Dice answered, first, denials; and, second, that he took from T. in good faith, without notice, and for a full consideration. Thompson, as an answer, interposed a cross-complaint against Dice, in which, after denying any fraud, he alleged that he took a conveyance from the heirs of C. Morris, deceased, of all their interest, which was an undivided two-thirds of the tract; that by mistake his own deed to D. conveyed a greater interest in the land than that which the heirs of C. M. had owned, and which was all that he had intended to convey to D.; prayer, that his deed to D. might be reformed by correcting the mistake. Dice answered this cross-complaint, denying its averments. On the trial, D. moved for a separate trial of the issues between himself and T., which was refused. The court found from the evidence that the plaintiff's deed to T. was a mistake; that T. had reconveyed to her by quitclaim; that on the same day T. conveyed to D., and in that deed also there was a mistake, namely, that it conveyed five-sevenths of the whole tract instead of five-sevenths of an undivided two-thirds, which was the amount intended to be conveyed; and a judgment was rendered reforming this deed from T. to D. On an appeal by D. from this judgment, the court held that the matters averred in the cross-complaint, and the relief sought by it, were so intimately connected with the subject of the principal suit by Mrs. Morris, that the whole might be properly litigated together; that the crosscomplaint stated a good cause of action against D., and that the latter was not entitled to a separate trial of the issues raised by his answer to it. It is plain, from the facts as they were found by the trial court, that the real object of the suit by Mrs. Morris was to get rid of Thompson's deed to Dice. Thompson's deed back to herself had purported to reconvey the title to her, but was partially inoperative by reason of the outstanding deed from Thompson to Dice, which was at least a cloud upon her title. By making both of these persons defendants, she forced Thompson to attack his own deed to Dice. As the matters of difference between Thompson and Dice were closely blended with her own claims against both, and as her remedy so directly depended upon the result of the contest between these two parties, it seems eminently proper that this triangular legal duel should be fought in one contest, as was done. 1 Dice v. Morris, 32 Ind. 283. § 807. Another decision by the same court shows when a crosscomplaint by defendants against other defendants, will not be sustained. Gasharie and Davis sue one hundred and seven defendants, partners trading under the name of "Farmers' Home Store," and seek to recover the amount of certain notes given by the firm for the price of goods sold on credit, amounting to several thousand dollars. The firm was an association having a president, directors, and members. The business was conducted by a managing agent, and overseen by the directors. One of the articles of association forbade the purchase or sale of goods on credit. The notes in suit were given by the managing agent for goods bought on credit. Twenty-eight of the defendants put in an answer by way of a cross-complaint against the directors and managing agent, who were also defendants. This pleading stated the articles of association, alleged a violation of them by the directors and managing agent in the said purchase upon credit, and prayed that the judgment in favor of the plaintiffs might be rendered against said directors and agent in the first instance, and enforced out of their property. The plaintiffs, and the directors and agent defendants, demurred to this cross-complaint. The court held that it stated no defence to the plaintiff's action, and presented no case for relief against the directors and agent. While the code provides that "judgment may be rendered for or against one or more of several plaintiffs, or for or against one or more of several defendants, and it may, when the justice of the case requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as between themselves," and while the court has thus the power to settle disputes between the defendants, it will not do so to the detriment of the plaintiff.1 §808. The Code of Indiana expressly authorizes the court to determine the rights of the parties as between themselves on each side, when the justice of the case demands it. The mode of procedure is not pointed out, and therefore the general methods of chancery must be adopted, modified by the spirit of the code. When a defendant seeks relief against a defendant as to matters not appearing on the face of the original complaint, he must file a cross-complaint setting up the matters on which he relies, making as defendants thereto such of his codefendants and 1 Manning v. Gasharie, 27 Ind. 399. See Indiana code (2 G. & H. 218), § 368. "The others as are proper; and process is necessary to bring them in. It is plain that there must be notice and process to the persons against whom relief is sought on the cross-complaint.1 only real difference between a complaint and a cross-complaint is, that the first is filed by the plaintiff, and the second by the defendant. Both contain a statement of the facts, and each demands affirmative relief upon the facts stated. In the making up the issues and the trial of questions of fact, the court is governed by the same principles of law and rules of practice in the one case as in the other. When a defendant files a cross-complaint, and seeks affirmative relief, he becomes a plaintiff, and the plaintiff in the original action becomes the defendant in the cross-complaint."2 The same rules as to setting out written instruments and copies thereof apply to cross-petitions which are prescribed in reference to original petitions. Where, however, the cross-petition is based upon a writing which it does not set out in full, but which is annexed to the petition in the action, this is sufficient; the rule is practically complied with. An answer being denominated a counterclaim by the pleader, cannot in California be treated as a cross-complaint.* 1 Fletcher v. Holmes, 25 Ind. 458, 465,, per Frazer C. J.; Meredith v. Lackey, 16 Ind. 1. 2 Ewing v. Pattison, 35 Ind. 326, 330. 8 Coe v. Lindley, 32 Iowa, 437, 444; Ryder v. Thomas, 32 Iowa, 56. 4 McAbee v. Randall, 41 Cal. 136. ALPHABETICAL INDEX. [THE REFERENCES ARE TO SECTIONS.] ABATEMENT, defences in, 697, 698; with those in bar, 721. A. are new matter, 711; — may be joined ACCORD and satisfaction, defence of, new matter, 712. - - ACCOUNTING, plaintiffs in action for, 259; - defendants in do., 378. - - ACTION, CAUSE OF, statement of by the plaintiff, 432-580 (see Coм- PLAINT, and CAUSE OF ACTION). ACTION, CIVIL (see CIVIL ACTION). ACTIONS UPON CONTRACTS, defence of new matter in, 707–710. ACTIONS FOR A CONTRIBUTION, defendants in, 385. ACTIONS AGAINST CORPORATIONS and stockholders, defendants in, ACTIONS BY CREDITORS, defendants in, 346-350. - ACTIONS, EQUITABLE, plaintiffs in, 247-270 (see PLAINTIFFS, JOINDER ACTIONS EX CONTRACTU AND EX DELICTO, cannot be confounded, - ACTIONS, FORMS OF, use and effect of, in development of the law, 6-24; — ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST HUSBAND and wife, plaintiffs in, 234-246 - |