erly authenticated according to the act of congress of May 26, 1790. The act of congress declares, that "the records and judicial proceedings of the courts of any state shall be proved, or admitted in any other court within the United States, by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court annexed (if there be a seal), together with the certificate of the judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, as the case may be, that the said attestation is in due form:" Prince, 221. Here the certificate of the clerk is to a record from the county court of Mecklenburg county. The certificate of Abram Keen certifies that he is the presiding magistrate of the county of Mecklenburg, but does not certify that he is the presiding magistrate of the county court of Mecklenburg, from whence the record purports to have Now it is true that the presiding magistrate of the county of Mecklenburg may be the presiding magistrate of the county court of Mecklenburg county, but the certificate does. not affirmatively state that fact; and the act of congress, in our judgment, requires that the certificate should be from the presiding magistrate of the particular court from which the certified copy of the record is taken, and that fact should affirmatively appear on the face of the certificate. We, therefore, are of the opinion this objection ought to have been sustained by the court below.

come.

The third exception taken is to the admissibility of a receipt given by Reuben M. Rainey, to the executors of Thomas Cleaton, for one of the negroes in controversy, dated the sixteenth of March, 1818, and witnessed by Edward Travis. It appeared, on the trial, that Travis, the subscribing witness, was living in the state of Tennessee. The defendant objected to the receipt being read in evidence, until its execution was proved, by proving the handwriting of the subscribing witness, it appearing he resided beyond the jurisdiction of the court. The objection. was overruled, on the ground that the execution of the receipt. was sufficiently proved by one witness, who stated, "he felt confident that Reuben M. Rainey signed the same, and was also confident that the signature of the witness thereto was genuine." The rule is well settled, that where a subscribing witness to an instrument resides without the jurisdiction of the court, the execution of the instrument may be proved, by proving the handwriting of the witness. This is a relaxation of the old rule, which required the subscribing witness to be examined by commission, if living, and residing abroad: Barnes v. Trompowsky, 7 T. R. 265; Watts v. Kilburn, 7 Ga. 356. Although

we do not hold that this receipt was admissible in evidence on the ground that its execution was duly proved, yet we think it was properly admissible in evidence on the ground that it was more than thirty years old, and therefore its execution need not have been proven at the trial.

In admitting written documents in evidence, when more than thirty years old, the courts do not go altogether upon the presumption that the subscribing witnesses are presumed to be dead, but they adopt that limit of time, as a rule of practical convenience, beyond which proof of the execution of written instruments will not be required, although the subscribing witnesses may be alive: 1 Stark. Ev. 343. In Doe v. Burdett, 31 Eng. Com. L. 18, Lord Denman said: "The will is more than thirty years old, and, therefore, proves itself without calling any witnesses, even were they all alive:" See Doe v. Wolley, 15 Eng. Com. L. 21, and Jackson v. Christman, 4 Wend. 282, to the same point. The receipt is shown to have come out of the hands of the individual to whom it was originally given, and who was properly entitled to the custody of it, and ought to have been admitted in evidence without proof of its execution by the subscribing witness, being more than thirty years old.

The next objection is to the admission of the sayings of Reuben M. Rainey, as testified to by Catharine Rainey. This witness stated, "she had often heard Reuben M. Rainey say that the slaves, Minerva and Stephen, were brought from Virginia, and were given to Reuben M. Rainey's wife and children, by his wife's father, Thomas Cleaton, and could not be sold for Reuben M. Rainey's debts, or in any other way for said Rainey's benefit."

It does not appear at what time these declarations of Reuben M. Rainey were made, and in that view of the question, they were clearly illegal, as was ruled by this court in Carter v. Buchanon, 3 Ga. 519, 520. The defendant in error, however, concedes that the declarations of Reuben M. Rainey were improperly admitted in evidence, but insists that there is sufficient evidence, on the part of the plaintiff below, to sustain the verdict, without the evidence of Catharine Rainey. The great question in issue between the parties on the trial was, whether the slave, Minerva, went into the possession of Reuben M. Rainey, as a gift, before the death of Thomas Cleaton, or whether he obtained possession of the slave after the death of Cleaton, under his will. Upon this point, the testimony is so much in conflict, that it is very difficult to determine on which side is the weight of the evidence.

The illegal evidence as to the sayings of Reuben M. Rainey, having been admitted by the court as competent evidence, to the jury, to determine that issue, might, and in all probability did, decide the question in favor of the plaintiffs. We can not say that the jury were not influenced by the testimony of Catharine Rainey; and where illegal testimony has been admitted, which not only might, but most probably did, influence the mind of the jury, a new trial ought to be granted: Marquand v. Webb, 16 Johns. 89.

The next objection is to the charge of the court to the jury. The defendant relied on the statute of limitations, and the court charged the jury, that they could find a verdict in favor of such of the plaintiffs as they might believe not to be barred by the statute of limitations, and against those whom they might believe to be barred by the statute. It appears from the record, that some of the plaintiffs had been of age long enough to be barred by the statute, and that some of them had not been of age a sufficient period of time for the statute to operate as a bar. The charge of the court was in accordance with the rule established by this court, in Jordan v. Thornton, 7 Ga. 517, decided at the last term in Milledgeville, and, therefore, constitutes no ground of error. It appears from the record, that the jury found a verdict for four of the plaintiffs only, and did not find a verdict either for or against the other four-there being eight plaintiffs. The jury ought to have returned a verdict, under the charge of the court, in favor of such of the plaintiffs as were not barred by the statute of limitations, and against those who were barred by the statute. A general verdict is a finding, by the jury, in the terms of the issue or issues referred to them: Tidd's Pr. 798. One of the issues referred to the jury was as to the right of all the plaintiffs to recover from the defendant, or only a part of them. As this question was submitted to the jury, it was their duty to have passed upon it: Brockway v. Kinney, 2 Johns. 211; Van Benthuysen v. De Witt, 4 Id. 214.

The verdict was imperfect, inasmuch as it did not find all the issues that were submitted. It was as much the duty of the jury to have found against the plaintiffs who were barred by the statute, as it was to have found in favor of those who were not barred. The court, however, after this imperfect verdict had been received and recorded, and the jury dispersed, four days thereafter, permitted the jury to reassemble, and state what they intended to find by their verdict, and to amend it accordingly. To allow the jury, after their verdict had been received

and recorded, and they discharged from the further consideration of the cause, and mingled with the parties, the witnesses, and their fellow-citizens generally; ascertained, perhaps, the wishes of one of the parties, the intention of the witnesses, or the state of public opinion, in relation to their verdict-I say, to allow the verdict to be amended, under such circumstances, according to what the jury might then state it was their intention to find (such intention not appearing on the face of the verdict), would be a dangerous and mischievous practice. In Spencer v. Goter, 1 H. Black. 79, the court refused to alter the verdict of a jury, unless it clearly appears, on the face of the verdict, that the alteration would be agreeable to the intention of the jury, and that the proper remedy was a new trial. Although no mischief may have resulted to the parties from the amendment of the verdict, in this particular case, under the circumstances stated in the record, yet we are unwilling, by our judgment, to establish such a precedent.

Let the judgment of the court below be reversed, and a new trial granted.

DISABILITY OF TENANT IN COMMON PREVENTS RUNNING OF Statute of LIMITATIONS against him, but his co-tenants not under a disability will be barred: See note to Moore v. Armstrong, 36 Am. Dec. 78; Wade v. Johnson, 42 Id. 422; McFarland v. Stone, 44 Id. 325.

AMENDING VERDICT.-In Mitchell v. State of Georgia, 22 Ga. 236, it was held, distinguishing the principal case, that where the jury had not been called over by name when the verdict was rendered, the reassembling of the jury by the court within five or ten minutes after their dispersion, and hav ing each juror swear that he was in the box when the verdict was read in open court, that he heard it read, that it found the defendant guilty of murder (the verdict already rendered being in fact to that effect), and that he agreed to it, was not error on the part of the court. A jury can not be recalled to alter or amend a verdict after they have been discharged: Rigg v. Cook, 46 Am. Dec. 462; Walters v. Junkins, 16 Id. 585. In Anderson v. Green, 46 Ga. 376, the principal case is cited to the effect that a plain and unmistakable verdict must speak for itself, and the jury can not be interrogated as to their intention by the party against whom the verdict is rendered. It is held that a special verdict, when concluding by mistake with a general finding, may be amended by striking out the general finding: Huchinson v. Kelly, 39 Am. Dec. 250. And the court may amend and correct a verdict when it is erroneous on immaterial matters: Apthorp v. Backus, 1 Id. 26; Little v. Larrabee, 11 Id. 43; Friedly v. Shutz, 11 Id. 691; Rew v. Barker, 14 Id. 515, and note 518.

VERDICT NOT COVERING ISSUES MADE BY PLEADINGS ON MOTION. The principal case is cited to this effect in Ga. 649; Van Leonard v. Eagle & P. Mfg. Co., 60 Id. 546. coffer, 7 Am. Dec. 708; Jenkins v. Richardson, 22 Id. 82. wealth v. Cook, 9 Id. 465; Barrett v. Wills, 26 Id. 315.

MAY BE SET ASIDE Wicker v. Woods, 55 See Jones v. Zolli. But see Common. A party can not

complain of the absence of a finding on a point on which there is no evidence: Armstrong v. Prewitt, 32 Am. Dec. 338.

CERTIFICATE OF JUDGE TO FOREIGN JUDGMENT, WHEN SUFFICIENT: See West v. McConnell, 25 Am. Dec. 191; Merriwether v. Garwin, 27 Id. 650. The principal case is cited to the effect that such certificate should affirmatively show all particulars concerning the extent of the jurisdiction of the court over which the certifying magistrate presides, in Buck v. Grimes, 62 Ga. 607.

CERTIFICATE OF CLERK TO TRANSCRIPT OF Judgment of ANOTHER STATE is sufficient, if it complies with the form used in that state: McRae v. Stokes, 37 Am. Dec. 698; Adams v. Lisher, 25 Id. 102.

ADMISSION OF INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE, When Ground FOR NEW TRIAL: See note to Crary v. Sprague, 27 Am. Dec. 116; Stephens v. Crawford, 44 Id 680, and note. It is not ground for a new trial, when no injury can have been suffered from its admission: Id.; Landon v. Humphrey, 23 Am. Dec. 333; Crosby v. Fitch, 31 Id. 745; Schlencker v. Risley, 38 Id. 100, and note. Contra: State v. Allen, 9 Id. 616; see Merriam v. Mitchell, 29 Id. 514.

DECLARATIONS OF FORMER OWNER, after parting with possession or title, not admissible. The principal case is cited to this effect in Gill v. Strozier, 32 Ga. 696; Williams v. Terrell, 54 Id. 464. The cases on this subject in this Bories are referred to in the note to Maxwell v. Ilarrison, ante, p. 385.

DEED MORE THAN THIRTY YEARS OLD, COMING FROM PROPER CUSTODY: in such case, the execution of the instrument need not be proved. To this effect the principal case is cited in Gardner v. Granniss, 57 Ga. 555; and in Eagle & P. Mfg. Co. v. Welch, 61 Id. 448, to the effect that a subscribing witness beyond the jurisdiction of the state need not be produced: See Crane v. Marshall, 33 Am. Dec. 631, and note.

WORTHY V. JOHNSON.

18 GEORGIA, 236.]

ALL PARTIES NEED NOT HAVE INTEREST IN ALL MATTERS CONTAINED IN SUIT to sustain the bill against the charge of multifariousness; it being sufficient if each party has an interest in some matter common to all the parties. CREDITORS AND HEIRS CAN SUE ONLY THROUGH LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEDENT, except there be collusion, insolvency, unwillingness to collect the assets, or some other special fact. Therefore, where the bill. expressly charges an application to the administrator to sue, and a refusal, he was properly made a co-defendant.

TO SET ASIDE PURCHASES MADE BY EXECUTORS AT THEIR OWN SALE, heirs must resort to equity. So, also, when it is necessary to sue otherwise than through the legal representative of the estate.

RULES RELATING TO MARKET OVERT IN ENGLAND have not generally been recognized or enforced in this country.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS SELLING PROPERTY OF DECEDENT UNDER. AUTHORITY OF LAW have no power to bind the estate by warranty, though they may, if they choose, bind themselves by a personal obliga tion of this kind.