dictates of common honesty forbid. The law will not allow them to affect ambiguous expressions, and then permit them to put their own construction upon them. Here the words are emphatically their own, for the grantees-the public-were not there to dictate or suggest, and certainly the principle of selfinterest was sufficient to make them "careful not to prejudice themselves by using words of too extensive a meaning." It is incredible to me that intelligent parties could have used such emphatic and pointed words to include these blocks, if it was not the intention of the parties to embrace them in the dedication. It may be observed that several of the lots, set apart to Whitesides and Reynolds, are immediately in the rear of one of these blocks, and their value very much depended upon having the space in front of them open to the river, rather than have it obstructed by the individual property of Easton. And this may explain why even stronger expressions are used in the reservation contained in the deed to him than are found in the covenant to Easton. Possibly other words might have been used, so as to have left less room for controversy in the minds of some, that the parties did intend to include these blocks in the dedication; yet this is no reason for saying we will not believe that they intended what they have said. This would be reversing the rule of the law, and throwing every doubt or uncertainty in favor of the grantor. I can not entertain a doubt that by every rule of law and of reason we ought to hold that the premises in question were dedicated to the public use.

Nor do we think the rights of the public are barred by our statute of limitations, which prescribes that certain real actions shall be brought within seven years after possession taken by the defendants. Without stopping to inquire whether the rule that laches are not imputable to the public, or that time does not run against the government, applies to inferior municipal corporations, such as towns, cities, and counties, as well as to the state, we entertain no doubt that this statute has no application to the case before us. Whatever title to these public grounds may be vested in the city, she has not the unqualified control and disposition of them. They were dedicated to the public for particular purposes, and only for such purposes can they be rightfully used. For those purposes the city may improve and control them, and adopt all needful rules and regulations for their management and use; but she can not alien or otherwise dispose of them, for her own exclusive benefit, nor are they subject to the payment of her debts. At most, she but

holds them in trust for the benefit of the public. The right to the use of the property is not limited exclusively to the citizens of Alton, but the citizens of the state generally have an equal right with them in the appropriate enjoyment of the dedication. This is not like the case of property purchased by the city for her own exclusive use, which she could dispose of at her pleasure. Whether an adverse possession would run against property thus held, we do not now propose to inquire, but we entertain no doubt that this statute does not apply to this case, and that the rights of the public in this dedication have not been forfeited by non-user, or barred by adverse possession.

Russell's judgment against Easton, under which the defendant claims to hold title, was subsequent to the deeds, and as the deeds were recorded within the time prescribed by the statute then in force, the title conveyed by them could not be prejudiced by that judgment.

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded.
Judgment reversed.

CONSTRUCTION OF DEED SHOULD GIVE EFFECT TO EVERY PART of it if possible, and conflicting descriptions should be reconciled if possible: Shulta v. Young, 40 Am. Dec. 413. A construction which requires the rejection of an entire clause of the deed is inadmissible unless it becomes unavoidably necessary: Riggin v. Love, 72 Ill. 556, citing the principal case.

REFERENCE TO PLAN, MAP, OR SURVEY IN DESCRIPTION IN DEED, effect of: See Kennebec Purchase v. Tiffany, 10 Am. Dec. 60; Ilagun v. Campbell, 33 Id. 267; Stevens' Ex'rs v. Hollister, 46 Id. 154.

DEED SHOULD BE CONSTRUED MOST STRONGLY AGAINST GRANTOR where two constructions are possible and it is doubtful which should prevail: Jack son v. Hudson, 3 Am. Dec. 500; Rung v. Shoneberger, 26 Id. 95; Melvin v. Proprietors, 38 Id. 384; Budd v. Brooke, 43 Id. 321, and notes. See, as to the grantee's right to elect which construction shall prevail, Jackson v. Hudson, 3 Id. 500, and Armstrong v. Mudd, 50 Id. 545, and note.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS RUNS AGAINST CITY SEEKING TO RECOVER LAND DEDICATED to public use: Cincinnati v. First Presbyterian Church, 32 Am. Dec. 718, and note. See generally, as to whether the statute runs against the state or sovereign, or municipal corporation, the note to the case last cited, and United States v. White, 37 Id. 374; State v. Pratte, 40 Id. 140; Hoey v. Furman, 44 Id. 129; Moody v. Fleming, 48 Id. 210, and notes. In Logan Co. v. Lincoln, 81 Ill. 156, 158, it is held, citing the principal case, that as respects all public rights, or as respects property held for public use, upon trusts, municipal corporations are not within the statute of limitations; but in regard to contracts or mere private rights, the rule is different, and such corporations, like private citizens, may plead or have pleaded against them the statute of limitations. In that case it was decided that the authorities of a county, receiving under a public law for the benefit of a city, could not plead the statute of limitations.

LANDS DEDICATED CAN NOT BE APPLIED TO DIFFERENT PURPOSE: See Lo

Clercq v. Gallipolis, 28 Am. Dec. 641. When lands are dedicated for a pub

lic use, the public acquires a mere easement, and not a right to the soil itself: Pomeroy v. Mills, 23 Id. 207. As to the power of a municipal corporation to authorize an obstruction of its streets, see Humes v. Mayor of Knoxville, 31 Id. 657; Shepherd v. New Orleans, 41 Id. 269. To the point that a municipal corporation can not alien or dispose of its streets or other grounds dedicated for a public purpose, the principal case is cited in Kreigh v. City of Chicago, 86 Ill. 410, where it is held that such a corporation can not surrender a public street to park commissioners for use as a pleasure-ground. Nor can a right be acquired by prescription against such a corporation in its streets: Quincy v. Jones, 76 Id. 231, 242. Nor can lands dedicated for streets or squares be seized on execution for the debts of the corporation: Ransom v. Boal, 29 Iowa, 70, also citing the principal case. In New Orleans etc. R. R. Co. v. New Orleans, 26 La. Ann. 491, it is held, by Ludeling, C. J., dissenting that the legislature has power to change the destination of land dedicated for a particular purpose, and the principal case is referred to. In Chicago v. Wright, 69 Ill. 327, it is held, citing the principal case, that the right of use in the streets of a municipal corporation is not in the citizens of the corporation alone, but that the citizens of the whole state have an equality of right therein.

GARLAND V. BRITTON.

[12 ILLINOIS, 232.]

WHERE COURT HAS JUDICIAL SEAL, IT MUST BE AFFIXED to all its process; if the court has no seal, the clerk must use his private seal, and should certify that no public seal has been provided.

SERVICE OF UNSEALED WRIT IS WITHOUT VITALITY, and a decree or judg.

ment based upon such service is unauthorized and must be reversed. BILL to foreclose a mortgage. The opinion states the case.

Stuart and Edwards, for the plaintiff in error.

S. T. Logan, for the defendant in error.

By Court, TREAT, C. J. This was a suit in chancery to foreclose a mortgage. The summons issued and served on the defendant was not under the seal of the court. The bill was taken for confessed, and a decree of foreclosure entered. The defendant sued out a writ of error. The statute declares, that "all process issuing from the said circuit courts shall be sealed with the judicial seal which shall be provided for that purpose; but in case there shall not be a judicial seal, the clerk shall affix his private seal until a public one shall be provided:" R. S., c. 29, sec. 40. This statute is imperative in its requirements. If a court has a judicial seal, it must be affixed to all of its process; if it has not, the clerk must use his private seal, but he ought in such case to certify that no public seal has been provided, for the presumption is that every court has a seal. The writ in this case

did not purport to be under the seal of the court, nor the private seal of the clerk. It was, therefore, without vitality, and the service of the same was without effect. The defendant not being before the court, by the service of process, or by appearing in the case, the decree was unauthorized, and must be reverse. See Hunnum v. Thompson, 1 Scam. 238, and Anglin v. Nott, Id. 395.

Decree reversed.

PROCESS NOT UNDER SEAL, EFFECT OF: See Woolford v. Dugan, 35 Am. Dec. 52, and note discussing this subject; Stayton v. Newcomer, 44 Id. 524; Frosch v. Schlumpf, 47 Id. 655. As to the amendment of process by subsequently affixing a seal, see the cases cited in the note to Woolford v. Dugan, supra. See also Purcell v. McFarland, 35 Id. 734. In Besimer v. People, 15 Ill. 441, it is held, citing the principal case, that a writ of scire facias against cognizors in a recognizance for the appearance of a party, issued without the seal of the court, is void, and a return thereof ineffectual.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE ILLINOIS AND MICHIGAN CANAL v. PEOPLE.

[12 ILLINOIS, 248.]

ALTERNATIVE MANDAMUS MUST SHOW ON ITS FACE CLEAR RIGHT to the relief demanded by the relator, and must distinctly set forth all the material facts on which he relies, so that the same may be admitted or traversed. If it fails to do this, it is fatally defective.

OBJECTIONS TO SUBSTANTIAL DEFECTS IN ALTERNATIVE MANDAMUS may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.

APPLICATION for a mandamus. The opinion states the case.

R. S. Blackwell and I. N. Arnold, for the plaintiffs in error. N. H. Purple and J. V. A. Hoes, for the defendants in error. By Court, TREAT, C. J. This was a proceeding by mandamus to compel the trustees of the Illinois and Michigan canal to erect a bridge over the canal in La Salle county. Upon a petition and accompanying papers, the circuit court directed an alternative mandamus to issue. The writ, after reciting the term of the court and the names of the parties, proceeded to state that the court "did order that an alternative mandamus issue out of said court, directed to and commanding the said trustees, that immediately upon the receipt of said writ, they cause a bridge of suitable dimensions to be built over the Illinois and Michigan canal, at the center east and west of section ten, township thirty-three north, of range three east of the third princi

cipal meridian, in said county, the said canal at that point obstructing a public highway; or that they show cause to the contrary, before our said circuit court. Now, therefore, we, being willing that full and speedy justice be done in this behalf, as it is just, command you, the said trustees, that immediately after the receipt of this writ, you cause the said bridge to be built, or that you show cause to the contrary," etc. The writ was served on the trustees, but they failed to make any return thereto, and the court awarded a peremptory mandamus. The trustees sued out a writ of error from this court.

It is insisted, that the alternative mandamus is too defective to sustain the judgment. An alternative mandamus becomes the foundation of all the subsequent proceedings in the case. It answers the same purpose as the declaration in ordinary actions. It must show on its face a clear right to the relief demanded by the relator. He must distinctly set forth all the material facts on which he relies, so that the same may be admitted or traversed. The defendant is called upon to perform the particular act sought to be enforced, or, by a return, deny the facts alleged in the writ, or state other matters sufficient to defeat the relator's application. He is not required to answer the petition on which the writ is ordered. This is the well-established practice in the proceeding by mandamus: The King v. The Bishop of Oxford, 7 East, 345; The King v. The Margate Pier Company, 3 Barn. & Ald. 220; Clarke v. The Company of Proprietors, 6 Ad. & El., N. S., 898; The Commercial Bank v. The Canal Commissioners, 10 Wend. 26; The State v. Jones, 1 Ired. L. 129; Hoxie v. County Commissioners, 25 Me. 333; People v. Ransom, 2 Comst. 490.

In this case, the alternative mandamus is fatally defective. It does not set forth the facts on which the relators rely. It does not apprise the defendants of the grounds upon which the remedy is sought. They are not permitted to traverse a certain state of facts, or admit the same to be true and set up new matter in avoidance. The writ simply commands them to perform a particular act, or furnish an excuse for not doing it. It is not sufficient to uphold the proceedings. The judgment has no basis on which to stand.

The usual mode of taking advantage of a defective alternative mandamus, is by motion to quash. And that may be the only mode of reaching mere formal defects. But objections to substantial defects may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. This is like the case of a writ of error brought to reverse a judgment