in offering the quarter-section in separate parcels. Although it would ordinarily be advisable for officers to sell in smaller quantities, yet we are not prepared to say, that an entire quarter-section of land, which has been levied upon and designated as one tract, can not legally be sold without a division. It might require much less evidence to persuade the court that the land was injudiciously offered, where there has been an enormous sacrifice, as in this case, than where the property sold for a fair price. But we are not aware of any case, where mere inadequacy of price, has been held sufficient to set aside a sale, if it was conducted fairly and judiciously.

Another objection was taken upon the argument. And that is, that the coroner had no authority to make the sale. But the bill is not framed with a view to obtaining relief upon that ground. The coroner was authorized to act as sheriff, in case of a vacancy in that office, and there is no averment in the bill that there was a sheriff, nor is it even averred in any way that the coroner was not authorized to make the sale: Attorney General v. The Mayor of Norwich, 2 Myl. & Cr. 407; S. C., 14 Eng. Ch. 406.

At any rate, it was insisted that the coroner could not go on and complete the execution of a process, which had been directed to and partly executed by the sheriff, before the vacancy occurred. By chapter 99, section 18, of revised statutes, it is provided: "In case of a vacancy in the office of sheriff, by death, resignation, removal, or otherwise, the coroner shall do and perform all the duties pertaining to the office of sheriff," etc. We think, by a fair construction of this statute, the coroner may go on and finish the execution of process directed to the sheriff, the same as a new sheriff might, who succeeds the old one by an election.

The decree of the circuit court must be reversed, with costs, and the suit remanded, with leave to the complainant to amend his bill, and for further proceedings.

Judgment reversed.

MERE INADEQUACY OF PRICE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO SET ASIDE SALE of lands under execution: Coleman v. Bank of Hamburg, 49 Am. Dec. 671, note 673; Cowen v. Underwood, 16 Ill. 23; Gibbons v. Bressler, 61 Id. 114; both citing the principal case.

PROCESS SHOULD be Issued to CORONER where the sheriff is a party to the action: Collais v. McLeod, 49 Am. Dec. 376.

SALES EN MASSE UNDER EXECUTION, EFFECT OF: See Nesbitt v. Dallam, 28 Am. Dec. 236, note 244, where other cases are collected.

THE PRINCIPAL CASE IS DISTINGUISHED in Phelps v. Conover, 25 Ill. 313.

GODFREY V. CITY OF ALTON.

[12 ILLINOIS, 29.]

WHERE OWNERS OF LAND SURVEY AND LAY OFF Ground for PUBLIO USE as a street or landing, under an agreement among themselves, and make sales of adjoining lands in reference to and recognizing the exist ence of such street or landing, this amounts to a dedication of the land to the public, although no map be made of the survey.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS DOES NOT APPLY TO DEDICATION OF LAND to the public. Such dedication may be made by grant or written instrument, or it may be evidenced by acts and declarations, without writing, and is purely a question of intention.

DEDICATION OF LAND MAY BE MADE BY SURVEY AND PLAT ALONE, without any declaration, either oral or on the plat, where it is evident from the face of the plat that it was the intention of the proprietor to set it apart for the use of the public.

DEDICATION MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AND CONSTRUED with reference to the objects and purposes for which it was made, particularly in case of a public landing upon a navigable watercourse.

ALL ACCRETIONS TO PUBLIC LANDING NECESSARILY ATTACH TO IT, and form a part thereof.

WHEN EASEMENT IS GRANTED TO PUBLIC ON BANK OF NAVIGABLE STREAM, the right to use and treat it as a landing is undoubted.

WHERE PERSON has Dedicated Bank of NavIGABLE RIVER to the public, he has no interest in the bed of the stream which he can reserve to the prejudice of the enjoyment of the public easement over it.

AFTER VERDICT HAS BEEN FOUND FOR DEFENDANT ON SEVERAL PLEAS, he may withdraw one of them, if the verdict can be sustained on any one of the pleas.

TRESPASS quare clausum fregit. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

Billings and Parsons and William Martin, for the plaintiff in

error.

D. J. Baker, J. Gillespie and E. Keating, for the defendant in

error.

By Court, CATON, J. We shall rest our decision upon the single claim of declaration, arising from the survey made by Spaulding without investigating the various other claims insisted upon in behalf of the city.

Spaulding swears, that in 1832, Alton was intended and laid off by him at the request of the several owners, who agreed upon the plan, and that he made the survey. He surveyed block 92, and Front street. He says: "Front street was to extend into the river. It was laid out as a public highway and landing. The matter was talked over." Front street extended from block 92 down to and into the river. No pretense seems

to have been made at that time, nor until several years after, of any intention by Godfrey and Gilman to reserve to themselves anything south of Front street. They went on and made sales on block 92, in reference to and recognizing that street, and improvements were also made upon that block. This clearly amounted to a dedication of the space, thus made common for a street and public landing, according to the plan agreed upon among the proprietors, and the survey of Spaulding. The street and landing were laid off, and the owners of the soil proclaimed the purposes to which it should be devoted. All the other proprietors of the town, with whom the plan was agreed upon, as well as those who purchased with reference to that. plan and survey, paid a consideration for the dedication, and had a direct interest in insisting upon its perpetuity. It is true, that it does not appear that any map was made of this survey, but that was not essential to the validity of the declaration. The statute of frauds does not apply to the dedication of ground to the public. Such a dedication may be made by grant, or other written instrument, or it may be evidenced by acts and declarations, without writing. No particular form is required to the validity of a dedication. It is purely a question of intention. A dedication may be made by a survey and plat alone, without any declaration, either oral or on the plat, when it is evident from the face of the plat, that it was the intention of the proprietor to set apart certain grounds for the use of the public. An examination of the cases referred to on the argument will show that dedications have been established in every conceivable way by which the intention of the dedicator could be evinced. And great importance is frequently attached to the fact, that investments or improvements have been made, either by individuals or the public, in reference to a dedication, and with the knowledge of the proprietor.

A dedication must be understood and construed with reference to the objects and purposes for which it was made. This is peculiarly the case with a public landing upon a navigable watercourse. That is necessarily inseparable from the margin of the water, however that may fluctuate. Without this, its enjoyment would be precarious, and often destroyed. All accretions to a public landing must necessarily attach to and form a part of it, otherwise we should have the novel spectacle of a public landing separated from the water, as is in fact attempted in this case. Such a proposition does not require refutation.

The only question that arises here is, Was it the intention to

make this a public landing? That was the declared intention of the owners of the land, and their agreement with the other proprietors. But in the absence of any such expression, I should be equally clear, from the manner in which the ground was laid off, that it was for a public landing, as well as for a street. On the north side, it was bounded by block 92, and on the south by the river, varying in width according to the meanderings of the stream. This stream was a public highway, in contract with this, another easement is granted, and the very location of it shows that it was designed for the purpose of lading and unlading freight and landing passengers from the water communication, as much as the laying out of an interior street would show that it was designed for the use of travelers by land. The street and landing thus laid off was subsequently as it had been previously-used and enjoyed by the public, and was improved and extended into the river, both by natural accretions and by artificial means, and no pretense of any claim appears to have been set up on the part of any one, adverse to the full enjoyment of the public landing, until 1836, when the addition of Godfrey and Gilman to the town of Alton was platted by Burnap. By the marks upon this plat, we see for the first time a claim set up to a portion of the bed of the stream in front of this landing. The landing has since been filled up and extended into the river, so that it now covers the place designated on that plat, as claimed by the proprietors of that addition. For this claim we can see no pretense whatever. As we have already seen, long previous to this time, the entire space between block 92 and the river had been dedicated for a street and for a public landing, and to separate such a dedication from the river would destroy it.

But even if there had not been any previous dedication, we think the same construction should be given to the plat made in 1836. At that time, Front street, as laid out on that plat, covered the margin of the river, and extended twenty or thirty feet into the stream, and it was beyond this that a claim was indicated of the premises in question.

When an easement is granted to the public, upon the margin of a navigable stream, the right to use and treat it as a landing is undoubted. Having dedicated the banks of the river, this united the two easements, each of which was essential to the full enjoyment of the other; they had no interest in the bed of the stream, which they could reserve, to the prejudice of the enjoyment of the public easement over it.

Exceptions were taken to the instructions. These are very numerous, and some of them very long, and not very perspicuous, and may not have tended much to the enlightenment of the jury. It would be tedious and unprofitable to review them separately. Although some verbal alteration might well have been made to one or two of them, still, on the whole, we think. the law was not improperly laid down to the jury.

A verdict was returned for the defendant, upon all the pleas, after which the plea of liberum tenementum was allowed to be withdrawn, and this is assigned for error. In this there was nothing improper, nor was there anything prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff. That plea may not have been sustained by the evidence, yet the defendant was entitled to a judgment, if the verdict upon any one of the pleas could be sustained. Because the verdict upon one plea was erroneous, it would not vitiate the finding upon the others.

The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed, with costs.
Judgment affirmed.

DEDICATION OF LAND TO PUBLIC USE, HOW ESTABLISHED: See Dwinel v. Barnard, 48 Am. Dec. 507, note 514, where other cases are collected. Dedications are not within the statute of frauds, and may be made by parol: Warren v. Jacksonville, 15 Ill. 240; Rees v. Chicago, 38 Id. 338, both citing the principal case. Making a survey and laying off ground for public use amount to a dedication: Trustees v. Walsh. 57 Id. 369; Field v. Carr, 59 Id. 200, both citing the principal case. Dedication is purely a question of intention: Waugh v. Leech, 28 Id. 491, citing the principal case. Dedication may be established by grant or written instrument, or by the acts and declarations of the owner: McIntyre v. Storey, 80 Id. 130, citing the principal case.

PUBLIC LANDING, WHAT IS: See State v. Randall, 47 Am. Dec. 548. Ac cretions attach to and form part of a landing: Lovington v. St. Clair Co., 64 Ill. 65, citing the principal case.

ACCRETIONS TO BANK OF STREAM, TO WHOM BELONG: See Inhabitants of Deerfield v. Arms, 28 Am. Dec. 276, note 281, where other cases are collected.

CITY OF ALTON V. ILLINOIS TRANSPORTATION CO.

[12 ILLINOIS, 38.]

CONSTRUCTION OF DEED WHICH REQUIRES REJECTION OF WHOLE CLAUSE thereof will not be adopted, except from unavoidable necessity.

WHERE PLAT REFERRED TO IN DEED HAS UPON ITS FACE that to which the expressions of the deed can apply, the court will make the application rather than reject the words of the deed.

DEED CAPABLE OF TWO CONSTRUCTIONS MUST BE CONSTRUED MOST STRONGLY against the grantor.