Arguing that Athanasius was not the author of the creed that bears his name, he cited by way of authority passages from Gibbon and Warburton to establish his position. Fixing his eyes on Lord Ellenborough, he then said, "and further, your lordship's father, the late worthy bishop of Carlisle, has taken a similar view of the same creed." This reference to his father's heterodoxy was more than the chief justice could endure, and, in a voice broken by emotion, he exclaimed, "For decency's sake, forbear." In his charge to the jury he told them that the writings in question were "an impious and profane libel," and "believing and hoping that the jury were Christians, he had no doubt they would agree with him." But the jury, proving to be heathen, acquitted the prisoner. On the next day the chief justice returned to the charge, and Hone was a third time acquitted. The excitement and mortification undoubtedly produced a most unfavorable effect on Lord Ellenborough's feeble frame. His biographers tell us that he rallied sufficiently to stop his carriage on his way home from the court, and order six herrings, but these were among his last official acts. If his lordship could have lived, he would perhaps have been provoked to see this infidel bookseller become very religious, and die in full communion with a dissenting chapel. The great judge and the free thinking bookseller have probably by this time arrived at a good understanding, and have settled the authorship of Athanasius' creed and the question of Bishop Law's heterodoxy.

Erskine may not have been destitute of religious principles, but we do not find that he was celebrated for them. He certainly had every other virtue. One anecdote of him, at least, illustrates the triumph of wit and logic over cant. A witness demanded to be sworn with uplifted hand, refusing to kiss the book.. On Erskine's inquiring his reason, he answered: "It is written in the book of Revelations, that the angel standing on the sea held up his hand.” "But that does not apply to your case," replied Erskine; "for in the first place you are no angel; and, secondly, you cannot tell how the angel would have sworn if he had stood on dry ground as you do."

A HALF HOUR WITH THE SUPREME COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS.

We all relish, now and then, something in the nature of gossip concerning those of whom we know more or less through their writings. It gives us a closer acquaintance with them, and we find after it a fresher interest in their writings, which it oftentimes helps us the better to understand and remember. This may not be true to so very great an extent in law, but even there it is in a measure the case. When we read an opinion we look for the name of the writer, and almost unconsciously associate with it in our minds something we may know of the judge. And we usually take advantage of every opportunity of learning something more of those judges whose names we meet as familiar acquaintances in the reports. Let us then avail ourselves of a favorable occasion offered, and attend for a spare half hour a session of the supreme court of Massachusetts.

We go feeling strongly impressed by the fame with which this court has so long been enveloped. The sound reasoning, deep insight, philosophic breadth and sterling integrity, associated with such names as Parker,

Parsons and Shaw, have given it a reputation and respect which are world-wide. Its judgments have become, many of them, leading cases, and are regarded as authority wherever the common law is administered.* All this leads us to expect much; and we are not disappointed. As we enter we see before us five judges sitting within the usual elevated space, all dressed in the "customary suit of solemn black;" five dignified and earnest looking men, gravely listening to a legal argument. They are a marked body, and at once command our respect and trust. Great, indeed, would be the presumption that could doubt their ability or question their integrity. The central figure is, of course, Chief Justice Chapman. The Chief Justice has now been nearly eleven years upon the bench, and is a man well advanced in years, bald and gray, rather short in stature, with a smooth, full face, and whom we judge to be a good liver as well as a good lawyer. He presides with a quiet and easy dignity, and pays close attention to what is going on before him. During the argument it would be difficult as a general thing to tell from any expression on his face toward what view he inclines; but he passively receives every thing as if it were good law, except now and then a sharp question warns the speaker that there is danger in that quarter. One peculiarity we notice is, his frequently closing his eyes while listening to an argument. Mr. Chapman was appointed justice September 28th, 1860, and, upon the resignation of C. J. Bigelow, was made chief justice, February 7th, 1868. His decisions are found commencing in 16 Gray, and extending through the subsequent reports.

In the right hand associate of the chief justice we see untiring energy and great power. Judge Gray is a very tall man, quite bald, smooth face, and with a somewhat more nervous temperament, we imagine, than his chief. He is the most restless of all judges; and seems the most prone to indicate what he thinks of an argument. He is probably the readiest judge on the bench; with a wide familiarity with cases, he sees a point instantly, and quickly forms an idea of its soundness. A shade of pleasure passes over his face as the counsel takes some bold or knotty position and ably sustains it. That lawyer must get into his good graces who can talk of cases with which he is not familiar-and we had almost said that would be merit enough to entitle one to favor. But woe to him who undertakes to argue unprepared. Judge Gray has, seemingly, an intense dislike for loose and ignorant practice, and now and then takes occasion to show it. He is quite inclined to put questions to the counsel

The following list may not be devoid of interest and worth, showing the names of the former members of the court, and the reports in which their decisions may be found: Francis Dana, C. J., 1 Mass.

Simeon Strong, J., 1 Mass.

Theodore Sedgwick, J., 1 Mass. to 9 Mass.
Samuel Sewall, J. and C. J., 1 Mass. to 11 Mass.
George Thacher, J., 1 Mass. to 2 Pick.
Isaac Parker, J. and C. J., 2 Mass. to 9 Pick.
Theophilus Parsons, C. J., 2 Mass. to 10 Mass.
Charles Jackson, J., 10 Mass. to 1 Pick.
Daniel Dewey, J., 11 Mass, to 12 Mass.
Samuel Putnam, J., 11 Mass to 3 Met.
Samuel Wilde, J., 12 Mass, to 6 Cush.
Levi Lincoln, J., 2 Pick.

Marcus Morton, J., 3 Pick, to 24 Pick.
Lemuel Shaw, C. J., 9 Pick to 15 Gray.
Charles A. Dewey, J., 19 Pick, to 12 Allen.
Samuel Hubbard, J., 3 Met. to 12 Met.
Charles E. Forbes, J., 1 Cush, to 2 Cush.
Theron Metcalf, J., 1 Cush. to 10 Allen.
Richard Fletcher, J., 2 Cush. to 10 Cush.

George T. Bigelow, J. and C. J., 6 Cush. to 98 Mass.
Caleb Cushing, J., 9 Cush. to 10 Cush.
Benjamin F. Thomas, J., 11 Cush. to 12 Gray.
Pliny Merrick, J., 11 Cugh. to 8 Allen.
Ebenezer R. Hoar, J., 13 Gray to 101 Mass.
Dwight Foster, J., 12 Allen to 100 Mass.

arguing, a practice which seems to us, if used with caution, to have many advantages. Justice Gray was for many years state reporter, his last volume of reports, the 16th, appearing during the past year. Of these volumes the Law Review, in a recent number, says: "The virtue of plodding care Gray's Reports have to a degree which makes them among the best in the country." Gray, J., was appointed justice August 23d, 1864, and his opinions are found commencing with Pomeroy v. Trimper, 8 Allen 398.

The short, thick-set man sitting next to Gray is Judge Colt―a good-looking man, with dark hair and side whiskers, a pleasant face and a genial twinkle to his eye, leading us to think him a person who loves to hear of the humorous and pleasant in life, as well as of the continued troubles of John Doe and Richard Roe. His appearance would strike us as of a man who would conduct an investigation with perfect openness and impartiality, and would come to a result on no narrow grounds; and that it would be conducted with ability and research his opinions sufficiently show. He was first appointed to the bench September 11, 1865, in place of Judge Metcalf, resigned; which position he resigned August 15, 1866; but upon the resignation of C. J. Bigelow and the elevation of Judge Chapman to the chief justiceship he was again appointed justice, February 14, 1868. His first opinion is in the last case reported in 10 Allen.

At the left of the chief justice sits Judge Wells — a tall, thin, spare man, a little awkward, perhaps, in his movements, with a prominent forehead, and with every appearance of the close student. He is carefully looking at the statement of the case before him, and glancing now and then to the speaker. We cannot question but we see in him the careful and thorough lawyer. It is rumored that to him we owe the course of decision in Massachusetts on the validity of unstamped instruments, in the numerous cases commencing with Govern v. Littlefield, 13 Allen, 127, note, and ending (so far as published) with Green v. Holway, 101 Mass. 243, in which last case the question seems to be settled for Massachusetts beyond doubt, in a very thorough and able opinion given by Judge Gray. Govern v. Littlefield was argued just before Judge Wells came upon the bench, and the journals announced the decision in that case to be against the validity of the instrument. But this decision was changed, through the medium of the newly appointed judge, it is supposed; and Wells. J., gave the first published opinion in the case of Tobey v. Chipman, 13 Allen, 125, where the opposite view was taken, and has been adopted in all the other cases. Judge Wells was appointed justice September 22, 1866, in place of Mr. Justice Dewey, deceased, and delivered his first opinion in Knapp v. Douglas Ax Co., the first case in 13 Allen.

Last of the five judges, sitting next to Judge Wells, is Judge Ames-the only one of the number, we believe, chosen from the superior court, of which he was chief justice at the time of his elevation. He is a small man, with a calm, sober face, iron gray hair and whiskers, and is also evidently a great student. He is very quiet, pays the closest attention, and has asked no question or given the slightest intimation of his views since we have been present. Judge Ames was appointed justice January 19, 1869, in place of Judge Foster, resigned, and his first opinion appears in the last (101) volume of Massachusetts Reports, and in which he discusses the question, whether or not a wife is related to

her husband; and, in these days of the wife's individualism, it may be of interest to add, he held that she was not. The some twenty and more opinions in this volume given by Judge Ames are all marked by that studious care which is so characteristic of the Massachusetts decisions.

But we must not longer linger in the judicial presence, however pleasant might be the stay. As we leave, however, we feel a deeper sympathy with that universal respect which has ever been accorded to the judiciary of Massachusetts; and a stronger belief in the wisdom of that system which leaves the judge free and independent. The words of that aged ex-member of this very court, who had but just retired from the bench which he had for thirty years so highly honored, and who was so soon to close his earthly career, ChiefJustice Shaw, seem to come up to mind with ringing clearness and great force, in these days of doubt as to which is the better system: "Above all," he says, "let us be careful how we disparage the wisdom of our fathers, in providing for the appointment to judicial office, in fixing the tenure of office, and making judges 'as free, impartial and independent as the lot of humanity will admit."

CURRENT TOPICS.

We learn from the New York World that the griev ance committee of the Bar Association is engaged in investigating the conduct of Mr. David Dudley Field in relation to the Susquehanna and other litigations. Mr. George Ticknor Curtis has been likewise engaged, and his conclusions are so unlike those of Barlow, Stickney & Co., that we should not like to hazard an opinion which way the association cat will jump.

The decision of Mr. Justice E. Darwin Smith in the case of the People v. The Albany and Susquehanna Railroad Company, so extensively quoted and relied upon in the many articles on that celebrated litigation, has been quite freely “revised” by the general term on appeal. On one material point it has been affirmed; on four other material points it has been reversed. The one material point affirmed was, that the Ramsey and not the Fisk directors were the directors legally elected and entitled to control the road. The points reversed were: so much of the opinion as restrained the further prosecution of the actions mentioned in the complaint; and so much as awarded costs in favor of the Ramsey board and others against the Fisk board; and so much as decreed an extra allowance; and so much as appointed a referee to ascertain how much and to whom an extra allowance should be made. It may be barely possible, after all, that there were two sides even to the famous Susquehanna case.

So much attention has been given of late to the alleged maladministration of justice in the state courts, that the United States courts have passed without notice. The grand jury of the United States district court for the northern district of New York has, however, been looking into some of the evil practices of that court, and has made a presentment thereof which is worthy of consideration. They declare that many of the cases brought before them were for mere flimsy or technical violations of the law, and more properly belonged to a police court than to that tribunal, "and most probably would have been brought

there, only it paid the complainants better to thrust them before this court." They declare their opinion that "if the authorities that sent them before us are held to their ruling at the great day of reckoning, we fear they would be shorn of their power for the abuse of it." Many other cases they pronounce "put up jobs," and that "they would more willingly have presented some of the witnesses than the accused had they been charged with the offense, judging by the apparent motives of both." The United States commissioners, they say, "have been led to issue warrants upon the affidavits of irresponsible parties, which practice, in too many instances, not only creates an unnecessary expense, but works great injustice and hardship to innocent parties, who are thus put to the necessity of defending themselves from charges brought or worked up by deputy United States marshals, as this jury are compelled to believe, for the sake of the fees-a mere technical violation of the law sufficing to create a serious charge against the integrity of men who are entirely innocent of any criminal intent." The jury, therefore, recommend a reduction of the number of commissioners and deputy marshals, and an investigation into the causes and extent of the evils set forth. From our own knowledge on the subject we are led to believe that the jury has not overdrawn the picture.

We have heretofore (p. 225) published the decision of the English court of exchequer, holding that a person whose name had been forged to a negotiable instrument could not afterward, by a memorandum in writing, ratify the forgery, and thus make himself liable. We have since seen a decision of the general term of the fourth department of this state, in the case of Howard v. Duncan, holding a contrary doctrine. In the latter case, a note purporting to be signed by Spencer Duncan and Smith Duncan was indorsed to the plaintiff by the former. The name of Smith Duncan had been forged, but it was contended, and evidence introduced to prove, that after the delivery of the note he told the payee of the note that "it was all right." The court charged the jury that unless they should find that the said Smith Duncan had admitted that he had authorized his son, the other defendant, to affix his name to the note, they must find against the plaintiff, as the act of forging the name was not the subject of ratification.

The exceptions to this charge were sustained by the general term, Mullin, P. J., delivering the opinion, which, by the way, is very brief. The only authorities cited are Bank of Commerce v. Union Bank, 3 Coms. 230, and Thorn v. Bell, Lalor's Supplement, 430. On examination we have been entirely unable to discover in what manner the first of these cases can be considered an authority in point. The learned judge closes his opinion as follows: "I cannot perceive any reason why a person whose name has been forged may not adopt and affirm the signature as his own act, and thereby subject himself to whatever civil liability may follow from it." It seems to us that there are several very excellent reasons against it one is, that, there having been no pretended authority for the forgery, the doctrine of ratification does not apply; another is, that the promise to adopt the signature was really a promise given for the purpose and in the consideration of stifling a prosecution, and was therefore void, as against public policy. But our object now is only to call attention to the decision. Hereafter we shall discuss the question and the American cases more at length.

THE MINORITY REPORT OF THE STATUTE REVISION COMMISSION.

The report of the majority of the commissioners appointed to revise the statutes was published by us at page 65. Mr. Waterbury did not join in that report, but has made a minority report which is worthy of consideration. We shall endeavor hereafter to present a review of both reports. Mr. Waterbury's report is as follows:

To the Legislature of the State of New York:

As a measure of respect to your honorable body, and in justice to myself, I respectfully present a statement of the reasons why I was unable to give an unqualified assent to the report heretofore submitted by my associate commissioners to revise the statutes of the state. My dissent arises chiefly from a different estimate of the extent to which it is proper for us to include, in the revision of the statutes, amendments to the existing laws. In my opinion, such amendments should be restricted to those which are expressly authorized by the act under which we were appointed; while my associates think that they should be upon a more comprehensive basis. They disavow an intention to make extensive amendments, yet the contrary idea pervades their entire report. It is with great regret, and with equal diffidence, that I differ from gentlemen whose learning and ability I fully appreciate, and for whom I have great personal respect; but my convictions of duty have allowed me no other course.

The difference in our views was more marked in their report, as it was drafted; for, at my suggestion, they made numerous changes in its phraseology, from the desire to assimilate their views to mine so far that I might be able to sign the report. This course was natural and proper, and I endeavored to meet it fairly. But in the progress of the effort it became evident that we would be unable to agree. This became impressively clear to my mind, when the sentence was under consideration in which my associates say that it is not possible to "ignore the decided preference of a large portion of the legal profession, and the general public, for a distribution of legislation into codes, and the opposition to be consequently encountered by any plan which would abolish the distinctive nomenclature of the existing practice act, by distributing its provisions among several independent chapters, forming part of a series which should embrace the general legislation of the state." In my opinion this is not the fact; and, of course, it was impossible for me to participate in the statement.

It is a poor compliment to members of the legal profession, to say to them (if that be what my associates intend to say) that they would oppose the harmonious combination of other statutes relating to proceedings in civil cases with the "existing practice act," however satisfactorily the work might be accomplished, unless the whole be styled the "Code of Civil Procedure." If such be the case, those who are so anxious about a name could be gratified by providing, in the chapter or part of the statutes embracing that subject, that it should be called the "Code of Civil Procedure." In the act passed at the last session of the legislature for the organization of the national guard, there was a provision that it should be entitled the "Military Code." Proceedings in the courts and the organization of the military power being matters for fixed, arbitrary rules, it may be proper that a statute

It will be seen hereafter that the arrangement of the statutes proposed by me provided for the segregation of the statutes upon these and other subjects more completely than that preferred by my associates.

Our difference in respect to that sentence extended far beyond a mere preference as to arrangement or name. I denied that "a large portion of the legal profession and the general public" expect us to report a series of codes. If any do, I claimed that it was not only possible for us to forego their preferences, but that it was our duty to do so. I could not believe that reasonable men expect us to depart from the instructions of the legislature; but, if any do, I deem it better to disappoint them than virtually to disobey the statute from which all our powers are derived.

My associates expressed a willingness to modify the sentence I have quoted from their report, if I would consent to use the term "code" in the designation of the different parts of the statute, so that every provision should be part of some particular one of four or more codes; but this I was unable to do. I am well aware that the use of that word is not, necessarily, restricted to an exclusive embodiment of law; but that, in its broader signification, it may be applied to any collection of laws. The latter, however, is not the sense in which the word is popularly understood. Many of those who desire that all our law shall be embodied in a code or codes, however mistaken may be their views, are earnest thinkers. They are not seeking the shadow of a name, but the substance which the name imports. If we are not to report a code, such as a code is commonly understood to be, why should we present an appearance of doing so? My associates expressly admit that we "are not at liberty" "to attempt a codification of the 'unwritten law.'" Then, I say, we ought not to make the pretense of doing so, which we would in using the name.

In considering this question, not only should the limited authority under which we act be borne in mind, but also the fact that the legislature use the word "code" in its more restricted sense. They directed the military act of the last session to be entitled the "Military Code;" but would that term be properly used if the act embraced only a part of the law upon that subject ?

Again, it should be remembered that the legislature has manifested a decided unwillingness to adopt a codification of the law. Gentlemen of great learning and ability were appointed, many years since, for the purpose of such a codification. Their report has been for years before the legislature without action. My associates themselves say that the omission to act upon a "codification of that character, prepared at a very great expenditure of time and labor by gentlemen so eminently qualified for the work as the late commissioners," is conclusive against our attempting such a work. Then, in my opinion, it is neither right nor proper to use the term. If the object were to foreclose the real codifiers by appearing to do their work, it would not be consistent with fair dealing. The objections to a codification of what may be called the principles of law, as distinguished from mere regulations, are so great that they should be frankly and boldly maintained, and not shrunk from behind pretenses of any kind.

As this report may be read beyond the limits of the legislature, I desire to make a few remarks upon the

that they are required by any action of my associates. The advocates of codification attempt to excite prejudice against what is frequently styled the "unwritten law," by stigmatizing it as "judge-made law." Yet every lawyer and many intelligent laymen know that the law is not made by the courts. This point is solved at once by an answer to the question, What does a court of law decide-what is best, or, what is law? A judge who should venture to disregard the principles of law, and decide a case merely upon his own sense of right, would commit a greater wrong than he could possibly redress by his decision, and justly subject himself to the derision of his professional brethren. All decisions by the courts profess to be based upon established principles, and if these are perverted or disregarded, the fact is an evidence of error of some kind in the judge, and not of imperfection in the system. There is even greater liability to such judicial misconduct in decisions upon the statute law.

No greater mistake can be made than to suppose that certainty is secured by positive enactments. No man was ever endowed with such prescience that he could frame a law which, in the different circumstances under which it might have to be applied, could not, on some point, be questioned by other minds. The greater number of suits at law are to settle the meaning of the language employed in statutes or private writings, and not to ascertain the principles of the common law. The amendments made by the revised statutes of this state were necessary to change the common law of England, which we inherited, and which, in certain particulars, was not in accordance with the spirit of our institutions. to settle the meaning and application of the comparatively few provisions which the revisers drafted to that end, notwithstanding their remarkable clearness and perspicuity, has involved an enormous expenditure of time and money, and has only been successfully accomplished by the exercise of the great ability which the state has generally been so fortunate as to secure for its appellate court. So great is the amount of adjudication which changes in the statutes involve, it may be safely said that if there were no legislation the litigated business of the courts would be very much reduced.

Yet,

The common law, or, as some call it, the "unwritten law," is that universal law for the government of human society which, founded upon natural and immutable principles, obtains force by the general consent of men. This law varies in different countries in accordance with the characteristics of the inhabitants, and with the changes that take place from age to age. As the counsel of several minds, of average ability, is better than the unaided judgment of any one of them, so the general concurrence of the mass of men is better than the counsel of a few. Every intelligent man realizes, painfully at times, the inevitable imperfection of even the best human achievement; and in no respect is this deficiency more manifest than in the inadequacy of any statutory system to meet the constantly occurring changes in social and business relations. New inventions, superior systems, the advance in every field of improvement, are, day by day, presenting new cases for the application of law, which can only be foreseen and provided for by the infinite mind. But the beneficial sway of the common law is ever present, and, like the air we breathe.

reaches into every recess and over every obstacle. No law can be better adapted to a civilized people, especially in a free country, than that whose proud boast it is. that it leaves no right without protection and no wrong without redress.

In dissenting from the report of my associates, I am not forgetful of the general rule that the majority should control, and that the office of the minority is to accept the result. This rule, however, loses its force when a principle is involved; and I hold the duty of obedience to the law under which we were appointed to be a matter of principle.

Our difference in respect to their report was not the first occasion of conflicting opinions. My associates, while frankly admitting, as they reiterate in their report, and, as is well known to the members of the legislature and to other intelligent citizens, that the present arrangement of the revised statutes is "cumbrous" and has led to "evil consequences of great magnitude," have determined to retain substantially the same arrangement, in the vain expectation that they can escape the original difficulty by numbering the sections of each of the four parts, or codes, or volumes, into which they propose to divide the statutes, consecutively from the beginning to the end of the volume. If this be done, the numbers of the sections of the part or volume which they propose to call the "Civil Code" will run into thousands. The inconvenience that would be caused by the quotation of such large numbers must be appparent. Figures alone being insufficient to express an idea, the danger of errors in quoting or transcribing them is much greater than in the case of words which aid each other. As it would be impossible for any ordinary mind to remember in every case in which precise one of thousands of sections a particular provision was to be found, the difficulty of correcting errors amid such a multitude of figures would be increased to an extent that might frequently equal an original search for the section.

But this objection to the proposed arrangement is not the most serious one. My associates regard with special favor that part of their plan by which each of the proposed codes shall be a separate volume. They even regard this feature with so much favor that, as they state themselves, the desire to adopt it "chiefly induced them to reject a plan" which, as will presently be seen, was proposed by me. Yet if their plan were strictly carried out, and every statutory provision put in its proper place, the volume containing the "civil code" would be much the largest, and would probably be of an inconvenient size. To avoid this evil result of a scheme, unimportant in itself, there would be a constant, even if an involuntary, tendency to transfer to other parts matter which should properly be included in the "civil code," in order to reduce its greater comparative bulk. Thus the great object of a correct and systematic classification of the statutes might not be secured.

Not merely because I perceived the force of such objections to their plan, but also because I realized the necessity of an arrangement of the statutes that should be at once simple and comprehensive, for the benefit of the legal profession as well as the public at large, I urged that every subject, general and public in its nature, that could be completely eliminated from every other subject, should be a separate part or chapter. It seems to me that the greater convenience of such a plan must be obvious at a glance. If a man had ten thousand beasts, birds and fishes, he could not as easily

find a particular creature, if he had them separated into only three compartments, as he could if he had them divided among a greater number of compartments, placing each variety, whose general characteristics were alike, in the same compartment.

Fully impressed with the importance of dividing the statutes into as many parts as there are subjects that can be completely separated, I prepared, after a thorough review of the existing statutes, and a full consideration of the matter in my own mind, a list of the titles of thirty-six acts, each of which titles was a brief designation of a particular subject, and under some one of which every provision of the existing statutes, of a general and public nature, could properly be placed. The list so prepared was intended only as a preliminary study, and I expected, of course, if the general arrangement met the approval of my associates, that the plan would be improved by their suggestions. As they rejected my proposition, it failed to receive any improvement from them, or the benefit of such further thought as I might have given to it. A studious examination of the subject by all of us might have resulted in an increase in the number of the acts and in an improvement of their titles. Upon that point I had only this rule, which seems to me to be the correct one, that every subject should be segregated, capable of such an absolute and complete disconnection from every other subject as to be in itself a perfect enactment. If from this rule a greater number of acts were evolved, the increase would be beneficial. If each be complete in itself, a larger number will only secure greater facility and certainty of reference.

What possible objection can there be to including in a separate act or chapter all the statutory provisions relating to real property, or to the estates of deceased persons? So, also, the proceedings in civil cases should be one chapter, and criminal offenses and prosecutions should each be another. In respect to government, the provisions in relation to the legislature and to the judiciary (I refer to the courts and not to proceedings) should each be in a separate chapter. So, also, in relation to the educational and military departments. The finances and property of the state would naturally be embraced in one chapter, and its public works in another; the great semi-public interests, such as railroads, banks, telegraphs, insurance, should each be placed by itself. What can be plainer than the advantage of such an arrangement, over a labyrinth of parts, chapters, titles, articles and sections, which, if learned to-day, would, by most persons, be forgotten to-morIf the statutes were thus divided into acts, or chapters, as they could be properly separated, the acts or chapters should, of course, follow each other, and be numbered in the most natural order. Then as many chapters in that order should be included in a volume as would make a volume of convenient size.

row.

The adoption of this plan would also obviate some of the objections to their own plan, which my associates very frankly state. They differ from the former revisers as to the proper part under which to place the statutes relating to corporations. The former revisers, regarding these institutions as public in their nature, placed the provisions in relation to them in the first part of the revised statutes; being that which relates to the administration of the state. My associates, considering that "a corporation can have no practical existence apart from its members," propose to include such legislation in their "civil code," or second part. They also say, that, "with respect to several subjects,