provides the means of preserving the ownership without the institution of a suit. If an acknowledgment in writing, signed by the person in possession, be given to the owner, or his agent, of the existence of the right, the time will run only from the period when the acknowledgment, or, if more than one, the last acknowledgment was given (s. 14).

But any acknowledgment, given after the period of limitation shall have expired, will come too late (e); for the new statute does not, like the old statutes, bar the remedy and stop there, but expressly renders the bar a final extinction of the right (s. 34); and this statute, too, still contracting more and more the former limits, includes in the bar to the present right of the claimant, all his concurrent rights and possibilities, in respect of future estates or interests (s. 20).

The distinction between the right of possession and the right of property is now reduced to this—that, though the right of possession may be in one person, as against strangers, and the right of property be in another, yet the right of property can exist no longer as a mere right, but only in connexion with a right of entry at least. The present state of the law in this respect may be illustrated by supposing that land is settled upon A. for life, remainder to B. in fee; that C. dispossesses A., and continues in possession for twenty years: now, if A. be still living, his right is extinct, and the right of possession is absolute in C., for the life of A.; but if A. be dead within twenty years, then the right of possession in C. is defeasible, being merely an apparent or presumptive right of possession, or that right which the law admits and protects till a better right is proved, while

(e) As to the vigilance required of landlords, by the new law, see 2 Sugd. V. & P. 10th ed. 351.

the true right of possession, or that right which flows. from the right of property itself, is in B. If, in the state of circumstances last supposed, C. be dispossessed by D., a stranger, then C., having a right of possession as against all mankind, except B., may recover the possession in ejectment from D. (ƒ); for to permit D., who has no colour of title, to retain the possession against C., who has a primâ facie title (g), would be, not merely to disquiet the possession without advancing the ends of justice, but possibly to do injustice, since the wrong of C. may have ripened by acquiescence into a right, while the wrong of D. is still recent and notorious. In the meantime, the title is really in B., who brings ejectment against C., and recovers by force of a right superior to that which enabled C. to recover from D.-by force of the right of property itself. But if B. should neglect to bring his ejectment within twenty years from the death of A., then the statute would at once bar his right of entry, and extinguish his right of property, and thus, by a necessary consequence, confer upon C. an absolute right to the possession, as against every possible claimant under the supposed settlement; for the bar to the now sole remedy would close the door against all but vexatious (h) litigation, and the utter extinction of the right would deprive the late owner of every chance of the resuscitation of his title by any other means.

We must not, however, confound the negative effect of the statute with the positive effect of a conveyance. In the example last considered, the rights of A. and B. do not become the rights of C., under a species of involuntary alienation effected by the statute. If that hypo

CHAPTER V.

The statute

does not con

vey, but de

stroys the right.

CHAPTER V.

General view of

fected by the statute, in re

gard to the legal

title.

thesis were adopted, it would follow that, when the bar became complete as against A., the tenant for life, C. acquired a lawful estate pur auter vie; in short, that where the land is in settlement, the adverse possessor would be from time to time invested with interests measured by those of the successive takers, whether chattel or freehold, and consequently be owner to-day of a short term of years, to-morrow, of the fee. Such is not the operation of the statute. The wrong-doer must be considered, according to the principle of the old law (i), as claiming generally, and therefore as claiming the absolute property, (unless, indeed, he expressly qualify his claim), and the statute as merely diminishing from time to time the danger of eviction, till at length his originally precarious fee becomes, by the exclusion of every stronger claim, a firm inheritance.

If we take a general retrospect of this exposition of the changes ef- the statute, with reference to the legal title, we shall find that important changes have been effected, not merely in the periods previously fixed by the law of limitation, but in the principles which had long governed the application of that law. To sum up the results :-according to the ancient law, adverse possession did not commence till the ownership was reduced to a right of entry at least; a state from which it gradually declined to a right of action, first on the possessory right, then on the mere right; and there were means by which, independently of any statutory limitation, both the right of entry and the right of possession might be successively taken away, but none by which the mere right, though limited as to the remedy, could be finally extinguished. Now, however, enjoyment may be adverse, for all the purposes of the act (k), without any disturbance of the seisin; the right of the owner, a right to (i) Ante, 225.

(k) Ante, 246, n. (g); 251, n. (r); 266.

be enforced by one and the same proceeding, will continue, without change, for a limited period, and then, on ceasing to admit of being so enforced, will cease to exist; and these effects will flow entirely from the statute. Again, under the old law, the necessary consequence of adverse possession, which supposed disseisin, was incapacity on the part of the rightful owner, to alien or devise. But now, as the enjoyment may be adverse, within the meaning of the act, without any suspension of the seisin, (as where, for example, rent is wrongfully received, (s. 9)), no such incapacity will be the necessary precursor of the bar (1). But it should seem, as we have already intimated, that, except for the purposes of the act, the character of the possession must still be determined according to the principles of the old law, so that, unless the time limited by the act shall have run against the claimant, the new principles cannot have any operation; and even as to possession for the purposes of the act, the change is yet too recent, and the discussions which have ensued too limited to justify any confident conclusions. Some discisions and dicta, already cited (m), certainly evince the strong inclination of the judicature to emulate the legislature, by casting away the old doctrines with the old statutes; and since this essay was last submitted to the profession, the inference drawn by the writer from those sources, as to the species of possession required by the new law, has been strengthened by the concurring opinion of a high authority (n). Such views, however, are but just beginning to open; the new law of limitation is yet to be formed; and in rejecting the doc

(1) Rights of entry are now devisable; see 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 3, (post).

(m) Ante, 246, n. (g); 251, n. (r). (n) 2 Sugd. V. & P. 10th ed. 349; Id. 353.

CHAPTER V.

How far the principles of the old law are

still in force.

CHAPTER V.

Extension of the limitation

to certain spe

cies of interests,

and of property,

not within the old statutes.

trine of non-adverse possession, engrafted by adjudication on the former statutes, where the recent statute does not itself expressly reject it, we must, in practice at least, follow cautiously the progress of decision. The law of limitation is beset with difficulties of every kind—difficulties inherent in its very nature, from the variety of subjects, objects, and interests with which it is conversant; difficulties created by the frame of the act; and difficulties springing, and capable of accumulating indefinitely, from decisions not founded on large and mature views of its provisions.

This statute not only provides, as we have seen, a stricter limitation of rights falling within the provisions of the former statutes, but supplies, in other cases, the want of a positive limitation, particularly with reference to equitable titles (ss. 24, 25, 26, 27, 28); to advowsons (ss. 30, 31, 32, 33); and to mortgage debts, judgment debts (o), and every other pecuniary charge upon land (s. 40), including even a general charge of debts (p). And the statute extends to tithes (q), not belonging to a spiritual or eleemosynary corporation sole (s. 1). Though the title and general tenor of the act would seem to contemplate real property only (r), yet the word "legacy" has crept in (s) (ss. 40, 42, 43), and, standing unexplained, appears to embrace every gift of

(o) Berrington v. Evans, 1 You. & C. 434.

(p) Lord St. John v. Boughton, 9 Sim. 219; and see s. 1, of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, as to a body of creditors.

N. C. 679.

(8) "The late act has settled periods of limitation in other cases; but there is none fixed with respect to a legacy." Per Lord Brougham in Campbell v. Sand

(q) See also 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. ford, 8 Bligh's Parl. Rep. N. S. 100.

(r) See Paget v. Foley, 2 Bing.

622.