Maine and the Governor of Massachusetts, | a part of the house, the former expression and in the third paragraph fully explains the meaning of the words "indicted here for larceny" by use of the following language: "Specifically, Macurda is indicted for procuring a genuine signature to be affixed to an instrument, the false making of which would be forgery." It is the opinion of the court that the news article, taken as a whole, would not, to a mind of reasonable intelligence and candor, lead to the conclusion that the plaintiff was charged with having been indicted for larceny, as the sentence just quoted, beginning with the word "specifically," as clearly and succinctly states the exact offense for which the plaintiff was indicted as the English language can convey. The effect of the article as a whole, we also think, would impress the mind of the intelligent and candid reader with a full understanding of all the facts upon which the plaintiff was indicted, and particularly with the gravamen of the charge, as found in the indictment, that he fraudulently obtained the release alluded to; that upon the strength of this fraudulent paper he had obtained the execution of the bonds in question; that he had received $3,333.33 for his services; that the bonding company had been induced by the plaintiff's fraud to execute the bonds; and that the defendant was indicted for fraudulently procuring their signatures. These general facts found in the news item ought to inform the ordinarily intelligent and reasonable mind that, whatever the offense was technically called, the plaintiff was actually indicted for having done the things which were generally and truthfully narrated, as well as specifically defined. The effect of reading the news article as a whole, therefore, brings it within the decisions above quoted, and especially within the language of 91 Me. 207, 39 Atl. 556, supra: "It is rather the effect which the language complained of was fairly calculated to produce and would naturally produce upon the minds of readers of reasonable intelligence, discretion, and candor, after it has been examined and considered in connection with all other parts of the writing, and in the light of all the facts and circumstances known to them." [3] Nor is it necessary, in determining the effect of the entire article upon the specifically alleged libel, that the reader should be able to make the legal distinction between the offense charged in the alleged libelous words and the offense described in the entire article. This rule seems to follow from the decision already alluded to in Wing v. Wing, 66 Me., 22 Am. Rep., supra, where the slanderous words were, "Arnold Wing stole windows from Benjamin Jordan's house." The court holds that these words are not actionable, since windows "are strictly a part of a house and ordinarily affixed permanently thereto. If the defendant had intended to charge the theft of windows which are not would more naturally have been that the plaintiff stole Benjamin Jordan's windows, or windows from Benjamin Jordan." The word "stole" implies a felony, and is well understood and admitted, when unexplained, to be slanderous, but when applied to real estate, such as a window becomes, if attached to a house, it is held by the court not to impute theft, inasmuch as real estate is not a subject of larceny. The words "from Benjamin Jordan's house" are therefore held to so explain and modify the slanderous word "stole" as to negative the inference of theft. If this refined distinction in the interpretation of the word "stole" in the imputed slander was regarded as sufficient to negative, in the minds of reasonable, intelligent, and candid men, the inference of theft, it would seem that the explicit definition of the offense for which the plaintiff was indicted, taken together with the general explanation, would obviously modify and limit the meaning of the word "larceny," as used in the alleged libel in the case at bar, to the actual charge upon which the plaintiff was indicted. The illustration used by Chief Justice Shaw, in Allen v. Hillman, supra, is also pertinent in corroboration of this rule. In analyzing the case, he says "that the words must, all taken together, charge an indictable offense: 'He is a thief; he has stolen apples from my trees."" As said, the first clause charges a felony, but, when explained by what follows, it become in law a trespass. But it could hardly be expected that even the intelligent and candid layman would be able to make this legal distinction. It is undoubtedly generally understood that stealing apples from trees is larceny, yet, not being so legally understood, the charge is not regarded as libelous or slanderous. All of the other cases cited are to the same effect. [4, 5] In the second count, the matter alleged to be libelous is an excerpt from the news item; but, as innuendo can in no way enlarge the charge, we are unable to discover in this allegation anything libelous or far afield from a narrative of the admitted facts. The third count consists of a combination of the two excerpts from the news article, as found in the first and second counts, and need not be further considered. In the fourth count, the matter alleged to be libelous is taken from the editorial article, the material part of which reads: "We trust that the charge is not true that Governor Guild's request that the extradition of Mr. Macurda, a lawyer of Wiscasset, indicted for larceny from the estate of the late A. L. Barris of Watertown, Mass., is denied because of political pressure." The gravamen of this charge is the use of the word "larceny." In this editorial comment, there also appears an explanation and specification of what is meant by the imputed charge of larceny, in which it is said: "The attorney got an order from the bond insurance company to deposit this ten thousand dollars in Maine. The charge is that this order was secured by false pretenses." The last sentence states precisely the offense with which the plaintiff was charged, and shows that the offense, imputed in the plaintiff's declaration, was not the offense described in the editorial, when read as a whole. This construction is in accord with the legal principles which have already been considered in connection with the first count, and does not require further comment. It should here be observed that the newspaper articles under consideration in each instance refer only to an indictment against the plaintiff, and not to his guilt. The distinction here noted is pointed out in Stacy v. Portland Publishing Co., 68 Me. 286, in this language: "To say that a man was arrested for murder and indicted for murder and tried for murder would not be saying or equivalent to saying that he was guilty of such a charge. If it were so, the newspaper press would be sorely perplexed for publishing the current news." In accordance with this distinction, we here wish to note that it is not our purpose to express the remotest opinion upon the guilt or innocence of the plaintiff of the offense with which he is charged. Our conclusion is that these articles are substantially true; that there is no evidence to the contrary sufficient to raise a question of fact in this respect; and that the description of the indictment in Massachusetts as an indictment for larceny, in both the news article and the editorial comments, was directly and specifically modified by the context, although in each instance such modification was omitted in the plaintiff's declaration, but, under the pleadings, has been read into it. [6] Upon the evidence, no malice could be imputed to the defendant, as the writer of the editorial declared upon the witness stand that when the article was written and the news item copied he did not know who the plaintiff was. The articles, therefore, cannot be regarded as libelous, upon the ground that they originated in corrupt and malicious motives. standing, or misrepresentation as to the terms or manner of the sale, or was not in all respects fair and proper. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judicial Sales, Dec. Dig. § 31.*] 2. JUDICIAL SALES (§ 31*)—VACATING-MIS DESCRIPTION. Where a purchaser of land at judicial sale was familiar with its location and characteristics, he would not be relieved from his purchase on objections by him to confirmation of the sale because the advertisement of the sale, after accurately describing the land, stated that it ran along a street, when, as a matter of fact, land and the street owned by a railroad comthere was a strip 18 feet wide between the pany and occupied by its tracks. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Judicial Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 59-67; Dec. Dig. § 31.*] 3. JUDICIAL SALES (§ 31*)-VACATING-MISTAKE-FAILURE TO READ ADVERTISEMENTS. Where an advertisement of a judicial sale of the land, one who purchased it under the correctly described the location and boundaries impression that it included other land is not entitled to object to the confirmation of the sale, because he did not read the advertisement; for mere recklessness or negligence does not entitle a person to equitable relief. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judicial Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 59-67; Dec. Dig. § 31.*] 4. JUDICIAL SALES (§ 31*)—VACATION-BURDEN OF PROOF. A purchaser excepting to the confirmation of a judicial sale has the burden of proving his exceptions. Sales, Dec. Dig. § 31.*] [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Judicial 5. JUDICIAL SALES (§ 31*) — VACATION GROUNDS. A purchaser is not entitled to prevent confirmation of a judicial sale merely upon showing that he was mistaken as to the value of the property and bid more than it was worth. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, Sales, Cent. Dig. §§ 59-67; Dec. Dig. § 31.*] see Judicial Appeal from Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City; H. Arthur Stump, Judge. Action by Christiana Kaiss and others against Edwin C. Kaiss and others. There was a judicial sale of land to the Columbia Paper Bag Company of Baltimore City, which filed exceptions to confirmation of the sale. From a judgment of confirmation, the purchaser appeals. Affirmed. Argued before BOYD, C. J., and BRISCOE, As the case comes up on report, the entry PEARCE, BURKE, THOMAS, PATTISON, must be: Judgment for the defendant. (116 Md. 541) COLUMBIA PAPER BAG CO. OF BALTIMORE CITY v. CARR et al. (Court of Appeals of Maryland. Nov. 15, 1911.) 1. JUDICIAL SALES (§ 31*)-CONFIRMATIONMISTAKE-ACCIDENT. URNER, and STOCKBRIDGE, JJ. Wm. E. Hoffman, for appellant. Charles A. Marshall and E. N. Rich, for appellees. BURKE, J. By a decree of the circuit court No. 2 of Baltimore city, passed in the case of Christiana Kaiss and others v. EdwinC. Kaiss and others, the fee-simple property mentioned in the proceedings in that case was decreed to be sold, and the appellees on While the court of chancery, in making a this record were appointed trustees to make judicial sale, sells the interest and estate of the sale. the parties to the cause, and the doctrine of auction to the appellant and reported the They sold the property at public caveat emptor applies, a sale will not be confirmed if it was induced by mistake, misunder-sale to the court. An order of ratification nisi was passed, I the interest and estate of the parties to the to which exceptions were filed by the pur- cause, and the doctrine of "caveat emptor" chaser. It also filed a petition asking for applies to all such sales. Farmers' Bank an abatement of the purchase price. Tes- v. Martin, 7 Md. 342, 61 Am. Dec. 350. timony on the exceptions and the petition was taken in open court, which dismissed the petition for an abatement, overruled the exceptions, and ratified the sale. This appeal is taken from those orders. The precise grounds upon which the appellant relies to vacate the sale, are stated in the exceptions, which are here transcribed. "First. Because the proceedings herein are irregular and insufficient, and not in accordance with the legal requirements for a sale of the property in these proceedings under the decree herewith. "Second. Because the property advertised and sold hereunder by the trustees herein, is not the same to be sold by them under the decree in these proceedings. "Third. Because the property advertised and reported as sold to this exceptant sets forth that the same runs along Lawrence street, and could be changed from its present use, so as to have frontage on Lawrence street, when in fact it does not so run, and said change could not be made. "Fourth. Because a strip of ground 18 feet 9 inches, lying between this property and Lawrence street, was advertised and sold as being open and for public use, when, in fact, said strip is private property. "Fifth. Because the property in these proceedings to be sold under the said decree is of much less value and less desirable than the property advertised for sale and sold by said trustees, as set forth in said report of sale. "Sixth. And for other reasons to be set forth at the hearing of these exceptions." [1] This court has announced in many cases the principles which control it in passing upon exceptions to trustees' sales. It is said, in Bolgiano v. Cooke, 19 Md. 375: "Trustees appointed by decrees of a court of equity to sell real estate are agents or instruments of the court; sales made by them are transactions between the court and the purchasers, and as such are regulated by all the principles of equity applicable to judicial sales." Glenn v. Clapp, 11 Gill & J. 1; Duvall v. Speed, 1 Md. Ch. 229; Goldsborough v. Ringgold, 1 Md. Ch. 239; Perren v. Keithly, 9 Gill, 412. Before the ratification of a sale made by authority of a court of equity, all objections within these limits are open for consideration. The sale will be set aside upon proof of error, mistake, misunderstanding, or misrepresentation as to the terms or manner of the sale; and it must appear to be in all respects fair and proper before it can receive the sanction of the court. Tomlinson v. McKaig, 5 Gill, 276, 277. A purchaser discovering a defect of title at a proper time may be relieved from his purchase by asking a recission of the sale. Duvall v. Speed, 1 Md. Ch. 299; Kauffman v. Walker, 9 Md. 229. When a court can see any injustice will be inflicted by the ratification of a sale upon a party not in default, the sale should not be ratified. Penn v. Benner, 12 Gill & J. 113. It is said in Kauffman v. Walker, supra, that "judicial sales will not be set aside for causes that the parties in interest might, with a reasonable degree of diligence, have obviated. .Every intendment will be made to support them. But where the court can see that injustice will be inflicted by the ratification of a sale upon a party not in default, by reason of the carelessness or omission of its own officer, it should interfere to prevent it." [2] We will consider the questions raised on this record in the light of these authorities. By deed dated August 15, 1881, the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company acquired title to the lot of ground located at the southeast corner of Fort avenue and the east side of Lawrence street. This lot had a frontage of 18 feet 9 inches on the south side of Fort avenue, and ran parallel on the east side of Lawrence street for the distance of 595 feet. The railroad company appears to throw this strip open to public use; there are three railroad tracks on Lawrence street. The distance between the property sold and the east track is about 28 feet, in which distance is included the 18 feet 9 inch strip acquired by the railroad company, the whole of which space is open and used by the public, and is apparently a part of the public highway, and has been so used, without obstruction or hindrance of any sort, for more than 20 years. The property sold was formerly owned by W. C. Kaiss, who died intestate in May, 1909. He acquired title to the property under a deed, which was filed as part of the bill in the above case, from John J. Myer, trustee, and others, dated June 6, 1888. This deed described the property as "being also at the distance of 18 feet 9 inches southeasterly from the corner formed by the southwest side of Fort avenue and the southeast side of Lawrence street, and running then eastwardly binding on the southwest side of Fort avenue, 115 feet 6 inches; thence southwesterly at right angles to Fort avenue 745 feet, more or less, to a point where formerly the middle of a creek or marsh; thence northerly, binding along the middle of said creek and on ground formerly belonging to J. S. Gittings estate, 175 feet The court of chancery, however, sells only 3 inches, more or less, to intersect a line drawn from the beginning southwesterly at right angles to Fort avenue; and thence reversing said line and binding thereon northeasterly 620 feet, more or less, to the beginning." story brick stable, shedding, office building, and a sawmill. There was a board fence on the west side of the lot along the eastern. most line of the 18 feet 9 inch strip owned by the railroad. There was a gateway in A diagram is here inserted, which shows this fence, used by wagons going from the the location of the property. street to and from the coalyard. There The trustees offered the property for sale | is no dispute as to the situation and surat public auction, on the premises, on Novem-rounding conditions at the time of the sale ber 1, 1910, and at this sale the appellant, and for many years prior thereto. acting through its superintendent, John Mc- We find as a fact that there was attached Ilvain, who was also one of its directors, to the contract or memorandum of purchase, and authorized to bid, became the purchaser above set out, at the time it was signed by of the property for the sum of $16,600. John McIlvain, the following advertisement of sale, being the one upon which the trustees had agreed, after careful consideration, contained an accurate and proper description of the property for the purposes of advertisement: Immediately after the sale McIlvain signed a memorandum of purchase in these words: "Baltimore, November 1, 1910. "I have this day purchased at public sale, for the sum of $16,600, upon the terms and conditions as announced by the auctioneer, "Trustees' sale of valuable fee-simple at said sale, viz.: One-third cash, balance in property, situate 18 feet 9 inches east from six and twelve months, or all cash, at pur- the corner of Fort avenue and Lawrence chaser's option, the fee-simple property street. By virtue of a decree of the cirknown as southeast Fort avenue and Law-cuit court No. 2 of Baltimore city, the underrence street, and more particularly described signed, trustees, will sell at public auction, in the annexed advertisement. John Mc- on the premises, on Tuesday, the 1st day Ilvain." of November, 1910, at 3 o'clock p. m., all "Witness: Samuel W. Pattison." that valuable lot of ground, in fee simple, At the time of the sale, this property was in Baltimore city, beginning on the southused as a coalyard, in which an extensive west side of Fort avenue, 18 feet 9 inches coal business had been conducted for a num-southeast from the corner formed by the inber of years. It was improved by a coal tersection of the southwest side of Fort street; thence southeasterly on the south- | pany property is in a little rougher condiwest side of Fort avenue 115 feet 6 inches, tion, and is little traveled on that side. and running thence southwesterly at right angles with Fort avenue 745 feet, more or less, to a point where was formerly the middle of a creek or marsh, and running thence northerly, binding along the middle of said creek and on the ground formerly belonging to J. S. Gittings' estate, 170 feet 3 inches, to intersect a line drawn from the beginning at right angles with Fort avenue; and thence reversing said line northeasterly 620 feet, more or less, to the place of beginning. The strip 18 feet 9 inches lying between Lawrence street and this property is open and used by the public. Improved by a fine coal switch and overhead trestle running from the southernmost side of the property towards Fort avenue, large twostory brick stable, shedding, office building, and sawmill. This property has been used for a very extensive coal business for a number of years past by the late William C. Kaiss. It runs parallel 620 feet along Lawrence street, along which street the tracks of the B. & O. R. R. run, and could be readily changed from its present use to the erection of warehouses fronting on Lawrence street, that could have introduced switches from the tracks of the B. & O. R. R. Terms of Sale: One-third cash, balance in six and twelve months, or all cash, at purchaser's option. Deferred payments to bear interest from date of sale, and to be secured to the satisfaction of the trustees. Taxes and expenses adjusted to day of sale. A deposit of $500 required at the time of sale. Alfred J. Carr, Chas. E. Cockey, Robertson Griswold, Trustees. Pattison & Gahan, Auctioneers." This advertisement was published in the Baltimore Sun, beginning on the morning of October 18, 1910, and was continued to the day of sale. It was also continued in the Daily Record from October 15, 1910, to the day of sale, and it was the identical form of advertisement read by the auctioneer at the time the property was offered for sale. Most of the travel is up and down the side between the tracks and the Kaiss property." All the testimony shows that the whole strip is apparently a part of Lawrence street, and that the property is located on the corner of that street and Fort avenue. Upon these undisputed facts, we are of opinion that there was no misdescription in the advertisement of the property under which it was sold. That advertisement was prepared by the trustees after careful consideration of the situation and the prevailing conditions, all of which were well known to John McIlvain. It embodies the description contained in the deed from John J. Myer, trustee, and others, to William C. Kaiss, and there was nothing in it calculated to mislead any man of ordinary care and prudence. It was certainly not calculated to mislead John J. McIlvain, who was thoroughly familiar with the property and the existing conditions. [3] We will now consider what took place on the day of sale. Mr. Samuel W. Pattison was the auctioneer who conducted the sale. He testified that he read the advertisement, and after reading it he asked whether any one wanted to ask any questions about the sale; but he could not recall whether any questions were asked at that time. He said: "I described the property from the advertisement as being 18 feet so many inches from the corner of Lawrence street, and at that time also made a statement that it was a valuable piece of property, and, no doubt, it would become more valuable on account of the strip which was owned by the B. & O. R. R., which adjoins this property, and at some future day the B. & O. R. R. might need this property, and it was an elegant opportunity for the purchaser to make a good investment. I made that statement before I asked for a bid." Alexander McIlvain, one of the directors of the appellant company, and the father of John McIlvain, testified, that he and The following testimony of Mr. Carr gives John and another son, all of whom are dia fair idea of the situation and general rectors of the appellant company, had a condition surrounding the property: "Q. consultation, and concluded that they would State what is the appearance of the whole bid on the property; that it was agreed of the property lying between the fence and that he was to bid to a certain sum, and the B. & O. tracks on Lawrence street? A. that John was to use his own judgment There is no difference between the tracks to after that; that he did bid, he thought the fence. It just forms one street bed $12,000, and then stopped; and that John apparently. No one could tell where one then began to bid. He testified that he did began and the other ended. Q. Where what not think he had any conversation with his began? A. Where the street ended, and son at the time, but might have shaken his where the strip began. Driving down, they head at him and said he was bidding too would drive partly on the strip and at other much, or something of that kind. "I thought times on the balance of it. One wagon the lot was going too high. That was my passing another, one would be partly on impression, because we figured it out somewhat would be the bed of the street, and thing like $12,000 or $13,000; but anyway partly on the strip, and the other would be he kept on bidding. He had that right. all on the strip. The other side of the track He had the control of the company, the between that and the Nivison Glass Com-stock, and he is the superintendent of the |