122 [14 Am. Dec. 779]; Harris v. Harrison, 1 Brown, 161. And this rule this court now adopts. For this reason, the judgment of the late district court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the Racine county circuit court for the further action of that court. MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF COVENANT OF SEISIN: See the prior cases in this series cited in note to Spring v. Chase, 39 Am. Dec. 597. In Messer v. Oestreich, 52 Wis. 695, the principal case is cited as correctly stating the measure of damages in such action. MOORE v. KENDALL. [2 PINNEY, 99; 1 CHANDLER, 33.] JURY SHOULD ATTEMPT TO RECONCILE ALL CONTRADICTIONS AND DISCREP. ANCIES IN TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES, and it is error for the court to instruct them that such attempt should not be made. EXECUTED CONTRACT OF SALE, ALTHOUGH MADE ON SUNDAY, is not void, either between the parties thereto or third persons. REPLEVIN. The opinion states the facts. Ben C. Eastman, for the defendant in error. By Court, HUBBELL, J. If the case were to be decided on the weight of evidence as shown by the bill of exceptions, the judgment of the district court might be affirmed. But this court does not sit in the capacity of a jury. The only error assigned related to the charge of the judge. The action was brought to recover a quantity of merchandise which had been levied upon by the defendant in error, as sheriff of Grant county, under executions in his hands against the property of James Moore. The plaintiff in error claimed as a purchaser from James Moore. On the trial, James Moore and John Stone were called as witnesses by the plaintiff, to prove a sale and transfer of the property from James Moore to Jonathan B. Moore, the plaintiff in error. Both the fact and the time of the sale became material questions. There was some contradiction or discrepancy between the two witnesses, Stone and Moore, on these points. The sale, if made at all, appears to have been made either on the first day of November, 1847, which was Sunday, or between the first and seventh of November. The executions were put into the sheriff's hands on the second, and an actual levy was effected on the tenth; but an effort AM. DEO. VOL. LII-10 was made to effect a levy on the sixth, which was resisted, but which must be regarded as having fixed the sheriff's lien on the goods. The court instructed the jury as follows: 1. "That it would be reasonable and proper in the jury to reconcile slight discrepancies in the testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses, but if there were contradictions on material points or facts, equally within their knowledge, that is to say, James Moore and John Stone, the plaintiff's witnesses, it certainly was not the duty of the jury to reconcile such contradictions; it was the plaintiff's misfortune to have brought on the stand witnesses contradicting each other thus, on material facts equally within the knowledge of each; and the weight of their testimony would be materially weakened, if not almost entirely destroyed.” The errors assigned on the second branch of the charge were abandoned; and the third was as follows: "That if the said sale by the plaintiff to his brother James Moore was made on Sunday, then said sale and transfer, made on that day, was absolutely void, and the purchaser, Jonathan B. Moore, acquired no right or title to the property in dispute." To these instructions exceptions were properly taken, and the question for this court is, whether such instructions were correct. In regard to the matter of discrepancy, I think the court erred. There was clearly a question of fact for the jury: Cowden v. Reynolds, 12 Serg. & R. 283; Lawrence v. Barker, 5 Wend. 301; and the effect of the charge was to cut off inquiry on the subject. Whether the discrepancies were material or slight, could make no difference that I can understand; and in either case, it should have been left to the jury to try and reconcile them. If, upon a full and fair attempt, they failed, still it would not follow as an inference of law that the testimony of the one was to neutralize that of the other. Conflicting witnesses are not necessarily to be regarded as opposing powers of equal momentum, which are to be measured by mechanical rules. The court should have told the jury that, failing to reconcile their statement, "on material points, equally within the knowledge of each," it became their duty to inquire whether each of the witnesses was equally credible; whether the statements were equally consistent; whether, from their character, appearance, and relations to the parties, or from any other circumstances connected with their testimony, more reliance ought to be placed upon the one than the other. Very possibly one of them was unworthy of credit; at any rate, it has been urged on the argument by counsel for the defendant in error, that one of them was absolutely perjured-and if so, certainly his statements ought not to have been sufficient to defeat those of the other. Looking at the bill of exceptions, I am inclined to think the charge of perjury is not sustained; but that most of the discrepancy arose, not from statements of fact, but from one of them having sworn to a conclusion of law. And in this view of the case I think their statements might have been reconciled. At all events, it could not happen until the jury should find, in view of all the circumstances I have mentioned, that the weight of evidence was equally balanced, that the court could properly say to them, as a matter of law, "that it was the plaintiff's misfortune to have brought to the stand witnesses contradicting each other," and that "the weight of their testimony was greatly weakened, if not almost entirely destroyed." With respect to the other branch of the instructions, it seems to me the court below was equally in error. Admitting the sale of the goods to have been made on Sunday, it by no means follows that it was void for all purposes. There was an actual transfer of property from James Moore to his brother, the plaintiff in error; and it was not possible thereafter for James Moore or his assigns to recover it back. Between the parties, it was an executed contract; and, unless the defendant in error could show some claim superior to that of James Moore, the vendor, he could not disturb the possession of the vendee. On this point the authorities are conclusive: Inhabitants of Worcester v. Eaton, 11 Mass. 369; 13 Eng. Com. L. 351; 9 Id. 193. This case must not be confounded with others. The defendants in error do not claim against James Moore as an insolvent debtor, with respect to the transfer in question. They do not raise the question of a fraudulent sale. They stand upon the naked right arising from a void sale; a sale void, simply because it was made on Sunday. For the purposes of this question. James Moore may be assumed to be a man of ample means and of honest purposes. The point before us is simply this: whether any man, under any circumstances, can make a valid transfer of property on Sunday. If he can not, the instructions were right; if he can, they were wrong. I think it would be carrying the rule of law further than the policy of the statute requires, and further than the current of decisions on this subject warrants, to deny that such a transfer, when actually completed without fraud, should stand between the parties. After such a transfer, notwithstanding the supposed or real violation of the statute, the vendee may claim the protection of that well-settled principle of law, In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis. It is not without regret that I am drawn to these conclusions with respect to the instructions of the learned and able judge of the court below. With my impressions of the merits of the case, as presented in the testimony, I could wish the jury had been left free to pass upon the main questions, which seem to me to be, whether there was an actual sale of the goods before the levy; and if there was, whether such sale was fraudulent as to the creditors. I do not mean by these remarks to prejudice the case; but inasmuch as the jury may have been improperly controlled by the charge of the judge, there must be a new trial. Judgment reversed, with costs. CONTRACTS MADE ON SUNDAY, WHEN VOID: See this subject discussed at length in note to Coleman v. Henderson, 12 Am. Dec. 290; also, Kepner v. Keefer, 31 Id. 460; O'Donnel v. Sweeney, 39 Id. 336; Allen v. Deming, 40 Id. 179; Adams v. Hamell, 43 Id. 455; Lovejoy v. Whipple, 46 Id. 157; Butler v. Lee, Id. 230. JURY IS TO JUDGE OF EFFECT OF TESTIMONY WHEN AMBIGUOUS: Irish v. Smith, 11 Am. Dec. 648; Gordon v. Little, Id. 632; Flemming v. Marine Ins. Co., 33 Id. 33; Cohea v. Hunt, 41 Id. 589; Bank of Pittsburgh v. Whitehead, 36 Id. 186; Gray v. Allen, 45 Id. 523. THE PRINCIPAL CASE IS CITED to the effect that the loaning of money on Sunday is "business" within the meaning of the statute, and presumptively illegal, in Troewert v. Decker, 51 Wis. 52. ELDERKIN V. SPURBECK. [2 PINNEY, 129; 1 CHANDLER, 69.] JUSTICE OF PEACE SHOULD DISMISS ACTION where the amount in controversy is shown by the declaration to exceed his jurisdiction. Such dismissal must be made without the imposition of costs on the plaintiff. WRIT of error from a judgment of the district court. The opinion states the facts. E. Elderkin, for the plaintiff in error. Kelsey and Gale, for the defendant in error. By Court, JACKSON, J. There are but two questions that properly arise in this cause. First, had the justice before whom the cause was commenced any jurisdiction? Secondly, conceding the justice had no jurisdiction, were costs properly awarded against the plaintiff? The first question can readily be answered by reference to the declaration; from which it is manifest that the plaintiff seeks a recovery for the price of a horse valued at seventy-three dollars, and for the expenses incurred in his keeping, etc., amounting to the further sum of twenty-five dollars. It is clear, therefore, that the justice had no jurisdiction, the "debt or the sum claimed " by the defendant exceeding fifty dollars. The second question, we think, is equally free from doubt. It is a well-settled principle, that where an action is dismissed for want of jurisdiction in the court, whether it be a court of limited or superior jurisdiction, no costs can properly be awarded: Williams v. Blunt, 2 Mass. 207. And although the justice before whom this cause was brought, very properly dismissed it for want of jurisdiction, yet, as the want of jurisdiction deprived him of the power to award judgment for costs against the plaintiff, the district court, to which this cause was brought up by certiorari, should for this reason have reversed and not affirmed the judgment of the justice. The judgment of the district court is therefore reversed, with costs. STATE EX REL. DUNNING v. GILES. [2 PINNEY, 166; 1 CHANDLER, 112.] CONSTITUTION OF WISCONSIN, IN TEMPORARILY ADOPTING OLD TERRITORIAL LAWS not inconsistent therewith, did so that no inconvenience might arise by reason of a change of government, but did not intend to extend the political disabilities of certain inhabitants of the territory to the citi zens of the state. CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST RE-ELECTION of sheriffs does not apply to those persons who hold such office at the time of the adoption of the constitution, but only to such as should be elected under it. ELIGIBILITY OF CANDIDATE WHO RECEIVES HIGHEST NUMBER OF VOTES at an election does not have the effect of electing the person receiving the next highest number. 1 MANDAMUS. The opinion states the facts. Catlin, Abbott, and George B. Smith, for the relator. A. L. Collins and J. T. Clark, for the respondent. By Court, Srow, C. J. The questions to be decided in this matter are, first, whether a person holding the office of sheriff at the adoption of the constitution was eligible to that office, having received the highest number of votes at the late general |