strip of land upon which the plaintiff claimed |ness block, that part of it immediately west they were about to encroach belonged to them of the dwelling had no east wall of its own and not to the plaintiff. The case was heard separate from the west wall of the dwelling, on bill and answer and the court below filed from the top of the passage or alleyway to an opinion, in which the principal material the top of the dwelling-the west wall of the facts were found, and the respective conten- dwelling serving for that purpose-but south tions of the parties were stated, as follows: of and beyond the south line of the dwelling "In the early part of the nineteenth cen- the business block did have a separate and tury, Isaac Beeson owned in fee simple, in-distinct east wall and standing upon the strip ter alia, a lot in the borough of Uniontown, of land in dispute. About 1851 a third story Pa., situate in the block between what is was added to a part of the business block, now Beeson avenue and Morgantown street and its construction from the top of the old on the south side of and fronting about 64 said west end wall of the dwelling it was feet 51⁄2 inches on Main street, extending just built above the gable, so that the east back the same width, 150 feet to South street. wall for that part of the third story of the The first improvement on the said lot was a business block was only the said west wall two-story brick dwelling house, which ex- of the dwelling extending upwards. Eventutended from what has long been known as ally the tramway in the passage or alleyway the Harah lot on the east, along Main street was abandoned, and the opening bricked up by westwardly 27.15 feet. The west end of this extending that part of the north and south dwelling was a regular 9-inch brick wall, walls of the business block eastwardly to the and from the square of the building up was west end of the dwelling, and thus taking the a triangular gable, highest in the center, slop- alleyway space into the east first floor room of ing to the north and south with the pitch of the business block, and thereafter the west an ordinary comb roof. wall of the dwelling from the ground up was "About 1832, some years after the erection the east wall of the business block. When the of the said dwelling, Mr. Beeson erected on a alleyway was closed and the walls extended, part of the said lot a partly one and a part- the brick were not interlocked in the front ly two story brick building for a business and west wall of the dwelling as they had block, including in part and extending from been from the top of the alleyway to the top the west wall of the dwelling on the east of the square of the dwelling when the busiside to the adjoining property on Main street ness block was originally constructed, but on the west. At the eastern end of the busi- left a broken joint, and as a consequence it ness block it was so constructed that there is not difficult to determine the original outwas a passage or small alleyway to the im-line of the foundation and walls of the dwellmediate west of the dwelling, which alley or ing. passageway was open to about the height of the first story, and there was operated through it for many years a tramway for the owned the fee-simple title to the entire lot transportation of merchandise, etc., from during all the time of the construction G the Main street to and from the warehouse in said buildings and the making of the said the rear. At the top of the Main street and other changes. In effect, when the said end of this passage or alleyway an arch changes were completed, the two said buildwas constructed, and above it the busi- ings were really but one building, partly one, ness block was extended eastwardly to and partly two, and partly three stories high, connected with the west wall of the dwell-part used for a dwelling and part for busiing. The front or Main street wall of ness purposes, so that the west wall of the the business block was built flush or even dwelling and that part of the east wall of with the front wall of the dwelling, and from the top of the passage or alleyway the construction was such that the brick were interlocked so that from the aforesaid arch up to the square of the dwelling the two front walls were so joined as now to appear and look like a single wall all built at the same time. The business block extended southwardly beyond the south line of the dwell ing at its southwest corner, and from that corner southwardly the east wall of the business block was built so as that its western side was even and flush with the western side of the west end wall of the dwelling, and its eastern side was about nine inches east of the said west side of the west end wall of the dwelling, and it was built on the strip of land in dispute. "Mr. Isaac Beeson or his lineal descendants the business block were one and the same and was in fact nothing more nor less than what is termed a 'cross-wall,' up to the top of the dwelling. If the entire structure be considered as two buildings, this cross-wall is just as much a part of one as of the other,. as without it the dwelling has no west wall, and without it the business block has no east wall, at least the extent of the dwelling, and none at all if plaintiff's contentions prevail. "By due process of law it so happened that in 1890 the fee-simple title to the whole of said lot and improvement was vested in Miss Jennie B. Beeson and her sister, Mrs. Louisa Mathers, subject to the dower rights of their mother, Mrs. Amanda L. Beeson. At and for some considerable time before the date last aforesaid, R. F. Hopwood, Esq., acted as "From the aforesaid, it will be observed agent f the sale of various pieces of real sister, and as such agent he negotiated with tending from Main street through to South the representatives of the Uniontown Young street. It is contended on the part of the Men's Christian Association, and at least one plaintiff that his agreement and conveyance other party, for the sale of the western part called for and carried the entire 'property of the said lot, which was proceeded in so heretofore used as a dwelling,' and all that that on September 10, 1890, a written agree- part of the lot covered by it, and since the ment was concluded between the Beesons first two stories of the said west or cross and a representative of the Y. M. C. A. for wall were built as a part of the dwelling the sale and purchase of all that part of the house, his lot must of necessity extend to said lot described as follows, viz.: 'All that and include everything to the line that was certain lot of ground with the dwelling there- the out and west side of the dwelling house on erected, situate on the south side of Main when it was originally constructed, which street, Uniontown, Pa., bounded and de- was the east side of the aforesaid passage or scribed as follows: Beginning at corner of alleyway when the business block was first lot of C. Claggett's heirs and running thence completed, and he further claimed that the eastwardly along Main street about thirty- aforesaid purchase by the Y. M. C. A. was eight feet to corner of the house lately used only to the corner of the said dwelling and as a dwelling by said first parties, now used did not include the east wall of the business for offices; thence southwardly at right an-block. The defendants contend that the congles with Main street 150 feet to South street; thence westwardly along said street about 38 feet to corner of Claggett lot aforesaid; thence northwardly by said lot 150 feet to Main street, the place of beginning. It being the property known as the Beeson store property, having erected thereon a threestory brick storehouse on Main street and a brick warehouse and stable on South street. tract for the sale to the Y. M. C. A. antedating that to the plaintiff, and 'it being the property known as the Beeson store property having erected thereon a three-story brick storehouse on Main street' and the distance expressed, while it says 'about thirty-eight feet,' being within the fractional part of an inch to carry the strip of land in controverSy to the Y. M. C. A. and through it to the defendants, the said wall and strip of ground belonged to them. And in support of their Contention the aforesaid R. F. Hopwood testified, as representing the Beesons, to having made the actual measurement on the ground so as to include the said wall and strip of land in the sale to the Y. M. C. A., and that it was clearly and distinctly the purpose to sell to the Y. M. C. A. the three-story building, and there is other evidence to the same effect. And in addition there is evidence of a fence having once been maintained from the rear of the building toward South street on the line claimed by the defendants, indicating such division of the said lot by the Beesons years ago-which appeared by marks on the ground and by reference to plan No. 2 at Which said agreement on August 12, 1907, was assigned by the proper authorities of the Y. M. C. A., with the approval of the court of common pleas of Fayette county at No. 185, September term, 1907, to Josiah V. Thompson and John D. Ruby, and in pursuance thereof on December 12, 1907, the said Jennie B. Beeson et al. executed a deed for the said premises to the said Thompson and Ruby, subject to the dower interests of Mrs. Amanda L. Beeson, and at a later date the said Thompson and Ruby sold and agreed to convey the said premises to Lee Stern, Joseph Stern, and Samuel Stern, the other defendants. On December 29, 1893, more than three years after the Y. M. C. A. had purchased and taken possession of the 'threestory storehouse,' the plaintiff herein purchased by articles of agreement the remain-tached to defendants' answer. There is some der of said lot, described as follows, viz.: 'All that certain lot of ground situate on the south side of Main street in the borough of Uniontown, Fayette county, Pa., and running through from Main to South street, bounded on the east by lot of John S. Harah and on the west by lot of Y. M. C. A., being the same property heretofore used as a dwelling by said first parties, now occupied by offices of O. P. Markley et al.' Which article of agreement was followed by a general warranty deed dated April 2, 1894, recorded in the recorder's office of Fayette county, in Deed Book, vol. 128, p. 334, in which said deed the description is the same as that quoted above from agreement. "The aforesaid facts developed the contentions between the parties to this action as to the ownership of the said cross-wall, the entire east wall of the business block, and the strip of ground about nine inches wide ex conflict in the testimony regarding the agency of Mr. Hopwood, but in our opinion none of a positively serious character; and we cannot conclude otherwise than as testified by Mr. Hopwood in that regard, and also as to measurements made by him on Main street, as, if it had not been the intention to include the wall and strip of ground in dispute in the Y. M. C. A. agreement, the measurement to the broken joint where the alleyway was walled up and the point to where it would then have extended would have been a very simple matter and could easily have been determined exactly. If that had been the intention, Mr. Hopwood's measurement was off 84 inches, whereas taking what we' find the intention to have been, his measurement was correct to within three-eighths of one inch. "In view of the foregoing and of the fact that, at the date of the contract with the Y. * M. C. A., the said Jennie B. Beeson and exceptions are filed, they must be heard and Louisa Mathers were the owners of the en- passed upon by the court below "as upon a tire lot, we conclude and find as a fact that rule for new trial," and "upon appeal to the it was the purpose and intention of all par- Supreme or superior court such matters only ties in interest to sell and purchase the en- as have been so excepted to and finally passtire three-story brick building and the grounded upon shall be assignable for eron which it and its necessary walls stood, ror." New Cumberland Borough v. Riverton and, having concluded that the wall in con- Cons. Water Co., 232 Pa. 531, 81 Atl. 799. troversy is a necessary part of the business Court rule 29 provides that "each error reblock or three-story building, the sale of the lied upon must be specified particularly and said three-story building included the said by itself," and rule 31 provides that, when wall, and, this being a fact, we find, con- the error assigned is to the admission or reclude, and hold as a fact that the title to the jection of evidence, the specification must said wall and the nine-inch strip of ground give “a reference to the page of the paper passed from Jennie B. Beeson and Louisa | book where the matter may be found in its Mathers when they sold the 'Beeson store regular order in the printed evidence," and property, having erected thereon a three- "any assignment of error not according to story brick storehouse,' to the Y. M. C. A. this rule will be disregarded." Kaufman et "There is no question but that on Septem-al. v. National Lumber Ins. Co., 231 Pa. 642, ber 10, 1890, the date of the agreement with 81 Atl. 53. Each of the specifications of erthe Y. M. C. A., all the parties in interest ror, except the ninth, in some way offends were under the impression, so far as the against these rules, in that it fails to state matter was given consideration, that at the where the testimony referred to can be point in dispute there were two walls-one found in the paper book, or specifically to for the west end of the dwelling and one show that an exception was taken and pressfor the east end of the business block, instead ed in the court below, or, if taken, to indiof being merely a single cross-wall. While cate how finally disposed of. we are satisfied and find as a fact that it was the intention to sell and purchase the whole three-story building by the agreement of September 10, 1890, yet we are equally well satisfied that it was not the intention to sell and purchase a wall that was supposed to be there as the west wall of the dwelling, yet we do not think that the absence of such wall could affect the sale to the Y. M. C. A." On May 24, 1910, the court below dismissed plaintiff's exceptions and confirmed the decree previously entered refusing the injunction, fixing the line between the lots as contended for by the defendants, and dividing the costs between the parties. Plaintiff appealed. Argued before FELL, C. J., and BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ. D. M. Hertzog and A. D. Boyd, for appellant. W. J. Sturgis, E. H. Reppert, and S. J. Morrow, for appellees. MOSCHZISKER, J. [1] The manner in which the appellant's paper book was prepared and printed has added greatly to the difficulty of review. Many pages of testimony are duplicated in such a way as to lead to confusion, connected and essential words are left out of the findings, and several important exhibits are omitted. Scarcely any of the assignments of error conform to the equity rules or the rules of this court. Equity rules 64-67 provide that after the adjudication is filed exceptions may be taken in the court below, "which exceptions shall cover all objections to rulings on evidence, to findings of fact or law or to the decree," and, if no such exceptions are filed, "all ob [2] While we will not pass separately upon each of these faulty assignments, we have examined the matters covered by all of them and are not convinced that the decree of the court below should be disturbed. The deed to the plaintiff was made more than three years after the sale of the defendant's property to the Y. M. C. A., and the grantors used especial care in describing the property conveyed to the plaintiff so as not expressly to include the wall in dispute. The frontage is not stated in the description, and no dimensions are given; the lot simply being mentioned as "bounded on the * west by lot of Young Men's Christian Association." The plaintiff now contends that the property so described included the wall claimed by the defendants as embraced in the conveyance to the Y. M. C. A. The description in the deed to the latter was: "All that certain lot with the buildings thereon erected beginning at the corner of the lot of C. Claggett's heirs and running thence eastwardly along Main street about thirty-eight feet to the corner of the house lately used as a dwelling, being the property known as the Beeson store property, having erected thereon a three-story brick store on Main street. * * The testimony shows that the dwelling house referred to was originally erected upon the premises of the plaintiff in or about the year 1824, two stories in height; that a building was erected on the adjoining lot, now belonging to the defendants, in about 1832; that the wall in dispute from that time on was used in common; that about 1852 the wall was run up one additional story in order to place a third floor upon the defendants' property; and that * in the rear of the defendants' three-story |ing to any line they might have chosen. building, the wall in question being extended Breneiser v. Davis, 134 Pa. 1, 19 Atl. 433. It for that purpose. Thus it appears that for is more reasonable to believe that they realmost three-quarters of a century the wall tained a building without a west wall than was used and treated as though it belonged that they sold one with no east wall. The to the premises now possessed by the defend- expressed dimensions of the lot conveyed and ants, rather than to the adjoining dwelling the specific mention of the building in the house, and the frontage of 38 feet in the de- description of the defendants' property could fendants' deed is sufficient to embrace it, well be construed as including the wall, unwithin the fraction of an inch. The court less the reference to the corner of the adjoinwas not bound to ignore all of these circum-ing property plainly indicated otherwise; and stances and to construe the deed of the defendants as excluding, and that of the plaintiff as including, the ground covered by the wall. what was meant by this reference was in dispute. "The identity of a monument existing on the face of the earth with one referred to in a deed is always a question of fact"; and, "while monuments capable of being identified must always control courses and distances, the measurements of the lines whose courses and distances are given should ty of the monuments claimed to be found with those referred to in the deed." Tyler v. Fickett, 73 Me. 410. No question of jurisdiction was raised in the court below or on this appeal. As the case was tried, its determination was made to depend upon the construction to be placed upon the description of the defendants' prop-not be disregarded in determining the identierty; the strip of ground occupied by the wall and running of that width to the rear line of the property being the subject-matter in controversy. The plaintiff's title and that of Under the circumstances, we are not satthe defendants came from the same common isfied that the chancellor committed error grantors, and neither conveyance specifically by considering the surrounding facts in dereferred to the wall. The question was: termining the ownership of the wall and Which of them included it? If the prior strip of land in question (Safe Deposit & conveyance under which the defendants Trust Co. v. Mfg. Co., 229 Pa. 295, 78 Atl. claimed included the wall, of course the later 268), and, while we do not agree with the one to the plaintiff did not. Had the de- learned court below as to the applicability of scription in the former conveyance plainly some of the principles of law relied upon, excluded the wall, then no outside evidence we are not convinced of error in the conclucould have been considered; but, as the wall sion reached. was not mentioned, we are not prepared to hold that the court below was bound to construe the words "to the corner of the house lately used as a dwelling," which occur in such description, as excluding it. A description, "running to the corner of a property," ordinarily would mean to the outside wall of the premises referred to; but, if the property did not happen to have an outside wall, such description could not be taken to intend that which was not there. The court below has found that the premises in question did not have such a wall, but, on the contrary, that the only one in existence at that point had been treated as belonging to the lot conveyed to the Y. M. C. A., and subsequently deeded to the defendants. This property was described as a lot "with the buildings thereon erected house." * * The first eight specifications are dismissed, the last is overruled, and the decree is affirmed; the appellant to pay the costs of this appeal. (233 Pa. 213) Oct. 9, MEISEL et al. v. O'NEIL et al. (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 1911.) MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 149*)-MAYORS -TERM OF OFFICE. Schedule to constitutional amendments of 1909, which was adopted to bridge the channel between the old and new systems of government, applies to the terms of existing as well as future officers, and under its provisions the term of the office of the mayor of the city of Pittsburg, elected November, 1909, for three years, was extended for one year, so that a a three-story brick store-primary election for candidates for that office in September, 1911, and an election in November, 1911, was unnecessary. [3] The mention of a building may constitute a monument (White v. Williams, 48 N. Y. 344; Carroll v. Miner, 1 Pa. Super. Ct. 439), and we cannot say that the mention of the building in question could not be taken as constituting a monument which would include all of the ground covered by the structure and indicate the lines of the land. [4] At the time of the Y. M. C. A.'s purchase, the common vendors owned both properties, and they could have conveyed accord [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 149.*] Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Allegheny County. Bill by Jacob J. Meisel and others against J. Denny O'Neil and others, County Commissioners of Allegheny County. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendants appeal. Affirmed. Argued before FELL, C. J., and BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN, STEWART, and MOSCHZISKER, JJ. For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Rep'r Indexes John P. Hunter, Walter Lyon, A. B. Hay, | whose terms might end in 1911 shall continE. B. Vaill, J. Garfield Houston, and Ward ue to hold their offices until the first MonBonsall, for appellants. William A. Stone and day of December of that year. Stephen Stone, for appellees. MESTREZAT, J. This is a bill filed by certain taxpayers of the city of Pittsburg, Allegheny county, to.restrain the defendants, the county commissioners, from printing the names of candidates for mayor of the city on the ballots for the primary election to be held on September 30, 1911, on the ground that no election was to be held for the office of mayor of the city of Pittsburg in November, 1911. The court below sustained the plaintiffs' contention, and granted the injunction prayed for. The defendants have taken this appeal. If there is no election to be held in November of this year for mayor, of the city of Pittsburg, it necessarily follows that no nomination for the office should be made at the primary election, and that the learned court below was right in restraining the county commissioners from printing the names of candidates for the office on ballots to be voted at the election in September, 1911. Do the provisions of the schedule extend the term of the present mayor of the city of Pittsburg, thereby preventing an election of his successor at the November election of this year? We are all of the opinion that such is the effect of the schedule to the amendments adopted in 1909. The contention of the defendants is that the schedule acts prospectively and does not apply to the terms of officers who were in office at the date of the adoption of the amendments. But this view entirely overlooks the purpose of the schedule to the Constitution, which is to bridge the chasm between the old and the new systems of government, and to eliminate any conflicts between the two systems. The changes made by the amendments of 1909 in the terms of some of the officers and in the dates of holding the elections necessarily resulted in overlapping and conflict in the terms of certain officers, and to remedy that condition the schedule was adopted. It must necessarily apply to present conditions, to officers in office at the time of the adoption of the amendments, or it would entirely fail of its purpose. There could be no occasion to apply it after the new system created by the amendments had gone into effect, and officers had been elected and taken their offices pursuant to its provisions. The chasm is then spanned, the new system is in complete operation, and the schedule has served its only purpose, which is always temporary. The present mayor of the city of Pittsburg was elected at the February election in 1909 for a term of three years expiring in April, 1912. Under the Constitution and laws in force at the time of his election, his successor would be elected in February, 1912, and his term of office would begin in the following April. But in November, 1909, certain amendments to the Constitution of the commonwealth were adopted, by one of which The language of the schedule removes any the February election was abolished, and it doubt that it was intended to apply to offiwas provided that all municipal elections cers in office at the date of its adoption. The should take place in November of the odd- first paragraph provides, it will be observed, numbered years, thereby requiring such elec- that, "in the case of officers elected by the tions to be held every two years. To avoid people, all terms of office fixed by act of asthe confusion and inconvenience necessarily sembly at an odd number of years shall each arising from the changes made by the amend- be lengthened one year. Lanments, and especially in the case of officers guage could not be clearer or more compreelected for an odd number of years, a sched-hensive. The terms of all elective officers ule to the amendments was adopted to carry them into effect. The schedule provides, inter alia, as follows: "In the case of officers elected by the people, all terms of office fixed by act of assembly at an odd number of years shall each be lengthened one year, but the Legislature may change the length of the term, provided the terms for which such of ficers are elected shall always be for an even number of years. The above extension of official terms shall not affect officers elected at the general election of 1908; nor any city, ward, borough, township or election division officers, whose terms of office, under existing law, end in the year 1910." It is also directed in the schedule that after 1910, and until the Legislature shall otherwise provide, all terms of city, ward, borough, township, and election division officers shall begin on the first Monday of December in odd-numbered years; that such officers holding office at the fixed at an odd number of years were extend- |