of the principal.

There is much learning and much discussion, in the books of the law, as to the proper mode of executing authority by agents. In what form the agent should execute his authority, so as to bind his principal and not bind himself, has been a subject largely considered in elementary works, and much discussed in numerous adjudged cases. The rule commonly laid down by all the authorities is, that to bind the principal, the instrument must purport, on its face, to be the instrument of the principal, and executed in his name; or, at least, that the tenor of the instrument should clearly show that the principal is intended to be bound thereby, and that the agent acts merely as his agent in executing it.

But it is contended, that it is nowhere laid down in any work of authority, or established by any adjudged case, that the agent may put the name of the principal, as his own personal act and signature; the execution of the agent, as agent, not being in any way disclosed. Such an execution does not appear to be warranted by the power delegated to execute the instrument as attorney, but in the name of the principal.

If such a mode of execution is proper and legal, it seems most remarkable that it is nowhere stated or suggested in any work of authority. The execution of instruments by agents in this way would certainly be attended with great difficulties and dangers. If the agent might execute instruments in this mode, the principal, if he found his name signed to an instrument, would have no means of knowing by whom it had been signed, or whether he was bound or not bound by such signature; and

other persons might be greatly deceived and defrauded by relying upon such signature as the personal act and signature of the principal, when the event might prove that it was put there by an agent, who had mistaken his authority, and consequently, that the principal was not bound. When it should be discovered that the name of the principal was not written by him, as it purports to be, it might be wholly impossible to prove the execution by attorney, as there would be nothing on the note to indicate such an execution. For authorities as to the form of execution of the mortgage and note, see Story on Agency, secs. 147, 148, 153, notes, and cases cited; Hoffman's opinion in 3 Am. Jur. 71-85; Wilks v. Back, 2 East, 142; Story on Prom. Notes, secs. 11, 66, 71. In the case of Stackpole v. Arnold, 11 Mass. 27, 29 [6 Am. Dec. 150], Parker, C. J., said: "No person, in making a contract, is considered to be the agent of another, unless he stipulates for his principal by name, stating his agency in the instrument which he signs. This principle has been long settled, and has been frequently recognized; nor do I know an instance in the books of an attempt to charge a person as the maker of any written contract, appearing to be signed by another, unless the signer professed to act by procuration or authority, and stated the name of the principal on whose behalf he gave his signature."

There is a dictum of Lawrence, J., in the case of Wilks v. Back, 2 East, 142-145, which would seem to import that an agent might put his principal's name, without stating it to be by attorney. But it is but a dictum, the import of which is not entirely clear and certain.

Though there is no direct authority to the point, the court are inclined to think that the execution of the mortgage and note, in the present case, were not such as the attorney was authorized to make, and not such as to make them valid and binding. But it is not necessary to place the decision of the case on that ground.

There is another point in the case which is conclusive against the plaintiff's right to the land, and of course against her right to maintain this action. Levi Goodridge, who made the mortgage and note, had no authority under his power of attorney from Benjamin Goodridge to do these acts, so that the mortgage and note are both invalid and without any legal effect. In accordance with the general and well-settled principles of law, the power of attorney to Levi must be so interpreted as not to extend the authority given to him beyond that which is given in