Total........

14,783,363 2,742,828 160,816 18,815 19,450 18,784,710

From the foregoing review, we think it is clear that the proposed tax of 20 per cent on leaf tobacco would, if laid, kill the export trade and discourage production. We have seen that this important staple can be raised almost everywhere. Its cultivation is not confined, like cotton, to narrow limits. The foregoing table shows, and the past year has proved conclusively, that the European demand can be supplied independently of America, and if now 20 cents per pound duty is added to the American article, it will be simply giving a bounty of 20 cents to stimulate the production in Germany and England. The vine lands would at once be converted into tobacco fields, and Austria and Hungary would furnish Europe with the supply heretofore obtained from the United States. Take, for example, the purchases of the French Regie-86,000,000 pounds, at 9 cents of which one half is from the United States. If what we have thus heretofore supplied now comes loaded with a 20-cent tax the cost would be 29 cents, a charge of $8,000,000 to the French treasury. It is clear that such an extra charge would at once find relief by stimulating production elsewhere. These new sources of supply must, in that case, soon become permanent, and the present northern growth of United States tobacco, amounting to 280,000,000 pounds, being excessive as a home stock, production would of necessity also be discouraged. The 70,000,000 pounds now grown in Ohio and Maryland for export would be lost, for these are qualities that compete with those which France can buy for 7 cents. Yet we think that Government can realize a large income by properly taxing tobacco. It is the home consumption we should tax. That would bear a heavy tax without materially decreasing the amount used and would also stimulate export if that remained untaxed.

THE SCHLESWIG-HOLSTEIN DIFFICULTY.

IS A GENERAL EUROPEAN WAR PROBABLE?

T. M. J.

EUROPE at present stands upon the brink of a precipice. Peace and war hang suspended in the balance, and it is impossible to say which will prove the heavier. As the subject of dispute has, from comparative insignificance, suddenly been raised to the very highest importance, it seems desirable to review the whole matter, and to lay before our readers a plain statement of this Schleswig-Holstein difficulty.

The duchy of Holstein has been a dependency of the Danish crown since the year 1489; not however as a component part of the monarchy. The king of Denmark ruled over this portion of his dominions under the title of duke; much in the same way as the Plantagenets, though independent kings over England, held their French provinces as fiefs of the French crown. The inhabitants, however, have always shown a desire for independence, and this desire has, more than once, exhibited itself in active hostility. In the year 1848 the two duchies of Schleswig and Holstein revolted against the Danish crown, and, being aided by friendly Germans, were enabled to maintain the contest till 1850. In July of that year the battle of Idstedt was fought, which, proving disastrous, reduced them to their former subjection. As the attempted revolution advocated the principle of constitutional self-government, it was obnoxious to the neighboring monarchs, and as the King of Denmark was an old man without male issue, it was considered a good opportunity for calling a Congress of the European powers, ostensibly with the view of settling the succession, but really in order to unite the two duchies more firmly to the Danish crown. This congress accordingly met in London, in May, 1852. England, France, (then under the Presidency of Napoleon,) Sweden, Norway, Russia, Prussia, Austria, and Denmark were represented, and the treaty, agreed to and signed by them, was afterwards acquiesced in by Hanover, Saxony, Wurtemburg, Electoral Hesse, Oldenburg, and most of the smaller German States; though Bavaria and some others. refused concurrence. The result of this treaty was, that Prince CHRISTIAN was declared successor, and he was named in the treaty Prince CHRISTIAN of Schleswig-Holstien-Sonderburg-Glucksburg. Bavaria, with all the German powers that refused to sign, looked upon the Duchies as forming part of the Germanic confederation, and was unwilling to see them permanently united to Denmark. But all the great powers had agreed, and they of course could do nothing but submit. Prince CHRISTIAN, however, was not without a rival. FREDERICK, Duke of Augustenburg, had always claimed the title of the Duke of Schleswig-Holstein, and his claimwas supported by the dissenting German powers. His father had sold his Schleswig estates to the King of Denmark for a fair compensation, in order that he might live in a manner becoming one of his high birth; and he promised that neither he nor any of his family should "undertake anything whereby the tranquility of his majesty's dominions might be disturbed, nor in any way to counteract the resolutions which his majesty might have taken or in future might take, in reference to the ar

rangements of the succession, to all the lands now united under his majesty's sceptre, or to the eventual organization of his monarchy." This did very well as far as the Duke himself was concerned, but he could not bind his heirs, and his son was in no way prevented from renewing his claim, if he saw fit to do so. Indeed, it is urged that the Duke of Augustenberg did not receive the compensation until his lands had been forcibly taken from him, and that his promise merely regarded the successor to the Danish throne.

King FREDERICK VII. died at Copenhagen, November 15th, 1863. On the 16th CHRISTIAN was proclaimed king, with title of CHRISTIAN IX., and on the same day the young Duke of Augustenberg issued a proclamation, in which he called upon the Schleswig-Holsteiners to shake off the Danish yoke, and swore to stand by them and to preserve their constitutional freedom. Of course the Duke would be utterly powerless to maintain his claim alone and make his way against the whole power of Denmark, but his cause is the cause of the German people; and although their rulers may be desirous of peace, they seem to have been utterly unable to withstand the current of the popular will. Prussia and Austria, however, and many of the smaller German States were parties to the treaty, and they are therefore bound to uphold the claim of CHRISTIAN. But when principle and interest oppose each other, it does not require a prophet to foresee the result; nor does it require such an ingenious brain nor such a politically unscrupulous conscience as those possessed by Herr VON BISMARK to invent and adopt some line of policy which will throw the treaty to the winds. The wily German tells us that honor and good faith alike require that the treaty should be observed, but that the treaty is the last of a succession of treaties entered into between Germany and Denmark, and serves as a compensation for the promises made by the Danish monarch to the German Diet. He also states that Germany must be the judge whether these promises have been fulfilled, and he informs us that these are the opinions held by the cabinet of Vienna. Of course this is all talk. The treaty of London said nothing at all about any previous treaties. Austria and Prussia entered into it unconditionally. The engagements of which he speaks concern merely Denmark and Germany, while to the treaty of London almost all the European powers were parties. This serves, however, as an excuse for holding up the Duke of Augustenberg, and for trying to unite the Duchies to the Bund.

On the 24th of December a detachment of Saxon troops entered Holstein and occupied the city of Altona. Since that time the German troops have been advancing and the Danes retiring, till the whole of Holstein and a few villages in Schleswig have been entirely abandoned by the Danish troops, and occupied by the forces of the Diet. The Danish King, however, has fortified the town of Neuminister-a strong strategical position--and has erected new and powerful batteries. Here, with the little river Eider in his front, he has prepared for the coming of the Germans, and seems determined to defend himself by force. So the matter stands at present. Any steamer may bring us news of an engagement.

If this were the whole of the matter it would not be of much consequence, for Denmark would not be able to cope single-handed with Germany; but any little commotion in European politics could hardly fail to involve the great powers in a general war. Indeed, England has already protested against the proceedings of the German powers, and refuses to

permit any occupation of the Duchies by their troops. England is the mother of the treaty, and the meeting of the representatives took place in her capital. She is therefore in honor bound to uphold CHRISTIAN as the successor to the late King, and she has expressed her willingness to do so. Should war ensue, therefore, we may expect to see Denmark supported by the whole strength of Great Britain-by all her military and naval power. England and Denmark would then be arrayed against Germany, and in such a contest it would be impossible for the other powers to remain neutral. Could the French Emperor help taking part? Certainly, if he were drawn into the struggle it. would be for Denmark, and not against her. He is a party to the treaty of 1852, and honor and good faith require that he should see it carried out. But honor and good faith are generally very poor arguments in favor of an expensive war. They are auxiliaries when they can be maintained on the side of interest. Interest is the grand motive power, and, if the interest of NAPOLEON is involved, no doubt his honor and good faith will be preserved. But is it his interest to go to war? If the war were a popular one, no doubt it would be. The constitutional opposition which has lately appeared in the Legislative Chamber is giving the Emperor a good deal of trouble. If he could drown the steadily increasing hum of discontent by engaging in a war which should advance the glory of the Empire and carry the tri-color to victory, then no doubt his enemies would be silenced, and his failures with regard to Mexico and the European congress would be forgotten. And if, moreover, his good faith should be rewarded by the much wished-for frontier on the Rhine, his lost prestige would be restored amid the excitement of national glory, and he would once more be le grand homme. No one can say that this would be; but an intellect inferior to that of the French Emperor might, if the contest were once engaged in, easily turn it to his own advantage.

Then, the King of Italy has an army, 300,000 strong, which is doing nothing. Why should he not make use of it, and, in the general tumult, endeavor to wrest Venetia from the grasp of Austria? His people are eager for the contest. If he should send his army into France, and take part with her in the struggle, or even if he attacked the Austrians in Italy, why could he not demand that his capital should be removed to Rome and, in case the issue of the contest were favorable, that Venetia should be united to his dominions? He would then reign over a united Italy, and that long divided and down-trodden country would at once take its stand, as a great power, upon the stage of European politics. Thus England, France, and Italy would probably assist Denmark, and if Hungary should seize the favorable opportunity to rise in arms against Austria and assert her independence, Germany would hardly be able to maintain the contest. Nor do we see, as the question stands at present, what power would be willing to aid her. It is true, when blood is once shed and the war really begun, that Russia might join the Diet and, with her tremendous power thrown into the other scale, render the contest more equal. But, as matters now stand, we see no reason why she should. She has no interest in upholding Austria, and can have nothing to fear from the increasing power of Italy. She may, it is true, object to any territorial aggrandizement of France; but would she go to war to prevent it? Her Poles appear to give her enough to do at present, without engaging in any foreign quarrel; and, moreover, she is a party to the treaty of Lon

don, and would hardly feel inclined to break it without good reason. Still, so many complexities might arise from the struggle itself, that it is impossible to say how any power, at present uninterested, might act.

Before closing this subject, let us consider, briefly, how the contest would affect us. What would be the advantage or disadvantage to the United States, should a general European war ensue? In the first place, it would put to rest, at once and forever, the question of foreign intervention. The great European powers, engaged in a struggle among themselves, would have little inclination to meddle in our affairs. They would allow us to fight our quarrel out, to our hearts' content, without any thought of taking part. But the result would be otherwise advantageous. England would then be a belligerent, and any disposition on her part to destroy our commerce, under the rebel flag-as she has been doing-would be speedily checked by a retaliation upon her, under the flag of the Diet. No more Alabamas or Floridas would leave her ports on their errands of destruction, and, with no fresh supply of piratical cruisers, the ocean would soon be safe again for the peaceful merchantman. Again, should Russia be drawn into the contest, the great supply of breadstuffs would be immediately cut off, and the United States would find a ready market for its wheat and corn. The West would pour its cereal treasures into the European storehouses, and the trade of the country be benefited to just the extent of the increased demand.

Thus we see three ways in which a European war would prove favora ble to us. It would cause all fear of foreign intervention to cease; it would stop the course of the rebel privateers; and, should Russia be drawn in, it would open a larger market for our crops.

But, although such an event would be beneficial, we could not but deprecate a war. We cannot shut our eyes to the great evils it would bring upon the poor and destitute of those countries which engage in it, and to the bereavements which it would beget. Whatever possible advantages might ensue to us, we cannot but hope that, for the sake of humanity, the European sovereigns will try every expedient, before they draw the unrelenting sword.

COMMERCIAL LAW. No. 10.

AGENCY.

HOW A PRINCIPAL IS AFFECTED BY THE ACTS OF HIS AGENT.

Ir an agent makes a fraudulent representation, a principal may be liable for resulting injury, although personally ignorant and innocent of the wrong; nor can he take any benefit therefrom. And even if, without actual fraud, he makes a false representation as to a matter peculiarly within the knowledge of himself or his principal, the principal cannot claim or hold any advantage therefrom; and the party dealing with the agent may rescind and annul the transaction, if he do so as soon as he has knowledge of the untruth; and may then recover back money paid or goods sold or delivered. But such representations will not affect the principal, unless they are made. during and in the very course of that transaction.