THE opinion sufficiently states the facts. By Court, WELLS, J., orally. A question has suggested itself whether the heirs should not be made parties; but we think the rightful parties are before the court. Where, as in this case, the executors have control of all the estate, no other parties need be introduced. Executors or administrators may dis charge mortgages and surrender notes. The only question then is, whether the bequest can be cor rected by substituting "George Wood" for "J. Wood." Courts are often called upon to adjudicate as to devises and legacies, when there are several persons of the same name. Such cases present a latent ambiguity. In this case, the complainant is not of the name mentioned in the will. There is no latent ambiguity. It is a case of misdescription. Can the court inquire who was meant? There is jurisdiction as to mistakes, as well in regard to wills as to other matters. The testimony makes it very apparent, that there was a mistake in the name, which ought to be corrected, and we consider that the power to do it exists in the court. Prayer of the bill is allowed. MOOR V. VEAZIE. [32 MAINE, 343.] SOLE ASSIGNEE OF MATTER IN LITIGATION MAY MAINTAIN SUIT in equity without joining his assignors. HOLDERS OF SHARES MAY MAINTAIN SUITS AGAINST OFFICERS and other shareholders of a corporation under certain circumstances. CITIZENS HAVE INHERENT RIGHT TO NAVIGATE NAVIGABLE WATERS of their country at common law. RIGHT TO NAvigate Navigable Waters is not limited to waters in which the tide ebbs and flows. NAVIGABLE WATERS ARE UNDER CARE, SUPERVISION, PROTECTION, REGU LATION, AND IMPROVEMENT of the state government. STATE MAY REMOVE IMPEDIMENTS to the use of a navigable stream. STATE MAY GRANT EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO NAVIGATE ITS WATERS BY STEAN to encourage the introduction of that method of navigation and as com pensation for the expense of its introduction. STATE MAY IMPEDE NAVIGATION (as by dams) to increase the facilities of navigation (as by canals and locks). COURT CAN NOT DETERMINE REASONABLENESS OF LEGISLATIVE ACT. waters as can be employed in commerce between states, or between a POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE COMMERCE IS NOT RESTRICTED to com merce on salt water. POWER TO REGULATE COMMERCE INCLUDES LIKE POWER TO REGULATE NAVIGATION, except as to Indian tribes. POWER OF CONGRESS TO REGULATE COMMERCE WITH INDIANS does not include navigation with the Penobscot Indians. COASTING LICENSE TO VESSEL ON INTERIOR WATERS, from which it could not reach another state or nation, is wholly inoperative and unauthorized. ACT GRANTING Exclusive NavIGATION BY STEAM POWER on that part of a river from which a vessel can not be navigated to another state or foreign state is constitutional. BILL in equity for an injunction and for relief. On July 30, 1846, the legislature of Maine passed an act entitled "An act to promote the improvement of the navigation of the Penobscot river." This act granted to plaintiff and othors, who afterwards sold their several interests to plaintiff, the sole right to navigate the Penobscot river above Oldtown by steamboats for twenty years, on condition that the navigation of the river should be improved in certain parts, that a steamboat should be run over the route, and that a canal should be built around Piscataquis falls within seven years. Plaintiff spent several thousand dollars in rendering the river navigable, by removing bowlders and straightening it, and built a railroad around the falls. They also built five dams, four on their own land and one on defendants' land. The latter, defendants had threatened to tear away. Plaintiffs also built two steamboats, and commenced and continued to run them, with some unavoidable interruptions, ever since. Defendants built a steamboat and put her in operation between Oldtown and Piscataquis falls. Plaintiff prayed that defendants be enjoined from further employment of the boat, and from tearing away or removing the dam. The vessel run by Veazie, the defendant, was enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade at the port of Bangor, which was a port of entry at the head of the tide on Penobscot river. The Penobscot Indians own the islands in the river, and occupy some of them. They are under the jurisdiction and guardianship of the state. The Penobscot river is wholly within the state of Maine. Moor, plaintiff, pro se, with whom was Kelley. A. W. Paine, for the defendants. By Court, SHEPLEY, C. J. The cause, after argument, is submitted for decision upon the bill and answers and upon an agreed statement of the facts. By virtue of an act approved on July 30, 1846, the plaintiff claims the exclusive navigation, by boats propelled by steam power, of that part of the Penobscot river above the town of Oldtown, so far up as it may be rendered navigable for such boats by virtue of the act. By the first section, William Moor and Daniel Moor, jun., their associates and assigns, are authorized to improve the navigation of the river above that town; and for that purpose to perform certain acts in the bed of the river. By the second section they are authorized to hold land upon the banks of the river, and to appropriate certain property of the riparian proprietors, and to flow their lands, upon payment of damages. The third section declares that the grant is made upon condition that they shall within seven years improve the navigation of the river from Oldtown to Piscataquis falls, and from Piscataquis falls to the foot of the Five Island rips, and shall build and run over said route a steamboat, and shall within seven years build a canal and lock round said falls, or a railroad to connect the route above with the route below said falls." The fourth section grants to them, their associates and assigns, upon performance of the condition, "the sole right of navigating said river by boats propelled by steam from said Oldtown as far up as they shall render the same navigable,' ""for the term of twenty years, from and after the completion of the improvement as provided in the third section of the act." It also prohibits the obstruction of the navigation for certain other purposes; and provides that boats not propelled by steam power shall be allowed to make use of any locks and other improvements, upon payment of a reasonable toll. The fifth section authorizes them to become a body corporate, by the name of the Penobscot River Navigation Company, with the powers incident to corporations described and defined in the seventy-sixth chapter of the revised statutes, "provided that they shall, at any time during the continuance of the grant, elect by a vote of a majority in interest and proceed to organize under and according to the provisions of said chapter of the revised statutes." The bill alleges that the conditions required by the act have been performed, and that the plaintiff has become, by assignment, entitled to all the rights and privileges granted by the act. It is admitted that he is assignee of said charter, property, and privileges under it as set forth in the bill." 66 The objections which have been to the maintenance of the suit, and to the decree prayed for, will be noticed in their order. AM. DEO. VOL. LII-42 1. The jurisdiction of the court was examined upon a motion for an injunction pending the suit, and the objection made to it was overruled by an oral opinion, notes of which were taken by an intelligent member of the bar, which appear to have been published in the Law Reporter, vol. 12, No. 6 (see also 31 Me. 365), in a manner that might lead a reader to the conclusion that a maturely considered opinion had been drawn in writing. It may not be useful to present the reasons in a more perfect manner. 2. The performance by the grantees and their assignees of the conditions required by the third section of the act, what was required by a correct construction of the act, and how far the defendants were entitled to make the objection, were noticed in the same oral opinion. As the objection has not been renewed, it may not be useful to enter upon any further discussion of these matters. 3. The right of the plaintiff to maintain the suit in his own name, and not in the name of the corporation, is for the first time denied. The law is different as administered in courts of equity and courts of law respecting parties plaintiff. Courts of equity do not so much regard technical difficulties, as they do the fact that the suit is prosecuted by those who represent the entire legal and beneficial interest to the matter in litigation. Hence assignees of all the interest to rights and contracts may maintain suits respecting them in courts of equity: Whitney v. McKinney, 7 Johns. Ch. 144; Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 41. Holders of shares in corporate bodies may, under certain circumstances, maintain suits against their officers and against other shareholders: Gray v. Chaplin, 2 Sim. & St. 267; Hichens v. Congreve, 4 Russ. 562. But a suit can not be maintained by all or any portion of such shareholders, involving the interest of the corporation, unless the corporation itself will be bound by the judgment. In this case the plaintiff appears to be the sole assignee and owner of the corporate franchise, if such there be, and it might be difficult to determine, that the corporation would not be bound by the judgment, or that it was absolutely essential that the suit should be prosecuted in the corporate name. It is not, however, necessary to decide this question, for the rights and privileges granted do not appear to have become vested in a body corporate. They were granted to the persons named in the act, and to their associates and assigns, and not to a corporation. There is no proof that they have been conveyed to one. The plaintiff is admitted to be the sole owner, which is inconsistent with any other ownership. The grantees by the act are not constituted a body corporate, except upon certain conditions precedent. The privilege of becoming such a body at any future time during a continuance of the grant is accorded to them. They can become such a body only when a majority in interest elect to avail themselves of that privilege, and to organize according to the provisions of statute, chapter 76. There is no proof, that a majority in interest have at any time elected to become a corporate body, or that they have organized as such according to the provisions of the statute; and no proof therefore of the potential existence of such a corporation, as that named in the act. The objection can not prevail. zens. 4. The provisions of the act are alleged to be repugnant to the provisions of the constitution of this state. All the citizens of a country have by the common law a right in common to navigate its navigable waters. This is an inherent right, of which they can not be deprived by the sovereign of any government based upon an acknowledgment of the rights of its citiThis is in substance the conclusion to which the court came in the case of Williams v. Wilcox et al., 1 Will. Woll. & H. 477, in which the right of the British sovereign to destroy a common right of navigation in tide-waters was very elaborately investigated, both by the bench and the bar. The defendants have a right in common to the navigation of the Penobscot river; but the proof does not show, that by reason of being riparian proprietors or otherwise, they have any rights superior to those of other citizens. The right in common of all the citizens to the use of its navigable waters has been established by judicial decisions; and that right is not limited in this state to waters in which the tide ebbs and flows, but is admitted in lakes and fresh-water rivers which are navigable: Berry v. Carle, 3 Greenl. 269; Wadsworth v. Smith, 11 Me. 278 [26 Am. Dec. 525]; French v. Camp, 18 Id. 433 [36 Am. Dec. 728]; Brown v. Chadbourne, 31 Id. 9 [50 Am. Dec. 641]. In the province of New Brunswick it was fully admitted in such waters by a decision based upon the common law, in the case of Esson v. Mc-` Master, 1 Kerr. 501. The same doctrine has been admitted in most of the states of the Union, either by regarding freshwater rivers as navigable waters, or by regarding them as common ways for passage and transportation: Scott v. Willson, 3 N. H. 321; Commonwealth v. Chapin, 5 Pick. 199 [16 Am. Dea 386]; Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai, 307 [2 Am. Dec. 270]; Pilkin |