interest has been taken, as well by the House of Lords and the House of Commons as by the Judges, in measures, which may affect the liberties or lives of those persons, who may unhappily become the objects of criminal proceedings. At first sight, peradventure, it might be supposed that the interests of such a portion of the community were little likely to meet with much consideration. Far otherwise, however, was the case in the present instance. Never shall I forget with how much anxiety all-Peers, Judges, Members of Parliament-laboured, perhaps I ought rather to say, vied with each other in their endeavours to accomplish one and the same object, so that whilst large improvements might be made in criminal proceedings, no provision should be adopted, which was calculated in any degree unfairly to prejudice any party charged with any offence. If any one knew after how much discussion and with how much difficulty the first clause of "The Act for the Amendment of the Administration of Criminal Justice," which confers a limited power of amendment, passed, I am convinced that, however clear his opinion might be that such a clause was imperatively required, he could not for a moment doubt that the interests of those, who might become the subjects of criminal proceedings, had never been watched over with greater care than on the present

occasion.

However strong my own opinion may be that these statutes do not by any means go to the extent they ought-which opinion, I have the best reason to know, is entertained by many great and luminous minds,-yet, when I reflect that the only reason why the provisions of these acts were not extended further, was the apprehension felt by those, for whose opinions no one could fail to entertain extreme respect, that peradventure in some instances accused persons might be unfairly prejudiced, I am mightily consoled-and I do not doubt, that after these acts shall have been found to operate, as I have no doubt they will, without any unfair prejudice to any party accused, those who have watched them so narrowly, finding their apprehensions were unfounded, will be willing to lend their powerful assistance to the passing of larger and more comprehensive measures of a similar character.

The great object of "The Act for the better Administration of Criminal Justice" is, that every criminal case should be tried on its real and intrinsic merits.

It establishes two great principles.

First. That it is right that wherever upon a trial a variance happens to occur in a matter of fact not evidenced by any writing,

such variance ought to be amended. Such no doubt is the principle, upon which the first section proceeds. True it is that full scope to that principle is not given, as the power of amendment is confined to the particular cases designated, and moreover is only to be applied to those cases where the variance is not material to the merits, and the defendant cannot be prejudiced in his defence upon the merits by an amendment.

This principle being established, the only question for future consideration is, whether the power of amendment ought, not to be extended to every variance not material to the merits, and by the amendment of which the prisoner cannot be prejudiced in his defence upon the merits. I entertain no doubt whatever that this is the only limitation that ought to be made; and, my own opinion further is that the only question as to any amendment ought to be, whether the prisoner will be prejudiced in his defence on the merits by the amendment or not. If the amendment will not prejudice the prisoner in his defence on the merits, I not only see no reason why it should not be made, but every reason why it should.

The other principle is, that Indictments ought to be in the plainest and simplest form. When an Indictment for murder has been made sufficient, which simply alleges that the prisoner feloniously, wilfully, and of his malice aforethought, killed and murdered the deceased, it will be very difficult to find any adequate reason why all other Indictments should not be reduced to an equally simple form so far as is practicable with reference to the particular offence.

This bill originally contained a clause making every Indictment good, which charged an offence in the words of the statute, which is the case now after verdict, &c., under the 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 21; but this clause was struck out in the House of Lords, on the ground that it would make it unnecessary to set out any of the pretences in an Indictment for false pretences. It is by no means easy to see any good ground for holding an Indictment good after verdict, which was insufficient before verdict. The chief object of an Indictment is to specify the charge in such precise terms that the jury may know exactly the charge they have to try, and the Court may strictly confine the attention of the Jury to that charge. Now the 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 21, plainly indicates that an Indictment, which follows the words of the statute, may be sufficient to enable the Jury to know the precise charge they have to try, and the Court to confine their attention to such charge. If that be so, it seems but reasonable that an Indictment, which

uses the terms of the statute creating the offence, should be sufficient for all purposes; and it must be confessed, that it is a strange anomaly that the same words, which are sufficient to create an offence, should not be sufficient to describe the same offence in an Indictment.

I cannot avoid offering a few remarks with reference to Indictments in this place. It has ever seemed to me that, upon principle, an Indictment ought merely to charge the crime in apt and plain language. To allege the means of death in murder, or the pretences in false pretences, or to set out the letter in an indictment for sending a threatening letter, seems to me against principle. The common law Indictments for burglary, robbery, larceny, &c. &c., all proceed on the right principle by merely charging the crime, not the mode, in which, or the means by which, it was effected. A reason can in some, if not in all, instances be assigned for the opposite course. Thus, the reason for stating the means of death and the wounds, &c. in murder, no doubt was, that the statute De Coronatoribus required coroners to inquire into these matters. So in false pretences the reason for requiring the pretences to be set out was, that the Court might judge whether the pretences were such as fell within the statute creating the offence : and the same reason prevailed in Indictments for sending threatening letters. This reason seems little satisfactory, as the Court, which tries the case, must always, whether the pretences or letter be set out or not, determine whether in point of law the false pretences or the letter fall within the meaning of the statute. And if it be said that the statement is required, in order that a Court of error may have an opportunity of determining the question, it will not be easy for those who rely upon this ground to account for the omission to state the means of committing the offence in the numerous instances where it is not now required; for if the statement of the means be necessary for the purpose of enabling a Court of error to determine whether an offence has been committed in one case, no possible reason can be assigned why it is not equally necessary

in all.

Great opposition is ordinarily made to the simplification of Indictments upon the ground that it is by them that the prisoner is informed of the charge he is called upon to answer. Now any one really acquainted with criminal procedure must be well aware that to a very great extent indeed this is an entire fallacy. What takes place upon the arraignment of a prisoner, in immeasurably the greater number of instances, is this. The

Clerk of Arraigns states to the prisoner the substance of the charge in plain English, and to this he pleads; and no one can doubt that the prisoner much better comprehends the charge so stated than he would the Indictment, if it were read over to him. True it is, that every acute defender of prisoners carefully examines the Indictment, and to him it not unfrequently supplies the means of raising some technical objection to it for some defect apparent upon the face of it, or some objection on the ground of some defect or variance in the proof. The information that is really conveyed to prisoners is that which they learn before the committing magistrate, and from the copies of the depositions. No doubt there are some cases in which a defendant has not been before a magistrate; these cases are however very few, and it is to be remembered that every Court has power to order particulars of the crime charged to be delivered to the defendant, wherever he may appear to the Court to stand in need of further information. Nor can it be doubted, that in every case where there was any reasonable ground for thinking that the defendant had not sufficient knowledge of the precise charge intended to be proved against him, the Court would order particulars to be supplied to him.

Some suggestions for the amendment of criminal procedure will not, I trust, be considered inappropriate in this place. It cannot be doubted, that the great end of all criminal procedure is not the mere punishment of the offender, but the prevention of crime, and that any system, which has the greatest tendency to prevent the commission of offences, is obviously the best. Now it is plain that that system, which secures to the greatest extent the certainty of the conviction of offenders in the greatest number of cases, must have the strongest tendency to prevent the commission of crimes. If it were possible to create such a system as would secure a conviction in the case of every offence that was committed, it cannot be doubted that the number of offences would be infinitely decreased; now, although it is undoubtedly impracticable to establish so perfect a system as the one supposed, still it may be possible to form such a system as may, to a considerable extent, approximate to such a degree of perfection. That our present system is very far from being so perfect as it might be made no one can doubt, and the object of the following suggestions is to point out certain alterations in it, by which its efficiency might be very essentially increased.

The first consideration, which naturally presents itself to the mind is, supposing an offence to have been committed, is there any legal and effectual obligation incumbent on any one to in

stitute a prosecution for such offence? It may be true that "silently to observe the commission of a felony without using any endeavour to apprehend the offender,” may be a misprision, punishable by fine and imprisonment, on the ground that it is the duty of every one, who sees a felony committed, to discover it with all reasonable expedition to a magistrate. But this obligation is so imperfectly understood, and evaded with such perfect impunity, that it depends, to a very great extent, on the inclination of the party who is injured, or who sees the offence committed, whether any investigation take place at all, and, consequently, many offences are passed over without any investigation or prosecution. It appears to me that, in order to remedy this defect, it is very desirable that provision should be made that every person, who knows or has reason to suspect that an offence has been committed, should forthwith give information to some peace-officer or magistrate, in order that the case might be investigated, and that any person neglecting so to do should be made liable to a fine, not exceeding a certain amount, recoverable summarily before two magistrates. Such a provision would stimulate persons cognizant of the commission of offences to give information, and deter persons injured from abstaining from prosecuting.

The next observation that occurs is, that there is no regular system as to the mode of investigating offences suspected to have been committed and, consequently, it is very much a matter of accident whether the preliminary proceedings in any case are properly conducted. In some instances every proper step has been taken; in others the most obvious measures have been wholly omitted. Not unfrequently does it happen that a mortal injury is inflicted, and that the party has died without any dying declaration having been obtained, or any examination of the suspected parties being had in the presence of the injured party, and thus it sometimes happens that the most important evidence is lost. By this means injustice may be done as well to the accused as to the public, as the statement of the injured party might at once absolve or fix the accused as the party who committed the injury. Again, great irregularities sometimes occur in the proceedings before magistrates and coroners; and after a prisoner has been committed it frequently happens that no further inquiries are made until the trial takes place. Now, I think these defects obviously arise from the want of a superintending mind to guide and regulate the proceedings, and therefore I suggest that a public officer for a given district should be appointed, whose duty it should be to superintend and direct the