In the matter of the estate of Robert Patterson, deceased. From a decree dismissing a petition to compel payment by a trustee appointed to make sale in partition, the Board of Church Extension of the United Presbyterian Church of North America appeals. Affirmed. edgment of the mortgage reciting a consideration, but that he was a mortgagee for a valuable consideration. Stopping short of this prerequisite, his mortgage was void, and could not be enforced against the wife. Being void, it imposed no obligation upon the wife, and, when put in evidence on the trial of the scire facias, it did not warrant a re- Argued before BROWN, MESTREZAT, covery against her. It was of no more effica- | POTTER, ELKIN, STEWART, and MOSCHcy than if a sheet of blank paper had been ZISKER, JJ. offered and admitted in evidence. A recital in a void instrument affirmatively proves nothing. It is as if it were contained in a mortgage which had not been signed by the wife. The recital therefore in the mortgage was no evidence that the plaintiff was a S. Harvey Thompson and Donaldson Bros., for appellant. James R. Sterrett, for appel lee. BROWN, J. On July 20, 1898, Fannie B. Risher executed to W. W. Whitesell, at that mortgagee for a valuable consideration. The time a reputable member of the Allegheny right of the plaintiff to recover against Mrs. McQuitty on the scire facias issued on this county bar, a mortgage for $1,800 on an unmortgage depended upon whether the plain- divided, fourth interest in certain real estate tiff was a mortgagee for a bona fide consid-devised to her by Robert Patterson, deceased. eration, and the burden was upon him to show the fact, and that burden was not met by a recital in the instrument which had no efficacy until the prerequisite consideration had been established. The judgment is affirmed. (234 Pa. 128) In re PATTERSON'S ESTATE. Appeal of BOARD OF EXTENSION August 20, 1898, Whitesell assigned it upon The mortgage was duly recorded, and on the margin of the record to the Board of Church Extension of the United Presbyterian Church of North America. At the time of the execution of the mortgage, as well as when it was assigned to the appellant, there were pending in the court below proceedings in partition in the estate of the said Robert Patterson, which culminated in an order of sale to the Pennsylvania Title & Trust ComOFpany as trustee. The property was sold, and on an adjudication of the account of the trustee the following award was made out of Fannie B. Risher's share of the proceeds of the sale: "To W. W. Whitesell for use of Board of Church Extension of the United Presby. Church of N. A. mortg. recorded in M. B. Vol. 856, p. 8 and int., $1,821.60." No one appeared at the audit on behalf of the (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Jan. 2, 1912.) 1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT (§ 104*)-NOTICE TO ATTORNEY. A church board whose attorneys, on assignment to it of a mortgage, examined the title, had actual notice of the pendency of partition proceedings involving the mortgaged property. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Attorney and Client, Cent. Dig. §§ 92, 93; Dec. Dig. § 104.*] 2. MORTGAGES (§ 257*)-ASSIGNMENT-BONA FIDE ASSIGNEE-NOTICE. Where a church board had actual notice, on receiving an assignment of a mortgage, of partition proceedings, and a sale in partition was given after due legal advertisement, the board is charged with constructive notice of the sale. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mortgages, Cent. Dig. §§ 682-687; Dec. Dig. § 257.*] 3. PARTITION (§ 111*)-RIGHTS OF PARTIESLACHES. A church board which received an assignment of a mortgage is charged with notice of partition proceedings affecting the property, and of the sale of the property, and the award of a share of the proceeds to the assignor of the mortgage to the use of the board is barred by laches from compelling the trustee under the mortgage to pay to the board the amount awarded to it by proceedings commenced 10 years after the sale. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Partition, Cent. Dig. §§ 401-418; Dec. Dig. § 111.*] Appeal from Orphans' Court, Allegheny County. appellant as assignee of the mortgage, but on May 26, 1899, the trustee paid to W. W. Whitesell the amount awarded upon it, and he placed upon the record the following receipt: "Received May 26, 1899, W. W. Whitesell, Atty." Whitesell never paid this sum to the appellant, but from time to time paid interest to it on the mortgage debt until his death, which occurred July 8, 1905. In the following May or June, when more than a year's interest had apparently accrued upon the mortgage and the appellant was about to take steps to collect the same, it discovered from an examination of the records that the real estate had been sold as above stated; that, the lien of the mortgage had been transferred from the land to the fund in the hands of the trustee; that the same had been distributed in 1899, under a decree of the court; and that the distribution included the award for which Whitesell had receipted. The original trustee, the Pennsylvania Title & Trust Company, was consolidated with the Colonial Trust Company, which has succeeded to all of its debts and liabilities, and this appeal is from the refus al of the court below to compel the Colonial | spring of 1899 that it no longer had a mort. Trust Company to pay the appellant the amount awarded to it on the Risher mortgage. It claims to be entitled to this payment for the alleged reason that it had no notice of the partition proceedings, the sale of the real estate by the trustee, or the distribution of the proceeds of the sale until after the death of Whitesell. gage which was a lien upon Mrs. Risher's interest in the Patterson land, and that thereafter no interest would accrue upon the same. But, notwithstanding this, it regularly took semiannual interest from Whitesell on the Risher mortgage indebtedness for a period of six years after the mortgage had been wiped out. The mortgage was no long. [1] John Donaldson, Esq., a member of the er bearing interest, for out of the fund from legal firm of Donaldson Bros., who were at- which it was payable there had been awardtorneys for the Board of Church Extension ed, on March 29, 1899, the full amount due of the United Presbyterian Church of North upon it. Of this the appellant unquestionaAmerica at the time it purchased the mort- bly had constructive notice. The interest gage from Whitesell, was called as a witness which Whitesell continued to pay was on the by it, and testified that his firm had examin- fund he had received under the decree of dised the title of Mrs. Risher when Whitesell tribution, and, in view of the actual notice offered to sell them the mortgage. As this which the appellant had of the proceedings was done, the records disclosed the proceed- in partition and of its constructive notice of ings then in progress for the partition of the the decree of distribution, the unavoidable real estate, on an undivided interest in which presumption is that it must have known the mortgage had been executed, and the Whitesell had received the money and acappellant was, therefore, bound to take no- quiesced in his retention of it during the tice that those proceedings would, in all subsequent six years of his life. Nothing probability, result in a sale which would was shown by the appellant to rebut this divest the lien of the mortgage and trans- presumption. If Whitesell was without aufer it to a fund arising from the sale, to thority to receive the money and retain it, be distributed under a decree of the court, the officials of the appellant could easily and that in such event it could look to that have so testified, but not one of them was fund alone for payment. The appellant called to deny such authority. As he was a thus had actual notice through its attor- member of the bar and an officer of the neys, that just what subsequently did hap-court, there was a presumption that he acted pen would be likely to occur. The mortgagee by authority. Miller v. Preston, 154 Pa. 63, of Fannie B. Risher was not entitled to be 25 Atl. 1041. made a party to the proceedings in partition, and was not, therefore, within the statutory requirement as to notice (Long's Appeal, 77 Pa. 151; Stewart v. Bank, 101 Pa. 342), but the appellant had acquired, through its attorneys, actual notice of the partition proceedings, and, in addition to that notice, it had constructive notice of the filing of the trustee's account and of the adjudication of the same. [2] Less than a year from the time it took the mortgage it had constructive notice that the land upon which the same had been a lien had been judicially sold, and that it would have to look for payment to the fund produced by the sale. This constructive notice was acquired through due legal advertisement, which was sufficient. App v. Dreisbach, 2 Rawle, 287, 21 Am. Dec. 447; Priestley's Appeal, 127 Pa. 420, 17 Atl. 1084, 4 L. R. A. 503; Ferguson v. Yard, 164 Pa. 586, 30 Atl. 517. [3] In view of the actual notice which the appellant must have had of the partition proceedings and of the constructive notice to it of the filing of the trustee's account and of the distribution of the fund by the court below, it is presumed to have known in the The appellant took no steps to compel the appellee to pay what it now alleges was improperly paid to Whitesell until more than ten years had expired, from the time it had constructive notice that he had received the money and more than three had elapsed from the date of actual notice of the payment to him. True, in March, 1907, the appellant entered into an agreement with the appellee that nothing should be done by it for six months, during which period should be allowed to use its name in an effort to collect from Whitesell's estate, without prejudice to the rights of either party to the agreement; but this agreement expired in September, 1907, and the appellant did nothing until November, 1909, when this petition was presented. It did nothing at all until after the statute of limitations had barred any recovery by the appellee, or its predecessor, from Whitesell or his estate of the amount alleged to have been improperly paid to him. The gross laches of the appellant is unexplained, and, under the undisputed facts in the case, the conclusion is not to be avoided that it is estopped from asking relief from the appellee. Appeal dismissed, at appellant's costs MEMORANDUM DECISIONS BOSTON ART METAL CO. v. F. W. CUNNINGHAM & SONS. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. April 1, 1912.) Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Cumberland County. Action by the Boston Art Metal Company against F. W. Cunningham & Sons. On report. Judgment for defendant. See, also, 107 Me. 534, 80 Atl. 1131. Assumpsit on an account annexed to recover the sum of $5,437.42 for metal ceiling lights claimed by the plaintiff to have been sold by it to the defendant corporation. There was no question as to the delivery of the lights to the defendant; but it was alleged by the defendant that the lights were furnished under a written contract between the parties, and that there was nothing due thereon. The plaintiff claimed that the lights were furnished to the defendant without any reference to the contract, and that they were "extras." These lights were used in the construction of the Cumberland county courthouse in Portland. Symonds. Snow, Cook & Hutchinson, for plaintiff. William C. Eaton and Charles G. Keene, for defendant. PER CURIAM. Judgment for defendant. BURNETT v. BARRETT. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Dec. 13, 1911.) Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Cumberland County. At Law. Application of Robert C. Burnett for writ of habeas corpus against A. S. Barrett. From an order denying the writ, petitioner brings exceptions. Dismissed. PER CURIAM. The entries made in this case at the law court held in Portland on the 4th Tuesday of June, 1911, were as follows: "Case and plaintiff's brief in. Thirty days for respondent to file brief. Fifteen days for plaintiff's reply, or petition dismissed. As no brief has been filed by the respondent, and the time in which his brief and the reply were to have been filed have long since elapsed, the entry must be: Dismissed for want of prosecution." CURTIS v. AUBURN PAPER BOX CO. the defendant. Whether, under the terms of the contract, the gravel was to be delivered to the city upon the cars or along the track was sharply controverted. It seems clear, however, that delivery was to be made along the track by defendant, and not upon the cars, to be removed therefrom by the city. There is evidence tending to show that the foreman in charge of the employés of the city directed them to clean out the cars which had been dumped by the employés of the defendant, and that plaintiff was among those who undertook to do so. There is no evidence, however, showing, or tending to show, that the action either of the foreman or of the plaintiff was at the request or by consent of the defendant or its employé. The plaintiff was a volunteer, and cannot recover. EDWARDS v. LEWIS. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Nov. 22, 1911.) On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Androscoggin County. Action by Jonas Edwards against George R. Lewis. Verdict for defendant. Motion for new trial overruled. Action to recover damages for an alleged breach of a contract to purchase the stock of an undertaker's establishment in Auburn. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant agreed to purchase the stock for $2,500, and paid him $100 "in earnest to bind the bargain," the balance to be paid in one week. The defendant contended that he made no contract to purchase the stock, but that the $100 paid to him to the plaintiff was for the purpose of obtaining an option to purchase the stock within one week for $2,500, and that he exercised his right not to purchase the stock, and forfeited the $100 paid. Oakes, Pulsifer & Ludden, for plaintiff. Harry Manser, for defendant. PER CURIAM. Motion overruled. (Su GOLDER & McCARTHY v. BUTLER. preme Judicial Court of Maine. July 14, 1911.) On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Androscoggin County. Action by Golder & McCarthy against A. B. Butler. Verdict for. plaintiffs. Motion for new trial sustained. MeGillicuddy & Morey, for plaintiffs. W. H. Jud (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Nov. 17 defendant. PER CURIAM. Exceptions overruled. PER CURIAM. The facts and testimony, as well as the circumstances, so strongly negative the plaintiffs' claim of an original promise, that the verdict should not be allowed to stand. DROUIN v. LEWISTON, A. & W. ST. RY. CO. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. July 25, 1911.) Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Androscoggin County. Action by Isidore (alias George) Drouin against the Lewiston, Augusta & Waterville Street Railway Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff excepts. Exceptions overruled. McGilli-perils and dangers of the employment, utterly cuddy & Morey, for plaintiff. Newell & Skelton, for defendant. PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, a laborer employed by the city of Auburn, seeks to recover damages for an injury, sustained by him while removing gravel from a dump car belonging to defendant. The gravel was in process of HAMET v. PEPPERELL MFG. CO. (Sapreme Judicial Court of Maine. Nov. 27, 1911.) On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, York County. Action by Jemal Hamet against the Pepperell Manufacturing Company to recover damages for personal injuries received by the plaintiff while operating in the defendant's mill certain carding machines. The plaintiff alleged that "the defendant, although well knowing the failed to give the said plaintiff any instructions or notice of the dangers and perils incident to said employment as aforesaid, whereby, and solely by reason of such failure on the part of the defendant to give the notice," etc., the plaintiff "was injured and suffer d great pain," etc. Verdict for plaintiff for $895.83. Motion plaintiff. N. B. Walker and T. B. Walker, for defendant. PER CURIAM. The only question here presented is: Was he (the plaintiff) entitled to instructions as to how to operate the machine in which he was at work, or from his own knowledge and experience must he be deemed to have known the dangers, and especially the danger by which he was injured? The court is of the opinion from the evidence that the plaintiff should be charged with the knowledge of the dangers connected with the operation of these machines, and particularly with the knowledge of the danger liable to be incurred by inserting his hand into a space occupied by a cylinder which he knew to be revolving and the particular location of which in the hidden space he did not know. The plaintiff's own evidence fully warrants the conclusion that he thoroughly understood every method of starting and stopping the whole or any part of the machine and cylinders; that he knew, or with the exercise of due care ought to have known, at the time of the accident, that the big cylinder was revolving; that, when revolving, it was dangerous; hence, when he thrust his hand into the space occupied by this revolving cylinder, he was either so thoughtless that he took no note of his act, or, knowing the danger, voluntarily took the chance of injury. In either case he was guilty of contributory negligence and cannot recover. LENFEST v. ROBBINS. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Nov. 13, 1911.) On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Knox County. Action by Elmer Lenfest against Jason M. Robbins for alienation of his wife's affections. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial overruled. Charles W. Lovett and Rodney I. Thompson, for plaintiff. Lindley M. Staples and C. M. Walker, for defendant. PER CURIAM. It was not in controversy that the plaintiff's wife deserted him and took up her abode in a tenement owned by the defendant, that the defendant frequently visited her in that house, and that before and after her desertion of her husband she worked for the defendant at his home, and frequently remained there during the night, as well as during the daytime, with no other persons in the house. As is usual in a majority of this class of cases, the evidence tending to prove illicit relations between the parties was circumstantial; but after a careful examination of all the testimony, in connection with the situations and circumstances disclosed, it is the opinion of the court that it fully justified the conclusion reached by the jury, and that the damages cannot be deemed excessive. MEHAYLO v. GREAT NORTHERN PAPER CO. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. April 16, 1912.) Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Androscoggin County. Action by George S. Mehaylo, administrator, against the Great Northern Paper Company. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant brings exceptions and moves for a new trial. Exceptions not considered, motion sustained, and verdict set aside. Action by the plaintiff as administrator of the estate of John Hreha, deceased intestate, to recover damage for an injury received by the deceased November 26, 1907, while employed by the defendant company in its pulp mill at Madison, Me., resulting in his death three days later. In the first trial of this action the verdict was for the plaintiff for $4,750. This verdict was set aside by the law court. See Mehaylo, Adm'r, v. Great Northern Paper Company, 107 Me. 521, 80 Atl. 1133. At the second trial of the action the verdict was for the plaintiff for $6,958.33. McGillicuddy & Morey, for plaintiff. Oakes, Pulsifer & Ludden, for defendant. PER CURIAM. Exceptions not considered, motion sustained, and verdict set aside. SAFFORD v. GEORGE A. FULLER CO. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. July 21. 1911.) On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Kennebec County. Action by George W. Safford against the George A. Fuller Company. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial sustained, unless plaintiff file remittitur. Williamson, Burleigh & McLean, for plaintiff. Heath & Andrews, for defendant. PER CURIAM. A careful examination of the record discloses sufficient evidence, if believed by the jury, to warrant their finding upon the question of liability; but upon the assessment of damages they are clearly excessive. While the verdict is not large in itself. it is nevertheless double the amount warranted by the testimony, and upon this feature of the case the defendant is as much entitled to a judicial judgment as the plaintiff is upon the question of liability. It is the opinion of the court that so much of the verdict as is in excess of $300 should be remitted. SAMPSON v. SPRINGER. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. July 3, 1911.) Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Waldo County. Action by Charles B. Sampson against W. H. Springer. Verdict for defendant. Plaintiff moved for new trial, and excepts. Motion E. Bangs and H. C. Buzzell. for plaintiff. overruled, and exceptions not considered. Thompson & Blanchard, for defendant. H. PER CURIAM. This case involves a question of fact only, based upon the following. memorandum, admitted to have been executed by the defendant, to wit: "Freedom, Maine, Oct. 7, 1909. Sold to Chas. B. Sampson about 9 tons of hay at $13 per ton. Said hay to be delivered or loaded on car at Danforth Station." The time of delivery was omitted, and has now become the only issue in the case, depending upon a collateral agreement as to the time when the hay was to be delivered. The defendant testified that the plaintiff was to accept delivery of the hay within three weeks from the date of the contract, and contends that at most he was entitled only to a reasonable time in which to demand a delivery at the cars. The evidence does not show that the plaintiff ever furnished a car at the Danforth station for the shipping of the hay. It also affirmatively appears that he did not call for the hay until about the 13th of January, 1910. In view of all the circumstances surrounding the case, and the positive testimony of the defendant as to the time agreed upon for delivery, and the further question of fact whether the plaintiff called for the hay within a reasonable time, all questions for the jury, and found in favor of the defendant, the court does not feel authorized to disturb the verdict. Motion overruled. STATE v. LUMBERT. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Nov. 27, 1911.) On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Penobscot County. Frank Lumbert was convicted of rape, and moves for new trial. Motion sustained. In relation to his being a married man, the defendant, on direct examination, testified as follows: "Q. Whether or not you have a wife? A. I have. Q. Have you a wife living? A. No sir. Q. When did your wife die? A. Two years ago the 12th of last January." And on cross-examination, in relation to the same matter, he testified as follows: "Q. You say, Mr. Lumbert, that you are 33 years old? A. I do. Q. You have been a married man? A. I have." George E. Thompson, Co. Atty., for the State. | the ground of newly discovered evidence. C. PER CURIAM. In this case the respondent was indicted for rape, and convicted. He admitted his improper relations with the complainant. From the evidence, however, the only reasonable conclusion to be drawn is that, being a married man, he was guilty of adultery. Motion sustained. STEWART v. LEWISTON, A. & W. ST. RY. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. March 12, 1912.) On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Kennebec County. Action by James O. Stewart against the Lewiston, Augusta & Waterville Street Railway. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant moves for a new trial. Motion overruled. Action on the case to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, and caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant in operating one of its cars upon its right of way where it crosses a public highway. The plaintiff was riding in a team driven by a Mr. Martin, and upon passing the railroad crossing a collision took place between the team and one of the defendant's cars, and the plaintiff was injured. The defendant admitted the negligence of its servants in operating its car, but contended that it was relieved from liability by reason of the alleged contributory negligence of the plaintiff. Verdict for plaintiff for $1,054.17. The defendant moved for a new trial. E. M. Thompson and H. E. Foster, for plaintiff. Heath & Andrews, for defendant. WELCH V. PORTLAND LIGHTING & POWER CO. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. March 26, 1912.) On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Cumberland County. Action by Joseph J. Welch against the Portland Lighting & Power Company to recover damages for personal injuries caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant in allowing one of its heavy wire cables to fall upon him as he was traveling along a crosswalk on York street, in Portland. Plea, the general issue. Verdict for plaintiff for $500. Defendant moved for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against evidence, and that the damages awarded were excessive. Motion overruled. Connellan & Connellan, for plaintiff. Strout & Strout, for defendant. PER CURIAM. Motion overruled. WEYMOUTH v. DUNN et al. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. July 14, 1911.) On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Cumberland County. Action by Orrin P. Weymouth against John W. Dunn and others. Verdict for plaintiff. Motion for new trial sustained. E. H. Wilson, for plaintiff. M. T. O'Brien, for defendants Rowe. Henry W. Swasey, for defendant Wade. PER CURIAM. This is an action upon a promissory note. The vital question was whether the signature purporting to be that of one of the defendants, James Rowe, was genuine. He denied it. A careful comparison of his admitted signature with that upon the note so strongly corroborates his denial that, in the opinion of the court, a new trial should be granted. Motion sustained. WHITEHOUSE v. DURRELL. (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Nov. 20, 1911.) On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Knox County. Action by Carl C. Whitehouse against Granville A. Durrell. Verdict for plaintiff for $600. Defendant filed a general motion for a COCHRANE v. PISKORSKI. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 4, 1912.) Error to Supreme Court. Action by John Cochrane, Jr., against Abdon V. Piskorski. From a judgment of the Supreme Court, affirming a judgment for plaintiff, defendant brings error. Affirmed. Harry Lane, for plaintiff in error. Roe & Runyon, for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. This writ of error brings before us for review a judgment of the Supreme Court, affirming a judgment of the First district court of Jersey City, based upon the verdict of a jury in favor of the plaintiff below and against the defendant, now plaintiff in error. The action was brought to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff below through being run down in the street by an automobile driven by defendant below. The Supreme Court held that the questions of the negligence of the defendant and of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff were properly submitted to the jury, and that the motions made for a nonsuit and for a direction of a verdict in favor of the defendant were properly refused. We agree with the view of the Supreme Court, and the judgment should therefore be affirmed. CRAGIN v. CRAGIN. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 12, 1912.) Appeal from Court of Chancery. Divorce proceedings between William B. Cragin, Jr., and Maysie Bruce Cragin. From an order granting the custody of an infant child, William B. Cragin, Jr., appeals. Affirmed. Malcolm G. Buchanan, for appellant. Edward A. Day, for respondent. THE CHIEF JUSTICE. The order appealed from is attacked upon the ground that, in making it, the court was not acting for the best interests of the child. We find that the contrary is the fact. The order under review will be affirmed. (82 N. J. L. 741) MIDLAND TP., BERGEN COUNTY, ▾. BOROUGH OF MAYWOOD et al. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 4, 1912.) Error to Supreme Court. Certiorari by the Township of Midland, Bergen County, against the Borough of Maywood and another, to review an assessment. From an order of the Supreme Court setting the assessment aside (80 N. J. Law, 76, 76 Atl. 453), defendants bring error. Affirmed. on the opinion of the Supreme Court. Wendell J. Wright and Edmund W. Wakelee for plaintiffs in error. Gilbert Collins, for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. The judgment under review herein should be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Swayze in the Supreme Court. (82 N. J. L. 748) STATE v. LIEBERMAN. (Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey. March 4, 1912.) Error to Supreme Court. Louis Lieberman was convicted of crime, and from a judgment of the Supreme Court (79 Atl. 331), affirming the conviction, he brings error. Affirmed. Adrian D. Sullivan and James A. Sullivan, for plaintiff in error. Munson Force, Asst. Prosecutor of the Pleas, and J. W. De Yoe, for the State. PER CURIAM. The judgment under review herein should be affirmed, for the reasons expressed in the opinion delivered by Mr. Chief |