Portions of the second and third instructions are assigned for error, as follows: "Second. If they believe, from the evidence, that on and prior to the fourteenth of August, 1880, the defendant had a depot at Red Hill, near plaintiff's property, that was in a defective condition and liable to take fire from a fire kept therein, and that knowing the premises, a few days prior to said fourteenth day of August, 1880, defendant stored in said building a large quantity of atlas powder, commonly known as giant cartridges, and kept the same therein, and while it was stored therein said building took fire through a lack of the care and diligence, above described, on the part of the defendant, by and through its agents and employees, and caused said powder to explode and destroy by fire, or otherwise, the property of the plaintiff, they should find for plaintiff."

"Third. And if the jury find, from the evidence, that the defendant stored and kept in the depot, at Red Hill, giant powder, or cartridges, or other inflammable and combustible materials, when said depot building was defective and unsafe for the storage and keeping of such materials; and that defendant was aware of such facts, or that it did not keep the same with the vigilance and care, and in the charge of such careful and proper servants, as a prudent man would have done with the same kind of substances, and, that by reason thereof, the said depot building was burned, and the said giant powder and other substances, exploded and destroyed the property of plaintiff by fire, or otherwise, they should find for the plaintiff."

The objections assigned to these instructions are, that there was no evidence produced by the plaintiff that said depot building was defective and liable to take fire from a fire kept therein; nor any evidence that it was unsafe for the storage and keeping of such materials as therein described; nor any evidence that the defendant was aware of such facts; that there was no allegation in the complaint nor any evidence produced on that trial that said defendant did not keep said depot with vigilance and care, and in charge of such careful and proper servants as a prudent man would have done, and that by reason thereof the building was burned, the powder exploded and the plaintiff's property destroyed.

It is also assigned for error that the court instructed the jury, that notice to defendant's agents was notice to the defendant, and that the acts of its agents and employees were the acts of the defendant.

The objections to these legal propositions are, that they are too broad, and consequently that they were calculated to mislead the jury; also, that there was no evidence to support them.

The foregoing objections embrace the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth and fifteenth assignments of error.

We will first consider the objections to the legal propositions contained in the foregoing instructions.

Respecting the acts and responsibilities of corporations, the law is that artificial persons, like natural persons, are liable in damages for acts of negligence imputable to them, whereby injuries result to third persons. A corporation acts through its officers and employees,

who, in the exercise of their respective functions, and, to that extent, represent the corporation.

The rules and principles of law applicable to the relation of master and servant, apply equally to corporations and their agents, and damages resulting from the negligence of both classes of persons, is measured by the same rule.

If a servant is guilty of a wrongful act when engaged in his master's business and while acting within the general scope of his authority, the master is liable, although he did not authorize the particular act. It is no defense in such case that the servant disobeyed private instructions, or abused his authority. So a person who puts a servant in a place of trust or responsibility, or commits to him the management of his business, or the care of his property, is held responsible for damages resulting to third persons through the lack of judgment or discretion of the servant, while executing the trust, although he departed from the strict letter of his authority in the execution thereof.

The same rules obtain in respect to railroad companies. Accordingly it is laid down that the employees of such a corporation both of the higher and the subordinate class, who are engaged in service at its stations, or on its trains, are presumed to be authorized by it to do such service, and to perform the acts usually incident to their positions; and it is liable for their tortious acts which are performed in the course of such service: Rounds v. D. L. & W. R. Co., 64 N. Y., 129; Cohen v. Railroad Company, 69 N. Y., 170; Passenger Railway Company v. Donahue, 10 Pa. St., 119; Pierce on Railroads, 277.

Concerning the question of notice, the rule is the same in respect to corporations as to natural persons. As to the latter, the principle obtains that willful ignorance of a fact, is equivalent to actual knowledge of the fact.

The rule is well settled that notice to an agent in transactions in which he is employed, where it becomes his duty, by virtue of his employment, to act on such notice, is notice to the principal. The term notice, in such instance, is synonymous with the term knowledge.

It may, therefore, be said that knowledge acquired by agents of corporations in the discharge of official duties, of facts material to the transactions in which they are engaged, or coming within their respective departments of service, is the knowledge of the corporation: Ewell's Evans on Agents, p. 229; Angell and Ames on Corporations, sec. 305; Abbott's Digest Law of Corporations, pp. 543, 544. An illustration of the rule that notice to the agent in the transactions in which he is employed, and within the scope of the authority confided to him, is notice to the principal, is found in the case of a locomotive engineer, wherein it is held that if the fact be known to him that either the road or the machinery is defective, it is knowledge on the part of the company, and renders it responsible for the consequences: N. & C. R. R. Co. v. Elliott, 1 Cold., 611.

It will be observed that the rules above stated concerning the responsibilities of corporations growing out of the acts of their agents, and concerning notice to their agents, are more full and guarded upon these subjects than the legal propositions of the instructions upon the same subjects. This fact requires us to make an important rule of practice. It is this: That courts are not required to state, in their instructions to juries, the entire law upon any given subject, but only so much thereof as may be applicable and essential to the issues and facts of the case on trial. To this extent the charge must be correct and explicit, and if unexceptionable in these essentials it will not be ground of reversal that the instructions are not strictly correct as universal propositions of law: Proffatt on jury trial, secs. 311, 313; Wells' Questions of Law and Fact, secs. 393, 403.

The instructions were correct, therefore, if applicable to the case. But counsel affirms that they were neither applicable to the issues nor based upon the evidence.

What then, were the issues, and what was the effect of the evidence?

The complaint explicitly charged that the injuries and damages sustained by the plaintiff were occasioned by the wrongful and negligent acts of the defendant. It specified in what the wrong and negligence consisted, and likewise the nature and extent of the damages sustained.

The answer as explicitly denied that the defendant was guilty of wrong or negligence, denied that the fire and its consequences were the result of wrong or negligence on its part; and denied, seriatim, the specific acts of negligence alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff. It further denied that the defendant had any notice or knowledge of the alleged negligent or wrongful acts.

So far, then, as the issues were concerned, the instructions were applicable under the rules and principles announced.

Upon looking into the evidence we learn that the depot building was a wooden structure, of the dimensions of about twenty-four feet by thirty-six feet, erected upon upright blocks of wood, which elevated the side nearest the railroad about eighteen inches above the ground, and the opposite side about three feet above the ground. The ends and sides of the building were composed of single boards placed upright against the frame timbers, the edges or cracks of the boards being battened with narrower strips of lumber. The roof was a steep gable, constructed of boards, which were battened like the ends and sides, and the exterior surface was covered with tarred paper, to protect the interior from snow and rain. The interior was divided into four rooms and a loft, the rooms being named respectively,"office," "waiting room," "warehouse and "kitchen." These apartments, or some of them, including the office, were separated from the loft by a board ceiling, which has already been described, as has also the aperture therein through which the pi pe of the office stove passed.

That this building was the property of the railroad company is not denied; that the company caused it to be constructed and equipped in manner described, was proven by the witnesses.

C. W. Fisher, superintendent of the defendant, stated upon the witness stand, that the building was constructed for the company upon contract; that it was his business to inspect the building and property of the company, and that on the completion of the depot he inspected it, found it all right and received it.

When asked about the condition of the defective flue in the office ceiling, he answered that he did not remember of giving special attention to the flue, he was under the impression that the flues were all right. He said it was his special duty to see that such things were safe, that he went there to examine and found them all right. He was unable to say, however, whether there was a flue in the office ceiling or not, at the time of his inspection, but admitted that the furnishing of flues for the building was not included in the contract. He then stated that an employee of the railroad company known as "foreman of buildings," by name of John Greenslit, was to look after the flues. Mr. Greenslit being called to the stand and asked if he knew anything about a flue in the office ceiling, answered that he did not. He said he had furnished but one flue, and that went into the waiting room; he had put none in the office.

The testimony shows there were three stoves in use in this building, but we have here the remarkable admission that but one flue was provided, and that was not for the office, where it seems, fire was necessary at all seasons, but for the waiting room.

The testimony further shows that from the completion of the building to the time of the fire, this depot station was in the general charge of one F. E. Colyer, as station agent and telegraph operator of the defendant. The only other employee of the defendant at that point, at and about the time of the fire, was one Charles Hilton, who appears to have been employed as an assistant to the agent, Colyer. Mr. Rundle, the defendant's superintendant of telegraphs, says he authorized Colyer to employ Hilton, for the business of checking tracking freight at the station. But the testimony shows that in the absence of Colyer, Hilton ran the station, excepting only the telegraph instrument. These two men, Colyer and Hilton, slept together in a bed in the office, and were sleeping there when the fire occurred. The weather was cool in the evenings, at that point, rendering it necessary to have fire in the office stove almost every night, although it was in the month of August. On the night of the thirteenth of August, there was a fire in the stove, and as these men were about to retire to bed, the stove was filled up with coal, more than the usual quantity being put in, according to the testimony of Colyer. They were awakened about twelve o'clock in the night, by the fire, which had been communicated to the ceiling, and had gained such headway that they could do nothing but escape from the building, which was soon destroyed. Two or three weeks before this, the station agent was alarmed by

It will be observed that the rules above stated concerning the responsibilities of corporations growing out of the acts of their agents, and concerning notice to their agents, are more full and guarded upon these subjects than the legal propositions of the instructions upon the same subjects. This fact requires us to make an important rule of practice. It is this: That courts are not required to state, in their instructions to juries, the entire law upon any given subject, but only so much thereof as may be applicable and essential to the issues and facts of the case on trial. To this extent the charge must be correct and explicit, and if unexceptionable in these essentials it will not be ground of reversal that the instructions are not strictly correct as universal propositions of law: Proffatt on jury trial, secs. 311, 313; Wells' Questions of Law and Fact, secs. 393, 403.

The instructions were correct, therefore, if applicable to the case. But counsel affirms that they were neither applicable to the issues nor based upon the evidence.

What then, were the issues, and what was the effect of the evidence?

The complaint explicitly charged that the injuries and damages sustained by the plaintiff were occasioned by the wrongful and negligent acts of the defendant. It specified in what the wrong and negligence consisted, and likewise the nature and extent of the damages sustained.

The answer as explicitly denied that the defendant was guilty of wrong or negligence, denied that the fire and its consequences were the result of wrong or negligence on its part; and denied, seriatim, the specific acts of negligence alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff. It further denied that the defendant had any notice or knowledge of the alleged negligent or wrongful acts.

So far, then, as the issues were concerned, the instructions were applicable under the rules and principles announced.

Upon looking into the evidence we learn that the depot building was a wooden structure, of the dimensions of about twenty-four feet by thirty-six feet, erected upon upright blocks of wood, which elevated the side nearest the railroad about eighteen inches above the ground, and the opposite side about three feet above the ground. The ends and sides of the building were composed of single boards placed upright against the frame timbers, the edges or cracks of the boards being battened with narrower strips of lumber. The roof was a steep gable, constructed of boards, which were battened like the ends and sides, and the exterior surface was covered with tarred paper, to protect the interior from snow and rain. The interior was divided into four rooms and a loft, the rooms being named respectively, office," "waiting room," "warehouse" and "kitchen." These apartments, or some of them, including the office, were separated from the loft by a board ceiling, which has already been described, as has also the aperture therein through which the pipe of the office stove passed.