have, distinctly, done so in terms. If, then, it is impossible to comply with the condition, the impossible condition must be regarded as not intended as to this class of laborers; or, if intended, it must be void. The law requires nothing impossible-Lex non cogit impossibilia: Bour. Law Dict., Maxims; Broom's Maxims, 242; and Lex non intendit aliquid impossibile: Bour. Law Diet.,-the law intends not anything impossible, are among the most venerable maxims of the law. In a statute, 'No text imposing obligations is understood to demand impossible things: Sedg. Stat. Law, 191. 'Provisions in acts of parliament are to be expounded according to the ordinary sense of the words, unless such construction would. lead to some unreasonable result, or be inconsistent with, or contrary to, the declared or implied intention of the framer of the law; in which case the grammatical sense of the words may be modified, restricted, or extended to meet the plain policy and provision of the act: Dwarris on Stat., 582. The rule is to construe the words 'in their ordinary sense, unless it would lead to obscurity, or manifest injustice, and if it should, so vary them as to avoid that which, certainly, could not have been the intention of the legislature, we must put a reasonable construction upon the words: lb. 587; See Donaldson v. Wood, 22 Wend., 309; Lake Shore Ry. Co. v. Roach, 80 N. Y., 339.

* *

To

"All laws should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over the letter:' U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wal., 486. 'In whatever language a statute may be framed, its purpose must be determined by its natural and reasonable effect. require a heavy and almost impossible condition to the exercise of this right, with the alternative of payment of a small sum of money, is, in effect, to demand payment of that sum:' Henderson v. Mayor of New York, et al., 92, N. S., 268; see, also, Brewer v. Blougher, 14 Pet., 198; U. S. v. Freeman, 3 How., 564. So in the case of the class of Chinese laborers now under consideration. To require them to produce a certificate as the only evidence of their right to land when it was impossible, or impracticable, to procure it, would be, in effect, to absolutely, and unconditionally, exclude them. Yet, it is, manifestly, the policy, intent, and reason of the law, to carry out in good faith the stipulations of the treaty; that they 'shall be allowed to go and come of their own free will and accord;' and 'be accorded all the rights, priviliges, immunities, and exemptions which are accorded to the citizens and subjects of the most favored nation.'

"We are, therefore, fully satisfied that those Chinese laborers who were in the United States on November 17, 1880, and left before the passage of the restriction act, and those, also, who came into the United States, and departed therefrom between that date and May 6, 1882, are entitled to re-enter the United States upon satis

No. 41.-2.

factory evidence other than the certificates provided for in said section 4

The foregoing was said with reference to the act of 1882, before its amendment, but it applies with even greater force to the act as amended in 1884.

In Ah Quan's case, ante, arising under this act, as amended in 1884, after a further discussion of this point, as applicable to the act as amended, we stated our conclusion as follows: (22 Fed. Rep., 183.)

"To hold that congress intended to require the performance of the dependent obligation, on the part of the Chinese laborer, until the government has discharged its correlative and precedent duty, and obligation, upon which his obligation rests, imposed by the act, by furnishing the certificate, and, thereby, rendering it possible for him to produce it, would be to attribute to congress a deliberate intent to enact a palpable and glaring absurdity, thereby violating one of the most venerable canons of statutory construction, that a statute must not be so construed as to lead to an absurd conclusion. We must conclude, therefore, in the absence of any express declaration to that effect, and of any reference whatever to those, who had, already, departed, with a right, at the time of their departure, secured by express terms of the treaty, to return; that it was not intended to require the production of the certificate, by those who departed from the country before it was possible to obtain it, And in the absence of any provision so declaring, that congress did not, in fact, intend to exclude such Chinese laborers as were in the country at the time mentioned, is clearly manifest, because it has said so in express terms in the provision of section 3, that the two foregoing sections (excluding Chinese laborers) shall not apply to Chinese laborers, who were in the United States on the seventeenth day of November, 1880,' etc. It is clear, from the necessities of the case, that this section is only applicable to those who departed after the passage of the act, and who had the opportunity to procure the certificate.

"To hold otherwise, would be to render this clause, making the impossible certificate the only evidence, as to those who had departed before the passage of the act, absolutely inconsistent with the clause of section 3, referred to, that the preceding sections shall not apply to Chinese laborers who were in the United States,' at the designated period, and render that provision wholly nugatory, as well as to violate the treaty which the act proposes to execute, and not to abrogate. The different provisions of the statute must be so construed, if possible, that they can stand together, and not so as to nullify each other.

"The clause of the amendment making the certificate the only evidence, as to those to whom it is applicable, of a right to re-enter the United States, only declares, in express and explicit terms, what we held the original act to mean, and in no way changes its effect, in this particular, as we had construed it.

"Our construction of the original act in Long Yick Dew, 2 W. C. R., 83, and 19 Fed Rep., 491, was before congress at the time of the passage of the amendatory act. If it had been intended to make the amendment as to the prescribed certificate being the only evidence of a right to return applicable to those Chinese laborers, who were in the country at the date of the treaty, and who departed after that date, and before it was possible to obtain the certificate required, as to whom we had before distinctly held it to be inapplicable, congress would, certainly, have amended the first clause of section 3, so as to read in substance as follows: "The two preceding sections shall not apply to Chinese laborers who were in the United States on the seventeenth day of November, 1880, etc., except as to those who departed from the United States after said seventeenth day of November, 1880, and before the passage of the act, or before it was possible to obtain such certificate. This is, in effect, the way those who insist upon the production of such certificate by that class, as the only evidence of their right to re-enter the United States, must read it in order to sustain their view, or the view that it was intended absolutely to exclude that class in violation of the treaty stipulations. Congress has not introduced any such exception, and we are not authorized to interpolate it into the act. To do so, would be to legislate, not to construe. The action of congress in not introducing any exception of the kind indicated, but, on the contrary, so amending the act, as to make the propriety of our construction more clearly manifest in view of our well known previous construction of the original act on this very point, is, in effect, an emphatic apapproval of that construction:" See, also, the case of Shong Toon, 3 W. C. Rep., 596, where this question is well discussed by Hoffman, district judge.

Another shade of the opposing views maintained by the United States attorney, but, essentially, the same, has been suggested, which, necessarily, assumes that section 4, does not apply to those who departed pior to the passage of the act of 1882. It is, that congress did not intend that any of these Chinese laborers, who were in the country on November 17, 1880, who had departed before the passage of the act of 1882, or, in other words, who were not still in the country, at that date, should return at all; and, consequently, that there was no need of requiring, as to them, the certificate prescribed by section 4, or any other. There is not one word in the act, that, directly, declares or hints, at such a purpose, and not one section, clause or word from which an inferance of such intent, necessarily, or naturally, arises; nor does it necessarily, or, naturally, arise upon the whole act taken together. On the contrary, the opposite intent, as we have seen, is expressed in precise and unmistakable language, that cannot be misunderstood, in that clause of section 3, which provides, "that the two foregoing sections shall not apply to Chinese laborers, who were in the United States on the seventeenth day of November, 1880, or who shall come into the same before ninety days next after the passage of the act to which this is amendatory.'

This language embraces every individual member of the class to which it refers, no matter whether he was in the country at the time of the passage of the act, or not; and its force and effect cannot be limited except upon some vague, imaginary inference of a purpose not justified by any thing found elsewhere in the act.

The only supposed ground for the inference suggested not already noticed, arises out of sections 5 and 12.

Section 5 provides, "that any Chinese laborer mentioned in section 4 of this act, being in the United States, and desiring to depart from the United States by land," shall be entitled to demand and receive a certificate similar to those given to those departing by water, etc. The limitation is expressly restricted to the class provided for in section 4, that is those necessarily, who depart after the passage of the act. It is suggested, that this clause "being in the United States," indicates, that it was only intended that those allowed to return, are only such of those who were in the United States, on November 17, 1880, as were still remaining in the United States, at the date of the passage of the act; and that the first clause of section 3 should read: "That the two foregoing sections shall not apply to Chinese laborers who were in the United States on the seventeenth day of November, 1880, and who are still in the United States at the date of passage of this act." I do not draw any such inference from that clause of section 5, either taken alone, or in connection with any other provisions of the act. Congress has not inserted in section 3 any such clause as, " who are still in the United States at the date of the passage of this act," or any equivalent language. To insert such language, would be to change the entire scope of the provision. As congress has not seen fit to insert words, so largely limiting the number embraced in the language of section 3, as actually used, we, certainly, are not authorized to legislate and insert it. The inference I draw, on the contrary, is, that in this section it appears by the express terms of the provision, that it was, only intended, to require those who were in the country at the date of the passage of the act, and who could comply with the act, to procure the certificates, and produce them on their return-or, in other words, it expressly sanctions what I have endeavored to maintain the true construction of section 4 to be-that its provisions were, only, intended to be applicable to these, who still remained in the country at the date of the passage of the act, and, no provision at all is made as to what evidence those who departed before the passage of the act shall produce, and they are left to the usual evidence recognized as competent by the general laws of the land. This clause, as I think, confirms, instead of opposes, the view which I have adopted and endeavored to maintain. Neither the provisions of sections 4 nor 5 apply to those who departed before the passage of the act, but are limited to those who were in the country at the date of its passage, and were, in fact, able to comply with its terms; and no other view can be sustained without incorporating into sections 3 and 4 language not used, or authorized by congress-without further amending the act.

and

From the fact that section 4 prescribed a certain certificate to be procured and produced, on return by those Chinese laborers who were in the country, at the date of the treaty, and departed after the passage of the act, and who could procure and produce it; and from the fact that such parties are required to procure and produce said certificate-the certificate issued to that class of Chinese laborers as the only permissible evidence of their right to return; and from the further fact that nothing is said as to what kind of evidence shall be produced by all those Chinese laborers who were residing in the country on November 17, 1880, and who left before May 6, 1882, and who, under the treaty, and under the express. provision of the first clause of section 3 of the act itself, are entitled to return, it is sought to draw the inference that congress intended that those very Chinese laborers mentioned in the treaty, and the first clause of said section 3, as being entitled to return, who had departed before May 6, 1882, should not be permitted to return at all. I do not, myself, perceive how such an inference or conclusion can be drawn from such premises. There is nothing in the least respect inconsistent in the two ideas; 1 That as to those who had departed before the passage of the act of 1882, to whom it would be impracticable to apply any other rule as to the competency of evidence, or to require any other kinds of evidence than those recognized by the general law of the land, should not be required to produce any other kind of evidence; and, 2. The idea that those who departed after after the passage of the act, who could procure the more certain prescribed certificate, should be required to procure and produce procure and produce such certificate. The conditions of the two classes are radically different, and different conditions require, or at least admit of, different treatment, and different rules. The rules applicable to these two conditions in no way interfere with each other. They can stand, and, consistently, operate together, and the fact, that congress has prescribed a certain certificate for parties entitled to re-enter the country to whom they are, practically, applicable, under certain. conditions, in which they are found, affords no inference, that congress, by so providing for such conditions, and such parties, and saying nothing about another class, surrounded by different conditions, equally entitled to re-enter under the express provisions of the same act and treaty, to which class a requirement to produce a similar certificate cannot possibly be made practically applicable, were intended by congress to be excluded altogether. Especially is no such inference afforded where the general rules of evidence applicable are practicable and effective, as to such latter class. I am not aware, that any statutory provision was ever held to be repealed, abrogated, nullified, or in any way rendered ineffectual by some other provision, in the same act, saying nothing at all about it, in no way inconsistent with it, and practically or possibly applicable, only, to other parties, and other conditions. I am not aware of any rule of statutory construction, justifying such an inference, not