No. 9,692. COUNTY OF MERCED v. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. In Bank. Filed October 10, 1884. COUNTY BONDS-FORM OF AFTER Act of 1883.-One who has contracted to purchase county bonds, issued after the passage of the county government act of March 14, 1883, cannot be compelled to take such bonds, unlesss the same are in the form prescribed by such act. APPEAL from a judgment of the superior court for Merced county, entered in favor of the plaintiff. John B. Mhoon, for the appellants. Frank H. Farrar, for the respondent. MYRICK, J. The act of March 14, 1883, to establish a uniform system of county and township governments, sec. 25, subd. 14, repealed section 4,048, political code, at least so far as the latter required the bonds to refer to the political code, and directed that bonds should refer to it (the act of 1883). Without considering any question as to the validity of bonds, reciting their issue under the political code, it is sufficient to say that the act of March 14, 1883, gives the form of the bonds, and the defendants should not be compelled to take them unless they are in conformity with that act. The former class of bonds might, perhaps, be good, as against the county, in the hands of a purchaser; but the defendants should not be compelled to take any risk. They are justified in standing on the form prescribed in the act of 1883. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded. MORRISON, C. J., THORNTON, J., and MCKINSTRY, J., concurred. No. 8,057. LAKE COUNTY v. SULPHUR BANK QUICKSILVER MINING COMPANY. In Bank. Filed October 10, 1884. ASSESSMENT OF REAL PROPERTY-MISTAKE IN NAME OF OWNER. --In a suit against the owner of real property to recover the tax levied on it, a mistake in the name of the owner in the assessment of the land upon which the tax is based, does not render the assessment thereof invalid, nor furnish any defense to the suit. ASSESSMENT OF PERSONAL PROPERTY-MISTAKE IN NAME OF OWNER. -But a mistake in the name of the owner in the assessment of personal property upon which a tax is based, unless the mistaken name is legally equivalent to the true name, does invalidate the assessment, and constitute a defense to a suit brought against the owner to recover such tax. THE SAME.-Tax proceedings must be in strict accordance with the statute. Without an assessment all subsequent proceedings are nullities. An assessment of personal property to a named person, other than the owner, it absolutely void. THE SAME.-An assessment of personal property was made to "Sulphur Banks Q. M. Co., F. Fiedler, agent." Held: that this was not equivalent to or the same thing as Sulphur Bank Quicksilver Mining Company," the true name of the owner, and the assessment and tax based thereon were void. ASSESSMENT OF REAL PROPERTY-DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND.-Under secs. 3,650, 3,628 of the political code, it would seem to be a sufficient assessment of a tract, where such tract does not contain more than 640 acres, to describe it by stating the congressional subdivisions contained in it where it has been sectionized. The description, a tract of land entered by Frazier in section 13, township 13, range 7," is fatally defective. LEVY OF TAXES BY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS. --When a board of supervisors duly adopted an order "that they have this day fixed the rate of county and district tax to be levied and collected upon each one hundred dollars of the assessed valuation of the county, etc., as follows, to wit: state fund, 0.64; general county fund, 0.40; county school fund, 0.37, etc. * * * Total state, county and district tax, 1880-81, $2.75." Held: that the omission of the word "cents" from the various items of the levy did not invalidate the order levying the tax nor render the levy ineffectual. Taking all the order together these various items plainly mean so many cents upon each one hundred dollars. 66 ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT ROLL-EVIDENCE-Where a board of supervisors have dispensed with a duplicate assessment roll, the original assessment roll is prima facie evidence in the same manner that the duplicate would have heen. APPEAL from a judgment of the superior court of Lake county. The facts appear in the opinion. J. C. McCeney, D. M. Hanson, and Welsh & Britt, for the appellant. R. W. Crump and Rutledge & McConnell, for the respondents. MCKINSTRY, J. 1. The assessment put in evidence shows property assessed to "Sulphur Banks Q. S. M. Co." Section 3,628, of the political code, provides: "No mistake in the name of the owner, or supposed owner, of real property, shall render the assessment thereof invalid." There is nothing in the language of the section to indicate that the clause quoted can be given effect only when an attempt is made to enforce the lien for the tax. The effect of the clause in section 3,628 is but to give a more enlarged operation to a rule already established. Prior to the adoption of that clause, it had been frequently held that a defendant sued for a tax, assessed to "unknown" owners, could not be permitted to prove that the assessor might, with more diligence, have ascertained the real owner of the property. On behalf of the defendant, in those cases, it was urged that unless inquiry was permitted, with respect to care and diligence of the assessor, that officer would have it in his power entirely to neglect his duty, and assess to unknown owners property, the ownership of which he should use no effort to ascertain, or which he might even know to belong to a particular person. So, here, it is said that, if he is allowed to assess the property to a person, other than the real owner, he may abuse the power. But the ascertainment of the name of the owner is a matter with respect to which the assessor has discretionary power, and his judgment or conclusion in regard to it is final, so far as the validity of the tax is concerned. of In the case before us the defendant was sued as the owner the property assessed to the "Sulphur Banks Q. S. M. Co." If the defendant is not the owner of such property, it had full opportunity to establish that fact, but it is not a defense to the payment of the taxes upon the real estate that the assessor mistook the name of the owner of it. Section 3,628 of the political code, however, only declares that a mistake in the name of the owner of real property shall not avoid the tax. A portion of the taxes here sued for is upon personal property. We have further to inquire, therefore, whether the assessment of personal property is invalid. Unless we can take judicial notice that Sulphur Banks Q.S.M.Co." is the equivalent or an abbreviation of "Sulphur Bank Quicksilver Mining Company," or unless there was evidence tending to prove that the corporation defendant was known by the name "Sulphur Banks Q. S. M. Co.," the assessment of the personal property cannot be upheld. Tax proceedings are in invitum, and, to be valid, must be in strict accordance with the statute. Without an assessment all subsequent proceedings are nullities, and in making the assessment the provisions of the statute under which it is to be made must be observed with particularity: Cooley on Tax., 259-60; Moss v. Shear, 25 Cal., 46; People v. Mahoney, 55 Id., 288. The statute seems to require all property to be assessed to the owner: Pol. C., 3,650. So far as relates to real property a mistake in the name of the owner does not invalidate the tax, as we have seen above: Pol. C., 3,628. But with respect to personal property it would seem to be the duty of the assessor to assess it to the owner. Even, however, if section 3,636 of the political code (which speaks only of absent owners), can be held to apply to an owner not absent, personal property must be assessed to the real owner, or to "unknown owners. An assessment of personal property to a named person, other than the owner, is absolutely void: Smith v. Davis, 30 Cal., 537; Blatner v. Davis, 32 Id., 328; Kelsey v. Abbott, 13 Id., 609; People v. Whipple, 47 Id., 591; Crawford v. Schmidt, Id., 618. 66 Sulphur Banks Q. S. M. Co., F. Fiedler, agent," is__not the same thing as "Sulphur Bank Quicksilver Mining Company." We may conjecture or very strongly suspect, that the assessor meant to assess the defendant as the owner of the personal property, but he did not assess the defendant. If the case showed that the defendant had been usually known, or was even sometimes called "Sulphur Banks Q. S. M. Co," it may be conceded, for the purposes of this decision, that the assessment of the personal property to defendant would be good: see People v.Sierra Butte's Q. M. Co., 39 Cal., 514. But in the transcript before us there is no evidence that defendant was called, or called itself by that name. It is plain we cannot identify the name to which the personal property was assessed as an abbreviation of the name of defendant, even if an assessment to an abbreviation would be valid. We are forced to the conclusion that the assessment of personal property cannot be enforced against defendant. 2. It is insisted by appellant that the assessment of real property is invalid because it departs from the requirements of section 3,650 of the political code, which makes it the duty of the assessor to enter in his book, under an appropriate heading, "Land by township, range, section or fractional section; and when such land is not a congressional division or subdivision, by metes and bounds, or other description sufficient to identify it, giving an estimate of the number of acres (not exceeding in each and every tract six hundred and forty acres), locality, and the improvements thereon. When any tract of land is situate in two or more school, road, or other revenue district of the county, the part in each district or township must be separately assessed, together with the improvements thereon." It is claimed by appellant that the statute requires a separate assessment of each "section or fractional section" whenever the land has been surveyed into congressional subdivisions, and exceeds 640 acres in area. And appellant urges that the intent of section 3,650 is made more apparent by the language used in section 3,628: "Land shall be assessed in parcels or subdivisions not exceeding 640 acres each, and tracts of land containing more than 640 acres, which have been sectionized by the U. S. government, shall be assessed by sections and fractions of sections." It is said that in the face of the code requirements a tract of 3,500 acres, sectionized by the government, has not been assessed in sections or fractional sections. But the statement that the 3,500 acres constitute a single tract is not borne out by the record. There is no evidence of the fact. Nor does it appear that subdivisions exceeding in aggregate quantity 640 acres are assessed as a single tract. It is true the west fractional half and the southeast quarter of section 5, township 13, range 7, containing 436 acres, is assessed with the whole of fractional section six, in the same township and range, containing 133 But the subdivisions thus assessed as one tract contain together but 569 acres. So also, fractional sections 1, 2 and 3, township 13, range 8, assessed as one tract, aggregate but 500 acres. Reading sections 3,650 and 3,628 of the political code, it would seem to be a sufficient assessment (at all events where a tract does not contain more than 640 acres), to describe such tract by stating the congressional subdivisions contained in it. acres. We think, however, the attempted description of "a tract of land entered by Frazier" in section 13, township 13, range 7, is hopelessly defective. This is neither a description by "township, range, section or fractional section," nor is it description by "metes and bounds," nor is it otherwise sufficient to identify the land. 4. The description, "west fractional half and southeast quarter of (mine) section 5, township 13, range 7, 436 acres, all of fractional section 6, township 13, range 7, 133 acres," is sufficient. It is in effect a statement that all of the subdivisions are a mine. As the assessment was good of itself, the oral testimony of the assessor did not prejudice any right of defendant. 5. It is contended by appellant that the order of the board of supervisors, dated October 4, 1880, is, as a levy of taxes, ineffectual. The order is in words and figures following: "Ordered unanimously by the board of supervisors of Lake county, California, that they have this day fixed the rate of county and district tax to be levied and collected upon each one hundred dollars of the assessed valuation of the property of the county of Lake, California, to raise the specific amounts required to be raised for the thirty-second fiscal year 1880-81, as follows, to wit: $2.75 General Road Fund. Total state and county levy, 1880-81. Wagon Road District Fund, Lake county. Old Road District Fund six, Lake county Total state, county and district tax, 1880-81. (Signed, by the members of the board). Section 3,714 of the political code provides: "The board of supervisors of each county must, on the first Monday of October, fix the rate of county taxes, designating the number of cents on each hundred dollars of property, levied for each fund, and must levy the state and county taxes upon the taxable property of the county; provided, that it shall not be lawful for any board of supervisors of any county in the state to levy, nor shall any tax greater than fifty cents on each hundred dollars of property be levied, and collected in any one year, to pay the bonded indebtedness, or judgment arising therefrom, of this state, or of any county or municipality in this state." But It will be observed the section just recited requires the supervisors to "fix the rate of county taxes, designating the number of cents on each one hundred dollars," etc. The order of the board of supervisors does fix the rate and designate the number of cents, etc., unless the omission of the word "cents " vitiates the order. the sixty-four-hundredths (for example) is undoubtedly intended to bear a relation to one hundred dollars, and it is a natural, if not necessary, interpretation to say that it is sixty-four one-hundredths of one dollar. The language of the order is to be referred to the power which the board were authorized to employ and they were attempting to employ-a power to designate "the number of cents on each one hundred dollars." The cases in this state in which it has been held that figures in an assessment must be accompanied by a dollar mark, or other character, showing what they represent, are not conclusive of the question now before us. The order, read in the light of the law clearly indicates what is meant by the figures and decimal points. 6. Was the admission in evidence of the original assessment-roll erroneous? The political code and the act of April 23, 1880, except so far as the former is impliedly repealed by the latter, are to be read together. The law, 1880, does not provide for the making of a duplicate assessment roll. 3,732 of the political code requires the auditor |