an appropriation thereof under the right of eminent domain. Taxation and eminent domain indeed rest substantially on the same foundation, as each implies the taking of private property for the public use on compensation made; but the compensation is different in the two cases. When taxation takes money for the public use, the tax-payer receives, or is supposed to receive, his just compensation in the protection which government affords to his life, liberty, and property, and in the increase in the value of his possessions by the use to which the government applies the money raised by the tax.1 3 But if these special local levies are taxation, do they come under the general provisions on the subject of taxation to be found in our State constitutions? The constitution of Michigan provides that" the legislature shall provide an uniform rule of taxation, except on property paying specific taxes; and taxes shall be levied upon such property as shall be prescribed by law";2 and again: "All assessments hereafter authorized shall be on property at its cash value." The first of these provisions has been regarded as confiding to the discretion of the legislature the establishment of the rule of uniformity by which taxation was to be imposed; and the second as having reference to the annual valuation of property for the purposes of taxation, which it is customary to make in that State, and not to the actual levy of a tax. And a local tax, therefore, levied in the city of Detroit, to meet the expense of paving a public street, and which was levied, not in proportion to the value of property, but according to an arbitrary scale of supposed benefit, was held not invalid under the constitutional provision.* So the constitution of Illinois provides that "the General Assembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property; such value to be ascertained by some person or persons to be elected or appointed in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise," 5 &c. The charter of the city of Peoria provided that, when a public street 1 People v. Mayor, &c. of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 422; Williams v. Mayor, &c. of Detroit, 2 Mich. 565; Scovills v. Cleveland, 1 Ohio, N. S. 126; Northern Indiana R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. S. 165. Art. 14, § 11. 3 Art. 14, § 12. ↑ Williams v. Mayor, &c. of Detroit, 2 Mich. 560. And see Woodbridge v. Detroit, 8 Mich. 274. 5 Art. 9, § 2. was opened or improved, commissioners should be appointed by the county court to assess upon the property benefited the expense of the improvement in proportion to the benefit. These provisions were held to be constitutional, on the ground that assessments of this character were not such taxation as was contemplated by the general terms which the constitution employed. And a similar view of these local assessments has been taken in other cases.2 But whatever may be the basis of the taxation, the requirement that it shall be uniform is universal. It applies as much to these local assessments as to any other species of taxes. The difference is only in the character of the uniformity, and in the basis on which it is established. But to render taxation uniform in any case, two things are essential. The first of these is that each taxing district should confine itself to the objects of taxation within its limits. Otherwise there is or may be duplicate taxation, and of course inequality. Assessments upon real estate not lying within the taxing districts would be void, and assessments for personal property 1 City of Peoria v. Kidder, 26 Ill. 357. People v. Mayor, &c. of Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419; Matter of Mayor, &c. of New York, 11 Johns. 77; Sharp v. Spier, 4 Hill, 76; Livingston v. Mayor, &c. of New York, 8 Wend. 85; Matter of Furman St., 17 Wend. 649; Nichols v. Bridgeport, 23 Conn. 189; Schenley v. City of Alleghany, 25 Penn. St. 128; McBride v. Chicago, 22 Ill. 574; City of Peoria v. Kidder, 26 Ill. 351; City of Lexington v. McQuillan's Heirs, 9 Dana, 513; Hines v. Leavenworth, 3 Kansas, 186; St. Joseph v. O'Donoghue, 31 Mo. 345; Egyptian Levee Co. v. Hardin, 27 Mo. 495; Burnet v. Sacramento, 12 Cal. 76; Yeatman v. Crandell, 11 La. An. 220; Wallace v. Shelton, 14 La. An. 498; Hill v. Higdon, 5 Ohio, N. S. 243; Marion v. Epler, Ibid. 250; Reeves v. Treasurer of Wood Co., 8 Ohio, N. S. 333; Northern Ind. R. R. Co. v. Connelly, 10 Ohio, N. S. 159; Maloy v. Marietta, 11 Ohio, N. S. 636; State v. Dean, 3 Zab. 335; State v. Mayor, &c. of Jersey City, 4 Zab. 662; Bond v. Kenosha, 17 Wis. 289; City of Fairfield v. Ratcliff, 20 Iowa, 396; Municipality No. 2 v. White, 9 La. An. 447; Cumming v. Police Jury, Ibid. 503; Northern Liberties v. St. John's Church, 13 Penn. St. 107. The cases of Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242, and Lumsden v. Cross, Ibid. 282, recognize the fact that these local burdens are generally imposed under the name of assessments instead of taxes, and that therefore they are not covered by the general provisions in the constitution of the State on the subject of taxation. An exemption of church property from taxation will not preclude its being assessed for improving streets in front of it. Le Fever v. Detroit, 2 Mich. 586; Lockwood v. St. Louis, 24 Mo. 20. But sometimes, when a parcel of real estate lies partly in two districts, authority is given by law to assess the whole in one of these districts, and the whole parcel may then be considered as having been embraced within the district where taxed, by an enlargement of the district bounds to include it. Saunders v. Springstein, 4 Wend. 429. made against persons not residing in the district would also be void, unless made with reference to the actual presence of the property in such district.1 In Wells v. City of Weston,2 the Supreme Court of Missouri deny the right of the legislature to subject property located in one taxing district to taxation in another, upon the express ground that it is in substance the arbitrary taxation of the property of one class of citizens for the benefit of another class. The case was one where the legislature sought to subject real estate lying outside the limits of a city to taxation for city purposes, on the theory that it received some benefit from the city government, and ought to contribute to its support. In Kentucky and Iowa1 decisions have been made which, while affirming the same principle as the case above cited, go still further, and declare that it is not competent for the legislature to increase the limits of a city, in order to include therein farming lands, occupied by the owner for agricultural purposes, and not required for either streets or houses, or other purposes of a town, and solely for the purpose of increasing the city revenue by taxation. The courts admit that the extension of the limits of a city or town, so as to include its actual enlargement, as manifested by houses and population, is to be deemed a legitimate exercise of the taxing power, but they declare that an indefinite or unreasonable extension, so as to embrace lands or farms at a distance from the local government, does not rest upon the same authority. And although it may be a delicate as well as a difficult duty for the judiciary to interpose, the court had no doubt but strictly there are limits beyond which the legislative discretion cannot go. "It is not every case of injustice or oppression which may be reached; and it is not every case which will authorize a judicial tribunal to inquire into the minute operation of laws imposing taxes, or defining the boundaries of local jurisdictions. The extension of the limits of the local authority may in some cases be greater than is necessary to include the adjacent population, or territory laid out into city lots, without a 1 People v. Supervisors of Chenango, 11 N. Y. 563; Mygatt v. Washburn, 15 N. Y. 316; Brown v. Smith, 24 Barb. 419; Hartland v. Church, 47 Me. 169; Lessee of Hughey v. Horrell, 2 Ohio, 231. 2 22 Mo. 385. City of Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Monr. 491. case being presented in which the courts would be called upon to apply a nice and exact scrutiny as to its practical operation. It must be a case of flagrant injustice and palpable wrong, amounting to the taking of private property without such compensation in return as the tax-payer is at liberty to consider à fair equivalent for the tax." This decision has been subsequently recognized and followed as authority, in the last-named State.1 The second essential is that the apportionment of taxes should reach all the objects of taxation within the district. Of the correctness of this as a principle, there can be little doubt, though there may sometimes be difficulty in determining whether in practice it has been applied or not. "With the single exception of specific taxes," says Christiancy, J., in Woodbridge v. Detroit,2 "the terms tax' and 'assessment' both, I think, when applied to property, and especially to lands, always include the idea of some ratio or rule of apportionment, so that of the whole sum to be raised, the part paid by one piece of property shall bear some known relation to, or be affected by, that paid by another. Thus, if one hundred dollars are to be raised from tracts A, B, and C, the amount paid by A will reduce by so much that to be paid by B and C, and so of the others. In the case of specific taxes, as well as duties and imposts, though the amount paid by one is not affected by that paid by another, yet there is a known and fixed relation of one to the other, a uniform rate by which it is imposed upon the whole species or class of property or persons to which the specific tax applies; and this is so of duties and imposts, whether specific or ad valorem. To compel individuals to contribute money or property to the use of the public, without reference to any common ratio, and without requiring the sum 1 Langworthy v. Dubuque, 13 Iowa, 86; Fulton v. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 404; Buell v. Ball, 20 Iowa, 282. These cases, however, do not hold the legislative act which enlarges the city limits to be absolutely void, but only hold that they will limit the exercise of the taxing power as nearly as practicable to the line where the extension of the boundaries ceases to be beneficial to the proprietor in a municipal point of view. For this purpose they enter into an inquiry of fact, whether the lands in question, in view of their relative position to the growing and improved parts of the town, and partaking more or less of the benefits of municipal government, are proper subjects of municipal taxation; and if not, they enjoin the collection of such taxes. It would seem as if there must be great practical difficulties if not some of principle in making this disposition of such a case. 28 Mich. 301. paid by one piece or kind of property or by one person to bear any relation whatever to that paid by another is, it seems to me, to lay a forced contribution, not a tax, duty, or impost, within the sense of these terms as applied to the exercise of powers by any enlightened or responsible government." In the case of Knowlton v. Supervisors of Rock County,1 an important and interesting question arose, involving the very point now under discussion. The constitution of Wisconsin provides that "the rule of taxation shall be uniform," which, if we are correct in what we have already stated, is no more than an affirmance of a settled principle of constitutional law. The city of Janesville included within its territorial limits, not only the land embraced within the recorded plat of the village of Janesville and its additions, but also a large quantity of the adjacent farming or agricultural lands. Conceiving the owners of these lands, too greatly and unequally burdened by taxation for the support of the city government, the legislature passed an act declaring that "in no case shall the real and personal property within the territorial limits of said city, and not included within the territorial limits of the recorded plat of the village of Janesville, or of any additions to said village, which may be used, occupied, or reserved for agricultural or horticultural purposes, be subject to an annual tax to defray the current expenses of said city exceeding one half of one per cent, nor for the repair and building of roads and bridges, and the support of the poor, more than one half as much on each dollar's valuation shall be levied for such purposes as on the property within such recorded plats, nor shall the same be subject to any tax for any of the purposes mentioned in § 3 of ch. 5 of [the city charter], nor shall the said farming or gardening lands be subject to any tax other than before mentioned for any city purpose whatever." Under the charter the property of the city was liable to an annual tax of one per cent to defray the current expenses of the city; and also an additional tax of such sum as the common council might deem necessary for the repair and building of roads and bridges, and for the support of the poor. Thus it will be perceived that the legislature, within the same taxing district, undertook to provide that a portion of the property should be taxed at one rate in proportion to value, and another portion at a much lower rate; while from taxation for certain proper local purposes the latter class was exempted altogether. 19 Wis. 410. |