that Allen was not the prior inventor, and if Allen was not satisfied with this decision, he should have taken his appeal. Allen being out of the question, the examiner then proceeded to ascertain whether he could give priority to Crane & Rogers.

Judging from the testimony taken on the question of priority, and with no reference to that of joint or several invention, he was of the opinion that Crane alone invented the device in question, and, therefore, he could not give priority to Crane & Rogers; and as the judgment in interference must be either priority or dissolution, his judgment was dissolution.

So far as the examiner considered the matter of joint invention, he considered it as an ex parte question-a question solely between him and Crane & Rogers, with which Allen had nothing to do. Had priority been given to Allen, the question of joint invention would not have been discussed. As it was, this question did not arise in the mind of the examiner until after he had decided the whole controversy, between Allen on the one side and Crane & Rogers on the other, by deciding priority against Allen.

Allen was not a party in any opinion or decision the examiner may have given as to whether Crane alone, or Crane & Rogers jointly, were the inventors, and has no right to make any motion nor in any other way interfere in any matter pertaining to such opinion or decision.

If Allen was dissatisfied with the examiner's decision on the question of priority, he had his remedy in appeal. As to the judgment of priority, Crane & Rogers were satisfied.

An appeal from the examiner's opinion or dicta on the matter of joint invention, would have been irregular, and could have furnished no relief.

After the expiration of the thirty days granted for appeal, the interference stood dissolved, and of course Allen went out of the Office with his patent, and Crane & Rogers' application went back to the examiner, where it was prior to the declaration of interference, with the question of priority decided against Allen, in which decision Allen acquiesced, and a strong presumption raised that Crane & Rogers were not joint inventors.

Allen's attorneys refer with great assurance to the Commissioner's decisions in the cases of Weston vs. Hunt & Turner, May 14, 1871, and Pugh vs. Hamilton et al., May 19, 1871.

But a more careful examination of those decisions would have disclosed to them the fact that the action of the Office in the matter of Crane & Rogers' application has been in exact accordance with those decisions.

In the case of Weston vs. Hunt & Turner, both parties were applicants for patents. The Commissioner decided priority against Weston, but the testimony in the case clearly showed that Hunt was the first and only inventor; hence the Commissioner declined to give priority to Hunt & Turner, and dissolved the interference, and closed the decision

with these words: "The examiner, in his further examination of the applications, will take cognizance of the testimony in this case."

The closing of the decision in the case of Pugh vs. Hamilton et al. was substantially the same, both decisions clearly indicating that the question of joint invention should be the subject of further examination by the primary examiner. Any other course would be grossly unjust. When Hunt & Turner were taking their testimony, their attention was alone called to the question of priority of invention, that being the only question at issue, and on all other questions they were careless and indifferent; and when the Commissioner raised the question as to whether they were joint inventors, they had a right to be heard on that question, and to present additional testimony, if necessary. This being an ex parte matter, Weston had no interest or concern in it. The same is true in the case of Allen vs. Crane & Rogers.

In the case of Weston vs. Hunt & Turner, the words "decision and" ought to have been inserted before the word "testimony" in that part of the decision quoted above. These words are in the Pugh vs. Hamilton decision.

Against Weston in the first case, and Pugh in the other, the decisions were final; but the questions of joint invention were referred to the primary examiner, and his attention called to the testimony on that subject in the interference cases.

I regard the course pursued in the matter of Crane & Rogers' application as regular and proper, and in perfect harmony with the prior decisions of the Office, and hence overrule the motion.

THOMAS J. CHUBB.

Extension.

August 24, 1871.

In the matter of the application of Thomas J. Chubb for the extension of his patent for SEPARATING ORE.

Upon the order of the Commissioner, as provided in section 10 of the patent law, this case was heard by the examiners-in-chief, who reported upon the application as follows:

The patent sought to be extended is one of several obtained by Mr. Chubb, all relating to the same subject. This is the foundation patent, however, and is the only one for which an extension is asked. Its purpose was undoubtedly to cover the process of separation by forcing puffs of air up through a thin layer of crushed ore, spread upon plates suitably perforated.

The extension of the patent is opposed mainly upon two grounds: First, Chubb is not entitled to a broad claim for the process. Secondly, his machine, to which alone he is entitled, is worthless for the purpose intended.

In support of the first proposition, the patent of E. L. Seymour, September 19, 1854, is cited as anticipating any claim to the process. Upon examination it is found that Seymour does not set forth the Chubb process with such distinctness as to be recog

nized, and if he did, he is precluded from setting up any claim thereto by reason of an agreement between himself and Chubb, dated September 10, 1853, in which he acknowledges the latter to be the inventor of the process in question. A copy of this instrument was filed by Chubb before he obtained his patent; but it is now claimed that the paper is a forgery, Mr. Seymour swearing that he never signed such a document.

The original has been laid before us, together with a letter bearing the accredited signature of Seymour, and upon comparing the two signatures there appears to be no good reason for doubting the genuineness of the former. Chubb has enjoyed the possession of his patent fourteen years, and it is probable that Seymour has been aware of its scope and contents during this entire period. It is too late for Seymour to destroy the force of his written acknowledgment by parol evidence.

On the second point the testimony is conflicting. There is very little, however, directly to the effect that Chubb never produced a successful machine. The most of it is presumptive in nature. The opposition attempt to prove that, although many have made the attempt, a machine for separating ore by the dry process, as it is called. performing satisfactory work, has never yet been produced; and that if such a machine had been brought out at any time during the last fourteen years, it would have been taken up with alacrity by operators of mines in various localities. The argument is this:

1st. A successful machine for separating ore by the dry process is not known in the market.

2d. Chubb did not succeed in introducing his machine into general public use, although such a machine was a desideratum.

3d. Therefore Chubb's machine was impractical and a failure.

Now, on the other hand, to say nothing of operations in other places, Chubb proves conclusively that he did, practically and successfully, operate his machine for some time in Jersey City and Brooklyn, for the purpose of separating plumbago. He purchased the tailings of mines, run the same through his separator, and sold the product. In this business he swears he made $15,000 in 1863-'64, when he was interrupted by loss of all by fire. Here is a practical result, which cannot be gainsaid. It stands a sufficient answer to all the presumptions of the opposition. It may be that Chubb has not produced a machine adapted to all kinds of ores, but that he has constructed one suitable for some, we think is satisfactorily proved.

The objection urged that the invention is not clearly described in the specification, is not worthy of a moment's notice. The invention is undoubtedly there. Machines were made like Fig. 4 of the drawings. If the description is defective, it may be remedied by reissue, and the defect can form no bar to the grant of an extension, if a complete invention is shown by model and drawings.

From the nature of the case, it is impossible for the patentee to fix the estimated value of his invention. There are no reliable data from which a conclusion, at all satisfactory, may be reached. That it is of considerable value at present, and will prove to be of much greater importance in the future, we have little doubt.

Without entering into a critical examination of the statement of account, which is faulty in some respects, it is sufficient to state that the patentee has received little or nothing above his expenditures in connection with his invention; he shows an absolute loss of two or three thousand dollars.

His efforts to introduce his invention into public use seem to have been remarkable, Difficulties, which would have disheartened almost any man, have arisen repeatedly in his way. Two or three times he has lost by the failure of persons to whom he has sold machines, twice fire has consumed his all, and the late war put a stop to operations in North Carolina, where he had just commenced operations which promised to be remunerative.

The case seems to be one of more than ordinary merit, and we heartily recommend the grant of the extension sought.

Respectfully submitted.

LEGGETT, Commissioner:

DECISION.

The report of the board of examiners-in-chief is approved, and the extension will be granted.

AMOS RANK.

APPEAL FROM EXAMINERS-IN-CHIEF.

August 31, 1871.

In the matter of the application of Amos Rank for IMPROVEMENT IN HARVESTERS.

LEGGETT, Commissioner:

The applicant's claim, as it now stands, relates to the second and third clauses of claim as set forth in his amended specifications filed August 15, 1870, the examiner in charge having passed the first clause of original claim, and the board of examiners-in-chief the first of amended claim.

The second claim of amended specifications consists in the combination of the main frame, the drag-bar hinged to said frame, the shoe hinged to the drag-bar, the finger-beam secured to the shoe, the extended pivotpin connecting the drag-bar and shoe, and constituting the fulcrum on which the cutting apparatus rocks, the coupling-arm pivoted to the shoe in front of the pivot-pin, and the lifting apparatus connected with the drag-bar; all these parts being constructed and arranged for joint operation, as set forth.

Third. The combination of the main frame, the drag-bar hinged to said frame, the shoe hinged to the drag-bar, the finger-beam secured to the shoe, the extended pivot-pin connecting the drag-bar and shoe, the couplingarm pivoted to the shoe in front of the pivot-pin, the lifting apparatus connected with the coupling-arm, the rake-support mounted on the shoe in front of the pivot, and the platform secured to the finger-beam; all these parts being constructed and arranged for joint operation as hereinbefore set forth.

The applicant has withdrawn the claim allowed by the examiner from his application, and upon another application has received a patent upon it.

The board of examiners-in-chief allow the first clause of the amended specification, rejecting the second and third clauses of the amended specifications, which were originally the third and fourth claims.

Applicant insists that the board of appeals having allowed the first clause of amended claim, the third and fourth must be allowed also, as they set forth only combinations of what is already allowed.

If the board of appeals has made any mistake, it was in allowing the first clause of amended claim, and I must decline to give wider scope to this mistake.

The decision of the board of examiners-in-chief must be affirmed.

TINGLEY AND CARPENTER.

APPEAL FROM EXAMINERS-IN-CHIEF.

September 1, 1871.

In the matter of the interference between the applications for letterspatent of Cyrus B. F. Tingley and James M. Carpenter for making GIMLET-POINTED SCREWS.

LEGGETT, Commissioner:

There seems to be but little, if any, controversy in relation to the facts in this case, as established by the evidence.

Tingley claims "the combination of the former C, the tool-port D, having a stem as described, and the roughing and threading tools f, g, with the head B, of a screw-cutting machine, in the manner and for the purpose specified."

Carpenter claims "the combination of one or more cutters for forming a tapering thread on the point of the screw, substantially as described." The invention in controversy consists in the combination of one or more cutters for forming the thread on the tapering point of a chased screw, with the dies for forming the thread on the body of the screw.

In the spring of 1869, Carpenter entered the employ of W. H. Haskell, a manufacturer of bolts, nuts, and screws, in Providence, Rhode Island, where he worked building machinery for cutting bolts and taps, and while thus engaged invented and commenced the construction of a machine for making taps, and while working upon said tap-machine he conceived the idea that he could combine with the screw-making machine, then in use by Haskell, cutters which would make the gimletpoint while the body of the screw was being threaded or cut; the suggestion arose from the manner in which his tap-machine operated. At this time, which was in the spring or summer of 1869, he made drawings of the parts which hold the cutters, and by which, in conjunction with well-known devices, they are operated; and from these drawings were made the patterns, (Exhibits B, C, and D.) Previous to this time Carpenter explained the invention to his employer, Haskell. Carpenter also explained the invention to A. J. Kelly in June, 1869, and showed him the drawings and patterns (Exhibits B, C, and D.) Kelly fixes the time on or about June 17, 1869, it being his birthday and it being the occasion of his being at home. The testimony of G. H. Webb clearly shows that Carpenter had fully matured his invention as early as the summer of 1869. He had made working drawings, patterns, and procured the castings, and had fully described to sundry persons how the invention would work when combined with ordinary screw-making machines, such as were in use in Haskell's shop. Carpenter was employed as a day-laborer in the machine-shop of Haskell, and had not the time or the opportunity afforded him to complete and put his machine in practical use.

On the third of June, 1870, Carpenter filed in the Patent Office a