that other particular acts of bad conduct can not be given in evidence against an accused person; in Terry v. State, 13 Id. 71, as approving the decision that where the indictment averred that the defendant stole a bank note of the value of ten dollars the description of the property stolen was sufficiently particular; in Jones v. State, 11 Ind. 359, in support of the proposition that it is by no means clear that an indictment for having counterfeit money in possession with intent, etc., must describe the bills with the same minuteness that is required in an indictment for passing counterfeit bills; in Reed v. State, 8 Id. 204, it is cited in support of the statement that where an indictment is found in one circuit court, and the record of that court shows that the defendant was arraigned there, if the venue is afterwards changed to another circuit court, it will not be necessary to record the indictment in the latter court. Where the record shows that the arraignment and plea occurred in the first-named court, they need not be repeated in the latter; in Commonwealth v. Doran, 14 Gray, 38, it is cited to the point that where the word "year" is introduced to fix the period of an event, the Christian calendar is to be regarded as the one intended.

HOBBS V. BEAVERS.

[2 INDIANA, 142.]

SHERIFF SELLING UNDER EXECUTION IS NOT OBLIGED TO TAKE BID of an irresponsible person. REFUSAL OF SHERIFF TO CRY BID MADE BY STRANGER, unless the latter would make himself known or give some evidence of his ability to conform to the terms of the sale, does not render the sale void on account of the property being sold to a person who was not the highest bidder. ERROR to the Lagrange circuit court. The opinion states the

case.

J. B. Howe and W. H. Combes, for the plaintiff.

H. Cooper, for the defendant.

By Court, SMITH, J. This was an action of disseisin brought by Beavers against Hobbs. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The plaintiff having proved his title to the land in controversy by certain deeds dated in 1836, rested his case, The defendant claimed the premises in controversy by virtue of a sheriff's deed made pursuant to a sale under an execution which had issued upon a judgment in favor of one Fury against the plaintiff and others.

The main question being whether the sale under the execution was valid, some parol testimony was offered, with the view of proving that the sale was fraudulent, because a higher bid was offered than that at which the premises were struck off to the defendant Hobbs. It was proved that a stranger, unknown to any of the parties, bid ten dollars higher than Hobbs; but

the sheriff, at the suggestion of the attorney for the execution plaintiff, refused to cry the bid unless the said stranger would make himself known, or give some evidence of his ability to conform to the terms of the sale.

With reference to this evidence, the court instructed the jury that they had a right to inquire into the improper conduct of the sheriff who made the sale, and if they found it was not made to the highest bidder, but that another person bid ten dollars higher, and the attorney of the execution plaintiff, in the presence of Hobbs, the defendant, prevented it from being taken by the sheriff, the plaintiff in this suit would be entitled

to recover.

We think this instruction was improper, and calculated to mislead the jury. There was no evidence of any improper conduct of the sheriff, and the mere fact that some one bid ten dollars higher than the purchaser to whom the property was struck off, would not necessarily render the sale void. A sheriff, in making sales upon execution, is not obliged to take the bid of an irresponsible person; and to prove that he acted fraudulently in refusing to cry a bid under circumstances like those in this case, it should at least be shown that the person offering to bid was responsible.

The judgment is reversed, with costs. Cause remanded, etc.

STATE BANK OF INDIANA v. YOUNG ET AL.

[2 INDIANA, 171.]

COURT OF CHANCERY CAN NOT CORRECT MISTAKE MADE BY CLERK in enter. ing in the record the judgment of a court of law. WHERE JUDGMENT IS RENDERED PURSUANT TO PREVIOUS PAROL AGREE

MENT, the rendition of the judgment puts an end to the parol agreement, and the party in whose favor the judgment is rendered is estopped from saying that it does not accord with the previous parol contract.

WHERE CLERK HAS OMITTED TO MAKE ENTRY OF FILING OF PLEAS which are on file among the papers in a cause, a court of law may have the misprision amended at any time when proper application is made. APPEAL from the Owen circuit court. The opinion states the

case.

S. B. Gookins and A. Kinney, for the appellant.

C. Hester and D. Wallace, for the appellees.

By Court, BLACKFORD, J. This was a bill in chancery filed in the Owen circuit court by the appellant against the appellees.

A temporary injunction to restrain the prosecution of a certain writ of error sued out by the defendants was granted, and an answer was afterwards filed. The cause was submitted to the court upon bill, answer, and depositions. The injunction was dissolved and the bill dismissed.

The bill states that the bank sued the appellees, in the Owen circuit court, on a promissory note; that the defendants filed several pleas in bar of the action, upon which issues were joined; that during the trial, at the September term, 1841, the parties agreed to compromise the suit upon the following terms, viz. that the jury should be discharged, that the defendants would abandon their defense, and would give the plaintiff a judgment therein for the amount of the note, with interest and costs, in consideration that the defendants should have a stay of execution for a certain time; that, thereupon, the plaintiff and defendants appeared in court, and the court, at the request of the parties, discharged the jury; that the defendants then and there in open court gave the plaintiff a judgment for the amount of the note, interest, and costs, according to and in pursuance of said agreement; that the court gave judgment accordingly; and that the plaintiff entered a stay of execution as agreed on.

The bill further states that, by some mistake of the clerk of the court, the judgment was not entered by the clerk as given by the court, but that the same was entered as having been given by nil dicit; that the record does not show the impaneling or discharge of the jury; that the defendants fraudulently, in the plaintiff's absence, and without notice to her, caused the court, at the October term, 1845, to enter of record, nunc pro tunc, that, at the September term, 1841, certain pleas which were on the files among the papers in said cause were filed, the filing of which the clerk had omitted to notice on the order book.

The bill also states that the bank had performed her part of said agreement; that the defendants had not kept their part, but had sued out a writ of error to said judgment; and that, as the record does not show the said agreement for the compromise of the suit, which agreement was not reduced to writing, but was immediately carried into execution by the giving of said judgment, there is nothing in the record by which the same can be amended by a court of law.

The bill sets out the record of said judgment, which record is as follows: "The plaintiff appears by Kinney, Wright, and Gookins, attorneys, and the defendants, except the said John Johnson, by Champer, Hester, Secrest, and Bollman, their attorneys,

but say nothing in bar or preclusion of the plaintiff's action hereof against them, and the evidence being seen, and the court being sufficiently advised of and concerning the premises, it is therefore considered by the court here, that the plaintiff recover of the defendants (except said Johnson, who appears from the sheriff's return not to have been served with process) the sum of three thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven dollars and thirty-six cents, being the amount of the note and interest thereon and costs of protest, together with her costs by her in this suit expended, taxed at sixteen dollars and fiftyone cents, and the defendants in mercy, etc. It is agreed by the parties to this judgment, with the assent of the court, that there shall be a stay of execution for the term of four years, without security, upon condition that the defendant, at the expiration of one year, pay one fourth of the amount thereof, with interest on the whole amount to that time; at the expiration of two years from this date, they pay one other fourth thereof, with interest on the whole balance to that time; at the expiration of three years from this date, they pay one other fourth thereof, with interest as aforesaid; and at the expiration of four years, they pay the residue of said judgment, and interest, with costs. And in case of failure of the defendants to pay either of the said installments for sixty days after the same shall be due by the terms of this agreement, the plaintiff shall have a right to execution, as if this agreement had not been made."

The bill prays that the record may be so amended as to show the impaneling and discharge of the jury, and the abandoning of their defense by the defendants, and the giving of said judgment on said note by agreement. There is also a prayer that the defendants be enjoined from prosecuting their said writ of error, and for general relief.

We think that the case made by this bill is not within the jurisdiction of a court of chancery. The bill states that the dgment was correctly rendered, in the presence of both parues, according to the agreement. The gravamen of the bill is, that the clerk of the court made a mistake in entering the judg ment which the court had rendered. If there be such clerical mistake, it can not be corrected by a court of chancery. This is snown by the cases of Shotlinkirk v. Wheeler, 3 Johns. Ch. 275, and The Bank of Tennessee v. Patterson, 8 Humph. 363.

The complainant's counsel contend that the object of the bill is to enforce performance of the parol agreement of compro

mise. It does not appear to us that the bill can be sustained on that ground. We need not inquire whether the parol agreement is such a cae as a court of chancery could, under any circumstances, specifically enforce. The bill shows that after the parol agreement was made, the parties, in pursuance of it, appeared in court, and had a judgment rendered in the cause for the plaintiff. The rendition of that judgment put an end to the previous parol agreement on the subject. For the terms of that judgment we must look to the records alone of the court that rendered it. The plaintiff is estopped from saying that the judgment does not accord with the previous parol contract. In the case of a mere written agreement, neither party is permitted to say that the terms previously agreed upon by parol were different from those shown by the agreement in writing, and he will, therefore, notwithstanding the written agreement, resort to the one by parol. The rule is the same a fortiori in the case of a record.

What the bill says as to the entry made in the record relative to the filing of the pleas, is not material. The pleas were on file among the papers in the cause, but the clerk had omitted to make an entry of their being filed. The court of law surely could have that misprision amended at any time when proper application was made. If the amendment was objectionable for the want of notice to the bank of the motion, as is insisted upon by her counsel, she should have applied to the court of law, on that ground, to set the amendment aside.

We think the decree dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill is unobjectionable.

The decree is affirmed with costs, etc.

JUDGMENTS OF COURTS OF RECORD CAN NOT BE CONTRADICTED or falsified by proof aliunde: See Bank of Tennessee v. Patterson, 47 Am. Dec. 618, note 622, where other cases are collected.

COURT OF CHANCERY WILL NOT INTERFERE TO CORRECT CLERICAL MIS. TAKE made by the clerk in entering a judgment of a court of law: Cooper v. Butterfield, 4 Ind. 424, citing the principal case.

AMENDMENT OF JUDGMENT: See Smith v. Redus, 44 Am. Dec. 429, note 431, where other cases are collected.

SMITH ET AL. v. BLATCHFORD.

[2 INDIANA, 184.]

ATTACHMENT SUIT IS A SUIT INTER PARTES and not in rem, and can only affect the parties in it and their privies.